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Levy, Adam Gardner (Ph.D., Geography) 
Territory and Sovereignty in a Borderland:  The Case of Moldova 
Thesis directed by Professor John O’Loughlin   
 The Republic of Moldova, situated in a classic European borderland, remains an alleged 
site of ungovernability given protracted economic and political crises following its independence 
from Soviet rule, subsequent conflict and emigration, and the rise of the European Union (EU).  
In charting the growth of geopolitical projects like the EU’s Border Assistance Mission, national 
projects governing citizenship legislation, and biopolitical restrictions undergirding migration 
controls, I show how the country emerges in discourses of “risk management” for some and 
social “catastrophe” for others.  As a study of the macro-geopolitics seen in EU external relations 
and the national regulation of borders, I ask how sovereignty and territoriality are understood, 
formally and informally, to reproduce what I label a “paradigmatic periphery”.  I argue that in 
this case, governance projects have failed to coalesce as intended but have still rendered new 
bundles of territorial sovereignty evident in the formal and informal understandings of border 
and migration control.  Via attention to legal and informal use of new categories of people like 
“tolerated persons” and old ones like “Bessarabian”, this dissertation shows the future of both 
EU and Moldovan sovereignty seen from the top-down and the bottom-up. Using mixed methods 
including census data, public surveys, and my own comparative focus groups in the borderlands 
to triangulate formal and popular understandings of geopolitical risks and national crises, I 
explain how variegated sovereignty, as the power to exclude or enter an area, is actually 
territorialized in the minds and lives of citizens and those who try to govern them using various 
legal devices and spatial arrangements.  
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CHAPTER I:  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
…[I]n the last three months, according to data from the National Bureau of Statistics, 17,500 Moldovans 
left to work abroad.  This means a city the size of Ungheni has no people and looks like the terrifying 
image of a sci-fi film showing empty cities after atomic bombs or natural catastrophes.  (Loghin, 2010). 
 
 
We lose three-four villages each year. In the post-industrial period, we lost over 300 villages. At the 
moment, villages are registering a high rate of depopulation because of massive migration from villages 
to cities and emigration...Moldova is in its 20th year of depopulation. Until recently, population losses 
were estimated at over 300,000 people, excluding the Transnistrian region.  Rural areas in particular are 
entering an incapacity for reproduction since they have the lowest growth rate…Villages are mostly 
populated by children of up to 16 years of age, whose parents are working abroad, and the retired. 
(Sainsus,  2009). 
 
Part I:  Introduction 
A) Overview 
This dissertation is about making and managing Moldova(ns), territorially, as object of 
rule and how it serves as a useful model for future modes of (state) sovereignty.   I consider 
formal, elite (i.e EU, Moldovan officials’) narratives about political and economic crises 
alongside more popular concerns about national sovereignty and territorial security documented 
during my fieldwork with particular citizen-subjects.  In the above-quoted visions, existential 
crises and catastrophes are presented as threats to the social and spatial core of the country, with 
the risk of depopulation and displacement linked to mobility and labor emigration.  Seen 
differently, and taken together alongside EU visions of Moldovan borderlands and their 
residents, the problem is one where hegemonic discourses and informal practices invoke a space 
of protracted ungovernability, viewed from inside and out, in elite vision and public opinion.  
Such perceptions contrast with more conventional national security threats and fears about loss 
of territorial sovereignty in this case like during talk about war or national reunification with 
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Romania or Russia for some minority group members, including those in Transnistria (TMR), a 
de facto statelet still seen as an illegitimate sovereign country despite the trappings of border 
posts, passports, and even an anthem.  For me, the overall situation is best seen as a question of 
the production of hegemony, sovereignty, and national territory. Thus, the Moldovan case 
suggests the logic and grammar of contemporary geopolitics via attention to the hegemonic 
politics of the post Cold-War era.  It offers a fine-grained approach to the quantification of space 
and subjects and the role of calculative mechanisms like those used to regulate borders and 
govern migrant-citizens as part of wider attempts to constitute Europe’s eastern limit.   
Domestically, emigration has had a profound effect on daily life and state government, by 
all accounts.  Though often presented with alarm and a sense of ungovernable crisis as seen in 
the semi-official newspaper quote appearing in Suverana and reproduced above, Moldovan 
migration demonstrates a fully typical pattern for developing states and (post)conflict zones, i.e. 
dislocation, diaspora, and remittances. Clearly, faced with economic stagnation, labor migration 
has emerged as a key livelihood strategy.  This pattern of post-conflict outmigration and 
remittances follows a familiar pattern experienced by people worldwide. The latest census, 
which included temporarily absent persons, indicated 130,000 (48%) out of about 270,000 
sampled had been abroad for more than one year (National Bureau of Statistics 2006). 
Demographically, men make up about 63.8 percent of migrants. Related data suggest Moldova is 
arguably the most remittance-dependent country worldwide, as 1/3 of households received 
remittances and 1/3 of adults work abroad. Credible estimates also indicate that 600,000 
Moldovans have left already, and that 150,000 plan to leave within a year (many not for the first 
time) (Mosneaga 2009).  As a state in socio-economic and political-territorial crisis, Moldova 
increasingly appears as a project for outside experimentation framed in the form of technical 
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assistance and aid given its small size and big problems. In my fieldwork, rather than security 
risks and crises, focus group participants repeatedly used words like “catastrophe” and “tragedy” 
to describe the situation.  For them, however, the reference is usually made to specific family and 
community effects rather than national or political problems generally, not wider appeals to ‘big 
picture’ politics or grand civilizational narratives as in formal visions.  Domestically, influential 
observers and politicians see national crises of politics and identity dominating the debate about 
what it means to be Moldovan and where Moldova is in the world.  
The conventional and formal, if increasingly western-oriented view of a government in 
crisis is encapsulated in the new president’s first speech to parliament in March 2012 after 
Alliance for European Integration’s (AEI) candidate was narrowly elected. Accordingly, the 
political outsider and respected jurist, Nicolae Timofti, first addressed ethno-national concerns, 
framing goals in terms of geopolitical orientation to Brussels, not Bucharest.  He also promoted 
partnerships with Russia while aiming to resolve the TMR conflict via the existing Moldovan 
constitution, which mandates “neutrality” as a legacy of Russian suspicion of NATO expansion 
manifest during the early 1990s when it was written.   Timofti summarized the situation in 
discrete yet geographic terms, noting that concerns were not about irredentism, but rather about 
independence and integrity, i.e. sovereignty:  
 
Moldova is at a crossroads and must decide where to go next: confrontation, instability, and 
chaos, or stability, development, and prosperity. Moldovan society continues to be divided along 
political, ethnic, cultural, and other lines and needs an idea to unite the whole society that would 
make it move forward as a whole…This idea must be European integration…The resolution of 
the Transnistrian conflict must take place exclusively within the current constitution, which 
emphasizes the unitary, indivisible, sovereign, and independent nature of the state... 
 
In response to his vision, critics like C. Tanase editorialized in Timpul, a private newspaper that: 
 
[W]e have a president, but we need a country...The election of the head of state has solved a 
psychological problem, but we have not gotten rid of poverty, corruption, social conflict, and so 
on. I think it is wrong to expect too much from the near future…Moldovan society is a tangled 
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bundle of identity, social, psychological, religious, and ethnic problems, all of them underlined by 
a geopolitical meaning (2012a).     
 
Clearly, much formal contention and popular discussion surrounds how to best understand such 
crises.   
 
B) Argument 
Below, I work to untangle this bundle using a more nuanced approach and less 
psychological analysis to show the production of governance problems in the minds of other 
Moldovans.  I argue such orthodox approaches to ethnicity, nationality, unity, and identity, like 
those of Timofti or Tanase above, are limited.  Instead, I favor more critical approaches to 
governance, population, and territory.  My dissertation sees efforts to frame self- and external 
political identifications, or who you are when you act in such a way, are also evident in enduring 
socio-spatial frames and practices surrounding kinship, citizenship, community, and history, so 
policies are not unfolding in a vacuum or necessarily according to plan.  
My argument is that the future is being built using multiple legal and technical tools of 
statecraft like biopolitical bordering practices to reconfigure territorial sovereignty.  I show how, 
seen from outside, EU-Moldova geopolitical maneuvers are about the power to make and 
manage overlapping border, mobility, security, and citizenship regimes in 21st century Europe. 
As hegemonic tools, Europeanization is decidedly spatial as shown in my study of boundary-
making and its effects.  Put differently, my attention to territory and boundary management 
alongside the parallel production of uneven biopolitical migration controls for competing 
categories of students, businessmen, tourists, fruit pickers, and sex workers is about exclusion, 
exceptional cases, and how protracted crises yield permanent control.  In looking at the 
production of exclusion and risk management from above and below, I engage big picture 
questions in academic geography.  Geographers have also considered the re-bundling of 
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sovereignty, territory, authority, and rights today.  In focusing on how Moldovan borderlands are 
perceived and negotiated formally across social and spatial contexts, rather than hegemony or 
identity in isolation, I seek to build upon contemporary geographic approaches to sovereignty 
and identity. In so doing, the aim has been to contribute to theories and understandings of state-
making and nation-building, as well as border demarcation and territorial formation, by 
unbundling them and considering them in light of empirical study.  Following Taylor (1994), 
Agnew (1994, 2005), Sassen (2006), and others (Marston 2000), I see this geographic approach 
to disentangling sovereignty, self-identification, and territory as indispensable because it helps to 
study governance challenges and their consequences.  This view helps show whether, when, and 
where others forms of social or political affinity or interest such as nationhood or ethnic 
community are emerging, how, and why (Brubaker 1994).  
 As scholars of territory like Elden suggest in discussions of the “spatial extent of 
sovereignty” (2009), one of the key questions or “paramount concerns” in political geography 
today involves precisely the contemporary relationship between sovereignty, land, and people.  
For him (169), how geographies of division play out territorially is about practices states and 
other actors that are unable to govern effectively are recast as perennial threats, or in this case 
calculated and managed via “risk analysis”.  In focusing on the Republic of Moldova and the 
EU’s efforts in border control as a case where multiple sovereign and territorial fictions are at 
work, I aim to distill the core spatial and geopolitical frames used to produce a picture of how 
discourses of ungovernability and insecurity to render a European borderland seen as perpetually 
in crisis.  In tracing the latest articulation of this crisis as seen from inside and out, informally 
and diplomatically, I show how new logics of intervention are emerging in response to the failure 
of previous development and governance aid efforts, which have rendered the current 
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borderland.  The tensions between security and humanitarian logics now trump rights-based 
approaches, and the contradictions and their extra-territorial nature have also garnered recent 
attention from anthropologists (Ticktin 2009) and policy analysts (Hayes and Vermeulen 2012), 
not just geographers.  Here, I show how my geographic approach to sovereignty as exclusion 
works because it traces how the EU seeks to harmonize external relations as border and 
migration management controls with non-Member States. Thus, my research helps to reveal how 
the tensions between human rights and European security models work in an explicitly 
geographic way beyond just ‘camps’ to look at the internalization of externalization.  In this way, 
I accept that state frontiers remain pre-eminent but nevertheless seek to develop tools for moving 
beyond taken-for-granted notions of territorially sovereign nation-states as pre-existing power 
containers in the world to see how boundaries are made to remain powerful.  In short, I argue this 
case shows how harmonization and cooperation is really securitization and exclusion.   
I argue the shift to security and risk management is not accidental, but reflects new 
modes of territorializing sovereignty for the EU and nation-states like Moldova.  In seeking to 
offer my own properly critical approach to the quantification of space like the EU periphery and 
the Moldovan homeland, I privilege the role of calculative metrics and technological standards 
used to establish and police borders and make travellers legible to authorities works to expose 
the hegemonic politics of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, because these questions are 
fundamentally about territorial integrity and a tendency to preserve old orders, they are thus 
made contingent upon security and are therefore inherently problematic.  As a result, I echo that 
the “crucial thing” as for Elden (2008: 57) and the “disquieting element” as for Agamben (2000) 
that emerges from such investigations into bordering is the idea of the nation-state, in this case 
Moldova, that brings the “sovereignty fiction” (20) into crisis for a growing section of 
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humankind today. In asking various migrant citizens and those who manage them about these 
risks and efforts to contain them, I seek to show how modern bordering works, as sovereignty 
regimes, for the EU and its neighbors in both policy statements and common practice in a 
paradigmatic case like this one.  Following Agamben’s reading of Arendt and the figure of the 
European refugee during an earlier geopolitical transition, I too seek to explore the corrosion of 
traditional political juridical categories and their “awkward confusions’ (22).  Likewise, I follow 
their lead while also arguing that the “marginal”, rather than treated as an outlier, “should be 
central”, rather than dismissed.  While I do not agree the refugee figure and their camps as 
spaces of control are the only objects worth deconstructing, I concur migrants are profoundly 
useful subjects for unpacking how  ‘Europe’ is perennially reconstituted via radical crises of the 
nation-state.  Thus, my dissertation demands a re-thinking of sovereign power and a 
reconsideration of how the “inside” and “outside” of Europe is continually reconstituted as 
chaotic fringe rather than core feature.   
I use EU bordering exercises as proxies for how it approaches sovereignty and territory.  
Taking EU-Moldova relations and the Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in particular as 
objects of study, I argue such attempts have emerged to reflect the latest iteration of a localized 
geopolitics of migration and border management as proxies for socio-economic mobility or as 
EU/NATO exclusion in regional security architectures.  As technological zones created via 
multiple communities of professional practice, the production of these kinds of geopolitical 
borders works at not only the regional scale, but also in biopolitical or population controls. As 
overlapping but asymmetric political processes, bordering practices also seek to circumscribe via 
national citizenship limits and monitor privileges using devices like visa, passport, and customs 
controls to govern ostensibly risky flows, thereby outwardly managing risk for some actors like 
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border agents seeking to simplify belonging.  These tools empower weak states like the 
Moldovan government and are thus nation-building tools also.  Taken together, such formal 
efforts combine alongside other citizens’ actions and transit migrant behavior to produce a 
variegated “spectrum of desirability” reflecting the new political geography of “state 
embodiment” (Mountz 2003) rather than defensively guarding a frontier.  In asking who is 
crossing these borders, when, and why, my focus charts how bordering practices are bundled, 
embodied, reified, spatialized, and/or undone as governance schemes.   
EU-Moldova relations, in my view, are best seen as the production and re-
territorialization of authority and sovereignty in an iconic borderland.  In analyzing border and 
citizenship regimes of authority that use overlapping political rights like voting, civic obligations 
like taxation, and agencies like the EUBAM or the Moldovan Border Guard Service, my view 
suggests how plans to reassemble nation-state models of territoriality and identification work as 
part of the traffic in sovereignty.  Operating via languages of bureaucratic categorization, new 
bordering practices offer EU and Moldovan government authorities the power to engineer 
entirely new subjects like “tolerated persons” and sanction entirely new spaces like “visa 
application centers”. In my view, such evidence has emerged as extra-territorial controls worth 
detailing because they have only proliferated abroad (e.g. Cape Verde, Georgia, Senegal) once 
tested in Moldova, i.e. a liminal “laboratory” (Parkes 2009).  Likewise, efforts to govern mobile 
citizen subjects can reveal insights surrounding “transnational governmentality” (Silvey 2006) 
and new “vectors of insecurity” (Hyndman and Mountz 2007) where migration is both economic 
survival and national security strategy. As such, I argue migration controls and return-
migrant/citizen visions in the Moldovan context are best seen as proxies for overlapping 
citizenship, territory, and security regimes, both from inside and out.  Focusing on these regimes 
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as expressions of sovereignty and mobility allows me to trace the formation of modern 
Moldova(ness), or what Agamben meant when he asked “what is a people” (28).  In a similar 
vein, I follow his answer that invoked an answer showing the word is rooted in a genealogy 
meaning poor, underprivileged and excluded, consistent with my findings, as well as the formal 
and informal “semantic ambiguity” (29) of this idea in general as expressed in debates about who 
is Moldovan.   
 
C) Why Moldova?   
The Moldovan case is relevant for bigger picture studies governance and governmentality 
because it links bordering and exclusionary practices in revealing ways. Like most modernist 
experiments in governance, this one is also presented as a potentially transformative model for 
humanity designed to correct crises and discourses of perceived ungovernability perpetuated via 
remote sensing and used to make hidden populations legible in the name of ‘cooperation’ vis-à-
vis ‘Europeanization’ rather than modernization, per se. Like many other grand schemes, it has 
not met expectations (Scott 1998).  Like its neighbors, Moldova has experienced the 
kaleidoscope of governance regimes in the 20th-21st century: starting as a traditional kingdom 
and imperial possession before brief flirtations with independence, as short-lived autonomous 
Soviet republic, under fascist occupation, alongside war-time anarchy, parliamentary democracy, 
and a bloody break-up into quasi-state fiefdoms like Transnistria.  As political barometer, crystal 
ball, or canary in the coalmine, Moldova as an object of rule and Moldovans as people have a 
long history of being intimately bound up in a series of fashionable governance tactics.  In short, 
the region and its citizens seem to be in the vanguard of “sovereignty regimes” (Agnew 2005), or 
ways of bundling of territory and authority, but incapable of fully institutionalizing them.  In this 
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way, Moldova seems to always anticipate future trends, albeit with usually disastrous results for 
citizens. In this case, I offer a genealogy of EU-Moldova action plans to elaborate upon the 
notion of Moldova as governance laboratory referenced in Border Guard Service discussions of 
the “four-tier filter” model for frontier management and the legal regime for foreign residents as 
part of efforts to internalize previously external relations.   
For scholars, the Moldovan case is important because it represents European exclusion 
practices and reflects the future trajectory of security challenges associated with consolidating 
and governing national territory in the “age of migration”. In 2004, Moldova joined the ENP, 
and, as of 2011, was considered by the EU to be its most “most advanced and ambitious” Eastern 
Partner1 where in the eyes of its leadership “good progress” in legislative cooperation plans 
move at a “good pace” (EU 2010: 8). As an origin and transit zone for migrants, the EU is 
interested in partnering with this marginal neighbor.  “Due to its geography and the size of its 
migration flows compared to its total population, Moldova is probably the EU’s Eastern partner 
with the highest intensity of people-to-people interaction with the EU” (EU 2010: 8). While the 
vision of Moldova within the EU/ENP has focused on its status as a country of origin for 
migrants, Moldova is also transforming into a transit zone and holding pen for TCNs seeking to 
enter the EU.  It has recently developed entirely new legislative and punitive arenas to 
accommodate this shifting role as Europeanization takes on proprietary forms.  Thus, seen as a 
space where both Moldovans and other TCNs are held in administrative or punitive detention, 
current trends indicate moves toward extra-territorial controls and expert rules incorporated and 
embodied via calculated techniques of population management and risk assessment rather than 
realist discourses surrounding territorial control and threat perception.  This case thus works to 
                                                
 1  The European Union’s “Eastern Partnership” includes the Southern Caucasus states 
participating in European Neighborhood Policy projects.  Launched with little fanfare and without much 
 
 
11 
show classic geopolitical, national territorial, and biopolitical governmental practices of 
bordering and, thus, exclusion via mobility control.   
Moldova matters, but not for the usual reasons cited in the foreigners’ reports like 
trafficking or misery (e.g. Junger 2002; Lee Myers 2008; Weiner 2008), though those too are 
important. Despite the best intentions and millions of euros in technical assistance, the 
proliferation of migrants, increasingly restrictive visa application procedures2 and the failure to 
“manage” them suggests old approaches to have not worked (Democracy and Freedom Watch 
2012; Popescu 2010). In short, this case suggests the future of EU attempts to police its 
periphery.  Analytically, the evidence presented below shows how modern governance practices, 
as citizenship rules and border management, are using national security and institutional capacity 
discourses to justify distinct governmental logics and policies such as return agreements and 
mobility partnerships.  These practices and their self-serving perceptions are designed to promote 
a particularly exclusionary geographic project and geostrategic vision and are thus part of a long 
tradition of attempts to “order the crush zone” (O’Loughlin 2000).  As a result, my argument is 
that Moldova has come to represent the vanguard of EU external relations. 
 
D) Contextual Background 
Arguably since 1436, but certainly since 1918, Moldovan territory and its inhabitants 
have existed as a dynamic frontier zone and endured shifting territorial orders under Ottoman, 
Romanian, Russian, Soviet, and Ukrainian control. Regimes have ranged from ethnic Greeks 
serving under the Sultans as tax farmers to Russian Field Marshals campaigning under Tsars as 
                                                
 2 According to Democracy and Freedom Watch in Georgia, recent survey data claim average 
rejection rates are 3%, with Moldovan denied 7% of the time despite aggressive visa facilitation efforts by 
the AEI and pilot mobility partnership models with the EU; Russians are only rejected 1.2% of the time 
according to the same study, suggesting compliance with regimes and acceptance by them are not 
necessarily correlated.   
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imperialists (Ascherson 1995; King 1999; 2004). In the 20th century, interwar Romanian rule 
under King Carol and visions of a “Greater Romania” were replaced with Soviet-style ethno-
national and linguistic orders.  Thus, seen in the long term, attempts to manage this frontier have 
perennially frustrated mandarins governing it.  The EU’s latest efforts at migration management 
and border control are no exception to this durable pattern.  
As a landlocked country but fractured territory with limited sovereignty, Moldova is 
geographically about the size of Maryland and contains about 3.3 million citizens (National 
Bureau of Statistics 2006). As a state-building project, it is typically referred to as the poorest 
country in Europe and official remittance transfers from citizens working abroad total almost 
40% of GDP (Ritha et al 2007).  This situation remains an urgent crisis of national economic 
development and regional border control because since the Russian ruble’s collapse in 1998 (and 
Moldova’s parallel crash), an estimated 1/3 of the workforce has left to work in Israel, Italy, 
Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey, or beyond (Keough 2006). According to data from the National 
Bureau of Statistics, the population of Moldovan villages has fallen by an average 3,000 people a 
year, which is equal to the disappearance of two medium-sized localities annually (2006). Such 
studies report that in villages about 40 percent of the population has left to find jobs since 1998, 
a year of major economic crises when the ruble crashed, bringing down many former Soviet 
economies with it. Surveys have found at least 73% of the 321,000 Moldovans gone abroad to 
look for work are from villages. These latest findings show 85% of Moldovans working abroad 
are concentrated in 10 European cities. Most emigrants (60%) are in Moscow, with others 
working across the Mediterranean, from Portugal to Palestine (Mosneaga 2009).  These estimates 
are based on official data, but some experts argue that the number of Moldovan migrants is over 
half a million.  Furthermore, it was only in 2006 that incomes returned to 1990 levels, consistent 
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with the last year of the USSR (World Bank 2008).  This peripheral, underdeveloped, dynamic 
status is not new.   
A variety of territorial and sovereignty regimes are at work along this mosaic of 
Moldovan borders.  As shown in Map 1, European Union Border Assistance Mission’s “Area of 
Operations”, Map 2 of Official Border Crossing Points, and Map 3 of Border Crossing Points by 
Type, multiple crossing-types are formally legitimate and de facto in force. 
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Map 1:  European Union Border Assistance Mission’s “Area of Operations” (EUBAM 2009) 
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Map 2:  Official Border Crossing Points (State Border Guard Service of Moldova 2010) 
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Map 3:  Border Crossing Point Types (State Border Guard Service of Moldova 2009) 
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Despite formal statehood, central government authority does not extend over the territory of the 
left bank of the Nistru River.  At present, 26 checkpoints along the Ukrainian frontier remain 
beyond Chisinau’s control. The self-styled, yet diplomatically unrecognized, TMR, 
headquartered in Tiraspol and exercising de facto authority over this territory and its population 
is evidence that territorial disputes in the post-Soviet orbit remain unresolved and increasingly 
entrenched (King 1999; Kolossov and O’Loughlin 1999; Kolsto et al 1993; Kolsto 2006, 2008). 
This situation is a legacy of Soviet collapse.  In 1992 a brief but brutal separatist war with ethnic 
Russians, Ukrainians, and irregular Cossack sympathizers erupted over post-independence fears 
including ethnic retribution, territorial isolation, and Romanian annexation; the TMR remains the 
only ‘frozen conflict’ adjoining EU territory and it hosts both Russian ‘peacekeepers’ and the 
largest Soviet-era arms cache in Europe.  Transnistrian ‘authorities’ have boasted to French 
journalists they maintain the capacity to reach Bucharest in less than four hours, regardless of EU 
travel bans (Canal+ 2007).   
Without international recognition but under Moscow’s protection, TMR is reported to 
have emerged as a smuggling hub (Deutsche Welle 2012). According to conventional wisdom 
but mostly circumstantial evidence, this narrative of fractured sovereignty and unrecognized 
territory appears in formal and journalistic circles as mostly a national security and transnational 
criminal concern.  Indeed, reports from EU experts claim TMR is a profitable destination site for 
American poultry products in the region and note “40,000 tons of chicken was shipped, legally, 
into Transnistria through Black Sea ports in Ukraine.  Because that amounted to 66 kilograms, or 
146 pounds, for each Transnistrian, something was clearly amiss” (Lee Meyers 2008). These 
illicit flows are themselves a Cold War legacy of the first President Bush’s food aid to hungry 
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Russia in the early 1990s. They became known colloquially as “Bush legs” and have remained a 
continued object of trade wars where chemical tastes and public health are still invoked as threats 
to security and sovereignty.  Today, these debates involve the WTO rather than COMECON.  As 
a “last vestige of post-Soviet misery” such flows of “all fat, no flavor” products maintain a key 
place in the popular geopolitical imagination and a sign of humiliation and indignation in the 
former Soviet Union (Schwirtz 2010).  This pathway, where fatty, low-protein meats were first 
dumped as humanitarian gestures has evolved into a circuit for contraband avoiding sovereign 
controls like food safety checks and import duties to become quite profitable and remains so in 
TMR.  The Journal of the Border Guard Service also reports that cigarettes, chocolate, and 
seafood are smuggled routinely (2011).  Significantly, free of taxes and health inspections, such 
contraband flows offer lucrative opportunities for locals and threaten to render illegitimate 
attempts to govern borderlands and secure a frontier. In short, territorial controls and sovereignty 
claims remain a site of contention after twenty-plus years given arguably successful nation-
building and de facto state control in TMR.   
Sovereignty and integration are not the only popular subjects in Moldovan scholarship. 
Questions of “who” is Moldovan remain popular conundrums too.  Self-reported data on 
perceptions of the Moldovan population’s ethno-national identity remains as ill defined as the 
state’s territorial sovereignty.  According to the most recent census data collected between 1989-
2004, about 75% of the population claim Moldovan ethnic identity, while less than 10% are 
Ukrainian, Russian, Gagauz, or Bulgarian; 90% of Moldovans consider themselves Orthodox 
Christians. About 60% live in rural areas while 20% of citizens live in the capital, Chisinau.  
Questions of national identity remain especially complicated.  For instance, 20% of citizens 
claim a native language that differs from their national affiliation and while 78% of Moldovans 
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claim to speak “Moldovan” as distinct from “Romanian”, some 20% of “ethnic Moldovans” 
identify as “Romanian-speakers”, meaning linguistic identification and categorization are so 
convoluted that ethno-national markers of identity are simply too complex to justify popular 
narratives.  This trend also suggests national identity remains unconsolidated and malleable in a 
general sense as people identify as ‘both/and’ or ‘neither/nor’. These changes are useful markers 
of social mobilization and cultural framing of grievances given that during the late Soviet-era 
independence movements, efforts to replace Soviet-mandated use of Moldovan-as-Romanian 
written in Cyrillic characters revolved around Latinization campaigns among a population where 
slightly fewer citizens (65%) claimed Romanian identity (King 1999).  In 2004 census data 
released in 2006, 79% of Moldovans reported Moldovan identities, and only 2% claimed to be 
Romanian, while the number of Russians and Ukrainians dropped by about half, i.e. Russians 
13%-6% and Ukrainians 14%-7%.  
As an indicator of fractured sovereignty, citizenship remains complicated too.  Since the 
collapse of the ruble in 1997/1998, new EU mobility regimes and domestic economic challenges 
have also spurred Moldovans to seek out foreign passports whenever and wherever possible 
because they cannot access Romanian or other Euro-Mediterranean labor markets. From a 
practical standpoint, such moves are pursued as a avoiding proper controls.  Thus, Moldovans 
who can connect themselves to Romanian relatives alive in 1941 have conveniently rediscovered 
old ties to Bucharest, entitling them to EU passports. Despite official data showing only 2% of 
3.5 million Moldovans hold dual-citizenship and recent studies finding about 7%, Romania 
recently resumed processing some 900,000 passport-requests from Moldovans, after a hiatus 
from 2002-06.  According to official comments made to popular media, about 800,000 
Moldovans already have Romanian passports (The Guardian 2010, see below).  Likewise, many 
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have also (re)assumed Russian citizenship, where common political and ethno-linguistic legacies 
have concentrated economic opportunities. Consequently, according to the latest and most robust 
representative summary of national opinion polls, Moldovan “citizenship” is held to mean: 
 
…an unconsolidated ethnic identity, obedience, extreme poverty and ultimately emigration…to 
survive in your village by doing farming…Despite this, to be a happy person, which probably 
helps Moldovans to keep away from depression or figure out how to leave the country sooner to 
earn a living in another country…As a rule, massive labor migration is associated with patriotism 
and a high level of citizen loyalty (Ethnobarometer 2006: 257-258).  
 
For Moldovans as a whole, these data reinforce my argument that mobility is pragmatic and 
means opportunity in response to insecurity. In this encapsulation of the essence of contemporary 
membership in the national community, identity, mobility, and poverty are common threads 
binding citizens, rather than spatial contiguity, linguistic preference, or drunken misery as others 
have suggested.   
In Moldova, so-called ‘passportization’ moves by Romanian and Russian authorities 
suggest pragmatic, instrumental concerns exist alongside affective membership.  In this way, 
Bucharest offers what is widely derided outside Moldova as a “backdoor to Brussels” or “lighter 
shade of gray” (L’express 2010; The Economist 2012) because of its contentious and opaque 
consular policies of diaspora relations (see below). A recent Soros Foundation-backed study on 
the recovery of Romanian citizenship by Moldovan citizens, summarized in the newspaper 
Adevarul’s (2012a) headline “The Myth of the Romanianization of Moldova” claimed the latest 
evidence: 
 
 …shows that in the last 20 years only a quarter of a million Moldovans recovered their 
Romanian citizenship and that the process is very slow. The evidence shows that we are not 
talking about millions of people…From 1991 until August 2011, 226,507 Moldovan citizens, or 
about 7% of the population, received Romanian passports. There is no phenomenon of mass 
citizenship granting, considering the fact that states like Spain and France provide about 100,000 
citizenships yearly to people who are not even from Europe. 
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The author adds that Russia has always had a negative attitude to the recovery of Romanian 
citizenship by Moldovan residents or their descendants. This scenario where threats are 
perceived to stem from significant international migration and de facto statehood is consistent 
with claims that migrants embody a “fundamental challenge to the nation-state system” (Leitner 
1997, 1998), whereas others see quasi-states a primary threat to this order (Kolsto 2008).  In 
tracing transformations of territoriality and (post) national citizenship in this instance, my 
evidence suggests new ways in which the nation is imagined, narrated, organized, justified, and 
practiced in Moldova and beyond.   
Thus, for EU officials, a different problem is emerging to be governed.  Given their 
failure to resolve the TMR conflict through conventional measures, this de facto state is the only 
one now adjoining an EU member state.  For them, new EU-Moldova border security measures 
and surveillance networks are a response to perceptions that Moldova will become a major 
source of transit migrants seeking EU entry via Romania and then the Schengen zone (Interview 
2011a).  This perception has justified millions of euros in “secure borders” funding from the EU 
and means non-Member State, non-Moldovan “third country nationals” (TCNs) seeking to enter 
the EU via Moldova are now subject to new spaces of confinement, including but not limited to 
various kinds of migrant detention centers.  Seen as a site of insecurity given its weak 
governance over its territory (i.e. borders) and population (i.e. migrants), Moldova has emerged 
as a policy “laboratory” (Parkes 2009) in the eyes of migration managers, border scholars, and 
political geographers as detailed below.  It is worth studying for those seeking to understand the 
well-known links between space and self-identification and political affiliation, i.e. citizenship, 
related to ethno-national identity and territorial sovereignty in a classic borderland.  
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My genealogy shows a transformation of a discrete series of (extra)territorial 
consolidations of security and citizenship policies of remote mobility controls. This 
transformation has proven especially tricky for all because Moldovan growth remains uneven 
and political factions, like other elites, at an impasse.  Consequently, despite EU assistance and 
prodding, new population/migration controls remain incomplete while the allure of visa-free 
travel in the EU and a free trade agreement with its common market is dangled in front of an 
increasingly weary public (albeit one still rather sympathetic to joining the EU).  Recent opinion 
surveys (Gallup 2011) show Moldovans are less certain of EU leadership (48% approve) seen in 
comparison with other former Soviet republics like Kazakhstan, on par with Georgia, and far 
more favorable than those in Russia (22% approval).  The situation remains undecided, as 50% 
of a representative sample said they would vote to join the EU in December 2011, earlier that 
year the figure was as high as 62%, and those saying they would vote against went from 12% in 
March to 22% by year’s end, suggesting loss of public support for EU integration (IMAS 2012).  
 
E) The EU’s Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) as Model 
As objects of control, sovereign territorial borders are often seen as the sine qua non of 
statehood and prerequisites for national security.  EU efforts to engineer such controls in 
neighboring states, from inside its neighboring government’s institutional architecture via 
persuasion, funding, and training are taking new forms along the Moldo-Ukraine frontier.  Thus, 
my argument is that such moves are reflections of how the EU seeks to govern that which 
remains ungovernable and to exercise control, i.e. sovereignty, over a territory and population 
that has perennially frustrated externally designed controls.  As techniques and tools, both 
EUBAM and ENP are distinctive as proprietary EU geostrategy, but it is a mistake to take such 
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policies formally at face value.  As proprietary effort in this strategy, EUBAM, was launched in 
2005 as a counterweight to Russia. According to the Memorandum of Understanding, EUBAM 
should observe, advise and assist efforts to facilitate trade and counteract illegal activities using 
statistical analysis and risk management (2005). Formally, such regimes explicitly “target” 
dynamic “nodes” and “flows”; they seek to “combat” migration and organized crime, “fight” 
corruption, and produce “better border management” for “citizens and businesspeople” 
(EUBAM 2006, 2008, 2009).  This approach is distinct from earlier strategies designed to 
support border guards and their controls, bolster national defenses, and protect human rights. It is 
rooted in efforts to apply dispersed, technology-based solutions to turn invisible, ungovernable 
flows into manageable subjects (Carrera 2007; Panagiotidis and Tsianos 2006 in Buckel and 
Wissel 2010). Still, EUBAM (!44 million) is but one ENP tool in its !13 billion kit.  
EUBAM is thus a test strategy to extend the EU’s hegemonic vision of a seamless and 
secure Schengen area.  It is envisioned to exist in a sovereign space that lacks but can acquire 
well-defined edges and is an idealized model—a ‘monotopia’-- and is not reflected on the 
ground. Such world-views revolve around explicitly spatial policy metaphors like the “Ring of 
Friends” or the “European Neighborhood” and demand geographic attention like I offer in this 
dissertation. In focusing on the geography of the discursive devices I draw attention to the 
programmatic frames often deployed as both descriptions and prescriptions in contradictory and 
sometimes ambiguous ways alongside harder, territorial notions of security, i.e.  “fortress” or 
“maze” Europe. Projects like EUBAM also take allegedly softer forms like the mobility 
partnerships and involve non-binding legal technologies like readmission agreements and visa 
liberalization incentives administered across (supra)state bodies and (inter)national 
organizations.  Because the EUBAM is a model of such novel and ‘neighborly’ successes in 
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managing borders and securitizing responses to organized criminal threats, including trafficking 
and smuggling rings, it plays a privileged role in this vision. Considered in this light, EUBAM 
attitudes and practices suggest some of the many ways the EU is transforming as a geopolitical 
actor. In my view, the Mission appears as a special kind of technocratic power with opaque and 
contradictory origins pushing for a particular kind of self-interested change, but its success 
depends on the willingness of partners.  
As one of the most technical and territorial instruments in the toolbox, EUBAM is 
grouped with the ENP’s efforts to meet EU objectives concerning long-term visas; efficient 
small scale border traffic; facilitating movement for EU programs; visa free travel for diplomats 
and reductions for students; wider visa-free regimes; common integration of third country 
nationals; preventing illegal migration; and readmission agreements with neighbors (EC 2009). 
The result is a contested process where the re-scaling of European borderlands, sovereignty, and 
mobility within them is redefined. ENP invented EUBAM, then, in but only one high-profile 
response to threats to sovereignty and security in the region. Taken together, as signature moves 
projects like EUBAM indicate that surveillance and standardization efforts will only intensify, 
via internalization, as zones of confinement are promoted from afar but adopted from within.  
Efforts like ENP/EUBAM are thus set to become part of enduring, if yet unsuccessful, attempts 
to organize a unified border.   Via security experts, communication platforms, and best practices 
such projects seek to expand security and risk management schemes and are thus about 
reconstituting sovereignty and territoriality at multiple scales in the region where it clearly 
prefers to work via ostensibly neutral use of technical expertise and institutional cooperation.  
In the words of EUBAM’s first chief (Banfi 2009), recent political and economic changes 
mean “new security situations” and that Moldova is “closer in the sense of geography”. 
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Accordingly, ENP has aimed to “identify novel approaches to improve the management of legal 
movements of people between the EU and third countries ready to make significant efforts to 
fight illegal migration” (EC 2007: 2). Formally, the EU’s stance on Moldova is to focus on 
stability and risk management alongside territorial reintegration in its “significant efforts”.  
Despite its observer-status and lacking investigative authority, via EUBAM the EU aims to 
continue institutionalizing a modern Integrated Border Management (IBM) system. The goal is 
to secure the border using tools like job training and “European expertise” to ‘pre-empt’ risky 
flows. Indeed, General Banfi (2009) speaks about: 
 
…a system, which meets the needs and expectations of the citizens and businesspeople of 
Moldova and Ukraine while at the same time contributing to and benefiting from international 
cooperation.  In today’s world, with organized criminal groups constantly inventing new ways to 
evade border control, it is essential that all European states work together to keep our common 
neighborhood stable and secure. 
 
This apolitical self-image obscures the formal status of the project as an advisory body with 
limited powers to counter criminals. However, this geostrategic vision is biopolitical, national, 
and territorial.  In its institutional, technical, financial, and procedural guises it highlights trends 
toward attempts to rescale how problems are perceived, labeled, and thus governed internally 
and from afar. 
 
Part II:  Format and Organization 
A) Research Questions and Project Aims 
What does modern Moldovan territory and sovereignty say about the present and future 
of these core geographic notions?  How are these fictions produced formally and informally, 
domestically and in the eyes of foreigners?  What do EU approaches to Moldova(ns) suggest 
about how the EU is emerging as a geopolitical actor as evidenced in its ability to govern or 
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exclude people and places in and around its perimeter?  Thus, my aims include the following 
objectives: 
 
(I) Understand how Moldovan sovereignty is perceived and territorialized via an 
examination of formal and informal discourses of border control and territorial 
consolidation from above and below.   
 
(II) Ask how emerging Moldovan citizenship relates to new mobility opportunities given 
revised border, visa, and passport regimes and other novel forms of territorial governance 
as proxies for access to space and the ability to regulate access to territory. 
 
(III) Consider territorial controls and individual subject formations interactively and 
iteratively, not in isolation, using anonymous indicators of identity as measures of self-
awareness and seen in attitudes about risks, communities, and opportunities, i.e. 
geographic imaginations and formal or popular geopolitical visions.   
 
In this way, I aim to understand what Moldovan citizenship --defined as nested processes of 
negotiating memberships in local, legal, political, civic or imagined ethno-national communities-
- means to select people residing in border zones and how this meaning compares to formal and 
informal visions of territorial limits and social inclusion.  Thus, my argument focuses on 
sovereignty and self-identification practices in an explicitly geographic way because it asks 
about inclusion and foreign/domestic axes of popular differentiation alongside formal and 
technical markers of exclusion. Put another way, I show how shifting forms of citizenship and 
territoriality --i.e. dual citizenship, Romanian passport ownership, visa regimes, migration 
management—affect mobility or opportunity. To this end, I triangulate survey and spoken data 
from interviews and focus groups to compare the variable uses, by citizens and governments, of 
categories like ‘ethnic’ or ‘national’ as instruments for policing/producing citizen-subjects and 
legitimating sovereignty claims. 
 Together, the research questions are designed to investigate the geopolitics of frontier 
management alongside the micro-politics of national citizenship and territorial belonging. Thus, I 
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am seeking to audit and extend, not replace, census and survey findings of self-identification and 
formal categorization to triangulate findings using data collected from respondents in multiple 
ways. Two key assumptions underlie this research and my mixed-methodological approach: (i) 
Bordering practices and citizenship policies are best considered as dynamic and discursive 
political processes linked to strategies for influencing territorial control and fixing identities like 
nationality or migration status in space; (ii) Struggles over territory and citizenship are indicative 
of evolving sovereignties because they are about who can be where legitimately, free from the 
threat of arbitrary detention. It is important to note that my research, unlike much existing work 
on this case, does not assume socio-political mobilization is inherently ethno-national.  
 
B) Methods and Approaches 
 To achieve these aims, I have developed a mixture of methods to chart the informal 
individual perspectives of private citizens collected via surveys and group discussions, which I 
compare to more formal institutional performances of public representatives and legal or 
diplomatic statements.  This approach allows me to triangulate how discursive struggles emerge 
in contingent, contradictory, and complementary ways in the minds and bodies of various 
stakeholders, from the EU technocrats to recently returned migrants who live near a state border. 
Still, despite an ostensibly conventional approach to territory and identity in a classic borderland 
between great powers, my project contributes a critical and contextual analysis of how barriers 
and peoples are made and managed across space today because it looks at the discursive 
construction of borderland communities, national identities, and institutional controls from the 
top-down and bottom-up.  Academically speaking, it applies the lenses of border geography, 
critical geopolitics, and migration studies to re-conceptualize homelands, citizens, migrants, and 
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their managers as exemplars of (EU/national) territoriality, citizenship beyond borders, and both 
the geopolitics of migration management and its biopolitical or population-focused vision of risk 
controls and embodied threats. So, rather than starting with a static, stable notion of identity and 
territory as objects, my dissertation has endeavored to develop a more dynamic and processual 
approach to the (in)formal, political, and prosaic manufacture of Moldova(ns).  A full review of 
data and methods is included in Appendix A and a flowchart of techniques is provided in 
Appendix B). 
 My investigation focuses on two separate border areas in the country.  One of them, 
Ungheni, was a restricted area during Soviet times, and residents were tightly controlled as the 
Prut was the Soviet Union’s external boundary, whereas the Nistru (in Romanian)/ Dniester (in 
Russian) river between Moldova and Ukraine (and thus TMR) divided them during the Cold War 
as an internal administrative boundary (See Map 2 from King 1999).  Today, efforts to manage 
this zone originate in Brussels and Chisinau, not just Moscow or Bucharest.  As a result, a 
peripheral space along the eastern European frontier has been reconstituted yet again as a buffer 
zone where rules over non-member state citizens can be administered at a distance.  I argue this 
preference for extra-territorial controls is most evident in light of EU and Moldovan officials’ 
efforts to seek to reassert (at least customs) control over the breakaway Transnistria region via 
EUBAM (2006), “mobility partnerships” as both a “practical” and “next-generation 
partnership”(EC 2007), and readmission agreements (EC 2008, 2009).  
 In my view based on discussions with agents and private citizens, these policies and 
practices seek to make legible and governable, via expert rules and legal agents, those informal 
networks and flows that threaten to render modern controls illegitimate, not just ineffective, and 
leaving the EU’s eastern flank ‘at risk’. As a geographic object of rule, the manufacture of 
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modern Moldova has proven paradoxical yet paradigmatic because its people are notoriously 
slippery for governors to manage. Yet, despite a long history of failing to secure this border, 
projects like EUBAM continue seeking to mitigate risk in this region.  As migrants, smugglers, 
traffickers, and other threats to states and sovereignty have shown, the risks perceived to threaten 
borders or profit from their relative (in)security benefit from their porosity are constantly 
evolving in a cat-and-mouse style affair.   
 My data and mixed-methods include 100 surveys (see Appendix C-D) alongside 
representative census and, separately, privately-funded public opinion polls.  Additionally, 
observations and attitudes were collected during interviews with participants and government 
and NGO agents; in the second stage focus groups were organized to consider particular 
populations segmented according to age and life experience and standardized across groups and 
locations.  As Appendix A details, I also draw on visual methodologies (see also Appendix E-F) 
to consider the relevant academic literature related to my selection and use of pre-existing visual 
images to support photo-elicitation schemes during group discussions.  My attention to iconic 
and banal imagery is used to show how discursive and survey data derived visualizations and 
their analysis can work to construct and thus to chart socio-spatial frames of allegiance like 
affective or instrumental varieties of self-ascribed connections to “homeland” or usage of 
keywords like “money”, “visa”, or “patriot”.   
 In short, my research proceeded according to the following plan:  I first collected 
legislative and technical documents about citizenship, nationality, and migration law alongside 
data like census figures and contraband seizure statistics from the Moldovan Ministry of Interior 
and State Border Guard Service. These data on illegal border crossings and migration-related 
detention populations were then compared with qualitative and quantitative evidence of formal, 
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technical understandings of sovereignty using territorial and biopolitical logics that emerged in 
discourse analysis of the texts and interviews with their authors or other authorities, i.e. EU or 
local “implementing partners”. Census data, last collected in 2004 and published in 2006, were 
considered to establish baselines as indicated in chapter II, despite BBC/Council of Europe 
warnings about their accuracy (2006).  To guard against such concerns, in both cross-country and 
domestic comparisons I used data from representative social surveys (e.g. CBS-AXA 2011; 
Ethnobarometer 2006; IMAS 2009, 2012; QSP 2009; World Values Survey 2006); these data are 
reviewed for agreement and discordance in terms of factors like national pride and self-
identification patterns on pages 98-115 below.  I then interviewed domestic and foreign 
authorities and borderland residents about their understandings of life in Moldova and change at 
the frontier, including its management and personal experiences with crossing or displacement.  
Alongside survey and interview data, my focus groups were transcribed and coded such that 
keywords like “homeland” or “ethnicity” (or other frames) could be considered in terms of their 
relative frequency.  The results serve as rough proxies for the relative salience of particular 
frames of allegiance and authority, i.e. who speaks in national or emotional terms versus who 
offers localized or other frames governing how territorial attachments or socio-economic crises 
are understood.   
 Fieldwork in borderland communities and frontier zones involved formal, pre-arranged 
visits to villages, institutions, and non-governmental organizations.  I also made more than 30 
regular and informal visits to villages and markets.  In addition to trips to meet with politicians, 
activists, or bus drivers I also made regular border crossings throughout the region from 2008-
2010, including irregular trips to Transnistria itself, and those six isolated regions on the left 
bank of the Nistru still under Chisinau’s control, including Costita, home of the self-proclaimed 
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“Dubasari government in exile” (Interview 2009a).  Travels and inquiries in these areas enabled 
me to consider places where Chisinau’s road building and public works efforts might also offer 
evidence detailing the localized geopolitics and material practices of national integration and 
territorial control in Moldova.  To consider the northern frontier outside my eastern and western 
field sites, I accompanied a three-day UN-led, EU-backed training tour to offer legal instruction 
and conduct border monitoring and lead identification exercises.  The trip allowed me privileged 
access into the latest education and training programs and the chance to interact with more than 
50 Moldovan Border Guard Service agents, including the Major responsible for protocol, as well 
as low-ranking officers and new recruits, both male and female.  These training contingents to 
northern sections of the Moldo-Ukraine frontier ran through a Roma-dominated community and 
also involved a small Moldovan border town, Otaci, located immediately across the Nistru from 
a mid-sized Ukrainian city, Mogilev-Podilski, a regional commercial hub with vigorous cross-
border trade in small-scale goods like apples.  Other informal observations and discussions came 
from late nights chatting with Moldovan and EU/UN officials in bars and restaurants on these 
visits, walking along frontier access roads, and happenstance visits to chat with farmers and 
shepherds working fields and pastures near border checkpoints outside villages adjoining the 
Prut and Nistru rivers between 2008-2010.  I have continually monitored press coverage since 
then.    
 All focus groups were conducted during September-October 2009. Concentrating them 
over a short time is encouraged generally and was advisable here to limit the external influence 
of world and local events.  In the Moldovan case, contested elections had been on the agenda for 
six months at the time of the group discussions and the stalemate remained in place another two 
and half years.  Ironically, formal uncertainty in the political domain seems to match informal 
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ambiguity and general apathy in the social sphere as evident in discussions with focus group 
participants and others, including semi-structured interviews with 10 EUBAM agents and 
another former employee, 7 EU representatives, 12 Moldovan officials from various relevant 
departments and ministries, and 9 international and non-governmental organizations who were 
the primary formal data sources. Data on informal attitudes were collected via surveys 
administered prior to focus group discussions with borderland resident stakeholders, including 
different generations of students, teachers, civil society activists, pensioners, politicians, and 
return-migrants.  Significantly, my method generates otherwise inaccessible data points for those 
interested in charting nationalist landscapes and mental maps of the homeland because it allows 
for triangulation of individual self-understandings and situated practices of instrumentalizing 
self-identity evident in group interactions. Thus, externally and internally triangulating survey 
results with discourse analysis about how ideas and identities are understood collectively and 
articulated individually helps me reveal the processual, contested nature of identity formation 
and territorial consolidation as situated and spatialized subjectivities evident in how groups of 
people govern themselves and see others. As snapshots of group discussions, I have converted 
transcripts for each segmentation group overall, and then taken each site separately in the 
following visualizations, i.e. Figures 1.1.1-1.2.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
Figure 1.1.1: Students 
 
 
Figure 1.1.2: Teachers 
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Figure 1.1.3: Pensioners 
 
Figure 1.1.4: Politicians 
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Figure 1.1.5: Civil Society 
 
Figure 1.1.6: Return Migrants 
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Figure 1.1.7: Museum Curators 
 
Figure 1.2.1: Chisinau 
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Figure 1.2.2 Ungheni 
 
Figure 1.2.3 Stefan Voda 
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Using these approaches, I develop my argument that discursive patterns emerge across groups as 
instruments of authority and suggest positionality matters.  For example, when return migrants 
emphasize “money” and “homeland”, but students seemed to talk most about the correlating 
spatial referent of emigration, i.e. “abroad”.  Nevertheless, data show migrants discussing 
territorial attachments almost twice as much as other groups (e.g. politicians).  Likewise, familial 
frames like those for pensioners and teachers  --where children matter --are as evident as those 
with students, where parents are a key reference.  Not surprisingly, politicians talked about the 
“state”, and civil society about “patriotism” and “values”.  Unexpectedly, civil society and return 
migrants spoke more about two topics, “migration” and “memor(y/ies)”, but they seem less 
interested in rituals, with “tradition” mattering less.  Clearly, the country unit remains a 
prominent one for participants but in different ways, and this legacy is likely a result of my study 
design.  As snapshots, these visualizations suggest the relative frequency of these keyword 
signifiers beyond the ones counted and considered above, like “citizenship” or “homeland”, as 
shown below. To be clear, while they are internally comparable across my sample they are not 
necessarily representative.  As isolated symbols of important concepts articulated during the first 
section of focus group discussions, these signs indicate the relative weight of common words and 
thus help to summarize which frames participants actually use to discuss their own Moldovan-
ness in each interactive session.      
In arguing from the clouds themselves rather than frequency counts of them, the 
following discussions of national origins and common characters mimics the curators detailed 
above.  For return migrants, the nation appears abstractly as home rather than affectively as 
homeland in a national-patriotic sense.  For pensioners, language questions mattered far more 
than other groups as they debated the lack of authority and maintained that Moldovan and 
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Romanian are distinct tongues and other embodied metaphors to describe the depth of their 
Moldovan-ness.  Teachers were similarly affected by national membership but in more civic than 
emotive terms suggesting a logical rather than an experiential attachment to home as with the 
migrants and pensioners.  Civil society, ironically, was the least consistent in how its group 
members but frames like citizenship and patriotism were no less debated, just in more 
contentious terms involving bureaucratic and political wrangling rather than emotional ties or 
lasting memories.  For politicians, contention revolved around the veracity of claims about 
history, iconography, patriotism, and native national consciousness as with the teachers and 
curators, suggesting formal and informal visions of when and how the nation show how 
membership is negotiated today as an instrument of collective belonging.  
My approach to interrogating spatiality, sovereignty, and identity is best situated within 
the academic traditions of political and cultural geography. Since my mixed approaches rely on 
data about identity, territory, and mobility they are squarely within the tradition of political 
geography studies on borders where territorial narratives are viewed in terms of 
inclusion/exclusion, national security threats, or entitlements to ethnic homelands in the post-
Soviet space (Kaiser 1994). Still, despite a long history of ethnographic, geographic, and historic 
focus on state-making and nation-building studies in these borderlands, beginning with 
Herodotus, a convincing explanation of the Moldovan case where identification, 
territorialization, and mobilization are seen as instruments of governance and exclusion remains 
elusive.  So, drawing on borderland studies of post-Soviet countries including historic Ukraine 
(Brown 2004; Reid 2000) and modern Georgia (Pelkmans 2006) as well as contemporary Central 
Asia (Diener 2007; Megoran 2007), I seek to offer a corrective.  I situate my investigation of 
competing and influential perceptions and processes of social change and economic exclusion as 
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to show how markers of wider macro-scale questions about citizenship, territory, and exclusion 
work. Following this tradition but also drawing on political anthropology, my research design 
shows how a mix of qualitative and ethnographic methods helps to consider attitudinal and 
experiential data on citizenship practices as evidence of state effects on territory and identity and 
as proxies for sovereignty in terms of how people express their (collective) will.     
In triangulating formal and informal views I seek to correct those visions impaired by 
“methodological nationalism” (Giddens 1990) and to thus escape the “territorial trap” (Agnew 
1994) of state-society and foreign-domestic binaries, or the tendency to use pre-existing 
government statistics and their categories uncritically.  To be clear, while I rely upon competing 
EU and country-level evidence, I still seek to avoid the insidious consequences of relying solely 
on formal metrics and, instead, to see citizenship and state-scale privileges linked to it as 
contingent but contested.  Institutionally and discursively, the ways in which various interests 
cloak themselves in these norms and ‘discretely’ (in both senses) work themselves into banal 
practices, re-contextualizing old narratives and reconfiguring old histories to reconstitute society 
and territory remain a central focus of my project. I argue that mixing these research tools works 
well to document practices and perceptions that frame social and geographic differences and, 
therefore, reconfigure and recontextualize flexible yet durable understandings of territory and 
access to it, i.e. sovereignty seen as the power to exclude. As in modern nationhood (Brubaker 
1994) and boundary studies in Europe (Brubaker et al 2006; Meinhoff 2003; Sahlins 1989) and 
Asia (De Cillia et al 1999; Megoran 2007; Wodak et al 2009; Wodak and Weiss 2003) 
contextual approaches to authority and informality continue to prove useful for understanding 
exactly how borderlands affect identity and nationhood when boundaries disappear, re-appear, or 
persist in the course of routinized daily practices and formal citizenship regimes. This approach 
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is useful especially when context is seen as dynamic and contested rather than a ‘static 
background’ of dry and misleading historical visions of chaos.     
   
Because hegemonic discourses are not limited to formal actors, I argue that informal 
understandings are also worth documenting.  Since discursive constructions often reflect core 
understandings of space and society, capturing, coding, and reconsidering them in this case is 
useful.  The resulting text-as-data show how people perceive security, practice mobility, and 
therefore, enable and embody distinct modes of territoriality and political identification in terms 
of citizenship and community. Other scholars have used surveys and focus groups to consider 
borderlands and citizenship.  But such work has not combined all three tools --surveys and focus 
groups with visual triggers—instead using two of the trinity when challenging “strong state” 
discourses in illiberal contexts (Secor 2003, 2004), or investigating social change using focus 
groups and photo-elicitation but not alongside surveys (Meinhoff 2003).  Overall, authors 
(Brubaker et al 2006) have shown –separately-- how “everyday ethnicity” and critical attention 
to informal discourses operate to situate personal identity-formation and affect citizenship, itself 
a spatialized form of rule used to link people in place and govern their mobility. In combining all 
three tools I am able to consider alternative understandings of formal explanations of key 
political ideas like citizenship.  Thus my approach is to modify prefabricated tools like photo-
elicitation, border ethnomethodology, and discourse analysis and then use them in comparative 
ways as part of the framework discussed in this chapter. Methodologically, my contribution is 
innovative because it combines data about self-reported attitudes collected anonymously in 
private with that same individual’s discursive constructions about related themes as expressed in 
subsequent interactions to enable a new form of triangulating self-reported claims in an 
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important case.  
 
C) Challenging Conventional Wisdom 
 The following four analyses emerging from field-based observations have helped propel 
my analysis and substantiate my claims.  In one sentence, Moldova is exceptional but in subtle 
yet significantly different ways than observers have assumed, i.e. it is not a backwards place and 
people but rather emerges as the enduring yet dynamic location of efforts, and thus effects, to 
engineer Russo-European techniques for territorializing exclusion and producing legible subjects 
and regulate risky movements.  As expressions of sovereignty, I see Moldova as an object of 
territorial control and Moldovans as political subjects are best viewed via the “paradigmatic 
periphery” model detailed below.  
  “The” Moldovans are not a definite category, but a plural and political notion. Instead of 
historical object, my data show citizens ascribe various powers to these frames that change over 
time and remain unconsolidated and ill defined and thus in many ways ungovernable. My 
approach pays attention to participants’ more pragmatic use of identification and categorization 
processes in social interaction and alongside self-perceptions of nationality and mobility.  This 
dynamic approach to processes that citizens use to bring themselves into or out of line with 
stereotypes and legal categories is better than just indexing the characteristics of ‘pure types’, but 
I do indeed use the figure of such perfect forms like “homo Moldovanus” to show how such 
formal and popular understandings emerge and are embodied.  In attending to the shifty contents 
of these symbols, I seek to understand knowledge formation about (in)formal political or 
emotional attachments to community and related citizenship practices at the individual, national, 
and geopolitical scale.  Accordingly, rather than just correlate self-reported patterns of language 
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and ethnicity and decode their convergences or contradictions as commonly practiced, I seek to 
understand the conceptual frames evident when people self-report collective identification 
patterns and then articulate ideas using related frames within interactive discussions of iconic 
and banal topics.  
 As a whole, social scientists, development donors, and migration managers have all 
considered Moldovan identity using terms like “multi-ethnic” or notions of remittance-
generating emigrants (Cash 2007; King 1999; March 2007; Mosneaga 2009). In King’s (1999) 
historical analysis of ‘Who are the Moldovans?’ national identity is presented as a case that 
reveals the “unsettled nature of the essentials of nationality” (5). My dissertation moves beyond 
King’s ageographic, culturally-essentialized approach to understanding how a “stipulated” (i.e. 
pre-fabricated) nation has (re)emerged in the wake of Soviet collapse.  Because all nations are 
stipulated, I argue a better formulation of King’s approach to this problem asks ‘why’ and ‘by 
whom’ stipulations are made. The idea is to re-conceptualize this “unsettled nature” using 
attention to borders, territory, and mobility. Unlike King’s treatment –researched and published 
before widespread emigration from Moldova—my argument is that the uneven geographic 
development of national territory and citizenship cannot be ignored when considering the 
contemporary situation. The research thus questions and answers how Moldova’s borders reflect 
the changing territoriality of governance and how the meanings of nationality are conceptualized, 
institutionalized, challenged, or ignored in an era and throughout a region where territorial 
sovereignty and political authority are continually re-scaled and re-inscribed.  This view sees 
conventional approaches to Moldovan identity --meaning ‘where’ and ‘who’ is Moldova(n)-- as 
anachronistic because they focus on tired ethno-linguistic politics at the national scale.  
Explicitly, my research answers questions about the re-territorialization of political authority and 
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national citizenship in a post-Soviet, (Eastern) European context to compose a picture of 
ungovernability and competing understandings of political and socio-economic crises across 
formal and informal points of view.   
 To move past existing ageographic, essentialized approaches to how a “stipulated” (i.e. 
pre-fabricated) nation has emerged after Soviet collapse, key terms must be unpacked.   Only 
then can King’s overblown anxieties about the “unsettled nature of Moldovan identity” --
articulated today as fears of exclusion and employment and no longer Romanian reunification or 
Russian reintegration-- make contemporary or theoretical sense. Invariably, Moldova appears 
from the ethno-national ether in multiple forms: a place; a people; a people from a place; a 
political culture; a region; a frontier.  For King, self-proclaimed Moldovan maven,  “Moldovan-
ness” is the “most clearly contrived of identities” and thus the “most artificial of communities.”   
He claims Moldova is where questions over “authentic national culture, and the meaning of 
nationhood itself” are accurately seen as “fretful and sometimes violent projects to define the 
boundaries…”(5-6, emphasis mine).  I agree these projects can be deadly and agonizing and are 
about spatializing markers.  However, are all identities not contrived, artificial, and sporadically 
prone to territorially based violence, especially when co-opted by ethno-national causes or 
harnessed by fear mongers to manipulate the fretful? I seek to challenge this approach to 
authenticity and artificiality on the grounds that attempts to exoticize this place rather than study 
processes unfolding here and how these powers to exclude affect different people.   
 To be clear, my dissertation accepts some of King’s claims and appreciates his historical 
chronology.  On the question of its existence, for example, he argues that Moldova is “…a 
decidedly negotiable proposition, a protean yet powerful conception of community in a region 
where the mutability of cultural boundaries has been matched by the fluidity of political 
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ones…(6)”.  This attention to negotiation and community in historical context is perfectly valid.  
However, I adamantly reject the finding this dynamism is sufficiently settled as to be suitable for 
a historian to study since these ‘propositions’ never completely succeed.  In addition, its timing 
ignores neoliberal displacement in favor of forced dispossession during collectivization or war so 
mobility defies unity categorization and administration but is not treated accordingly in the 
eponymous study. Furthermore, the reference to the ‘mask of Proteus’ neglects to mention it is a 
costume that also fits other ‘ethno-national entrepreneurs’ in the former USSR, thus it is far from 
the “most artificial”.  There, others are equally familiar with geopolitical discourses around post-
Soviet ‘fluid borders’ (O’Loughlin, O’Tuathail, and Kolossov 2005; Smith 1999).  In other 
words, the Moldovan nation is no more unique than any other, despite claims to the contrary.  
And, actually, because cultural boundaries (however defined) are always political and authorize 
violence, just distinguishing between forms suggests the “political culture” approach to 
‘symbolic vs. real’ politics fails in that it does not develop a convincing theory rooted in process.   
 Unlike King’s treatment –produced before widespread emigration—my argument is that 
uneven territorial control and citizenship protections remain important and always incomplete 
embodiments of variegated sovereignty because they are constantly under construction and 
subject to domination or negotiation.  Other critiques of his analysis in The Moldovans (1999) 
are also worth noting. To list a few more concerns, it important to consider that just because the 
“unsettled nature of the essentials of nationality remains unconsolidated” it does not necessarily 
follow that the case is unique, more than any other nation is special. This uniqueness does not 
demand attention simply because Moldovans are the only post-Soviet nationalists to debate or 
question their existence.  Recent polls confirm this analysis is no longer true, if it ever was. The 
latest results show only 3% of representative samples of respondents self-identify as pan-
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Romanian “unionists” (CBS-AXA 2011). Census and survey data show no agreement on who 
Moldovans are because, poetically, frustrating formal designs is one of the common elements 
permeating ‘the national character’. King’s predictions suggest the perils of reading into the 
future based on a historical analysis instead of focusing on processes like displacement and re-
territorialization as enduring if variable features associated with perceptions of crises and an 
almost Orientalist ungovernability in a paradigmatic periphery.  
 More geographically, convention and confusion pervade analyses of Moldovan 
nationalism (Roper 2005). In analyses of education and nation-building, attention is linked to 
questions about post-Soviet national identities:  “…do Moldovans constitute a separate people 
and (ethno)nation or should they be considered part and parcel of the single Romanian nation, 
torn from it by a hostile external power, that is, Russia?” (Solonari 2002: 414).   Other scholars 
have insisted that a collective national identity has not emerged because of the mismatch 
between weak political borders and ethnic identities (Schrad 2004; Way 2003).  According to 
Berg and van Meurs (2002) Moldova remains a territory without its own separate nation, a 
political notion rather than an ethnic reality. As March (2007) noted in his useful analysis of 
Communist Party platforms, the nationalist question in Moldova is not settled.  He asserts 
Moldovans “have proved capable both of accepting overlapping identities and resisting elite 
politicization, but finding a distinctive and shared civic identity that recognizes Romania yet 
goes beyond it…” (624). Because contemporary studies show that massive migration and 
extreme poverty are the most pressing (social) issues facing Moldovans they too deserve 
attention in this analysis. These changing characterizations are evident in contemporary 
considerations of collective identity where ‘being Moldovan’ means “an unformed ethnic 
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identity, extreme poverty or… emigration” (Ethnobarometer 2006: 258). Informally, I ask if this 
view holds.   
 Moldova is not a marginal country despite its peripheral status, but rather it is mainstream 
and a future model.  I argue “only in Moldova” discourses of crisis, conflict, and criminality 
remain incomplete.  And while I accept that all nations claim to be exceptional, it is equally true 
such claims are just another way of saying no country is special.    Such visions misplace 
emphasis on hyperbole and hypermobility when framing issues in terms of national security and 
human misery. In other words, this case is more notable for its ability to frustrate territorial 
designs rather than the mere corruption of checkpoints or crossing-related violations.  Spatially, 
Moldova can be well described as a migrant source and transit country as indicated in remittance 
and repatriation data.  However, its experience is perfectly normal in the modern world.  As the 
territory has emerged since 1991’s independence, it has experienced an all-too-familiar cycle of 
conflict and later emigration patterns associated with post-conflict zones. The situation today 
reflects spatial exclusion in various forms, like where states and remittances still demand 
passports given inchoate ethno-national citizenship criteria and state-sanctioned visa categories 
designed to forge ties with spatially discontinuous communities and prioritize European stability, 
transnational mobility, and liberal democracy.   
  My focus on changes experienced in the wake of the waves of emigration in this country 
and among EU migration managers traces the emergence of what I show is a novel form of 
exclusion and its shifting referents, or “security dispositifs”, i.e. moves from threats to territorial 
sovereignty to more individual or embodied risks inscribed in ‘identity checks’ and “risk 
management” rather than exclusively via border demarcation efforts (Dillon 2007; Muller 2009).  
The resulting “zones of confinement” are categorically different from existing forms of remote 
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control, which work via internalization and cooperation more than mere externalization and 
exclusion as shown below (Bibler-Coutin 2010).  Given these legislative and carceral contexts, 
spaces of mobility (and thus economic opportunity) evident in new categories (e.g. “tolerated 
person”) and new detention centers (e.g. “migrant accommodation center”) are, like internal 
identification strategies, works ‘in progress’.  They reflect the “dual threats” (Ticktin 2009) of 
humanitarian protection and criminal policing, but unlike the Mediterranean cases most 
frequently discussed in discussion of “extra-territorial asylum” and “push-back” where talk is 
about EU-crisis controls for irregular migrants, the Moldovan case is about internalization and 
harmonization rather than simply surveillance, camps, and deterrence.   
 
Part III:  Big Ideas 
A) Remote Control Governance and Neighborhood Geostrategy 
 In terms of governance and geopolitics, Moldova reflects the latest attempts and 
territorialization schemes among putative great powers to cordon off a classic borderland.  
Geographers (Clark and Jones 2008; Kuus 2004, 2005) have considered Europeanization as elite-
level discourses of exclusion.  Their work focused on how elite-level constructions (i.e. Brussels, 
Chisinau) and the projection of Europeanization or regionalization projects (i.e ENP) are 
contested matter because they highlight how and where new spaces form and old ones are 
reconfigured.  Though necessarily limited to the view from Brussels given their approach, such 
efforts convincingly use formal narratives to chart a qualitative shift in governance strategies, i.e. 
the move from stabilization to securitization.  Indeed,  “security”, and “stability” both remain 
key concepts guiding EUBAM’s role in the ENP and beyond. Such efforts are reminiscent of 
Brown’s (2010) approach to walling as erosion rather than edification of sovereign powers, and 
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thus representative of anemic EU efforts to bring reality in line with the fantasy of a perfectly 
legible border and transparent regime governing it. This approach is in line with Huysmans’ 
(2000) consideration of how migration became political and the subsequent social construction 
of migration as security question. It also reflects approaches in “critical migration studies” and 
efforts to understand how states are re-scaling conventional controls (Buckel and Wissel 2010; 
Guild 2009). So, looking at this case as a cornerstone of EU common foreign and security 
problems along its Eastern and Black Sea regional borders, i.e. the “Eastern Dimension” of its 
“Neighborhood Policy” (ENP) reveals how the EU is emerging as a geopolitical actor via 
attempts to reconfigure sovereign spaces of mobility and security.  Faced with this crisis of 
ungovernable flows, human rights concerns, and security dilemmas, new spatial solutions have 
been devised by the EU, with Moldova as an enthusiastic partner since the summer of 2010 when 
the AEI came to power. Most importantly for my project, EU agents and member state leaders 
routinely tout Moldova as its model partner in public (EC 2007b, 2010, 2011a-c).  Using 
concepts of “remote control” (Zolberg 2003) bordering as developed in the EU, the US, and El 
Salvador, among others, I draw on migration and citizenship laws mixed with informal sources 
(e.g. participant stories and survey data) to show how Moldova(ns) have emerged as key subjects 
in EU border and migration management tools like EUBAM and the EU-Moldova “mobility 
partnership” suggest the future of EU territorial and sovereignty regimes.   
 Following from these sources, my analysis offers a genealogy of domestic and EU moves 
and their outcomes in Moldovan space as narrated formally and described informally. This 
approach leads me to see Moldova as important exactly because it reflects the success and failure 
of modern sovereignty and territoriality, or attempts to bring the outside in via standardized 
bureaucratic practices and governance metrics.  While other exceptional projects include off-
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shore camps for potential asylum seekers and economic migrants as emblematic of tensions 
between humanitarian and human rights concerns (Ticktin 2009), among others, the Moldovan 
situation is telling because it reflects a newfound internalization of national legislation and 
bureaucratic practice in radical new ways, thereby deepening rather than just expanding the EU’s 
cordon sanitaire approach to asylum-seekers and labor migrants in an age of austerity where 
technical fixes are preferred solutions to political problems.  In other words, this case helps show 
how variable notions of nationality and insecurity work for bureaucrats and outsiders.  
Paradoxically, my data suggest how territoriality and sovereignty are transforming via the 
proliferation of transnational smuggling networks, fractured political allegiances, and discursive 
expressions of national security or political stability.  
 
B) Paradigmatic Periphery, Liminal Laboratory 
 To show Moldova’s value as a case, I think it is useful to re-scale Nijman’s approach to 
the “paradigmatic city”.  For him, such a case “displays more clearly than other cities the 
fundamental features and trends of the wider urban system…[it] serves as a model, a laboratory 
for analysis”(2000: 135, emphasis mine).  This approach is visibly useful for thinking about 
other spaces and processes, especially migration pressures linked to neoliberal networks of 
mobility and exclusion.  Indeed, this exact notion of “laboratory” appears historically and at a 
different scale in Sahlins’ (1989) classic study of boundary formation in 18th century European 
borderlands.  In Boundaries, his method of looking at and from peripheries to the center enables 
appreciation of the processes and peoples challenging theories of state formation and nation-
building in pre-Revolutionary France and Spain.  He shows governing how, not where, local 
community rivalries or informal contraband networks emerge indicates power shifts. I agree his 
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original method is appropriate and his argument remains ahead of its time but in my analysis his 
case seems anachronistic.  Rather, contemporary Moldova, moreso than the pre-Revolutionary 
Pyrenees, encapsulates the most indicative “…set of laboratory conditions in which to examine 
the dual process of state formation and nation building” (Sahlins: 22, emphasis mine).  
Conceptually, Moldova’s small size and big problems have already led western analysts to label 
it a “policy laboratory” (Parkes 2009). Consequently, I re-scale the conceptual notion of 
“paradigmatic city” and reconstitute it using the Moldovan borderlands instead as “policy 
laboratory” to argue this situation reveals much about the postliberal, “liminal, porocratic 
institutions” governing national identities and citizenships as quasi-instruments, or contested 
governance regimes that operate via extension of technocratic risk management and the 
expansion of common fields of professional practice (Papadopoulous et al 2008). In asking how 
personhood and permeability are constructed and governed in a periphery, Moldova is quite 
telling about the present and future of territorial sovereignty seen as border management. 
 In fact, this case resonates not because it is ‘representative’, ‘frequent’, or even 
‘abnormal’ suggesting Moldovan exceptionalism has been incorrectly understood.  Moldova 
matters because it reflects emerging institutional architectures of population management and 
national security. As a governance exercise, this case shows how schemes regulating migrant 
populations and territorial access in a borderland work. It shows problems with policies to 
govern populations along dynamic yet durable borders in a world of enduring crisis and uneven 
dislocation. Again, as Nijman notes, “A paradigmatic city is extreme in the sense that it displays 
fundamental traits and trends of the urban system more clearly than do other cities.  Thus, the 
paradigmatic city is exceptional, but only in terms of the extent of it being characteristic of 
general trends” (135, emphasis added).  This attention to exceptions as opposed to extremes also 
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considers processes of migration and assimilation, broadly defined.  The core paradigmatic 
characteristics of Moldovans remain unadulterated because they embrace tensions around 
citizenship evident where confusions signal or anticipate impending reorganization. This 
approach enables me to argue convincingly and without too much hypocrisy against the “only in 
Moldova” chorus led by King (i.e. “most artificial”) or Weiner (i.e. unhappiest). This more 
contemporary view of modernist plans disputes generalizations that see this kresy, or 
“interzone”, as “…earmarked for special consideration, as if it were the epicenter of destruction, 
the bastard child of progress” (K. Brown: 1). Managerially, this scenario reveals what happens 
when asymmetric geopolitical, ethno-national, and biopolitical boundaries overlap (Walters 
2006) to expose a series of sovereign fictions about national territory and highlight a series of 
excluded figures like migrants.  For Arendt and Agamben, this limit figure was the refugee, 
which, though marginal, was central to the modernist construction of the nation/state citizen as 
sovereign object of rule.  Following their lead, I agree migrant figures remain telling in that role.  
For me, Moldova(ns) today suggest how exclusion in the face of economic mobility is seen as a 
social, economic and political crisis bound by those denied access to EU labor markets in the 
name of security and risk management rather than stability and human rights.   
 In terms of discourses of security and its inverse, perceptions of risk and symbols of 
ungovernability rather than the consolidation of state power as conventionally understood, my 
view is also consistent with Wendy Brown’s (2010) claims that rather than existing as exclusion, 
sovereignty (i.e. the de facto will of a political association to self-regulate in her view) is 
increasingly disconnected from the nation-state scale because of both god and globalization.  
Counter-intuitively, for her modern bordering fetishes reveal precisely the opposite, i.e. they are 
“icons of its erosion” (24).  Put differently, she argues walls are symbols of waning power and 
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express a lack of legitimate authority alongside the rescaling of nation-state controls in favor of 
capital flows, ultimately blurring rather than sharpening differences evident as effects and affect 
in the eyes of borderlanders (Newey 2011; Schippers 2011).  The failure to resolve the Moldovan 
question and other unsettled boundary-drawing practices, theoretically and empirically, is thus 
provocative because I see this case embodying the future of frontier management (e.g. EUBAM) 
and national security (e.g. migration law) where competing sovereignties and territorial orders 
will produce entirely new and politically variegated spaces rather than homogenizing state 
borders as conventionally understood into a flat and supremely legible security field to be 
collectively defended.   
 Rather than ethnic homeland or political heartland as traditionally understood, Moldova 
is now objectified in another way.  As a spatial tactic in this EU bordering model, the periphery 
takes new forms that show how eliding geopolitical, national, and biopolitical logics have 
rendered a country as space of confinement. In examining this case as one kind of policy 
laboratory, I also maintain Moldova has emerged as a “zone of confinement” different from 
similar zones of experimentation with off-shoring like in the Mediterranean with mixed-migrant 
flows or even Australia with its influx of asylum seekers arriving by sea.  Drawing on Bibler-
Coutin’s (2010) analysis of territorial transformations and the extension of sovereignty via both 
“extraterritoriality” and “intraterritoriality” to control migrants (see also Raustiaula 2009), my 
dissertation considers migration control in transit- and origin- rather than only in destination-
countries. Though the focus here is on the EU-Moldova context rather than Bibler-Coutin’s US-
El Salvador example, the ‘country as confinement’ model remains instructive but limited. In 
discussions about various crises, both public officials and other research participants repeatedly 
stressed how widespread emigration is a tragedy and an opportunity for families and other 
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communities; yet, the nation-state perseveres in the face of shifting attachments and competing 
justifications.  These justifications and diverse examples like El Salvador, Ireland or the 
Philippines show that Moldova is not odd or unique in attempting to maintain allegiance in the 
face of a nation of emigrants.  Rather, in this research, it became clear that this case is not exotic 
in the conventional sense, but rather is paradigmatic.  It is not paradigmatic in the sense that it 
most representative of a wider order today, instead it is emblematic of nation-building, state-
making, citizenship, and security, in the future.  Indeed, these regimes are notable precisely 
because actors including the EU and the US first deploy untested tools and policies in this 
laboratory, thereby suggesting the future of national security and border control in an iconic 
borderland.  In short, since so many Moldovans must leave home to survive today, then what, if 
any, are the strategies sustaining their homeland and their affective attachment to it? 
 
C) Folding from the Outside-in 
 My approach also challenges conventional mappings of inside/outside and home/away, 
offering a critical cartography of territoriality and sovereignty that focuses on mobility regimes --
that is, on the rules used to organize border permeability, manage porosity, and ‘tolerate’ 
foreigners.  However, instead of looking only at the external application of ‘remote controls’ 
over non-citizens or over citizens in foreign lands (e.g., airport carrier sanctions, detention 
camps, deportation schemes, or citizenship protections), my focus privileges revised passport and 
visa regulation alongside tolerated persons and “zones of confinement” that are engineered 
remotely but adopted internally as formal government policy.  In my analysis, these mechanisms 
are part of explicit cooperation plans manifest as border controls and migration regimes. This 
distinction is crucial for understanding the re-territorialization of state, nation, and security, both 
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in Moldova and beyond.  Therefore, one of my contributions is to extend the ‘country as 
confinement’ arguments and ‘camps as extra-territorial’ artifacts studies beyond its present 
territorial/external and security/humanitarianism dimensions to focus on the popular production 
and perception of key biopolitical, national, and legal strategies that use bordering tactics and 
sovereignty fictions to perpetuate exclusion or render new models of it. 
 In extending my “paradigmatic periphery” argument, I consider how the Moldovan 
government’s internal adoption of EU-backed legal procedures like “tolerated persons” and 
institutional constructions like “temporary accommodation centers” are rescaling the geopolitics 
of mobility along Europe’s outer edge in taking people rather than territory as its object. Whereas 
risks associated with territory have been conceived in geopolitical or national terms, risks 
associated with people are better conceived as biopolitical and I combine both visions here. 
Thus, my analysis of these proliferating migration-related spaces of detention and biopolitical 
boundary-making under EU auspices focuses on policies of territoriality and authority in a new 
guise. In approaching citizenship, migration, and border controls as specified in domestic 
legislation, the EU talks about parallel internalization (i.e. “legislative approximation” or “legal 
transposition”) too.  This internal incorporation via laws and duties marks border-transgressors 
generally as populations and individually as passport-wielding nationals, rather than their 
employers and thus is clearly political.   
 What is new and telling is the shift from external policing from a distance to a less 
obvious (and thus more insidious) and ostensibly neutral technical series of solutions via 
legislative and technological cooperation as a form of hegemonic control.  This internal adoption 
via EUBAM or the new ‘toleration’ regime happens as externalization and legal-bureaucratic and 
interpersonal integration for the EU, where it fears Moldovan government responsibilities to 
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readmit their own and other nations’ improperly documented migrants will go unmet. This 
situation illustrates well how such competing sovereignty frames are rescaled, i.e. in terms of 
national, regional, and socio-economic security. My argument it that the results show Moldova is 
a useful model for managers. Today, institutional processes including “approximation”, or 
mirroring EU practices/procedures, and “twinning” (i.e. shadowing a visiting EU technocrat) 
practices do this work.  In the dominant reality harmonization works as securitization, i.e. 
sharing technocratic procedures and control techniques, are increasingly visible in EUBAM for 
instance, and is thus eminently geographic. In my analysis, such moves suggest how the EU and 
Moldovan governments seek to expand rather than simply re-configure external relations via 
carrier sanctions or visa restrictions, extending sovereignty and security via surveillance and 
technical aid, theoretically in their geopolitical vision and on the ground for their agents, 
alongside residents and migrants. 
 In the Moldovan case, for instance, the recently passed Law on the Regime of Foreigners 
produces new people in its attendant spaces as with the awkwardly titled “migrant 
accommodation centers”, which are practically indistinguishable from run-of-the-mill detention 
facilities.  Semantics aside, these spaces work within broader attempts to recast, re-territorialize, 
and register Moldova(ns) as synonymous with insecurity and instability. Examining geographies 
of citizenship, exclusion, and detention around the EU in terms of spatial responses to security 
dilemmas and identity politics shows how sovereign EU and state powers, via territorial logics, 
are continuing to unfold. Yet, despite ceding some sovereignty and territory in the sense of 
rescaling border controls, Chisinau has been gaining powerful tools to consolidate institutional 
authority and population control Moldovan efforts to court Brussels and implement model EU 
policies are progressing despite the faint promise of EU visa-facilitation rather than full 
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membership. In this way, the traffic in sovereignty is seen as valuable because it allows the EU 
to extend it surveillance network and the Moldovan government is able to gain powerful new 
tools to (mis)manage its population of citizens and transit migrants.    
 I argue that this transformation marks an important shift in EU policy from external camp 
building as crisis response to more entrenched yet clandestine modes of control.  Whereas EU 
management efforts like its “border assistance missions” (e.g. EUBAM) and pilot “mobility 
partnerships” were intended to externalize risk as neutral technical moves, officials are now 
working to internalize the necessary controls associated with migration so they are internally 
consistent with member state procedures to create common border spaces and make them legible 
in new ways.  In adopting EU cooperation and harmonization demands (often verbatim) in the 
domain of migration legislation and border monitoring, the Moldovan government has allowed 
the extension of European sovereignty to its territory in important ways. In my view, the 
important shift reflects a broader transformation in which peripheral but proximal states are 
reproduced as spaces of confinement rather than as liberal safe zones of universal rights and 
protected privileges because, ironically, the EU cannot ensure the freedoms it was founded upon, 
despite appeals to humanitarian intervention. In sum, my macro-level geopolitical analysis of 
micro-level mobility controls helps explain how and why 21st century border and migration 
regimes work. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
CONTEXTUALIZING SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Political language --and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to 
Anarchists-- is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of 
solidity to pure wind (Orwell 1946). 
  
In this beloved country of ours, we not only have the best puppet master and peacock, but we also have 
the best mafioso, demagogue, Judas, and trickster…But we don't have any positive examples. We don't 
have the best farmer, composer, playwright, teacher, or professor. It looks like society is driven only by 
mafiosi, puppet masters, peacocks, and everyone else in this army of cavities who are rotting the country 
from the inside. Yes, they are tough and seem invincible today, but they are actually ephemeral. When 
they lose their jobs they go away, they evaporate, there is nothing left but a nickname. In the long term 
they do not get the last word (Tanase. 2012). 
 
Part I.  Background, “Context”, and Context 
A) Background and “Context” 
 This chapter offers a genealogy of geographic and nationalist visions of Moldova(ns) and 
their change over time to argue that while contests over its limits and contents are never settled, 
attempts to control these spaces and their denizens still endure.  In focusing on the flexibility of 
such attachments, my genealogy takes inspiration from Orwell’s quote about the instrumental, 
ethereal quality of ethnonyms and toponyms like “Moldovan” and is thus not limited to party 
politics or the English language. On the ground and in the mass media arena, popular Moldovan 
editorialists like Tanase echo these outsiders’ lamentations literally (i.e. “ephemeral” and 
“evaporate”) and reflexively  (i.e. ‘our beloved country’) via a mixed language of group conflict.  
In identifying political problems generally and in this context, both men specify the range of 
social and political problems in sweeping yet biting terms.  In Tanase’s more elaborate account, 
a sick public body and cycles of decay serve to bemoan the current social and political situation. 
In tracing the evolution of political language and frames invoked in claims about “this beloved 
country of ours” in this context, my argument shows why it is a mistake to consider formal 
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political statements alone without parallel critical reflection of their usage or absence in relevant 
counter-narratives. In this way, I seek to offer a genealogy of Moldovan sovereignty, 
territoriality, and national identity to show how power and authority are constructed in practice 
or incorporated into daily life.   
 To make my argument about the need to focus on the production of competing Moldovan 
governance schemes and the re-territorialization of competing hegemonic orders as  ‘sign of the 
times’, I focus on prosaic expressions of power used to regulate exclusion, i.e. self-association 
and political affiliation seen in terms of already existing government categories.  My data focus 
on showing why languages of bureaucracy are important but must be considered alongside 
popular statements in order to show how agents, from migrants to EU authorities practically 
articulate and spatialize differences, challenge hierarchical effects of attempts to legitimate or 
contest unity, and de-mystify formal narratives of Moldovan-ness. As a “stage”, how the power 
to regulate access into and out of or around Moldovan territory reflects the power of the state 
governments, as its agent, and the EU as hegemonic actor via attempts to orchestrate authority 
remotely.  Thus, my attention to bordering and citizenship practices, surrounding policies, and 
their transgressions or limitations from inside and outside suggests that certain sites like 
Moldova are about the drudgery of territorial control and population regulation rather than any 
particularly imminent danger like a nuclear bomb. 
 To study the banal institutionalization of authority and resistance to it, I follow Billig’s 
(2003) sympathetic but skeptical use of “context” in the critical discourse analysis (CDA) sense, 
rather than as simply a descriptive background painted onto a blank canvas or reflecting --not 
reproducing-- a static view of any precise setting in space or time3.  Like Elden (2009), my focus 
                                                
 3  
Thus, my approach sees language, text, and speech acts uttered by authorities and other citizens as both 
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on the “spatial extent of sovereignty” asks how geographies of fear, threat, and division play out 
territorially.  This focus matters precisely because how states that are unable to govern are 
effective recast as threats, territorially, is a key focus of critical geographic research.  Following 
Elden further, I accept that territory as a critical object of inquiry shows the “constitutive 
dimension” of geopolitical struggle, both formally and in popular narratives.  However, I 
disagree with his assessment, admittedly focused on non-European theaters, that any attempt to 
challenge the legitimate violence of the state is necessarily “terrorism”, as such a label 
misrepresents the nature of the TMR situation where locals in Moldova see the problem as 
economic and those in TMR see the official regime as terrorists rather than vice versa.  In this 
way, my focus on the transformation of territorial integrity and its relationship to sovereignty 
offers insights into contemporary geopolitics from a perspective rooted in localized and 
individualized bordering practices and biopolitical citizenship and visa controls.   
 
B) Argument 
 The argument in the chapter is that the frames used to mark territory, identity, and 
mobility in a borderland must be seen in genealogical terms. In offering a genealogy of external 
and internal territorial schemes evident in boundary changes and citizenship regimes I trace the 
production of sovereign state powers to regulate access to space and citizenship.  Thus, first I 
trace the remarkable fluidity of historical geographies and geopolitical boundary-making 
schemes surrounding formative visions that have long characterized this space as a zone of 
                                                                                                                                                       
descriptive and constitutive.  As practices reifying or resisting competing social visions, I understand 
context to matter in at least four ways: (1) internally among participants; (2) intertextually across 
strategies and discourses; (3) institutionally and extra-linguistically in terms of mid-range social science 
theories about specific situations; (4) and the wider socio-spatial context in which these discursive 
practices are embedded to focus on power relationships as embodied and enacted (Wodak and Weiss 
2003). 
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wildness. In establishing the plasticity of core frames used to mark and manage people in this 
place, starting with Herodotus’ chronicle and fast-forwarding through 19th century imperial 
rivalries, and the collapse of the Soviet Union including the birth of a sovereign, independent 
Republica Moldova (RM) in 1991 I outline the flexibility of instrumental territorial attachments 
in this zone.  This narrative seeks to establish the dynamic nature of the realm as seen from 
inside and out in the struggle to govern this realm and its inhabitants.  To contrast this historical 
view with a more modern, institutional account of bureaucratic frames I also outline key ideas 
about Moldova’s ethno-national and linguistic situation using metrics from government sources 
to show how citizens and their politicians have understood themselves in self-identification 
questionnaires and opinion polls.  As baselines, these ultimately ambiguous expressions 
including legislation and census data, as well as public opinion surveys and passport ownership 
figures show how national citizenship, in attachment to place, is constructed and popularly 
understood. I also emphasize formal, popular, and academic understandings of the national 
question in terms of pride and independence to show how the problem of citizenship is not 
debate about primordialism, in terms of passport ownership for instance, but rather pragmatic 
ones about economic livelihood. 
 My argument is that efforts to link sovereign territory to national borders and administer 
them via discrete notions of citizenship remain incomplete in Moldova.  If a key question for this 
project is how these notions are reconfigured across scales, from the geopolitical and national to 
the individual, then my effort to ask “what is sovereignty” and “how is it seen from above and 
below” shows the usefulness of the political geographic focus on bordering in an era when 
conventional sovereignty bundles are being reconfigured (Sassen 2005). If Moldovan practices 
can be situated in wider universe of nation-state scale controls and neoliberal migration 
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pressures, then my fine-grained focus on emergent thinking about how the produce borders and 
territory is warranted.  Likewise, if more critical approaches to boundary management have 
moved beyond their classification, erosion, or arbitrariness to highlight questions of discourse 
and identity (Donnan and Wilson 1998; Grundy-Warr and Schofield 2005; Kolossov 2006; 
Newman 2006; Schrad 2004), then my approach to the banal and institutional production of 
these spaces helps show why Moldova works as a model. 
 The chapter thus emphasizes participants’ discourse as simultaneously constitutive and 
consequential because it is about ideology, memory, power, and the production and re-
contextualization of spatial units like countries, but namely Moldova.  It shows how studying 
Moldova(ns) as an object of rule using attention to self-identification reveals the salience of 
competing and often contradictory socio-spatial categories and self-governance schemes. To so 
how Moldovans avoid being pinned down definitively, I seek to decode the conceptual frames 
used to show if and when my participants mediate their position(ality) or articulate lasting 
memories about their individual and collective experiences using categories like “nation” and 
“ethnicity”. This attention to conceptual framing as pioneered by Goffman (1974) has shown 
how people view experiences in society to affect their interactions and to structure social life.   
 Various data show a unified portrait of what ‘being Moldovan’ means remains elusive.  
To show the contention and variation, empirically, I detail how various other framings compare 
via census and public survey data (i.e. Ethnobarometer 2006, QSP 2009) alongside keyword 
counts and word cloud visualizations.  This approach works to show how my focus group 
participants deployed key frames during their interactions in comparison to in isolation. As 
political language in spoken or written social practice, discourse is “thus both socially-
constitutive and socially conditions—it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the 
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social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people…it helps to sustain 
and reproduce the status quo” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258).  My approach looks at words 
and texts in terms of their etymology and various contexts of production, to show how social 
continuities and political ruptures and reconciliations are experienced individually and 
collectively as social change over time and space. This focus on practice, perception, and 
performance exposes the prosaic construction of place and its reconstruction via ostensibly 
natural yet political and intra-textual references to “homeland” as territorial attachment and 
localized affect.  
 In looking to understand how people are put in place, I argue it is important to trace the 
evolution of ‘Moldovan identity’ as “subjectivity” as Foucault understands it, i.e. who one is 
when they act in a certain way, or the characteristic procedures resulting from individualization 
and differentiation (2007).  His approach matters here because it marks the shift from the 
exercise of sovereign power over individuals to the more risk-oriented and less fine-grained 
biopolitical shift to control over collective populations.  This definition is most appropriate for 
my research because it can accommodate both self-categorizations involved in isolated 
perceptions or descriptions and interactions as contexts and citizenship effects. Additionally, I 
find the CDA approach most useful because it does not assume language is powerful on its own.  
Instead, this model is useful for understanding how words gain power when more or less 
powerful people use them as instruments to organize attachments to places like homelands or the 
management of sovereign territorial borders via passport or customs controls as indices of 
governance or its absence. As a result, CDA is appropriate for my dissertation because it focuses 
on counter-narratives and exclusion as fine-grained effects of power.  These characteristics are 
visible where political language works to articulate differences, hierarchies, and struggles.  
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Finally, in considering how discourses work historically to dominate or legitimate these effects, I 
remain inspired by Habermas (1967).  Following his investigation of legitimacy and governance, 
my approach suggests the value in studying the interactions among social forces governing, 
organizing, or resisting power and their geographic expressions at multiple spatial scales.   
 
C) Big Picture Questions 
 How is Moldova ‘becoming’ in the world?  Attention to boundaries in this case demands 
attention to territory as particular kind of spatiality.  For Paasi (2008), the actual shape of 
becoming, symbolically and institutionally, reflects the processes of historical and spatial 
transformations for sovereign entities like nation-states.  Thus, attention to how a space 
‘becomes’, discursively and materially, matters.  Likewise, for Elden, territory itself is a question 
of etymology and genealogy.  In his influential view, it reflects the legal and technical controls 
used to legitimate the fiction of a sovereign monopoly on violence. Arguably the most important 
space in the Moldovan case is the “patrie” or “homeland”.   As a representative or material form 
it is similarly complicated.  In simple scientific and geographic dictionaries published in 
Bucharest it refers to “the country in which a person is born and is a citizen” (Brais 2002: 111, 
emphasis mine). Some Hungarians in Transylvania would understand but might disagree as they 
are excluded in this understanding, for instance.  In this view the state scale and jus soli 
territorial standard are applied in a civic vein.  More complex and less consistent notions are 
understood in wider use. A similarly convoluted view of “motherland” is also involved in this 
territorial relationship.  For instance, the gold standard Romanian-English dictionary defines 
“patrie” as a feminine form expressing “1. (one’s) native land or country; mother country; 
(one’s) fatherland; home, home-land, motherland; birth-place. 2. fig[urative] home” (Levitchi 
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2007: 728). Here, more abstract and even gendered notions of familial bonds and sacred spaces 
emerge in a way that separates them from any particular state or regime.   
 What is the Moldovan ‘homeland’ and how is it seen formally and in popular views? As 
Anderson observed in his chapter on “Patriotism and Racism”, “social change or transformed 
consciousnesses, in themselves do much to explain the attachment that peoples feel for the 
inventions of their imaginations—or, to revive a question…why people are ready to die for these 
inventions” (1983: 141, emphasis original).  In his influential view “political love” of 
“passionate patriotism” can logically be best understood via language and the vernaculars of 
kinship or home, i.e. motherland, Vaterland, patria. This vision is consistent with 
Ethnobarometer (2006) about the importance of having Moldovan parents and Quasi-States 
Project (2010) data showing the titular group characterizes itself in terms of residency though not 
exclusively.  These terms designate ways of conceptualizing naturalization as membership in the 
nation. Like all political language, they seek to anchor group continuity, establish social stability, 
and consolidate disparate ideas.  I also am inspired by Anderson’s study of the visual tactics 
related to the  institutionalization of power in museums.  While of course museums are not the 
most popular institutions in most societies, their political influence is well known (Anderson 
1983; Hooper 1994).  As authorities, curator perspectives are situated as a bridge running 
between formal citizenship laws and their cultural contents as expressed in formal governance 
practice and perception like the laws and regimes detailed in chapter two on the one hand, and 
informal talk about Moldovan territory and identity surrounding trigger images in focus groups 
on the other.  Because they explicitly serve as formal experts and inherently knowledgeable 
“guardians of tradition” (Anderson 1983) in the sense of those authorities who forge connections 
with a disparate and distant past (Hobsbawm 1990), including them is important. 
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I argue it is important to balance the formal and iconographic with the informal and banal 
constructions of nationality to understand how agents use such frames to exercise authority and 
manage access to a territory.  Like most constructivists who stress the need to bind people and 
their past together for political reasons, I too focus on museum curators.  For the influential 
Anderson, work focuses on “institutions of power”, i.e. the “census, map, and museum”. He 
notes the Indonesian case might not represent history museums everywhere and invites 
comparison. He shows how the museum, as an archaeological and historical project to stabilize 
the nation in space and time, is evidence of technologies of power, like the census and maps as 
totalizing projects to make certain subjects legible and legitimate. In my case, these subjects are 
Moldovan borders.  I seek to extend Anderson, who correctly describes these projects to control, 
categorize, and quantify but does not take such care to deconstruct the museum as he does the 
census and map.  Consequently, he overlooks how exhibits are represented, interpreted, 
expropriated, ignored, and/or incorrectly fabricated as signs of the times. After accepting his 
invitation to study museums, my findings show this oversight is remarkable because of the 
conceptual disconnect between formal agents’ visions and the banality of other forms of 
identification.  
 Elsewhere, academics including anthropologists (e.g. Verdery) and historians (e.g. King) 
have also paid attention to elite, symbolic cultural realms of curators and historians, i.e. “political 
culture”, in this context.  Their work emphasizes the interactions among Romanian national 
elites and socialist state-building projects. For them, elites drive discursive efforts to construct a 
“national body” through art, literature, dance, and folklore (Verdery 1991). In my project, the 
“political” is similarly seen as ‘embodied’ in popular imaginations and thus goes beyond elite 
influences assumed to direct social life, even if elites make nations. My findings detail 
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participants’ comments about displays of national identity and common culture -- i.e. “that music 
is totally Balkanized”; “I counted many mistakes”; and “I agree!  Not Moldovan at all”—and 
indicate the museum (institutionally) and its agents (individually, informally) should not be taken 
for granted as a consistent, neutral, or exhaustive source of nation-ness. Curators’ comments 
about the opportunity to correct what they perceive as problematic and popular misconceptions 
are revealing because they mark the conceptual distance separating formal and informal views of 
how Moldovan-ness is constructed.  The comments are consistent with Anderson and Siam 
Mapped in their approach to image, territory, and “geo-bodies” to suggest how sovereignty is 
institutionalized and spatialized (Winichakul 1997). 
 Because territorial strategies framed by nation building and designed to influence control 
over citizens, bordering practices reify particular types of power and displace specific 
populations (Sack 1983). In contemporary analyses, questions about frontier management require 
attention to the interaction among institutional processes and individual identities as narrated by 
(supra)state actors and citizens (Newman and Paasi 1998). According to Megoran (2007), it is a 
mistake to suggest that borderland dwellers are simply passive victims of a totalizing power, 
especially in the face of corrupt Moldovan officials (Carasciuc 2007). A geographic approach 
accepts this notion that territory is never perfectly sealed although it is typically represented as 
such (Van Houten and Van Naerrsen 2002). My argument also accepts Chalfin’s (2006) analysis 
of customs controls and notes that policing borders and controlling the circulation of persons and 
things can reify particular government-issued or gendered (Silvey 2004a/b, 2006) ideas about 
which kinds of people and qualities of goods can circulate to which destinations. Transparency 
International-Moldova’s longitudinal surveys and semi-structured interviews with commercial 
agents conducted in 2002 and again in 2006 have documented experiences and perceptions of the 
 
 
68 
customs services --but not Border Guards or border zone residents —to find that despite 
European training, standards, and aid, Moldova’s frontiers remain permeable and unimproved 
given endemic corruption (Carasciuc 2007). My findings echo Rumford’s (2006) view of frontier 
management as a vector of social change.   
 Like other geographers, I argue for more attention to the boundary build-up to reveal how 
complex interchanges between government actors and citizens affect concerns about national 
security and territorial sovereignty (Purcell and Nevins 2005). Discussing the “paradox of 
borders” under Europeanization, I am also in agreement with Walters (2004) when he argues that 
state borders remain pre-eminent frontiers in geopolitics and questions how regional blocs 
acquire frontier characteristics. In considering how borders and territory are inscribed, my 
research relies upon ‘critical geopolitics’ to chart where ‘threats’ to the nation are located on 
mental maps and how geopolitical narratives are organized in terms of ‘home/away’, ‘us/them’, 
and blocs of difference or patterns of exclusion (O’Tuathail 1996).  This approach matters to 
studies of mobility because migration is often constructed as a problem of national security and 
territorial integrity when organizing efforts to police it (Tesfahuney 1998). Attention to borders, 
threats, outsiders, and efforts to confront them allows new details to surface surrounding how 
strategies of control have evolved in the post-Soviet context (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 1999; 
O’Loughlin, O’Tuathail and Kolossov 2005; Smith 1999).    
 This situation highlights problems with traditional, exclusive notions of citizenship and 
territorial sovereignty not so much because so many citizens work abroad per se, but rather 
because the actual proliferation of different rules (i.e. bi-lateral, informal) has rendered such a 
variegated borderland and citizenship regime, thus exposing key fictions related to state 
sovereignty in terms of exclusivity and legitimacy. This uncertain empirical reality is 
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compounded when considering the neoliberal and transnational contexts of EU bordering.  This 
nuance is especially relevant in terms of nationalized and geopolitical bordering practices which 
have parallel effects and structure opportunities for migrants while challenging notions that there 
is a natural link between places or peoples and place-based identity (Van Houten and Van 
Naerssen 2002).  For instance, Romanian President Basescu noted as recently as May 2012 that 
he wanted to see the EU treat Moldova as a “border state” rather than a “buffer zone” during his 
introduction to President Timofti; he also offered more tangible expressions of connectivity 
including “one million books” and a new church (Adevarul 2012b).  True to form, his PC 
counterparts lamented again how such moves are the result of (a) external pressure from the EU 
to secure its external common border via demands on Romanian frontier controls; and (b) 
internal fears from PC about loss of sovereignty in the face of alleged Romanian designs to 
reunite and reincorporate Moldovan brothers.  They see a failure to maintain what Voronin and 
his cronies call “strategic partnerships” with Russia.  Such exchanges show the value of 
transnational social field approaches to post-Soviet borderlands and questions of ethno-territorial 
homelands more generally (Diener 2007; Kaiser 1994).  
Likewise, my approach relies on data about identity and territoriality and is squarely 
within the tradition of political geography studies on borders.  It is also sensitive to more 
contemporary critiques of this thematic core where I also consider competing formal and popular 
narratives of demarcation and its effects.  In asking how various authorities cast problems and 
comparing answers to how other borderlanders and migrants see the situation are or are not 
viewed in terms of social inclusion/exclusion, national security threats, or authentic entitlements 
to (ethnic) homelands I seek to capture a more grounded and pluralistic set of views from 
authorized and unauthorized subjects.   
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D) Individualizing controls 
 In addition to the cultural, historical, and political geographers and sociologists discussed 
above, political anthropologists and sociologists are also relevant for understanding my data and 
methods.  Following Trouillot (2001) and others like him (Mitchell 2004; Sparke 2006) who 
seek to reconsider the link between state-making and nation-building in the context of neoliberal 
globalization, I also privilege the processes, practices, and effects evident in tensions between 
capital accumulation and territorial sovereignty.  However, while we both seek to understand 
such tensions, I go about it in a more empirical way than most (e.g. Trouillot) and beyond 
borders (e.g. Brown 2010) or technocrats (e.g. Barry 2006) in focusing on migration, 
governance, and citizenship together a weakly consolidated country like Moldova with a large 
but young diaspora. Two key heuristics are relevant in this aspect of my study. I find it useful to 
consider Trouillot’s explicitly spatial and geographic four-part model of how ‘state ideas’ work.  
His process model sees state effects evident in: “isolation” or the production of atomized 
individualized subjects; “identification”, or the realignment of the atomized subjectivities along 
collective lines within which individuals see themselves as the same; “legibility”, where the 
production of a language and knowledge for governance and tools to classify and regulate 
collectives, and “spatialization”, or the production of boundaries and jurisdiction (126).  Despite 
its explicitly anti-empirical stance, this approach and its equally explicit geographic logic 
motivates my project when it calls for more ethnographic approaches to studying modes of 
power.  Indeed, this model of “state effects” as process, perception, and practice is remarkably 
consistent with Brubaker’s approach to “Ethnicity without Groups” (2004) insofar as the 
“categorization”, “identification”, and “groupness” trinity is used to portray anachronistic 
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approaches to identity as rather more contingent yet power-laden processes.  
So, while sympathetic to Hann and Kurti’s respective (2001) criticisms of Trouillot’s 
model because it ignores the localized variability of experiences with post-socialism and EU 
expansion, his processual approach is worth adopting because it helps show just how these 
macro-scale effects are really understood in the context of localized outcomes in the post-
socialist sphere.  In this way, I blend anthropological approaches to state power and its 
institutionalization in borderland territories.  My focus is thus on exactly how citizenship 
privileges are forged via more prosaic approaches to “the political geography of stateness“ 
(Painter 1999) in daily interactions with officials, the discursive construction of (national) 
identity in banal and iconographic visions, the effects of visual methodologies, interviews with 
officials and activists, survey measures of socio-economic and territorial change, I use focus 
group studies in a novel and revealing way.  As a result, I chart sovereignty as a power, manifest 
in practices including discourses people use to bring themselves into line with particular self-
perceptions and political categorization associated with what ‘being Moldovan’ means in this 
instance.   
 A key question in social science today is if and how states matter.  In recent approaches 
to the anthropology of the state, the trend is to use both theoretical and empirical tools that do not 
reify states, nations, or identity ‘as things’ or otherwise take them for granted, categorically or 
collectively, as pre-existing constructions that resonate with any depth, though they may indeed 
still dominate as my keyword counts confirm.  These perceptions, which inform practice, are 
thus about the dynamics of the relationship between central government authority and territorial 
consolidation but their precise contents remain contested and regimes of practice have only 
recently received attention to their territoriality and mobility (Agnew 2005).  As expressions of 
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sovereignty and shifting notions of (state or national) security, i.e. the shift from “Frontier 
Guards” to “Border Managers” in the Moldovan case, such processes emerge as “state effects” 
(Abrams 1988).  In practice, these moves appear within competing government efforts to codify 
and regulate emergent citizen-subjects and migrant populations.  As biopolitical bordering 
technologies, they are part of shifting neoliberal governance in spaces like NAFTA or the 
EU/ENP and thus show how variegated regimes are emerging to govern mobility (Ong 2006; 
Walters 2004).   
 Confused attempts to govern these people and their legacies reflect the emergence of new 
forms of allegiance and dispersed sovereignty both domestically and abroad despite the enduring 
idiom of the nation-state evident in border and citizenship controls. It is thus appropriate to 
consider citizenship and territoriality in a biopolitical sense with attention to governmentality 
where subjectivity is expressed informally using interests and idioms rather than solid-state 
representations of identity understood ‘as thing’ (Brubaker 2004).  As a result, I am able to show 
how competing security and boundary regimes are constituted via state effects visible in 
boundary-making practices and institutional haggling between border guards and customs 
agents, among many others, and internalized or avoided by migrants and borderlanders. 
Ultimately, academic contributions (Brubaker 1991; Meinhoff and Galasinka 2002, 2003; 
Wodak 2003) rooted in the discursive study of Austrian, German, Hungarian, Polish, and 
Romanian borderlanders’ experiences and understandings of citizenship have proven inspiring.  
These studies are useful because they show how new accounts of migration in Austria, Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania were explained via ‘old’ historical grand narratives.  Similarly, post-EU 
enlargement narratives are also seen as form of negotiation and resistance to grand narratives at 
the trans-cultural and historical scales such that how they are re-contextualized and re-
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territorialized is quite revealing about the logic and salience of social and political claims and 
scales of community.  These findings are not only valid from a theoretical perspective.  Rather, 
the Polish case is indirectly reflected in my focus group transcripts, where it was the most 
frequently mentioned by participants in terms of comparing ostensibly relevant experiences with 
EU bordering (6 groups: 3 civil society, 2 students, 1 return migrant). 
 One of my key contributions, therefore, is to show how both territorial and biopolitical 
approaches to citizenship and bordering offer evidence of sovereign power to exclude or 
incorporate subjects and manage objects.  Consistent with Arendt or Agamben (2000) in 
attention to the power to control life and death as a key biopolitical concern, it is clear that the 
limit figure of the tolerated person also reflects micro-controls over the ability to put people to 
death (Coleman and Grove 2009).  In a concrete, embodied sense these effects are evident in my 
research where controls are intensified and embodied in the specific values like daily caloric 
intake for transit migrants and visa application procedures and checks for Moldovan citizens 
while at home or before going abroad (Law on Regime of Foreigners 2010). Given that 
Moldovans are reportedly among the least proud of their nationality worldwide and 50% of 
working age citizens labor abroad4, such exclusionary and burdensome effects are worth 
considering (Mosneaga 2009).   
 
Part II.  Historical Background and Imperial Designs 
A) Origins and Imaginations 
                                                
 4 World Values Survey 2006.  34% of Moldovans not proud to a degree, fourth in the worldwide 
sample and first in Europe, behind Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, respectively.   Similarly but to a lesser 
degree, my participants have more pride than average and only about 27% of them reported they are not 
proud to a degree which is not surprising given my over-reliance on politicians, teachers, activists, and 
ethnographers. 
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 In the past and still today, questions about Europe’s limits have proven contentious and 
subject to various modes of control. Indeed, Moldova’s role has always proven itself particularly 
subject to fashionable ideas about how to govern it since it is arguably the historical origin of the 
western geopolitical imagination.  Seen as a space of contestation and interventions between all 
kinds of great powers, cold war camps, and EU stakeholders, the evolution of governmental 
designs and geopolitical visions, alongside their localized effects, remain worth studying 
genealogically and geographically as enduring attempts to regulate exclusion and govern 
borderlands remotely as strategic sites.  Taken literally, in his chronicles of the northern Black 
Sea shores and the Danube delta in 450 BC, Herodotus wrote about the “bearded ones” and 
“their babble”, with the resulting onomatopoeia “bar-bar-babble” yielding the word “barbarian” 
to signify the grain-trading nomads of the southern Eurasian steppe. In his pioneering attempt to 
conduct an autopsy, i.e. literally to see for one’s self, he showed respect for the Scythians and the 
value of trade with them. This view of those in the delta and across the steppe was remixed when 
later generations of Greek-speaking playwrights juxtaposed bearded, brown migrants against a 
city-dwelling, sedentary, ‘European’ civilization to help unify city-states against Persian invaders 
instead of each other. Indeed, in the Romanian language (and other Latin tongues) today the 
legacy is considered banal given that “barbat” is “man” and “barba” remains “beard”.   
 Though obviously not Moldovan in any way, these pre-Slavic groups were the original 
‘other’ in the birth of what is now naturalized as a core move in the western geographic 
imagination, i.e. Orientalism and the construction of European difference contra outsiders.  As an 
ethnographic and geographic artifact, the Black Sea region and its littoral have arguably “given 
birth to the Siamese twins of civilization and barbarism” (Ascherson 1995:6). The barbarian and 
Black Sea referents are thus first of all a legacy of externalization via narration. It also marks one 
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of the first known attempts to use ethnographic and geographic tools to chart a poorly understood 
and absolutely foreign other. Given these historical-geographic origins in the making and 
binding of ‘Europe’ as a space made in a mirror of an awful other, it seems reasonable to claim 
that the north shore of the Black Sea --rather than the eastern Mediterranean as conventional 
geostrategists from Mackinder (1904) and Kaplan (2009) to critical academics like Said (1979) 
or Mitchell (1989) have argued— has long served as site of European insecurity and illegibility, 
despite repeated efforts to govern its resources and people in face of war and migration. Thus, 
efforts to bring this zone under control and the perennial failure to do so suggests the contents 
and limits of European powers over outsiders seen in the ability to bring their stated views and 
plans into reality.   
 As a geographic artifact originating in this context, in its current form the EU sees 
Moldova as continuation of existential threats and the material limits of European continental 
civilization (EUBAM 2006). Though beyond the scope of this dissertation, a useful history of 
this realm would also note how Dacian tribes were assimilated into Roman culture (i.e. local 
women were given retired soldiers looking to start new lives and farms on the frontier) between 
100-270 A.D. The timeline would also chart the emergence of Slavs from 500-900 A.D. to 
outline the most recognizable proto-types, culturally or linguistically, of some groups that claim, 
based on their alleged historical existence, to populate the area today.  The same history would 
show Rome’s external geographic visions about bordering have had lasting and localized effects 
on borderlanders and their organization as a zone of intermixing and settlement.  As evidence of 
variable modes of governance consistent with their times, the latest efforts to externalize rules of 
this ill-defined territory remain signs of their times.   
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B) Independence and Intervention since 1812 
 As perennial site of insecurity, a genealogy of Moldovan sovereignty shows how it has 
emerged as an object of governance, or lack thereof, since 1812.  As modern object of control, 
imperial and national contests have left their mark and show how the European perimeter was 
contested since the Napoleonic era.  During imperial contests between Austrian, Ottoman, and 
Russian empires Moldova and Bessarabia were repeatedly carved up and reconfigured 
territorially (See Map 1).  First in 1792 and again in 1812, Ottomans ceded lands to Russians in 
the Treaty of Bucharest and left the area between the Prut and Nistru and even Danube rivers 
under Moscow’s control. Bessarabian Moldova was detached and remained a Russian 
principality until 1918 while Romanian Moldavia, of which Bessarabia had long been a part, 
united with Wallachia and Transylvania in 1859 to form the Kingdom of Romania.  Later, in 
1866 it achieved independence from the Ottomans, with Russian help they still like to remind 
Moldovans, in 1877-78.  In 1918 Bessarabia declared independence and announced its intention 
to reunite with Romania.  In 1919, a short-lived Bessarabian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) was 
born but quickly abolished by French and Polish forces. After the Ukrainian SSR was established 
in 1922, a small autonomous Moldovan model followed from 1924-1940 in Transnistria among 
minority ethnic Romanian communities before Romanian-Nazi occupation collapsed in 1944.  
The interwar years saw limited recognition of this arrangement by the Allied Powers, the 
formation of a Soviet government in exile, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that returned 
Bessarabia to Soviet control.  During the age of nationalism and again during the interwar era of 
self-determination, Moldova followed leading currents but never for long suggesting it has long 
been a site for fashionable experimenting with regime change.   
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 Further territorial contests during the interwar period were also consistent with Soviet-era 
nationalities policies as part of their efforts to extend territorial control and via conventional 
geopolitical buffers.  In 1940, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) was established 
on most of the territory of Bessarabia and merged with the western parts of the former 
Moldavian SSR (See Map 2). Bessarabia was then divided between the Moldavian SSR (70% of 
the territory, 80% of the population) and the older Ukrainian SSR. Bessarabia's northern and 
southern districts were allotted to Ukraine, while some territories on the left (eastern) bank of the 
Nistru (present day Transnistria) and previously part of Ukraine, were given to Moldavia. The 
Soviet republic created in the wake of annexation did not follow Bessarabia's traditional border. 
Territories where ethnic Ukrainians formed a large portion of the population went to Ukraine, 
while a small strip of Transnistria east of the Nistru with a significant (49% of inhabitants) 
Moldovan population was incorporated into the MSSR. The transfer of Bessarabia's Black Sea 
and Danube frontage to Ukraine insured its control by a ‘stable’ Soviet republic. This transfer, 
along with the division of Bessarabia, was also designed to discourage future Romanian claims 
and irredentism. Following the Soviet takeover, many Bessarabians who were accused of 
supporting the deposed Romanian administration were deported and/or executed (For detailed 
review see King 1999).   
 
C) Post-Soviet Border Demarcation and Territorial Challenges 
 Moldovan territorial sovereignty remains dogged by earlier regimes despite a preference 
to develop ‘next generation’ tools and partnerships.  When Moldova left the USSR in 1991 it lost 
access to the Black Sea through navigable waterways because the Danube was on Ukrainian 
territory. Then, at its closest point, the mouth of the Prut was still several hundred meters from 
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the Ukraine–Moldova border. Ukraine lost access by land to its town of Reni except across 
Moldovan territory.  In 1993 Moldova claimed a 1.5 km strip of Ukrainian land along the 
Danube. According to a settlement reached in 1998, Ukraine gave up a 430 m strip of land near 
the village of Giurgiulesti and about 150 ha of land next to Basarabeasca railway station as well 
as some other property. According to the same 1998 agreement on exchange of land, Moldova 
gave Ukraine control over a 7.7 km stretch of secondary road linking Izmail to Reni. The 
demarcation of the state border is still underway in compliance with the “Agreement between 
Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova on the state borderline of August 18, 1999”, which was 
ratified by the Ukrainians in 2000 and signed but not ratified by the Moldovans. 
 Today, the Moldovan border with Ukraine remains particularly ambiguous and more 
variably problematic5 compared to the Romanian one. On August 24, 1991, the Ukrainian 
Parliament declared itself an independent state; the Moldovans declared independence three days 
later. Their borders, all of which were intra-Republic before 1991, follow former Soviet 
divisions. The delimitation of all but 5-6 disputable sectors along the Northern and Southern part 
of the frontier was completed 1995-1999, but obviously the TMR portion is not properly 
delineated and controls remain precarious. Post-independence fears including ethnic retribution 
and persecution by Romanian-Moldovan nationals have eroded in the face of economic 
stagnation and labor emigration. TMR exists as a mix of Soviet-style nation building with 
Russian-approved protections, including special passport and energy access. Also in terms of 
sovereignty, swathes (421 km) of Moldovan territory along the Ukrainian border remain outside 
Chisinau’s control. Still, cooperation with Ukraine remains limited, as a border demarcation 
treaty between Chisinau and Kiev has been drafted since 2001 but has not been ratified given 
concerns about property rights and road access along the main highway between Stefan Voda 
                                                
 5 The full demarcation process was not scheduled for completion until 2012 
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and Odessa.  Finally, “hydro-technical” problems with a power plant privatized by TMR in 2004 
built during the Soviet era also remain unresolved.  
 Cooperation on Moldo-Ukrainian border control reflects EU bordering as externalization 
in similar ways to efforts along the Prut, but the context varies so it is important to note that 
while both are expert-led to securitize and manage discrete populations like students or prevent 
human trafficking.  Indeed, the fact that the Nistru is adjacent to a pseudo-state (i.e. 
unrecognized conflict zone) and a non-accession candidate for EU membership (i.e. Ukraine), 
means the role of EUBAM observers differs from the role of FRONTEX agents along the Prut, 
while Eurocentric, is qualitatively different. A series of trans-boundary environmental 
disagreements involving Ukraine and Moldova, both of which encountered transportation 
problems created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Joint Ukrainian-Moldovan Border 
Demarcation Commission was established and has met since 2002 to demarcate the Moldo-
Ukrainian state border. In 2010, based on the request of Partner Services, EUBAM deployed a 
“short-term expert “ (UNDP 2011) on border demarcation and a 452 km segment of the states’ 
joint border began in July 2010. Upon EUBAM-backed expert coordination and direct 
participation, assistance and monitoring was completed for about 112 km of border, rendering 
both paper and electronic versions of the satellite maps requested prepared by the EU Satellite 
Center.  These were provided to the Moldovan and Ukrainian delegations by EUBAM in January 
2011. Demarcation works will continue in 2011 and could be concluded in 2012 if funding and 
technical issues continue to be resolved at the present rate. EUBAM received another request for 
a short-term expert to support partners working to complete demarcation in 2012 (UNDP 2011). 
 
D) The Romanian Border 
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 Along the Prut, the sovereignty problem has been multiplied, not divided.  Between 1991 
and 2001, Moldovans traveled to Romania without restrictions.  Then, prior to EU enlargement 
for Romania, Moldovans were required to carry passports instead of drivers’ licenses and to 
apply for and purchase visas. Since 2004 and Romanian accession to the EU but not its Schengen 
treaty on internal and external border controls, a humiliating visa application process has 
emerged for Moldovans lacking Romanian passports or elusive Schengen visas.  These bordering 
projects are not located at the territorial nation-state’s “hard outer shell” (Herz 1957), but instead 
in the centrally located capital. These sites are far removed from the country’s outer perimeter 
but are the latest generation of border controls for Moldovans going west.  These “common visa 
application centers” for EU countries are designed as clearinghouses to coordinate visa requests 
from Moldovans for newer EU member states like Hungary via a single embassy or consulate.  
Though EU members only reject officially 3% of these applicants (Democracy and Freedom 
Watch 2011), the procedures are costly in terms of time, money, and self-respect such that 
overall they are considered particularly oppressive emotionally/psychologically.  For instance, as 
the Romanian-backed documentary film “Where Europe Ends” morbidly illustrates, during hot 
summers and cold winters queuing on the sidewalk without restrooms or shade, the potential 
damage to applicants’ health only compounds the effects of exclusion, as when the film shows an 
applicant convulsing from an exposure-induced seizure  (Mungiu-Pippidi 2010).  In response to 
restrictions on visa negotiations, and given increasing application rejection rates, a race for 
alternatives has erupted.  
 
E) Great Powers, Grand Designs 
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 As a geographic artifact originating in this context, in its current form Moldova is part of 
these lands that continue to be imagined to represent existential threats and the material limits of 
European continental civilization. Though the contents and contours of such othering projects 
have changed, the space and its residents remain paradigmatic objects of exclusion. These ideas 
about territoriality reflect the area’s organization and suggest enduring appeals to frontier 
management. As Orientalist scholarship has documented, arguments about the defense of Europe 
and Europeans are always related to disagreements about its eastern extent; these arguments are 
never settled (Kuus 2004, 2005; The Economist 2010; Turnock 2004). As noted above, over the 
last century Moldova’s place in interwar “Greater Romania” was recast with Soviet-style ethno-
territorial units via forced displacement. Geostrategically, for influential expatriates like 
Brzezinksi (1998), this scenario shows The Grand Chessboard remains marked by a “global 
zone of percolating violence” juxtaposed against the “critical core of Europe’s stability”.   
 Even more recently, Stratfor’s George Friedman6 (2010) labeled “Bessarabia as a key 
piece on the chessboard” but after walking across it still is unsure why it exists. Moreover, given 
his dubious role as leader of disgraced corporate spy shop and discredited fear monger (Fisher 
2012), such observations must be considered especially carefully. As Eastern European émigrés 
it is unsurprising both see Russia suspiciously and tie Moldova’s strategic options to big states 
like Ukraine. For other European observers like Heinz (2008: 1):  “From the perspective of the 
EU, historical Bessarabia today is a crisis zone on Europe’s easternmost periphery and mass 
outmigration is perceived as a threat.”  In more general and critical analyses, understanding 
                                                
 6 An outspoken Hungarian turned Texan whose hegemonic position as director of private 
intelligence/risk analysis outfit Strategic Forecasting, i.e. Stratfor, known for well-placed sources 
generating expensive “situation reports” from anonymous sources and, as one critic put it after Wikileaks 
posted Stratfor’s internal documents and exposed links to their new “chief geostrategists” Robert Kaplan, 
Max Fisher (Kaplan colleague at The Atlantic) noted of this “joke” of a “shadow CIA” is seen as “like 
The Economist, only a week later and several hundred times more expensive.” 
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frontier management is known to require attention to interactions among institutions and their 
identification and atomization strategies as narrated by (supra)state actors like the EU and 
citizens as migrant subjects, for example (Newman and Paasi 1998). Moreover, it is well known 
that migrants’ efforts to elude border controls have affected the character of the border regime 
just like flows of contraband such as 500m bootleg vodka pipelines running under the Nistru 
along the TMR/RM border to connect Jampil in the north to Vinnitsia in Ukraine.  Recently, 30 
tons of bootleg alcohol was seized as evidence of poor control 2010 (Security Service of Ukraine 
2010); more than 30 million cigarettes have also been seized in recent years (Culic 2008; Lavrov 
2009; Mungiu-Pippidi 2010). Uneven borders along the EU periphery have already affected 
Moldovans and risk making permanent the “paper curtain” that has appeared to replace the iron 
one (Berg and Ehin 2006). This situation, for elites and outsiders, is a problem needing academic 
and political intervention.  As a crisis scenario reflecting sovereignty controls, it shows what 
happens when exceptions and temporary statuses become permanent.   
 In the modern era, Russian czars, Soviet commissars, and EU commissioners --despite 
their disparate contexts-- have all shared concerns about how to govern this area as external site 
of control.  To trace this transformation’s territorial arc, I argue it is important to offer a 
genealogy of the Moldovan and European borderlands.  As with others (Elden 2008), I too 
accept it is important to maintain a focus on etymology in such cases. Using such logic, the 
historian Kate Brown has privileged the conceptual move from “ethnic borderland to Soviet 
heartland”7 in her archival and self-proclaimed biographic approach to the production of this 
realm.  There, she identifies the pre-Soviet “kresy”, as a space that has been rendered as an 
“amorphous zone”, a “multiethnic mosaic” with “no definite boundaries”, with “no definite 
                                                
 7 Not to be confused with Mackinder’s similarly-title model but consistent with his later notion of 
the inner or marginal crescent (1919), when Baltic and Black Sea buffer zones were instruments of 
external powers that have not lost their appeal. 
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polity”, since it is “[n]ever the center of things, the kresy has played the role in east-central 
Europe of an arena in which warring parties have time and again fallen into the exhausted 
embrace of worn-out prize fighters.  It is a place of synthesis and fusion where unlikely partners 
have come together in explosive creativity” (Brown 2004: 2-3). Others have characterized these 
emergent geographies similarly: as a return to the “colonial march”, i.e. a “neutral strip or belt of 
severance…without inhabitants or value, awaiting settlement and apportionment”… The march, 
then, is something like an interzone between powers’” (Pounds 1951 in Walters 2004: 683). As 
these scholars note, the precise meaning of Ukraine is this “march or border area” (Walters 2004: 
684 from Foucher 1998). More recently, Balibar argued Europe itself is best conceptualized as a 
borderland (2009) where conflicting patterns of representation have long dominated formative 
visions of border landscapes.  These relics, including the center-periphery or colonial march, are 
reflected when borders are relocated to ‘marginal’ areas. The contradiction between discrete 
geostrategic visions and ambiguous demarcation efforts reflects the modern bordering process, 
its origins, and future directions.   
 Other key theoretical pieces are useful in understanding the production of Moldova(ns) as 
exercise in variegated sovereignty seen in the long term.  In my view, this situation is best 
summarized via an interdisciplinary approach that includes pithy titles like “The Art of Not 
Being Governed” (Scott 2009), “Ordering the Crush Zone” (O’Loughlin 1999), and “Taming the 
Wild Field” (Sunderland 2004).  In each of these studies, the core historical and political 
geographic problems of identity, insecurity, and sovereignty emerge in useful ways. For 
O’Loughlin, drawing on Fairgrieve’s (1915) label for this territory between the Don and Dnieper 
Rivers, the region is constructed via localized effects and discourses of “chaos” versus a vision 
of “cosmos”, rooted in Eurocentric visions, which fear instability and conflicts among great 
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powers. Taking these observations together and in the spirit of Orwell’s (1946) ideas about 
“political language” above, these authors unmask powerful falsehoods about hegemonic 
discourses of danger and their durability. I seek to follow their lead.   
 In addition to externalization of European threats seen in terms of Orientalism, it is 
important to consider this durable narrative of harmony and instability.  For Sunderland, the 
“Wild Field” label is also indicative of early (but also enduring) Russian colonialism, explicitly 
those painting Bessarabia, i.e. the space between the Prut and Nistru Rivers, as the opposite of 
Russian civilization.  According to Sunderland, for early Russian expansionists, it was important 
to create space between and pacify those living within lands housing “terrifying Tavrians” who 
had migrated from the Crimea and the “scary Scythians” presumed to threaten Russian 
civilization in early 19th century visions of romantic nationalism. These identifications and 
imagined connections elide nation- state- and empire in anachronistic but no less powerful 
territorial and imagined geographic ways.  Indeed, my work with museum curators’ map 
collection on display today is not so different from the early 1800s when “archaeological atlases” 
proliferated to perpetuate precisely this kind of label to promote myths about savages. These 
discursive tools are evidence of longstanding and competing efforts to forge imagined 
connections to mythical, wild nature.  In such narratives, territorial expansion was a formative 
element in elite Russian culture throughout the region, with even Pushkin’s Road to Erzurum 
(1835) invoking this central metaphor of Russian power (albeit in the Turkish context and with 
an eye on Kars) when he confessed to being both tempted with and terrified of the “wild beauty” 
of the “Kalmyk girl” en route to the southern reaches of the Russian empire (quoted in 
Sunderland: 97-98). What is interesting today is how people still try, on occasion, to put 
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themselves and their self-perceptions into such old frameworks, especially given what kinds of 
changes this region has experienced.   
 Reflecting more broadly on the elusive character of territory and identity as well as its 
border landscape invoked in terms of physical geography, the Moldovan case is not particularly 
unique.  Moreover, these reflections are not purely academic or even necessarily European, 
though they are somewhat Eurocentric, as a recent New York Times opinion column on “The 
Undiscovered Country” recently explained (Jacobs 2012).  In thinking about characterizations of 
such meta-geographic spaces like Zomia in upland Southeast Asia or Alsatia in 18th C. London --
a dozen safe havens for debtors and organized crime beyond central government control-- I too 
focus attention on what are seen as problematic spaces for governments.  This lens reveals the 
larger analytical and theoretical contexts within which legal processes, daily practices, and both 
formal and informal perceptions are themselves embedded.  The resulting view shows how the 
production and regulation of territory affects people who shirk centralized authority, sometimes 
even within sight of authorities (Scott 2009).  Alsatia, named after Alsace, derives from elite 
perceptions of lawlessness that dominated the latter’s exit from the 30 Years War when the 
borderland of Alsace existed beyond Hapsburg or German sovereignty.  And while I reject the 
environmental determinist origins of the Zomia concept developed by the historian von Schendle 
(2002) --it is derived from a word for “highland”, for starters-- this notion of an elusive 
population avoiding traditional and modern government attempts to render them legible and 
embedded in mobility regimes is useful for thinking about Bessarabia too.  This coincidence is a 
function of the instrumental, flexible, and otherwise ambiguous approaches to identification tools 
in Eastern Europe, not just Southeast or Central Asia.  
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Part III.  The Post-Soviet Era 
A) Sovereignty and Identity as Soviet Legacy 
 Alongside geostrategic views I consider how observers have portrayed ethnic and elite 
politics of identity. In the post-Soviet-era, institutional barometers of citizenship have reflected 
long-standing difficulties marking and regulating people and borders in Moldova.  In tracing the 
evolution of identity and consensus opinion concerning citizenship fractures in formal and 
popular views, my aim is to show how the alleged ungovernability of Moldovan space is 
produced internally and externally via the regulation of uncertainty and ambiguity. If conflicting 
and overlapping views are taken as instruments of self- and spatial regulation, then my 
genealogy of identity politics shows how Moldov(an) has been viewed as an object of rule 
formally and in public opinion. To achieve this goal, I review how stakeholders have represented 
Moldova(ns) and their alleged crises of identity, values, politics, and elites (Cantarji 2006; 
Cojocaru 2006; King 1999). At the same time, I consider popular attitudes via various privately 
funded public opinion surveys (e.g. CBS-AXA 2011; Ethnobarometer 2006; Gallup 2011; IMAS 
2009; 2012; QSP 2010; WVS 2006) as proxies for informal opinion.   
 In conventional wisdom, analysts claim Moldovan identity continues to appear “like a 
toothache, it only gets attention when it hurts” (Mihaelescu in J. Rex 1998: 16), or as Moldova’s 
“Achilles heel” (Handrabura 2006).  Twenty years after independence, the question “Who are 
we?” still seems to excite foreign academics and newspaper publishers, if not many others 
(Dangaciu 2009; Infotag 2008). Below, I show how these commentators see the situation and 
interpret survey data as cause to decry the lack of a collective sense of self, i.e. a crisis of 
nationality and thus, not just territorial sovereignty but also institutional legitimacy.  In such 
views, individual and group ambivalence emerges as a product associated with an elusive or 
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inauthentic ethnicity, fractured elite coalitions, a new or revived nation-state, or an impoverished 
population governed by a dysfunctional polity. Such conventions and explanations self-
consciously appeal to objective measures of subjective traits, cultural politics of authenticity, and 
claims to historical truth evident in census and opinion data, ignoring more recent critical 
approaches to self-identification, citizenship, and security.  People in my study also used these 
ideas in discourses of authenticity and legitimacy or popular struggles in the face of collective 
crises, however inconsistently.   
 Despite the constitution or even because of its ambiguities, government policy about 
whom and what is Moldovan is muddy.  Thus, much like concepts of territorial integrity as 
modes of sovereignty, the notion of Moldovan identity, per se, is also subject to competing logics 
in law and in practice, suggesting more complicated ways in which territorial and biopolitical 
controls of certain kinds of citizens and spaces like homelands and borders work to regulate 
opportunity.  Attempts to forge state loyalty have considered a plurality of both ‘political 
citizenship’ and ‘ethno-cultural identity’ models. In 1992, less than a year after gaining 
independence, the Law on Citizenship extended blanket membership to all those present on 
Moldovan soil at the moment sovereignty was declared in 1990 rather than actual independence 
day, August 27, 1991, with the aim being to cast the widest possible net. Consequently, all those 
on Moldovan soil at the time of independence are part of the Moldovan nation and have 
associated political rights since, technically, regardless of their (self) identification, these 
“people” possess a legally prescribed existence. This liberal, broad-based option is well 
intentioned but institutionalizes confusion and is problematic because it enshrines civic and 
ethnic identities simultaneously yet inconsistently.  
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 As theorists of sovereignty like Agamben (2000) have noted, the question of “what is a 
people” remains central to the study plans to regulate groups and restrict citizenship, especially 
in the European context.  Today the Moldovan constitution specifies the “right to identity” for 
“national groups” and “ethnic” organizations but really only counts one. This law is consistent 
with de jure recognition of the Universal Declaration of Rights notion of the “right to 
nationality”, where “nationality” means “citizenship” as in Article 15, but Moldova is not party 
to this convention. Specifically, the constitution recognizes this national population’s right to 
exist, i.e. “the Moldovan people”.  It also specifies other rights and duties of citizens, including 
allegiance to state and society, where “loyalty to country is sacred” (Catana 2006).   But, 
according to the preamble and legal decisions interpreting it, this group includes “Moldovans and 
citizens of other ethnic backgrounds and indeed contains a “conglomerate of perspectives”.  
Here, “people” is the “[S]uperior form of human community which cannot be confused with 
other collectivities— it is not an exclusively ethnic or biological phenomenon.  It is a complex 
reality and at the same time the product of a lengthy historical process, based on the community 
of ethnic origin, language, culture, religion, psychology, life, traditions and ideas, but especially 
the historical past and the desire to stay together” (Caraus 2006: 91).  In the original and formal 
political sense, “Moldova” is “populated by Moldovans”.  That view sees an all-inclusive 
“people” but fails to distinguish among civic, ethnic, or biological versions. 
 It is difficult to reduce questions of popular sovereignty to questions of ethno-national 
frames in this case for several reasons.  First, the latest census8 form contains no question about 
“ethnicity”.  Moreover, it is important to note that “nationality” cannot be reported using 
hyphens, i.e. self-identification by Moldovan-Romanians or Bessarabian-Moldovans using 
                                                
 8 Conducted in 2004.  Results published in 2006. 
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partial designations is prohibited thus further dividing the fiction of popular sovereignty given 
disputes over the ‘popular’.  This rigidity suggests discrete frames for managing inclusion and 
subjectivity exist but they might not be particularly salient.  This limitation is just one technical 
legacy of Soviet policy, which conflated “ethnicity” with “nationality” to put people in place 
from birth using the infamous ‘entry number 5’ to define national affiliation.  In the case of 
‘mixed marriages’, children were allowed to self-select their group but were similarly prevented 
from further splitting their affiliation or keeping a hyphen. This grouping is still widely taken to 
subsume ethnicity and conceals differences and is another legacy of Soviet rule.  In the USSR, 
the two criteria were synonymous linguistically but asymmetric really as ethnic Russians 
remained primus inter pares. Moreover, when ethnic Russians or Ukrainians moved to Soviet 
Moldova, for example, they migrated internally and were not leaving their homeland, per se 
(Caraus 2006). Given this situation, laws variably accept jus sanguinis, jus soli, and jus domicili 
criteria leading to a miasma of identifications.   
 These struggles to define the contents of Moldovan-ness and contention about 
Moldovanism reflect key struggles around ethno-national identity politics and territorial 
sovereignty.  They are evident in discussions about the state language, official history, school 
curriculum, and migration policy.  Between 1988 and 1994, such tensions were harnessed around 
the declaration of independence, crystallized in the consolidation of sovereignty via international 
recognition, and coalesced into iconic events like the Grand National Assembly of 1989. In 1989, 
still during Soviet rule, the state language policy referred to a dual Moldovan-Romanian.   The 
result was a return to Romanian language replacing the Cyrillic-based “Moldovan” one 
perpetuated by Stalin’s Commissars of Enlightenment.  The Moldovan Soviet changed the law 
and its decision is emblematic of the struggles of the era, and thus draws on cultural and 
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linguistic frames linked to territory, proclaiming the  "Moldavian SSR supports the desire of the 
Moldovans that live across the borders of the Republic, and considering the existing linguistic 
Moldo-Romanian identity — of the Romanians that live on the territory of the USSR, of doing 
their studies and satisfying their cultural needs in their native language" (Official Government 
Monitor: Law 3465-XI, 1989). As elite-led artistic and literary movements, these struggles 
appealed to a particular set of Romanian symbols and were effective mobilizing frames for anti-
Soviet contention.  In discussions, my participants confirmed this view but emphasized their 
subsequent disappointment and disillusionment in equal measure, except among those who 
directly participated in protest events including curators, teachers, and pensioners.     
 
B) Popular Sovereignty and National-Territorial Unity  
 Collectively, independence movements and their cultural frames reflected splits between 
rural and urban worlds and the divides separating peasant and intellectual sentiments but still 
managed to mobilize people to express collective dissatisfaction with Soviet rule. They also 
reflected elite interests, suggesting language policy might be a canard.  During focus group 
discussions with State Ethnography museum, staff recalled that peasants and shepherds arrived 
to protest in traditional combat gear.  Vividly, a staff member recounted the costume’s details 
and how he felt witnessing busloads of rural Moldovans arrive in Chisinau wearing their pigskin 
boots and shearling hats raised up and pointed in the style reserved for battle. Following this pro-
Romanian cultural linguistic orientation, in 1990 the Declaration of Independence referenced the 
Romanian language explicitly. The unionist sentiments eroded by 1994 following elite fracture 
and at that time the Constitution specified Moldovan rather than Romanian as official state 
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language.  At the exact same time a countywide referendum overwhelmingly rejected joining 
Romania in favor of remaining a sovereign entity (TMR notwithstanding).  
 Shortly thereafter, in 1994, the ouster of the nationalist Popular Front that had promoted 
independence and a pro-Romanian view was followed by the rise of the Agrarian party.  Since 
then, democratically elected governments have moved away from anti-Soviet inspired pan-
Romanianism and faced multiple economic crises. The Agrarian regime, led by nominally 
reformed Soviet apparatchiks and security service types focused on managing interethnic 
tensions like those surrounding autonomy in Gagauz (successfully) or power-sharing in TMR 
(unsuccessfully).  With the Russian ruble’s crash in 1998 and the TMR conflict unresolved, 
widespread uncertainty and illegitimacy around the ruling Agrarian party led to the rise of the 
anti-unionist Communist Party (PC) in 2001, electing former security services member and 
actual Transnistrian Vladimir Voronin to be president.  The PC’s stance on the Moldovanist 
position was reinforced in 2004 when it pushed constitutional amendments to give Russian and 
Ukrainian languages separate but formal status. Until 2004, the ruling PC emphasized national 
sovereignty and territorial unity to transcend ethnic and linguistic divides formed under Soviet 
rule from 1940-1992. This Moldovanism viewed state sovereignty in an explicitly Russian (or 
Soviet) context but it too has changed in an effort to recast Moldovan as distinct from 
“Romanian” or “Russian”  (March 2007).   
 Today, regardless of their passports or past, overwhelmingly Moldovans assert they are 
not Romanians. These assertions are evident in Romanian newspapers and among my 
participants in Moldova. Agents including bus drivers and grape pickers are documented making 
harsh views in publications revealingly titled “From Brothers to Hypocrites”.  Reflecting on their 
experiences across the border, Moldovan migrants in Romania complained they were abused in 
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dehumanizing terms.  The men offered a discerning analysis when claiming “’Romanians let us 
sleep and live like animals…At the same time, few of them can describe what are the specifics of 
the Moldovan nation” (Romania Libera 2010). Clearly, some Moldovans differentiate 
themselves from Romanians in dramatic terms.  Nonetheless, these reports are also reflected in 
my focus group data.  In both instances, kinship ties and independence-era sentiments are shown 
to be fleeting moments of national revival and a false prelude to pan-Romanian reunification.  
 Indeed, during their rule, the PC drifted increasingly westward ostensibly and the AEI 
has continually and explicitly disavowed pan-Romanian goals. Regardless, coalition leaders like 
Ghimpu say, ‘even if I am Romanian I must negotiate on behalf of Chisinau with Brussels’, not 
from or for Bucharest.  These disagreements over the contents and convergences around ethno-
linguistic and cultural or civic frames of affiliation point to some limits of ethnic/civic binaries 
when interrogating ethno-national groupism and political crises of legitimacy along linguistic 
lines.  Additional divides are further reconfigured in this instance where the titular group itself 
cannot achieve consensus on the root ties binding it together.  These ruptures and continuities are 
evident in appeals to symbols and discursive frames in narratives about history, society, and 
geography.  In retrospect, elite schisms around pan-Romanian reunification and pro-
independence Moldovanists offer evidence of the relative successes or failures of state-making 
and nation-building since 1991.  Until April 2009, the PC consolidated security service rules and 
used Stalinist tactics like censorship and agent provocateurs to precipitate a crisis of legitimacy 
and youth-led protest.  The political crisis was formally resolved in Spring 2012 with the election 
of previously unheralded jurist Nicolae Timofti of the Alliance for European Integration (AEI), a 
group composed of anti-PC and even more aggresively pro-EU opposition members of otherwise 
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disparate parties.  As Tanase commented above, the country has a president, but what about the 
state of the people? 
 Questions of pan-Romanianism still concern formal debates about sovereignty.  The PC 
still stokes constant fears of creeping Romanian efforts to annex Moldova as existential threats to 
sovereignty.  These threats persist despite the Prime Minister Vlad Filat’s moves in 2010 to sign 
a treaty with Romanian Foreign Minister on state border cooperation and mutual assistance, thus 
reinforcing external sovereign relations between discrete countries.  However, PC members 
sense more insidious motives in words like “cooperation” and “mutual assistance”, seeing a loss 
of sovereignty in two senses, one in relation to Romanization-by-cooperation, and the second as 
EU pressures on Romania to complete and control border regimes before entering the Schengen 
space.  In the PC’s view, the EU offers no promises but Filat still complies with all wishes to 
please outside masters, including EC head Barroso’s comments that he “warmly saluted” this 
“excellent example” of future cooperation.  The PC would prefer a baseline political treaty first 
in favor of negotiating away sovereignty or territory (Imedia 2010).  
 
C) What is a People I:  Legal debates and formal definitions 
 This latest generation of confusion is the product of (controversial) decisions about 
identity and shows how discourses of ungovernability are enshrined formally and produced 
legally.  Relevant terms and decisions are codified in legislation including the 2001 Law on 
National Minorities, the 2002 Concept of Nationality Policy, and the 2003 Law on National 
Policy.  In these documents, “native culture” and “homeland” are formally defined and “national 
minorities” are awarded the right to self-select their affiliations in limited and potentially 
contradictory ways.  These laws simultaneously assert Moldovans are the “founding nationality” 
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and exist alongside other ethnic groups present on the “motherland”.  Ethnic “communities and 
groups”, alongside national “groups and minorities”, other “non-local populations”, and 
“ethnocultural formations” are likewise officially registered as present on Moldovan territory 
according to such laws.   As legal tools, these instruments allude to even more partial or 
compound terms including “multi-ethnicity”, “multiculturalism”, “multilingualism”, and “the 
consolidation of people” but still fail to define those “people”, unlike the constitution. According 
to the most controversial of these laws, The Concept on Nationalities Policy, the government 
formally recognizes: (1) a founding nationality; (2) other ethnic groups; (3) a “motherland”. In 
addition, at least seven other legal terms like those in the earlier laws serve to further complicate 
notions described in these and related Supreme Court of Justice opinions. Awkwardly, this 
uncertainty is considered progressive because it allows multiple citizenships and, paradoxically, 
protects but also prevents realization of ‘minority rights’, loosely conceived.  As such, formal 
designations are not mutually exclusive and can occupy overlapping spaces, polities, and/or 
members as they often do. This murkiness reflects problems linked the inability to specify the 
characteristics of the titular group itself and thus inhibits attempts to express ‘popular 
sovereignty’.   
 The institutional division of labor among authorities at the Academy of Sciences in 
Chisinau is also indicative of the formal approach to the identity question.  It reflects a problem 
where authorities operate separate offices for “national relations” and “interethnic relations”. 
Minority representatives see Moldovans in the Soviet sense of the titular nation and understand a 
geographic entity or toponym instead of an ethnonym. So, Russians who tend to self-identify as 
Moldovan citizens holding Moldovan passports can also define themselves against a cultural 
group without contradiction, as my participants confirmed. However, the multiethnic Moldovans 
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can also represent the majority ethnic community, though even within this group internal 
disagreements are evident.  Discord over ethno-national origins, knowledge formation, and the 
political use of multiple meanings suggest four additional understandings:  First, it can be used as 
an epithet to describe or differentiate between Moldavians in Romania when intending to offend 
pan-Romanian unionists. Alternatively, it can refer to the Romanian region of Moldavia and not 
strictly its inhabitants. Also, it can function as a synonym for Romanian citizens where some use 
it interchangeably.  Fourth, some use it as distinct from Romanian as an ethnic or national 
signifier (Handrabura 2006). Regardless of its slipperiness, attention to how different actors 
contest terms and complicate procedures shows designations themselves remain worth 
considering in debates about state sovereignty and legitimacy. 
 Questions of Moldovan-Romanian division remain unresolved for political reasons not 
irreconcilable differences.  For some local analysts, such situations are historically variable and 
evident when “identity and ethnicity” simultaneously alternate in importance over time and are 
insignificant compared to economic or social ills (Handrabura 2006). As “self-searching” 
expressions, these ideas emerge strategically in interactions among social groups across spatial 
scales and can fuel debate and “ignite the spirits.”  Still, she concludes with the claim: “There is 
no interethnic conflict in the Republic of Moldova.  We do notice certain tensions…on linguistic 
matters.  The nature of other tensions is attitudinal-behavioral, taking place at the inter-personal 
level, and is explained by the lack of knowledge over the other…”(220). Similar criticism is 
directed at those who link interethnic problems to government policies and seems to miss that 
most Moldovans simply do not think this confusion is a problem (Caraus 2006). These 
conclusions are worth quoting at length because they offer trenchant warnings against ethno-
centric understandings that dismiss how most Moldovans perceive and personify or manage to 
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ignore this purported identity crisis in daily life. Such analyses confirm my findings where less 
than half of focus group meetings involved the word “ethnic” or “ethnicity” and point to a more 
flexible sense of attachment to political and social community and its instrumental uses.  
 
D) What is a People II: Census and public surveys  
 What does it mean to be Moldovan?  According to the only two censuses in 18 years of 
independent Moldova, official data on ethno-linguistic membership are probably not reliable. As 
noted above, the census does not ask about ethnicity. According to census data collected in 1989 
and again in 2004 (released in 2006), about 75% of the population now claims the combined 
ethno-national notion of Moldovan identity, while less than 10% are (in descending order of 
magnitude) Ukrainian, Russian, Gagauz, or Bulgarian national minorities; Romanians now only 
register 2% as opposed to 65% during the last Soviet census in 1989. The BBC’s Moldovan 
section noted fear of political manipulation and confusion about categories in 2006 when 2004 
census data were presented.   
 Consistent with my attention to the production and legitimation of ungovernability thesis, 
all such metrics are suspicious.  Curiously, according to BBC reports and Council of Europe 
observers, these data are probably not robust.  They note 7/10 European monitoring teams 
present for the census reported that field agents were routinely seen to prod citizens identifying 
as Romanian nationals to register themselves as Moldovans instead.  These claims are a sharp 
warning that census data are potentially misleading, at best (Corneliu 2006). However, 
alternative baseline counts of ethnicity can also be derived from the World Values Survey 
(WVS).  For their 2006 study, curiously, “ethnic group” was identified, assigned, and reported 
via the survey administrator’s own independent observation of the respondent, as specified in 
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their codebook.  Despite this spurious method of ‘self-reporting’, WVS results for ethnic identity 
in Moldova are startlingly consistent with census statistics.  In their representative sample, 79% 
say they are ethnic Moldovans, 8% Ukrainians, and 6% Russians (WVS 2006).  
 Linguistic ambiguity, that is, the question if Moldovan and Romanian are distinct 
languages, indicates problems that arise when state-seeking Moldovanists collide with pan-
Romanian unionists rather than lack of mutual intelligibility and suggest how such tools can 
work to divide people. If ethnicity is assumed to include language, then linguistic features can 
count as key markers. This assumption is quite problematic.  Specifically, this perspective is 
unable to reconcile evidence collected for the first time in 2004 where census data show 20% of 
citizens claim a native language different from their national affiliation.  So, while 78% of those 
who identify themselves formally as Moldovans claim to speak “Moldovan” as officially if 
arguably distinct from “Romanian”, some 20% of these “Moldovans” indeed identify as 
“Romanian-speakers”. A non-representative sample of teachers from a 2004-05 “Tolerance and 
Social Integration” poll shows 86% of the wider population claims to speak native Moldovan, 
not Romanian, and 85% of this subset speaks Moldovan, not Romanian or Russian at home 
rather than only in public as the language of ‘inter-ethnic communication’. Ethnobarometer 
(2006) found similar results, when 86% of a representative sample of self-described Moldovans 
claimed “Moldovan language” as mother tongue and the remainder claimed “Romanian” except 
the 2% speaking Russian. More recently, QSP (2010) also found 80% of self-identified 
Moldovans speak Moldovan most at home while 14% say they speak Romanian in the same 
setting.  Of this entire representative sample, only 30% of self-identified Moldovans agree 
“Moldavian and Romanian is one language” and only 20% think “Moldovan” is a dialect of 
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Romanian.  These trends suggest national identity remains unconsolidated and atomization 
processes are incomplete.   
 Likewise, among the educated, ethno-national divisions remain slippery and convoluted. 
When asked in late 2004 how they perceived themselves given that some people believe many 
ethnic groups inhabit Moldova, 95% of a representative sample of Moldovan nationals identified 
as Moldovan ethnics, with the remaining 5% claiming Romanian identity. Also, in 2004, the 
“Tolerance and Social Integration” projects administered a series of targeted surveys with 94 
students attending the state teacher’s college and then again in 2005 with 16 teachers from rural, 
urban, and district-level schools.  These projects, comprising investigations into “Information” 
and “Intercultural education for understanding alterity”, polled participants specifically about 
ethnic identity, cultural identity, and linguistic community.  The results from 18-24 year old 
students training to become teachers at an institution named for Ion Creanga (i.e. the Romanian 
literary icon whose Childhood Memories collection of folklore and fables crafted early notions of 
the nation in 19th century Moldavia), reveal 89 self-identified as Moldovans, four as Romanians, 
and one as Ukrainian. Although neither sample is representative in any way, the teachers 
nevertheless indicate examples of uncertain identity among intellectual authorities.  For them, 
only 2/11 self-identifying respondents matched their ‘ethnic identify’ with their ‘cultural’ one.  
In this case, 4/16 teachers named Romanian, not the constitutionally mandated “Moldovan” 
language, as their mother tongue. This discord assumes implicit links should govern nationality 
but never specifies these connections so conceptual confusion remains rampant (Ethnobarometer 
2006: 223-224).  
 Census figures from the last Soviet census in 1989 and 2004 surveys show shifts in 
national identity, though the latest counts do not include people in TMR.  Because of various 
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factors including emigration and underdevelopment, the proportion identifying as Moldovans 
increased noticeably from about 2/3 (65%) to more than 3/4 (76%) in 15 years; the number of 
Russians fell by more than half (from 13% to 6%) and Ukrainians dropped from about 14% to 
around 8% at last count.  Interestingly but perhaps insignificantly, those claiming Romanian 
national membership shot up from near non-existence at .1% to a barely more noticeable 2.2% 
and never more than 8% in any district (e.g. centrally located Orhei).  This trend indicates that 
the latent Romanian national consciousness seems effectively unmoved since independence.  
Even more recent and representative samples mirror these proportions and trends in terms of 
populations, with about 80% identifying as Moldovan, 7% Ukrainian, 6% Russian, and 8% 
Gagauz or Bulgarian or other, including 2% specifying Romanian roots (QSP 2010).  
 
E) What is a People? III:  National characteristics 
 Qualities associated with the national character are contradictory and ambiguous as 
evidenced in polls detailing popular attitudes about group membership criteria, though some 
majority/minority group patterns are evident.  When QSP (2010) asked a representative sample 
“How Moldova is characterized”, 43% responded tautologically with the self-evident “country 
where Moldovans live” suggesting residency is not a requirement, while slightly fewer (37%) 
perceived it primarily as a “multiethnic country”.  Among self-identifying Moldovan nationals, 
however, almost half (49%) find it as their ‘country of residence’ compared to a quarter (23%) or 
a third (29%) of Ukrainian or Russian nationals, respectively.  For these minority groups, over 
half claim to see their country as a multi-ethnic state first compared to only 32% of self-selecting 
Moldovans. Other qualities worth noting include the 12% of those who think “Moldovan blood” 
is key, which is a larger percentage than those who see Romanian language mattering. These 
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figures are generally consistent with older WVS (2006) data more generally and in Moldova 
locally.  Their data show worldwide about 41% of people reported a ‘very important 
requirement’ for group membership is a birthright based on birthplace, compared to 32% of 
Moldovan respondents at the time.  These studies suggest existing approaches are not 
particularly revealing of answers to these questions, especially in light of terminological 
confusion. 
 National character and citizenship status are not the same things and Moldovans 
consistently demonstrate they understand the distinction, especially in comparison with minority 
group members. In a 2006 representative Ethnobarometer survey that asked which attribute a 
sample self-identified with most only 15% of the Moldo-Romanian majority considered 
themselves “citizens” first when asked to specify national group membership.  For IPP analysts, 
such a situation shows “…identity based on affective relations…” instead of legal qualities like 
“…citizenship, which is based on rational principles of respecting rights and liberties, and 
assuming citizen responsibilities” (IPP 2006).  While provocative, IPP’s attention to 
responsibilities misunderstands the instrumental aspects of the rights-based approach in relation 
to citizenship and governance in Moldova, assuming citizenship is discretely understood as 
political rather than fraternal.  A year earlier, these same analysts considered longitudinal data 
from 1998-2005 about ‘which two statements best describe your identity’.  They found 81% see 
themselves as representatives of their declared nationality, 57% as citizens, and 32% as members 
of their ‘locality’. For ‘Moldovans/Romanians’, responses show 70% chose “Moldovan” first 
and 81% selected it overall. This situation inverts data from minority Ukrainians and Russians 
showing they think citizenship matters most. Such data suggests nationality, which they call 
ethnicity, is valorized but not in attachments to place, arguing “territorial elements or legal-
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formal elements…are not fixed in a clearly determined space…the fact that the population 
identifies itself mainly based on ethnic background and less on citizenship, talks about the 
citizens’ lack of trust in the Moldovan state” (Ethnobarometer: 28). In other words, respondents 
might not valorize citizenship because the government is illegitimate and its territory thus not 
worth attaching oneself to. As the national pride data below suggest, this situation might be the 
case.  
 Also in 2006, the same representative sample was asked their “opinion about the three 
most important things that give a person the right to be considered a Moldovan”. For Moldovan 
self-identifying respondents, the three most popular responses were “having Moldovan Parents” 
(51%), “speaking the language at home” (48%), and ‘respecting traditions’ (36%).  Again, these 
characteristics outweigh, explicitly, components such as “citizenship”, “feeling Moldovan”, and 
“speaking the language” but not at home and suggest an informal rather than ethno-national 
orientation in my opinion. Practically, this lack of clarity presents problems for citizenship 
acquired via naturalization, as legal frames used to accommodate these views suggest 
(Osmochescu 2010).   
 
Part IV) Contemporary Public Opinion and External Portraits  
 As indications of commonsense beliefs and to consider metrics beyond elite discourse or 
census figures, in this section attitudinal indicators on key themes are detailed: (A) Happiness; 
(B) National Pride; (C) Support for Independence/National reunification.  Taken together, these 
metrics suggest foreign visions are mistaken in key ways.  If existing views fail to consider how 
Moldova(ns) emerges as a space in its current form, then my argument is that acknowledging 
because it shows the conventional wisdom of miserable or embarrassed citizens is misplaced.   
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A) Public Opinion I:  Happiness 
Looking at survey indicators, Moldovans are not the ‘most miserable’ as Weiner claims 
in his “Geography of Bliss.” Indeed, as WVS data show post-communist states generally show 
low amounts of trust and low levels of happiness, and in this case 52% of respondents are either 
“very” or “quite happy”, with clear generational trends visible.  Across age groups, those aged 
15-30 were happier than those 31-50 years old; pensioners, understandably, were grumpiest. In 
WVS data worldwide from 2006, most 'not at all happy' responses were in Iraq, Moldova, 
Albania, Bulgaria, and Zimbabwe, each registering 9%.  QSP (2010) data also contradict Weiner, 
finding most residents report being in a “normal, even, or excellent mood lately”.  Their data 
showed self-described Moldovans happiest overall (64% positive), versus slightly less cheery 
Russian (53%) or Ukrainian (49%) minority respondents. Medrano (2010) explains how the 
devil is developed in detail 9, concluding: “Bolivia is the only country where not very or not at 
all happy respondents are more numerous than quite happy or very happy respondents” (1).  
Clearly, these measures are contentious and can misrepresent the geography of grumpiness.  
Still, Moldovan misery is hardly an anomaly, however measured. Viewed in this empirical light, 
such work renders baseless Weiner’s suggestion that Moldovans are unhappy and “…a 
fabricated nation. It does not exist” (216). In showing how Moldovans see themselves in the 
                                                
 9 “Anyhow, the level of happiness is better measured using the 'Happiness Index' that is defined 
as the rate of those declaring themselves as 'Very happy' or 'Quite happy' less the rate of those declaring 
themselves as 'Not very happy' or 'Not at all happy', plus 100. This index ranges from 0 to 200, in such a 
way that the happiest countries will tend to 200 and the less happy countries to 0. 100 is the mid-point 
value or equilibrium point, and countries with indexes around 100 have a similar rate of persons quite or 
very happy and persons not very or not at all happy. The usefulness of the Happiness index relies in that it 
allows to compensate the effect of inequalities in some countries where a high rate of people feel very 
happy and another important proportion feels just the opposite…” (Medrano 2010: 1) 
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world, challenge categories, and express dissatisfaction with their role in these frames, a better 
conceptualization of how Moldovan-ness is measured, managed, and manipulated crystallizes.   
 
B) Public Opinion II:  National Pride 
 Obviously, these metrics and manifestations of Moldovan-ness are useless if they cannot 
help explain how pride and allegiance work or illuminate how scales of attachment operate.  A 
strong national identity ostensibly entails high levels of positive affect toward the nation, and 
pride is one of the most important dimensions of affect in the sphere of social identity (Cantarji 
2006; Catana 2006). While loyalty extends across groups, pride varies internally and remains 
less intense than international norms.  Globally, according to WVS, 90% of people are prouder 
than not of their national identity, however perceived; overall a smaller proportion representing 
67% of Moldova’s inhabitants are either very (19%) or quite (48%) proud of their national 
membership, a rather low figure in comparison to other CIS countries. Given its liberal vision 
and dual citizenship provisions, citizens express pride in their country of birth (86% ‘proud to be 
born here’, Ethnobarometer 2006).  Still, those who have not voted with their feet and emigrated 
have expressed doubt in state institutions --50% trust ‘the state’, 80% trust ‘the church’) 
according to 1998-2005, IPP survey (Rosca 2006).  Similar studies argue ethnic identities are 
more attractive than civic ideas about citizenship because the weak and convoluted government 
cannot serve as a “warrant of stability” since it has not promoted security and, understandably, 
remains difficult to understand. Indeed, the representative European Values Survey (EVS) 
(2006) results also suggest a substantial number of Moldova’s minority communities have 
developed a strong attachment to the country, as 56 % of ethnic Russian respondents and almost 
60 % of ethnic Ukrainian respondents claimed to be very proud or proud of being a citizen of 
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Moldova. These numbers are noteworthy in comparison to data from ethnic Russians in Ukraine. 
There, only 32 % of Russians reported having any amount of pride in being a citizen of Ukraine. 
 Comparing Moldova’s score on national pride to the scores of other post-communist 
countries in response to the question, “How proud are you to be a citizen of Moldova?” in 2006 
(Ethnobarometer) elicited the following responses: 12% said they were ‘very proud’, 56% 
‘proud’, 25% ‘not so proud’, 5% ‘not proud at all’, and 2% provided no answer. Comparing 
these results is possible given parallel questions and data about responses to a nearly identical 
question on national pride in the 1999-2000 EVS conducted in many European countries. In 
related analysis of EVS data Moldova’s score puts the country at the lower end of the list of post-
Communist countries according to the strength of national pride metric. Yet the Moldovans feel 
more pride about their country in comparison to Ukrainian neighbors or citizens of two out of the 
three Baltic states. These findings are consistent with Kolsto and Melberg (2003) who indexed 
attitudes of titulars and minorities as coarse measure of inclusionary attitudes toward minorities 
and their willingness to be assimilated. This study, which was framed as a comparative study of 
attitudes in Moldova and Estonia, found self-styled Moldovans were more willing to include 
minority nationals than were self-reported Estonians. In other similar studies (Protsyk 2007) 
minorities in Moldova appeared less willing to be integrated in the national community than non-
titulars in Estonia although QSP (2010) suggests this situation has changed. Their more recent 
findings show 74% were either very (42%) or rather (32%) proud taken together, and Moldovan 
nationals are slightly more chauvinistic (78%) than minority Ukrainians (69%) and Russians 
(53%). So, while higher than in Ukraine, and Russia, these figures are still a long way behind the 
EU average suggesting relative lack of enthusiasm for citizenship remains.     
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 Regional concern about evidence of sub-national allegiances and localized effects is 
visible in findings from the village-level data countrywide.  For some scholars (Cash 2007) who 
find the characterizations of self-reported identity in Ethnobarometer studies unconvincing, a 
more nuanced understanding is needed.  In her view, identity and locality are linked in a way that 
suggests ethnic Moldovans prioritize more civic citizenship and nationality membership over 
other attachments in their personal and political lives rather than evidence above showing 
nationality trumps citizenship for the titular group.  Instead, she suggests counter-factual 
evidence is visible through appeals to folklore as continuity and village as community.  I seek to 
consider her claims in light of competing QSP findings where IPP shows minorities are localized 
and QSP found the opposite when asking questions like ‘what is your native place’, when 63% 
of the total population listed “my village”, including 67% of Moldovans compared to only 49% 
of Ukrainians and 45% of Russians.  For ‘national minorities’, place-based attachments seem 
less rigid, with 25% of Ukrainians and 20% of Russians naming their native place as ‘where they 
are now’ (QSP 2010) so Cash’s position seems tenable.  Still, these data suggest geographic 
variation, even beyond rural/urban divides and into inter-urban ones.  For example, 74% of 
Ungheni residents reported their city/village where they were born or grew up as their native 
place whereas 58% of Chisinau-based respondents felt similarly connected.  About 20% of both 
populations second the notion that ‘where they live now’ is home.  The other major difference 
evident in location variability in terms of attachments to place is visible in data showing 12% of 
Chisinau’s more chauvinistic citizens list “land belonging to my people”, however defined, 
barely 2% of those in Ungheni feel likewise. While the village scale might not equate with 
homeland or necessarily govern attachments, geographic variation is evident.   
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C) Public Opinion III: Independence/Reunification 
 Unlike surveys of public opinion before the 1994 referendum, polls conducted after 1994 
rarely included direct questions about popular attitudes towards the idea of unification with 
Romania. This was partly due to the unambiguous nature of results obtained in the 1994 
plebiscite when 98% affirmed their desire for an independent Moldova. The lack of explicit 
attention to this issue in polls conducted by national rather than international or foreign 
institutions might also be a function of the unwillingness of pro- Romanian intellectuals to 
including in questionnaires an issue that is likely to reveal a great deal of public opposition 
towards their preferred policy agenda. The continuing unpopularity of the idea of unification, 
however, can be deduced from the weak electoral performance of pro-unification forces in 
campaigns throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.  The low level of popular support for 
unification does not necessarily mean that the idea has been fully discarded and is irrelevant in 
the current political context. The fact that the unification idea remains a salient point of concern 
and an important mobilizing force for a substantial number of politically active groups is 
illustrated, for example, in situations like where the urn of Moldovan soil delivered by 
Chisinau’s mayor to his counterpart in Bucharest, or by Moldovan society’s reaction to the July 
2006 Basescu’s initiative. The Romanian president, Basescu, issued an ambiguously worded 
appeal to the authorities in Chisinau and the Moldovan people “to join together with Romania 
the European Union.” While the Romanian president did not provide any details on what exactly 
he meant, his speech caused a major uproar across the Prut (Protsyk 2007). 
 Ethnobarometer data can be used to analyze respondents’ ideas of the state of inter-ethnic 
relations. One indirect measure from a longitudinal study was derived from providing 
respondents with a list of options and asking them to select three issues that they were most 
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concerned about at the time. The results of this survey, which has been conducted on a semi-
annual basis since 1998, shows that the number of respondents who indicated that ethnic 
relations was one of the problems they were concerned about the most, varied between 2-5% 
throughout the period. At the same time, problems of poverty, prices, and unemployment were 
consistently named as the most important by 20-60% of those polled. In a separate 
Ethnobarometer study commissioned by the IPP in 2005, respondents were also asked whether 
relations between their ethnic group and other ethnic groups were better or worse than fifteen 
years ago. Overall, a larger percentage of respondents from Moldova’s main minority groups – 
Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians – stated that their relations with other ethnic 
groups, including the titular group, had improved. A slightly higher percentage of representatives 
of the titular group, on the other hand, believed that their relations with all mentioned minority 
groups, with the exception of Ukrainians, became worse rather than better.  As shown above, 
QSP (2010) confirms this trend using more recent data on the same question.   
 The semi-authoritarian nature of the Transnistrian regime makes assessing public 
attitudes in the region, especially on the issue of reintegration, very problematic. With the 
exception of data reported in the study by Kolsto and Melberg (2003), the results of the last of 
several referendums held in Transnistria on the issue of independence indicated again the 
existence of a very high level of public support for independence. According to the Transnistrian 
central electoral commission, 78% of eligible voters took part in the September 2006 referendum 
and 97% cast their vote in support of independence and subsequent joining of the Russian 
Federation (ADEPT 2006).  More recently however, long time TMR leader Igor Smirnoff failed 
to receive enough votes to maintain his position.  In late 2011, Evgeni Shevchuk became the new 
leader in a clearly competitive election.  The new platform and latest data suggest his plans to 
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adopt the Russian ruble as currency and join the Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia customs union has a 
lot of support and in February 2012 ‘president’ Shevchuk announced plans to adopt the Russian 
ruble in anticipation of membership and to facilitate rapid job creation (ITAR-TASS 2012). 
 
D) Passport Policy 
 As alternative metric of citizenship, passport ownership remains equally uncertain in 
Moldova. As the ability to move freely and avoid arbitrary detention, civic citizenship has from 
its origins been about regulating the rights of people, including members of a polity, to move 
around a place.  In the modern, liberal, and multicultural era of rights and obligations, nation-
states have enjoyed the privileges associated with issuing passports and visas as part of their 
sovereign duty.  This power over citizens is bound by territorial limits in most instances of 
Westphalian sovereignty.  But when citizens depart en masse, power over the people requires 
different territorial tactics.  The latest census figures, which include temporarily absent persons 
but not Transnistrians, indicate 130,000 (47.7%) out of about 270,000 of those sampled had been 
abroad for more than one year (National Bureau of Statistics 2006). In 2003 dual citizenship 
provisions were added to the Moldovan constitution and official numbers indicate over 12,000 
resident Moldovan citizens exercise this right. Still, as with indicators on ethnicity and 
nationality, formal figures are misleading.   
 Today, some 300,000 Moldovans, mostly pensioners, still only possess their expired 
Soviet passport and refuse or cannot afford to buy new biometric documents (Publika 2010).  
The 2004 census reports show 5,374 citizens are stateless, and the UN believes about 500 cases 
like this are the result of failures to register with authorities in the early 1990s; the remainder are 
assumed to be people living in TMR who simply have not identified themselves to claim their 
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legal status (Osmochescu 2010).  More recently, according to the Ministry of Information 
Technology and Communication, the document issuing authority on this matter until 2011, 2,049 
stateless persons are present in Moldova and 1,559 of them are in TMR (personal 
communication, December 2010).    This situation highlights problems with traditional, 
exclusive notions of citizenship and de jure territorial sovereignty because so many citizens work 
abroad under different rules (i.e. bi-lateral, undocumented) and legal procedures accepting de 
facto citizenship claims are not supported by existing legislation. Because officially remittances 
from these citizens comprise almost half GDP, this population is a national resource that must be 
managed given its power.  
 Officially, Bucharest has expanded efforts to issue visas and passports, which an 
unofficially estimated 40% of Moldovans have accepted after proving a (grand)parent was on 
Romanian territory before 1941 (Culic 2008). EU-based newspapers paint this strategy of 
expediting Romanian passports for Moldovans as “the golden ticket” meaning the EU has “28 
members”. They have quoted with disdain President Basescu’s plans to naturalize 10,000 
Moldovans per month, noting "Since then, applications for regaining Romanian citizenship have 
multiplied…74,073 applications were made in 2010, while 3,900 were filed in 2009" (L’Express 
2010). Popular fears and political reactions are emblematic of how salient this issue has become.   
Adding to these fears, since 2009 the Romanian National Agency for Citizenship has opened 
three consulates to facilitate new (dual) citizenship requests. Despite 17,000 Moldovans 
receiving Romanian citizenship in 2010, nationalism and patriotism are not the drivers here.  
“’This is not about renouncing my Moldovan identity, it's about the practical issues of travel,’ 
said Ana Revenco,” a counter-trafficking professional (The Times of Australia 2010). This 
sentiment about the salience of pragmatism trumping patriotism also echoes from formal 
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echelons and retired politicians.  Former Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev also sees Moldovans 
motivated to move more easily ‘in Europe’ rather than by pro-Romanian patriotism.  He notes  
"Most of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova regain Romanian citizenship not because they 
are Romanian, body and soul! But acquiring the nationality of a EU member state, he is entitled 
to free travel or do business in the EU" (Deutsche Welle 2010). My participants (i.e. Chisinau 
Politicians) explicitly mocked him for admitting to owning his own Bulgarian passport.  To 
support further my argument about the instrumental, contested nature of passports as 
entitlements and privileged keys to escape confinement, Romania Libera reported snidely that in 
2010 some 1,500 Moldovans ‘were even willing’ to obtain Bulgarian citizenship (2010) and 
upon further review EUROSTAT (2012) figures confirm this trend. Curiously, it is worth noting 
findings from QSP where less than 2% of respondents from any group reported having more than 
one passport, compared to the Soros-backed study showing 7%.  A more measured view 
acknowledging that Spain and France approve over 100,000 such requests each year via the same 
EU privilege suggests that such external narratives are hyperbolic and hypocritical (Eurostat 
2012).   
 
E) Embracing Ambiguity 
 Domestically, Moldovan observers see inconsistent attitudes as the outcome of 
conceptual and verbal confusion over loyalties, where Moldovan-ness remains an “object of 
manipulation” and an “object of competition” interpreted by domestic analysts and politicians in 
the most favorable terms at that moment (Catana 2006; Rosca 2006).  Others, including 
outsiders, see it literally as a case of “uncertain terms” because what the words mean formally is 
contested just as the words themselves are used to signify different contents and references 
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informally too (Keough 2006). In the critical geographic tradition, categories and counts are 
known to exhibit convoluted distinctions and such murkiness seems to underscore the power of 
ambiguity, contingency, and complexity (Diener 2009; Secor 2003). My approach therefore is to 
audit (rather than replace) instrumental characterizations of categorical salience using surveys 
and CDA.  
 Therefore, in this instance it is essential to focus on ambiguity to explain how Moldovan-
ness is understood in hegemonic narratives and informally in counter-narratives for different 
groups.  These resulting “analytical ambiguities” in how categories and identities are governed 
hint at the difficulties inherent in measuring, let alone explaining, patterns of self-identification 
and group cohesion or commonality in this case as in others (Brubaker et al 2004). This approach 
to sameness, connected-ness, and group-ness across scales is worth considering further. The key 
contribution follows from Brubaker’s (2002) study of ethnicity as cognition and “without 
groups”.  In a critical way, he works convincingly to specify an alternative “in other words” 
model to identity-as-process rather than ‘identity-as-thing’. This work is important because it 
focuses attention on actions as opposed to passive analysis of  “identity” in favor of a three-fold 
conceptualization:  (1) self/other identification; (2) self/other categorization; (3) self-
understanding/social location practice.  The scheme is revelatory in its attention to how axes of 
commonality, connectivity, and group formation operate, including in the linguistic realm to bind 
otherwise disparate groups in communicative links but perhaps not into other communities 
(2002: 42-44).  
 Building on these and others’ group-based accounts of identity, territoriality, and 
citizenship construction I argue it is important to reconcile this process model with a more 
sophisticated geographic one. In my dissertation, my approach to citizenship also sees them as 
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processes assembling, identifying, and categorizing people, while simultaneously or variably 
fixing power relations, disciplining spaces, and as encountered or contested through spatial 
practices of daily life, which I seek to capture and analyze as expressions of belonging and 
modes of alienation (Secor 2003, 2004). Thus, attention to ambiguity of identity as evident in 
spatial stories and indicates why working with focus groups can clarify this confusion through 
attention to “ambiguity of anonymity” (Secor 2004: 364).  Furthermore, combining social and 
spatial lenses also responds to anthropological calls to reassess structure-agency debates under 
conditions of neoliberal migration management and border control.  As Keough (2003) suggests 
in her analysis of ethnic Gagauz Moldovan women who migrate to Istanbul, linguistic or ethno-
religious markers are subject to similar “Uses and Abuses” insofar as stereotypes of independent 
agents simultaneously needing protection yet exercising power over their household are 
understood.  In her convincing view, these various uses indicate precisely how such problems 
around  “Representations of Migrants and the Ambiguity of Agency” affect people and my 
research suggests these representations are indeed useful markers.   
 To conclude, in this chapter I have shown how competing frames of political association 
like ethno-national subjectivities and citizenship regimes are or are not evident and/or otherwise 
manifest across multiple scales –the national, biopolitical, and geopolitical—and localized in the 
production of modern Moldovan subjectivities forged across experiences and generations.  I have 
shown Moldovans are variously perceived by themselves and others as crisis-prone, do not 
consider themselves either particularly unhappy or proud about their positionality, and blame the 
failure to stabilize life in such a way that there is uniform agreement about how to proceed 
politically.
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CHAPTER III 
 
EUROPEANIZATION AND EXCLUSION 
 
Part I:  Introduction and Overview 
A) Introduction 
 This chapter is a discussion of EU-Moldova relations through the lens of EUBAM.  
Accordingly, it sees Europeanization as an explicitly spatial process expressed in terms of 
externalization for the EU, especially in terms of its policing agents and migration management 
authorities.  In this light, projects like EUBAM are best viewed as attempts to extend sovereign 
controls and empower neighboring states with mutually beneficial technological tools and 
financial aid so harmonization masks securitization, i.e. exclusion.  My analysis focuses on 
similarities and differences between how previously externalized remote controls are 
increasingly being folded into Moldovan domestic regulations to turn the country into an 
external reservation rather than a conventionally sovereign republic given endemic lack of 
control. In focusing on the transformation of tensions underlying more recent moves involving 
migrant repatriation and border securitization, alongside the proliferation of entirely new 
migration-related spaces of detention and risk-management systems designed as the latest 
generation of extra-territorial remote controls, I show how Moldova as a territorial notion and 
Moldovans as risky subjects are being recast from outside-in (i.e. ENP/EUBAM discourses of 
danger) and inside-out (i.e. borderlanders’ views of EU exclusion efforts).  
 The recent history of Moldovan border and migration control is bound up is EU security 
policy.  Following the increasingly restrictive reintroduction of Romanian border controls for 
Moldovans starting around 2001, the EU has promoted novel spatial solutions in its expanding 
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European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) program. As a legacy of the EU’s “Wider Europe” (2003) 
communiqué issued after the latest round of eastern enlargement, techniques for managing 
Moldova(ns) and navigating the Neighborhood were initially articulated in terms of “preventing 
the rise of new dividing lines in Europe”.  The ENP began formally governing EU external 
relations in 2005 and regular “progress reports” issued ever since have remained useful and 
paternalistic barometers of hegemonic constructions, bureaucratic practices, and territorial 
designs; they inform this chapter.  Institutionally, such ENP efforts reflect an extra-territorial yet 
extraordinarily geographic strategy to render existential threats visible to state agents.  They 
work, as I show via EUBAM as case, to manage risks seen in the latest round of expansion. 
Significantly, ENP recognizes frontiers are no longer control points along a river separating 
states and sees border security as population management.  In addition to EUBAM, a number of 
other EU-backed spatial transformations have come into use as indicative of the proliferation of 
controls.  These include the various migration-related spaces of detention like refugee housing 
units and trafficked-persons shelters detailed below also indicate the dispersion of sovereignty as 
recast on top of existing national-territorial frameworks like passport ownership in the face of 
increasingly restrictive visa regimes.   
 As hegemonic moves, such efforts are consistent with critiques of ENP as a bad neighbor.  
To outsiders, such moves also appear as one of the most innovative and sophisticated tools to 
date and can be read as attempts to extend Europeanization by alternative means.  For critics, 
“mobility partnerships” are “security partnerships” for the EU are “insecurity partnerships” for 
(third country) nationals (Carrera and Sagrera 2009).  Externally, Moldovan territory and 
mobility controls can thus be seen as emerging models of political and economic exclusion 
despite claims of their purely technological expertise and neutral function. Attention to these new 
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extensions of enforcement is not only external, however.  As recent internal legislation in 
Moldova shows, the political geography of confinement and incarceration is intensifying 
domestically too.  This legislation is designed to support the dispersion of controls via migration-
related spaces of detention (EC 2009, 2010, 2011a-c).  Thus, my attention to the contemporary 
geo-policing of migration and frontier checkpoints helps debunk the borderless Europe myth 
with attention to bordering practices as part of a wider governance transformation in the face of 
variegated sovereignty regimes. As territorial strategies framed by nation-building and designed 
to influence control over citizens, bordering practices matter because they reify particular types 
of power and displace specific populations (Sack 1983). Tracing the genealogy of EU-Moldova 
border regimes is therefore important.  It is consistent with studies arguing that sophisticated 
measures to restrict entry are replacing conventional searches to produce new geographies of 
security in the form of risk management (Foucault 2007). Similarly, seeing these configurations 
as tools, Schengen borders also function as a transfer of checks to external frontiers and follow 
multiple trajectories, including the “geopolitical” (i.e. classic territorial), “national” (i.e. nation-
state), and “biopolitical” (i.e. populations) (Walters 2002, 2004, 2006).  Here I trace these 
multiple trajectories in the eyes of their agents and select citizens.   
 Taken together, ENP/EUBAM instruments seek to engineer, via use of “short-term 
experts” and “European standards” (EC 2009, 2010; EUBAM 2008, 2012).  As small-scale and 
proprietary model for intensifying the shift to harmonization it is contradictory in practice 
because it reveals the aims of standardization and cooperation are merely euphemistic 
approaches to securitization.  Rather than an abrupt deviation, this trend is consistent with 
“racialized, criminalized, securitized” (Tesfahuney 1998) narratives about migration related risks 
evident in the EU’s internal migration policy (i.e. the Schengen agreement) that have existed 
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since at least the 1980s.  It is also fundamentally geographic as it seeks to expand influence via 
zones of standardized metrics and practices.  These tactics are evidence of an increasing 
preference for and tensions between domestic policing functions versus transnational mobility 
rights, as enshrined in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam.  In policy terms, this change marks a key 
shift from an economic to a political Europe insofar as common economic concerns were 
marginalized in favor of conventional policing and criminal threats.    
 
B) Argument 
 Today, relevant EU-Moldova priorities, association agreements, and action plans reflect 
this shift to risk management and extraterritorial controls. Using instruments with transparent, 
benign titles as signposts (e.g. mobility partnerships, border assistance missions) my argument is 
that the relationship between EU institutions and Moldovans specifically is best seen as rooted in 
re-articulations of sovereignty and negotiations around security practices. As reflections of crisis 
management practice and failed governance, i.e. reinforcing fortress Europe or recasting it as a 
porous if gated community, security-oriented narratives show how the struggle to govern this 
space and its residents has transformed since the independent Moldovan government was 
recognized as sovereign in the first place. As state effects, these policies have produced new 
vectors of exclusion like visa regimes and revised zones of confinement via the parallel 
internalization and externalization of legal-technical devices like biometric documents 
networked to INTERPOL and related databases.  Spatially, these regimes incorporate EU-backed 
documents and surveillance tools externally while also incorporating people domestically 
alongside “migrant accommodation”, “refugee resettlement”, and “temporary holding facilities” 
designed to regulate further their mobility as detailed below.  Geopolitically, these moves 
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suggest how hegemonic models of border and migration control work from the EU’s perspective 
and Moldova’s too. In focusing on how these spaces have emerged, I show how governments 
and authorities are both gaining powerful new surveillance tools and risk management capacities 
over some of their territory while, at the same time, facing other crises and loss of control in 
social or economic spheres.   
 In suggesting a geographic approach to how frontiers are made and who crosses them is 
worth pursuing, my argument is that Moldovan territory and sovereignty represent the present 
and future of EU hegemony now uses EUBAM as a case to situate EU-Moldova relations in 
terms of governance and exclusion as expressions of sovereignty, hegemony, and territoriality.  I 
thus argue it is vital to pay attention to the production and authorization of formal controls and 
popular uses of geopolitical knowledge by competing authorities and agents.  My argument 
draws on interviews and focus groups with relevant people ranging from the European Union’s 
Border Assistance Mission’s (EUBAM) first Director, the Hungarian General Ferenc Banfi and 
other EU technocrats as well as their UN and other implementing partners as authority figures 
and people engaged in the daily geopolitics of migration and border management at multiple 
spatial scales.  In contrast to this formal vision articulated by authorities, I also draw on my focus 
group participants to consider their experiences with life in different parts of this frontier zone 
where residents articulate a different vision of the border and ignorance of EUBAM.  Taken 
collectively, these sources indicate the prevailing brand of Europeanization remains an on-going 
spatial process marked by competing elites and visible in their efforts to reconcile “neo-
medieval” and “post-Westphalian” sovereignty (Zielonka 2001), especially in terms of bordering 
practices and territorial controls.  
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Part II.  Modern Moldovan Geopolitics in Relation to Europeanization 
A) Western Interventions  
 Clearly, multiple attempts to reconcile Moldovan sovereignty and reintegrate national 
territory have unfolded since 1991/92.  Contradictory efforts to introduce uniform tax stamps and 
customs regimes and navigate anachronistic “joint control commissions” have characterized the 
landscape of TMR-Moldova conflict resolution in the region. As commentators (N. Popescu 
2008) have argued, these mechanisms are 1990s-era instruments and cannot resolve 21st century 
problems given current power structures. A brief overview of these instruments and their 
genealogy highlights the problems for conflict resolution in TMR.  The case is perhaps most 
important for EU member states and NATO members because it is the only unresolved so-called 
“frozen conflict” in the post-Soviet space that borders, contiguously, an EU member state.  Such 
territorial anxiety remains problematic.     
 
B) NATO 
 As the EU and NATO have expanded east, newfound proximity to the unresolved 
conflicts in the former Soviet Union has stimulated fresh management efforts to promote their 
resolution via cooperation. NATO and its 1994 “Partnership for Peace” to promote technological 
solutions and strategic management in the FSU sought “interoperability” for states pursuing 
membership.  Despite its constitutionally enshrined neutrality, Moldova joined the partnership 
(but not NATO proper) in 1994. As a “stepping stone” to promote regional “stability”, this 
model distinguished between “advanced” countries but has proven ineffective in achieving its 
mission because it is not involved in the TMR conflict, arguably a key source of Moldovan 
insecurity given the presence of Russian army personnel and weapons caches (NATO 2011).    
 
 
119 
 
C) OSCE 
 Two other western-backed conflict resolution and regional security bodies are more 
important in this case.  Since the early 1990s, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) has served as the preferred vehicle for border management and conflict 
resolution in the region.  This post-Cold War talking shop of 56 member states, based in Vienna, 
remains a product of the Yeltsin era and a weak Russia.  However, given Russia’s resurgence 
and its OSCE veto power, efforts to enforce the 1999 Istanbul agreement dismantling the 
massive Colbasna arms depot in TMR remain unproductive. In the meantime, Putin pushed to 
reassert Moscow’s authority via plans advocating more asymmetric federalism, both within the 
Federation itself and also in the “Near Abroad”.  Following the stillbirth of these OSCE 
negotiations scheduled to take effect in 2003 and the Moldovan President’s subsequent decision 
to scrap the Russian-backed, bi-lateral Chisinau-Tiraspol Kozak memorandum, settlement 
negotiations have stalled.  The proposal, officially the “Russian Draft Memorandum on the Basic 
Principles of the State Structure of a United State in Moldova”, enshrined special status for TMR 
and a mandate for some 2000 Russian peacekeepers to remain until 2020.  It was an attempt to 
extend the Primakov (informally) or Moscow (formally) memorandum from 1997 to normalize 
Moldova-TMR relations.  At the time, Moldovan president Lucinschi and his former security 
service comrades including Ukrainian president Kuchma, the Russian Yeltsin, and self-styled 
TMR leader Smirnov met under the aegis of the OSCE to reaffirm that “The Parties shall build 
their relations in the framework of a common state within the borders of the Moldavian SSR as 
of January of the year 1990” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova 1997).  In 
denying TMR’s special status and rejecting the idea of foreign armies on its constitutionally 
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neutral soil where foreign alliances are prohibited, the PC was then forced to look west for 
alternatives.   
 To date, the EU and US still prefer to work via the “5+2” format of Russia, Ukraine, 
Moldova, TMR and the OSCE as mediators with the EU and US acting as observers. As noted 
above, EUBAM has also emerged as yet another ad hoc reaction to police this field alongside 
pilot Mobility Partnerships and their networks of migration-related exclusion and spaces of 
detention.  For western powers then, the emphasis on government-backed IBM is designed to 
“identify novel approaches to improve the management of legal movements of people between 
the EU and third countries ready to make significant efforts to fight illegal migration” (European 
Commission 2007:2), in the absence of a final settlement.  In EU eyes, justifications for new 
security sector cooperation, in line with Bigo’s (1998) analysis, help legitimate the EU as actor 
and, ironically, rather entrench the TMR authorities they are designed to eliminate.  This 
situation where conventional defensive strategy and conflict resolution is evolving into joint 
border controls targeting labor migrants and more banal contraband are cast as the primary 
threats, rather than terrorists or arms dealers, suggests the trajectory of conflict resolution:  a 
never ending and inconclusive series of negotiations that are moving away from the territorial-
defensive and towards the networked-biopolitical in terms of external sovereignty and expressed 
in border security and risk management practice.    
 
D) Action Plans and Mobility Partnerships 
 At present, two key documents govern the EU-Moldova relationship, including the 2005 
EU-Moldova Action Plan and the 2008 pilot EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership.  In addition to 
ENP/EUBAM, these technical-political efforts to secure long-term visa-free travel in the EU for 
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Moldovans depend on the EU-Moldova Mobility Partnership.  As a first of its kind, this project 
seeks to facilitate legal migration, establish cooperation of migration and development, 
prevent/combat irregular immigration and trafficking/smuggling in persons, and promote 
effective readmission and return policy (EU-RM 2010a/b). All of these ambitions reflect the 
general EU-wide trend of securitization.  Still, the last two items are particularly worth 
considering because of their function for extraterritorial policing of “risky populations”.  Indeed, 
readmission and return policies for both voluntary and forced migrants are listed last but are 
hardly least important.  Rather, the EU-Moldova Cooperation Council has consistently 
privileged security and repatriation agreements for “third country nationals” first before 
considering liberalization for non-member state citizens.  This document is presented as a model 
of border management, or what Van Houtum and Pijpers (2005) compressed into a uniform logic 
called “bordermanagement”. In practice, the ENP is the most contemporary form of EU external 
governance. Consequently, in this case attention to geographic metaphors like “remote controls” 
is necessary, but it is also necessary to expand them to encompass their new integrated, 
internalizing features.  Indeed, attempts to replace a fortress and iron curtain with an electronic 
frontier and common visa regime reflect changing tactics evident in new discursive formations.  
Rather than fences and obligations bound up in human rights protections and territorial control, 
the trend is toward risk management, population regulation, readmission agreements, and “best 
practices”.  
 Seeing itself as source of stability and exporter of security as elaborated in parts III-IV of 
this chapter, EU-led efforts to extend sovereign authority over trade (i.e. customs controls) and 
mobility (i.e. migration categories) reflect a Brussels-backed effort to empower Chisinau and 
Kiev at the expense of Tiraspol and Moscow.  For the EU, its operating assumption is that the 
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‘legitimate’ authorities must have territorial control over sovereign, i.e. externally recognized 
boundaries in order to qualify as “stable” and “secure” in its eyes.  This demand to meet 
idealized ENP standards is stipulated in its mandate and reflects changing EU-Moldova relations. 
Still, EUBAM promotional documentary-style videos explicitly acknowledge that locals are 
resisting these controls on their mobility and experiencing hardship because of changes 
(EUBAM 2006b). According to public statements by its chief, EUBAM is responsible for the 
border and it claims credit for closing 17 weapons firms (Banfi 2009).  However, ‘officials’ from 
TMR say the businesses never existed.  Additionally, some claim that the old weapons smugglers 
have simply diversified their cargo and shifted operations east to Ukraine. Despite Mr. Banfi’s 
personal and professional assurances to the contrary, such analysis also insists that planes can 
land in TMR and air traffic control is not within the EUBAM mandate (Interview 2009b).  
 
E) Remote Controls and Externalizing Governance 
In analyzing the EU-Moldova relationship as part of a wider transformation of the geopolitics of 
migration and border management, I focus on territorial and biopolitical governance.  In tracing 
its evolution, I draw on Zolberg’s (2003) notion of “remote control” as a form of 
extraterritoriality used to render Moldova as what Bibler-Coutin (2010) calls a “country of 
confinement”. As noted in the Introduction, historically the US and EU member states have 
relied on exporting control using passport regimes and visa facilitation/restriction policies. 
Today, the main western geostrategy of coordinating visas and returns to so-called safe third 
countries, regardless of the potential for refoulement, has been labeled a “burden shifting”  
(Lavenex 2001), “shifting up and out” (Lavenex 2006) or “push-back” strategy (Hayes and 
Vermeulen 2012).  In reality, it means Kazakhs or Uzbeks who enter the EU via Moldova or 
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Ukraine can be deported back to countries where their human rights are neither likely to be 
safeguarded nor consistent with international legal guarantees the EU prides itself on ensuring.  
Nonetheless, formally these controls are organized around ideas of “capacity-building” and are 
enacted by private contractors and government institutions (Lavenex  2004, 2006).  While this 
notion of manipulating mobility by externalizing controls first described the United States in the 
early twentieth century, has also served to label commercial airline carriers’ pre-emptive role in 
regulating territorial access, and remains useful for analyzing the EU today.   
 The EU has long supported efforts to improve controls and standardize checks along its 
periphery. Its tactics indicate how ENP attempts to re-scale border security and re-territorialize 
human mobility using third-countries as “spatial”, i.e. territorial fixes to frame immigration as 
risk and relocate migrants are forged in practice. As such, ENP (and EUBAM within it) is in line 
with other EU border control efforts like FRONTEX, where insecurity and risk are seen as the 
chief enemies and legitimate travelers as friends  (Neal 2009).  Taken together, its move to zones 
of confinement, in the plural sense, supports the assertion that a shift toward a “neo-medieval” 
order of flexible boundaries and networked authorities is increasingly likely. In the Moldovan 
case, the problem was articulated as the risks of weak statehood. Lately, EU efforts have aimed 
to strengthen such weak states’ frontiers and thereby extend its security network via improved 
border controls and risk management techniques.  Thus, the Moldo-Ukraine frontier and attempts 
to centralize control over it remain localized geopolitical products par excellence and, indeed, 
“paradigmatic peripheries” because they reflect these outcomes associated with (supra)state and 
regional efforts to manage borders. Indeed, at former Presidents Voronin (RM) and Yuschenko’s 
(UK) written invitation for assistance in the face of Moscow’s reticence to withdraw 
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‘peacekeepers’ or suspend support for TMR, the EU has continued to test its technical tools for 
external relations within ENP, including EUBAM and the Eastern Partnership.   
 Because it is about institutionalizing an expanded cordon sanitaire, EU tools place 
growing emphasis on extraterritorial control. In practice, they embody restrictive 
transgovernmental logics of hardened border security and expanded efforts to intensify exclusion 
and increase capacity for migration-related forms of detention.  These efforts are rooted in 
discourses of immigration as socio-cultural threat and linked to criminality to blur differences 
between kinds of mobility.  This “intensive transgovernmentalism” has expanded since the EU’s 
2002 policy concerning “integrated border management” (IBM) schemes of risk analysis.  
Today, assessments are executed via staff trained in European “best practices” and connected to 
EU surveillance networks and the AEI has rushed to complete its plan to adopt this model, with 
EU support of course. As a management tool, externalizing transgovernmental cooperation is not 
only dubbed a form of “remote control” (Zolberg); others have labeled this process “police a 
distance” or “remote policing” (Anderson and den Boer 1994; Bigo 2005). For geographers 
rather than security studies or world-systems proponents, such efforts represent the value of 
“very remote controls” and blur the lines between criminal smuggling responses and human 
rights-approaches for trafficking (Samers 2004). In this context of both Moldovan and EU 
political-economic “crises” (Voronin quoted in Infotag 2009), new laws and practices continue 
working to shift attention “outside”, externalizing crises and stemming “floods” (Bigo 2005; 
Huysmans 1995, 2000; Lavenex 2004, 2006; Tesfahuney 1998). Via IBM, ENP seeks to 
institutionalize such tools, shifting checkpoints further from the common territory and, in 
Moldova, going beyond just creating the EU’s first “remote control border”. Consistent with a 
neoliberal language of efficiency and a false vision of flat geographies of global flows, such tools 
 
 
125 
aim to distinguish legitimate traffic from smugglers, i.e. to regulate porosity artfully, not 
eliminate it (Sparke 2006).   
 The shift toward extraterritorial controls and “transgovernmentalism” is not new. Rather, 
it is a continuation of earlier forms transgovernmental cooperation in counter-terrorism as a 
legacy of the TREVI group, i.e. a 1980s era forum to combat “terrorism, radicalism, extremism, 
and violence” in western Europe (Lavenex 2006; Tesfahuney 1998). These practices frame a 
particular set of threats to public order and national security and ultimately function as part of a 
strategy to navigate border permeability in an age where the “hard outer shell” (Herz 1957) of 
territoriality has dissolved and new spaces like airport checkpoints, customs databases, and 
detention centers have emerged with their own geopolitical and geostrategic logics. This shift 
could be interpreted in line with Taylor (1994) in seeing ‘the state’ as a “bordered” or “leaky 
power container” but I argue a more processual approach is needed (Painter 2004).  As such, 
borders should be understood not only as the limits of a sovereign, territorial state, but rather as 
an assemblage of social processes and overlapping authorities like customs agents, border 
guards, or EU observers who are producing discrete categories of people to privilege movement 
in particular ways (Ong 2006).  
 Organizationally, projects like EUBAM are about re-scaling territorial and network 
control.  They are evident in research showing how an “archipelago of police” where expert 
networks are deployed “outward” or “upstream” along the EU’s eastern border to regulate 
external access (Bigo 1998; Kurokowska and Tallis 2009). Such thinking indicates how efforts 
like the EUBAM are an attempt to re-scale border security and re-territorialize human mobility 
using third-countries as spatial, i.e. territorial fixes to avert threats like immigration or terrorism 
by relocating unwanted migrants. In their studies of ENP bordering in its Southern, i.e. 
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Mediterranean dimensions, Vaughan-Williams (2011) and Gammeltoft-Hansen (2011) also 
suggest the same conclusion about exporting risk to the EU’s neighbors.  These institutional 
approaches are not neutral efforts to upgrade technology but, actually reflect a more substantial 
shift in thinking about technologies of territoriality and the parallel rescaling of the (geo)politics 
of mobility. 
 Explicitly,  “external governance” occurs when legal or institutional boundaries go 
beyond EU member states (Lavenex 2004). Still, others10 have referred to these types of 
processes using terms like “transnationalization”, “extra-territorialization”, “extraterritoriality”, 
“externalization”, “internationalization”, “pre-border controls”, “pre-frontiers”, and 
“europeanization” (Balzacq 2008; Bibler-Coutin 2010: Boswell 2003; Geddes 2001, 2003; 
Guiraudon 2000, 2001; Haddad 2008; Lavenex 2006; Lavenex and Ucarer 2004; Leonard 2006; 
Raustiala 2009; Rodier 2006; Van Selm 2002; Weinzierl 2007). While some use these terms 
interchangeably to discuss the external relations aspect of the Justice and Home Affairs security 
portfolio, others suggest blurring them leads to confusion (Leonard 2006).  In my dissertation, 
“extra-territorialization” is the best description of aspects labeled as “remote control” (Rodier 
2006; Zolberg 2003).   It is preferred because, rather than “extraterritoriality” as the extension of 
domestic law beyond state limits to render “zones of confinement”, Moldovans are internally 
engaged in “approximating” (i.e. mirroring model legislation’) and “twinning” (i.e. mimicking 
EU public sector practices cooperation).  In this way, remote controls are intensifying 
independently of external pressures in the conventional sense.  This hybrid logic to re-scaling 
territorial and mobility controls is most visible when EU (EC 2007, 2008) bodies discuss “pre-
frontiers” and “common core curriculum” in terms of management challenges and risk 
assessments.  Such euphemisms are part of their “Global Concept of Migration Management” 
                                                
10 For an excellent review see Chou 2009 
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(GCM) and “external management” or “second generation strategies” (EC 2009).   Given EU 
aims to strengthen GCM by increasing coordination and extending this next generation of 
mobility partnerships, Moldova reflects the trajectory of future EU external relations as mobility 
controls.  Indeed, Senegal, Georgia, and other ENP countries are now relying on regimes piloted 
in Moldova.  
  As the external governance debates above shows, the EU maintains its focus on reaching 
one-sided agreements with its newest gatekeepers.   These plans also work to internalize EU 
values with neighboring governments, allowing Brussels to externalize governance problems via 
such agreements (Lahav 2000).  Ironically, this externalization is labeled a partnership and 
marketed as a fast track to full EU membership because of the assumed benefits of harmonizing 
controls with EU standards (Verdun and Chira 2008).  Paradoxically, because this process is 
securitization, the result is a more restrictive and asymmetric border that limits mobility for most 
categories and populations.  Moreover, imposing fresh obligations on countries of migrant 
origin, which are increasingly destination- and transit states given their new proximity to the EU 
also works to externalize the problem for Brussels and internalize it for neighboring countries. 
To demonstrate how and why, it is key to focus on how the ENP has been articulated along the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian frontier since how borders are inscribed matters. Contra their aims, instead 
of enhancing cooperation and development as compensation for harboring its citizens and “third-
country nationals” (TCNs), efforts to enforce uniform controls have neither reduced unwanted 
migrant in-flows nor economic inequalities. Through 2011, only one EU-citizen (a Lithuanian) 
was readmitted from Moldova and not a single TCN has been returned (Interview 2011b).   
 Today, the “second generation” of remote controls is being implemented (EC 2010).  
These moves in favor of intensifying remote control beyond visa regimes and carrier sanctions 
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suggest new geostrategic and biopolitical logics are emerging.  Yet, despite ceding some 
sovereignty and territory in the sense of rescaling border controls, Chisinau is gaining powerful 
tools to consolidate institutional authority and population control via the EU-Moldova Action 
plan (2005, 2010a/b). Moldovan efforts to court Brussels and implement model EU policies are 
moving rapidly despite the faint promise of EU visa-facilitation rather than full membership. 
Starting in late 2010, the second generation of the GCM vision was realized internally in a 
radical new way (EU-RM 2010b).  Internally, the Moldovan AEI-led interim government 
adopted the EU vision wholesale in a completely new legislative package.  These “improved” 
controls entered into force via the 91-article “Law on the Regime of Foreigners”. It is a prime 
example of “approximation” to EU standards, but is better labeled “appropriation” because it 
internalizes EU standards so aggressively.  
 New laws, rather than purely externalizing certain controls as in the past, represent a 
qualitative shift to domestic adoption rather than external acceptance.  Consequently, new kinds 
of spaces like “temporary accommodation centers” now function alongside biopolitical mediums 
for newborn subjects like “tolerated persons” (Law on Regime of Foreigners 2010). In ENP and 
Eastern Partnership discourses considered below, where regional attention is an explicit 
acknowledgement of intent, a new EUROSUR is also unfolding in pilot form.  As articulated in 
the “EU-Internal Security Strategy” recommendations, these moves are part of “5 steps to a safer 
EUrope.”  Accordingly, they seek a “common platform”, “uniform picture”, and “genuine 
partnership” to forge a “coherent common policy” (EC 2011a: 1).  This trend indicates external 
controls still function as exclusion as much as “burden sharing” (Lahav and Guiraudon 2006).  
Seen in this light, my macro-level geopolitical analysis of micro-level mobility controls helps 
explain how 21st century border and migration regimes work. 
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F) Bordering and the European Neighborhood Policy  
 Controls within the ENP show how the EU approaches borders and regional security as 
technical, territorial devices for risk and population management (Ferrer-Gallardo 2008).  In 
Moldova especially, much uncertainty remains over what such ENP-led border regimes mean 
(Avram and Muller 2008). Still, EU/ENP policies increasingly favor restrictive measures.  For 
Marcu (2009), the territorial dialectic of globalization means that Moldovan borders are both 
opening in terms of cooperation and closing in terms of control and security.   In contrast, I argue 
that this cooperation is actually a way to promote securitization, i.e. more regulations on 
mobility, via re-territorialization of visa regimes for citizens and readmission agreements for 
unauthorized migrants or TCNs. The resulting zone of stratified rights renders this case as a 
modern-day buffer zone and reflects wider ENP asymmetries associated with differentiated 
action plans that are heterogeneous in practice (Balzacq 2007, 2008; Tassinari 2005). This 
transference, in the form of migration controls and border security, is being tested in Moldova 
today to see how best to govern migrants.   
 Clearly, new concepts are needed to understand the ambiguous character of EU borders. 
Below, I seek to extend productive discussions of borders and Europeanization. I seek to follow 
Walters (2004) who has argued that state borders remain pre-eminent in geopolitics and 
questioned how regional blocs acquire frontier characteristics. Later (2006), he suggested three 
spatial forms, including the emergent region-state, the gated community, and the IT-firewall.  
This thinking reflects the move beyond the “territorial trap”, explicitly, and focuses on fuzzy 
borders at across scales.  In the “IT-firewall”, discontinuous nodes exist to move border controls 
away from the EU and closer to countries of origin.  The notion of “firewall” thus serves as an 
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electronic version of the geostrategic “chokepoint”. In the purest geopolitical tradition, such 
concepts function as barriers and operate as an “update” or “patch” to secure smuggling routes or 
disrupt illegal flows using surveillance systems to restrict access to an area (2006).  I seek to 
show how in practice EU agents seek to embody this role as network architects, data managers, 
and expert observers under the ENP umbrella. Rumford (2006) has similarly identified such 
results as a “complex, networked border” in the sense that frontiers are now less about military 
defense and are notable for their porosity instead of their impermeability.  In an effort to 
understand the new spatiality of the EU, he considers borderlands at the edge of this single space 
as an area signaling the spatiality of borders and I seek to deepen his assessment in the case 
studies below.  More empirically, Bachmann and Sidaway (2009) argue that a “critical 
geopolitics of the EU” in terms discourses of risk and authority is useful to see how a complex 
territorial unit is differentiated and this chapter illuminate the eastern dimension of the EU to 
complement their Mediterranean-oriented vision.   
 
G) Securitization via Technozone 
  These kinds of coordinated EU efforts to produce common standards across a space with 
divergent practices yield what Barry (2006) calls a “technological zone”. For him (239), “A 
technological zone can be understood…as a space within which differences between technical 
practices, procedures or forms have been reduced, or common standards have been established.” 
Borrowing from Dunn’s (2005) analysis of Poland, he argues the EU can operate as a “zone” to 
expand. As the EU’s “risk analysis”, “gaps analysis”, and “migration profiles” highlight, it is just 
such efforts to establish “common measures, connections, qualifications and limits” that are at 
work along the EU-Moldova frontier via projects like EUBAM (Barry 2006; Council of the EU 
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2011). Indeed, in 2011 according to EUROSUR, efforts will target better “interoperability” like 
the NATO Partnership for Peace, though it relies on standardizing risk analysis practices rather 
than military support (EC 2011b: 2).  Considering such Moldovan-Romanian border challenges 
following accession, Trauner and Kruse (2008a) argued for a “new EU security approach” to 
explain these kinds of visa facilitation and readmission agreements.  In their convincing analysis, 
directing attention precisely to the construction of categories and categorization of dangers used 
to regulate risky people shows how bordering practices are changing in practice.  
  As illustrations of governance schemes and spatial standardization via risk transfer and 
containment via standardization, I argue EUBAM and ENP illuminate not just how Moldova fits 
in the EU’s geopolitical vision, but how the EU’s external relations can be seen as expressions of 
sovereignty and territoriality.  These visions are evident in “critical migration studies” and not 
just critical geopolitics or critical security studies since they are part of wider efforts to 
understand key control mechanisms like access to work or citizenship protections (Buckel and 
Wissel 2010; Guild 2009).  Thus, in tracing efforts that emphasize the professional management 
of risk via groups like FRONTEX and EUBAM (Huysmans 1995, 1998; Jeandesboz 2007; Neal 
2009) I show how alternative ENP threat narratives emerge. In focusing my attention on risk, as 
distinct from security, my analysis highlights competing policy prescriptions and management.  
Conceptually, risk emphasizes populations and actuarial-like data to manage contingency instead 
of preventing movement. Practically, managers attempt to expand security and minimize risk 
across the network rather than resolve threats (Aradau et al 2008). Such devolution of authority, 
or the “micro-geopolitics of risk intensification”, is active in US border control and applies here 
(Coleman 2009). As shown above, Chisinau is both at the core and the edge of on-going efforts 
to secure a particular idea of Europe.   
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  Recent shifts embody these changes in bureaucratic practice and via Barry’s technozones.  
These external patterns are eroding but exclusion is hardly disappearing.  Beyond police training 
and surveillance assistance in projects like EUBAM, other relevant EU-Moldova relations work 
via “twinning”, i.e. technocratic mentorships and best practices, and/or “approximation”, i.e. 
legal mimicry and legislative standardization.  In late 2010, the EU Council confirmed these 
preferences in their formal Conclusions in the context of the ENP’s Eastern Partnership 
meetings.  In its final statement, through which it seeks to facilitate “approximation and 
convergence”, border security is seen as the measure of bureaucratic capacity and efficiency.  In 
this instance, the earlier trend continues because cooperation remains about securitization. In the 
context of the Eastern Partnership, the EU considers the “essential” aim to be “promoting the 
mobility of citizens in a well managed and secure environment” (Council of the EU 2010).  Here, 
the preference for institutional control rooted in contradictory logics of efficiency, security, and 
permeability is made explicit.  Moreover, the Conclusion includes striking language on EU 
intentions to manage and secure citizens as outsiders first rather than people with rights, i.e. 
partners or neighbors.  
 
Part III) EUBAM as Case 
A) Proprietary Effort or Paradigmatic Move? 
As proprietary effort in this strategy, EUBAM, was launched in 2005 as a counterweight 
to Russia. According to the Memorandum of Understanding, EUBAM should observe, advise 
and assist efforts to facilitate trade and counteract illegal activities using statistical analysis and 
risk management (2005). Formally, such regimes explicitly “target” dynamic “nodes” and 
“flows”; they seek to “combat” migration and organized crime, “fight” corruption, and produce 
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“better border management” for “citizens and businesspeople” (EUBAM 2006, 2008, 2009).  
This approach is distinct from earlier strategies designed to support border guards and their 
controls, bolster national defenses, and protect human rights. It is rooted in efforts to apply 
dispersed, technology-based solutions to turn invisible, ungovernable flows into manageable 
subjects (Carrera 2007; Panagiotidis and Tsianos 2006 in Buckel and Wissel 2010). Still, 
EUBAM (!44 million) is but one ENP tool in its !13 billion kit. ENP invented EUBAM, then, in 
but only one high-profile response to threats to sovereignty and security in the region. Efforts 
like ENP/EUBAM are part of enduring, if yet unsuccessful, attempts to organize a unified 
border.   Via security experts, communication platforms, and best practices such moves in the 
region prefer to work via ostensibly neutral use of technical expertise and institutional 
cooperation. 
 As one of the most technical and territorial instruments in the toolbox, EUBAM is 
grouped with the ENP’s efforts to meet EU objectives concerning long-term visas; efficient 
small scale border traffic; facilitating movement for EU programs; visa free travel for diplomats 
and reductions for students; wider visa-free regimes; common integration of third country 
nationals; preventing illegal migration; and readmission agreements with neighbors (EC 2009). 
EUBAM is thus a test strategy to extend the EU’s hegemonic vision of a seamless and secure 
Schengen area. Because the EUBAM is a model of such novel and ‘neighborly’ successes in 
managing borders and securitizing responses to organized criminal threats, including trafficking 
and smuggling rings, it plays a privileged role in this vision. Considered in this light, EUBAM 
attitudes and practices suggest some of the many ways the EU is transforming as a geopolitical 
actor. In my view, the Mission appears as a special kind of technocratic power with opaque and 
contradictory origins pushing for a particular kind of self-interested change, but its success 
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depends on the willingness of partners. The result is a contested process where the re-scaling of 
European borderlands, sovereignty, and mobility within them is redefined. Taken together, these 
moves imply surveillance and standardization will intensify, via internalization, as zones of 
confinement are promoted from afar but adopted from within.  
 In the words of EUBAM’s first chief (Banfi 2009), changes mean “new security 
situations” and that Moldova is “closer in the sense of geography”.  Despite its observer-status 
and lacking investigative authority, via EUBAM the EU aims to continue institutionalizing a 
modern IBM system. The goal is to secure the border using tools like job training and “European 
expertise” to pre-empt risky flows. Indeed, General Banfi (2009) speaks about “…a system, 
which meets the needs and expectations of the citizens and businesspeople of Moldova and 
Ukraine while at the same time contributing to and benefiting from international cooperation.  In 
today’s world, with organized criminal groups constantly inventing new ways to evade border 
control, it is essential that all European states work together to keep our common neighborhood 
stable and secure.”  This apolitical self-image obscures the formal status of the project as an 
advisory body with limited powers to counter criminals. However, this geostrategic vision is 
biopolitical, national, and territorial.  In its institutional, technical, financial, and procedural 
guises it highlights trends toward rescaling of governance. 
 The EUBAM embodies the modern remote control border and it highlights how EU/ENP 
efforts are producing a borderland as an externalized object of governance via expert rule.  With 
a public relations staff of three, a dozen ‘field offices’ organized as “areas of responsibility”, and 
various government agents participating in trainings, EUBAM is extending EU practices across 
competing territorial and institutional visions. Field operations like site selection reflect a vision 
of “areas of responsibility” (AoR) where the EUBAM presence in the “field” is deemed most 
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urgent.  After deployment, five field offices were agreed but after a few months of operation, key 
ports like Odessa remained absent.  Internally with TN, and in terms of proportionality, 
relocating the offices was necessary to improve controls and increase presence.  This shift away 
from rail and road crossings was quite sensitive as Ukrainians were guarding their sovereignty 
and did not initially understand the need for a field office in Odessa.  After policy papers and 
shuttle diplomacy, Mr. Banfi was able to answer key questions for Russians reacting to the new 
field office in Chisinau, which covers the Red Army peacekeepers’ security zone.  After some 
concerns from Brussels, EUBAM received permission to expand its presence.   
 Despite this inherently political existence, the images presented in its glossy press kits, 
annual reports, and promotional videos offer a benevolent, seductively simple view of an 
ostensibly neutral and service-oriented effort. In its refined self-image, force and surveillance are 
swiftly deployed in a calculated and coordinated manner.  The responses appear uniform, 
organized and transparent and therefore in direct contrast to existing orders.  Local residents, 
government agents, and EUBAM observers are shown working together towards ‘progress’. 
Images of x-ray machines, camouflaged speedboats, and earnest officers delivering services play 
a prominent role in this public persona.  As models, they are included in ENP website-based 
reports of regional border and migration management (EC 2009). In its more highbrow reports, 
lectures, statistics, charts, maps, and graphs are deployed in an equally technocratic and 
calculating fashion to rationalize and organize ‘that which must be done’.  With its “training and 
standards coordinators”, EUBAM reflects a clear institutionalization of Barry’s “technological 
zones” (see above).  In these spaces and on speaking platforms, Mr. Banfi argues (in English) for 
inclusion and speaks of performance standards and seizure statistics with a no-nonsense tone.  
He bluntly engages with the culture of corruption, holds a contextual and sophisticated view of 
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borders, and seems personally convinced of Moldova’s future in the EU after reflecting on 
Europeanization from the standpoint of a longtime Hungarian police general.  In a less-
sophisticated metaphor but more humanizing tone emblematic of the incongruity of the situation, 
he describes his job promoting border security and risk management alongside better movement 
as “trying to swim in the river and keep the suit dry” (2009).     
 
B) EUBAM’s World-view  
 Despite its diplomatic credentials and outspoken assurances, EUBAM efforts are hardly 
neutral and serve the interests of a particular pair of states and one supranational project. A 
number of key documents, public statements, and interview responses are indicative of formal 
EU/ENP/EUBAM visions of the Moldova-Ukraine border show concern about uneven controls 
over flows that must be made visible from afar. As part of wider and longer running anxieties, 
prior to EUBAM, external donors and local partners implemented studies and assessments of 
Moldovan border guard capacities and structures to identify migration management and border 
control gaps.  The key limit in the eyes of those outside experts was not capacity, but training. 
Indicative of its self-assessment as a novel project, immediately after the founding memorandum 
was signed EUBAM issued its own 41-point plan as a Needs Assessment and Recommendations 
Report (NARR), with each item showing how EUBAM first saw its role. Almost all points were 
subsequently adopted suggesting the initial authority given, internally, to this new project as 
crisis resolution mechanism.   
 This initial list shows how EUBAM first saw itself.  Via NARR, it sought to “up-grade 
information flows and exchange of information” to build capacity and focused on illegal 
migration, contraband smuggling, and human trafficking as the chief threats to regional security 
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and stability.  These threats took the form of illegal border crossings, false or incorrect 
documents, stolen or unlicensed vehicles, undervalued goods, poor professionalism, or technical 
capacity. The goal is to unify the EU periphery via common standards.  But for Moldovan border 
guards and customs agents, integrated management or IBM is “yet to come” according to a 
leading EUBAM partner, which means that the mission is not complete, but entering a new stage 
(Interview 2009g).  Informally, knowledgeable agents see progress on IBM moving gradually, 
not because of lack of infrastructure but because of lack of willingness.  In this way, integration 
must first take the forms of “protocols, agreements, frameworks, and systems of compatibility” 
alongside other “confidence building measures”.   IBM is vital for Moldovan Border Guards 
because it effectively allows Chisinau to extend control over the TMR border once Ukrainian 
officials begin checks as proxies and thus shows how new sovereignty mechanisms are unfolding 
along the EU’s borders, thereby reconstituting territorial control over state frontiers. 
 Like the EU itself, EUBAM has a neoliberal worldview.  As a service exercise, EUBAM 
stresses business, trade, travel, and professionalism.  This globalized vision shows how 
permeability is regulated in favor of categories of travelers like “journalists” and 
“businesspeople”. It assumes that minimal state intervention is preferable.  However, a focus on 
only human flows ignores the state security function and advisory role of EUBAM. Thus, as part 
of conflict resolution efforts surrounding the sovereignty/territorial integrity question, EUBAM 
is overseeing a “certificate of origin” customs system where Moldovan tax stamps allow firms in 
TN to trade more liberally with EU partners.  Territorially and commercially, the region remains 
fractured but in this way economic ties are building confidence in settlement negotiations.  In 
interrogating EUBAM’s vision of neoliberal borders, representatives responded to written 
requests for clarification that:  
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The use of ‘customer satisfaction’ as a term describing the perceived quality and efficiency of 
border crossing procedures should not be associated with any changes in the discourse on national 
security in general or border management in particular. We use the term ‘customer satisfaction’ 
as a shortcut to refer to travelers and trade crossing the border. It is correct to say, however, that 
EUBAM is promoting service mentality in the partner institutions. This concept includes a wide 
range of components, including competent border officials, proactive provision of information to 
travelers about border crossing rules and respectful treatment of travelers. (Personal 
Communication 2009) 
 
This vision, crafted by an EUBAM public relations spokesperson, is illustrative because it 
acknowledges that national security and border management are not changing even if shorthand 
is used to recast the debate into “components” and “competencies” so they appear less 
threatening because they are now more manageable.   Furthermore, this attention to 
organizational culture is calculated to mask security practices in consumer garb alongside the 
utterly foreign concept of respect for travelers. 
 
C) Risk Management 
The EC/EUBAM project reflects a conventional approach to this borderland. Routinely, 
speeches and documents focus on the “massive land border” now marking Eastern Europe, 
perceived as a monolithic threat to economic and demographic security because of its external 
position. Even though a diplomatic approach to such views masks the initial effort to 
differentiate between asylum seekers, economic migrants, and criminal smugglers (in that order), 
this view of migrants requiring management remains the unifying theme (EC 2009). Consistent 
with decades of thinking on European borders involving buffer states, various geographical 
determinisms anchor EUBAM’s modern narrative. To the west, proximity to Romania as a major 
destination country for smuggled cigarettes is seen as an autonomous force. To the east, among 
the most appealing aspects of Ukraine for participants in the drug trade are the vast stretches of 
unguarded borders between Ukraine and Russia, which “enable” the traffic of heroin from 
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Central Asia to the Caucasus (EUBAM 2008).  These chaotic zones of wildness include the 
unprotected Black Sea coastline, and make Ukraine a “natural” choice for criminals and 
migrants.  Evidently, Moldova is also cursed by its environment and not just its neighbors.  In its 
risk analysis profiles, Moldova is seen as having both a relative geographical position and a 
climatological location conducive to insecurity.  In this thinking, “green” and “blue” borders 
represent different security challenges because of their physical characteristics.  Land borders, 
evidently, are terrain “naturally conducive to unfettered movement of goods and people…[and] 
necessitating first-rate management…Full demarcation is essential for reducing the porosity of 
the border…its lack precludes prosecution of offenders as there can be no conclusive proof the 
border was crossed illegally” (EUBAM 2006).  Such logic cannot explain the riddle of why 
smuggled frozen American chickens are crossing this frontier.   
 As EUBAM efforts are institutionalized and routinized, new information emerges that 
can affect how risks are seen to arise.  Quarterly reports analyze these risks using information 
provided by partners, as EUBAM has no investigative authority nor do the partner agencies, 
except for MDCS.  According to these recent reports, the majority of detainments along the 
green border are attempts to cross for domestic reasons or small-scale smuggling.  Most of the 
detentions at control points and the green border were the failures to provide travel documents or 
people offering forged documents.  In terms of contraband, drugs and weapons were smuggled 
on a small scale, though most involve isolated cases of hunting rifles, gas pistols, and air guns, 
not crates of Kalashnikovs bound for terrorists. The trend is therefore to perceive the main 
categories of cross border violations as human trafficking, illegal migration and people 
smuggling.  In some areas, joint border control operations have identified schemes for those 
trying to get to Western Europe, indicating how localized pressures along the border are a 
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function of broader events. Because these risks are measured in “detainments” and “seizures”, 
they are able to chart the variable character of objects entering their field of view.  This 
ambiguity is reflected in the frequency of smuggling cases, which decreased 2006-2007.  This 
could be interpreted as the result of reinforced operation skills, better border monitoring 
techniques, or enhanced application of risk analysis.  The dramatic increase in prevented 
attempts is significant, even if they are only for isolated cases of chicken meat and scooter 
smugglers headed to the “7 km market” near Odessa.   The causes remain obscured however, as 
food, alcohol, and tobacco is smuggled in increased value in terms of goods detained.  High-risk 
commodities like these remain the biggest threat to the two host states’ budgets.  In terms of tax 
evasion, including undervaluation of illegal import of vehicles, no changes are evident. 
 
D) EUBAM Effects   
 The results of the EUBAM mission to date are ambiguous.  In terms of the ‘fight against 
cross-border crime’, the border remains a focus in the eyes of EUBAM.  The most frequent 
justification for assistance requests involves illegal migration and human trafficking cases, more 
than smuggled goods, chicken meat, and weapons or ammunition.  Operational results include an 
increasing number of persons prevented from crossing the border, more people identifying an 
illegal border crossing, various document violations, possession of drugs, and undocumented or 
unregistered vehicles. The formal “expected results”, including reduced illegal migration, 
trafficking in human beings, smuggling of goods and other threats that challenge border security 
in the region were anticipated after the new enhanced border surveillance service.  After risk 
analysis was established within the MDBGS and MDCS, improved cross-border and interagency 
cooperation was supposed to follow with a reduced level of corruption. Targeted risk analyses 
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and case-based targets established by individual services have produced successes such as 
identifying 100 ha fields of cultivated marijuana in Ukraine, for example.  Enhanced professional 
capacity at the operational and tactical level remains unaltered in the eyes of outside observers 
though cross-border cooperation has improved by all accounts.  Studies of corruption show no 
significant changes in terms of decreases among custom officials (border guards are excluded 
from the study) and improved risk analysis still depends on data collected by partners.  
 Clearly, there is improved knowledge of EU standards and best practices as a function of 
relationships with the “Border Guard College” in Ungheni, though the application and 
sustainability of this new knowledge is unknown. IBM remains elusive and the improved 
analytical overview of the cross-border movement of goods and persons continues to reflect a 
banal landscape of consumers and traders. These efforts to develop the comprehensive picture of 
criminal activity at the state border and produce “common border security assessment reports” 
have proven successful in the sense that capacity is increased, with all variety of modern tools 
like field testing kits for drugs and x-ray scanners for cargo.  Training sessions have also raised 
awareness, but political will and professional capacity are not the same thing.  In public fora, the 
head of the intelligence assessment unit has boasted of EUBAM’s “benefits for security and 
trade” (Fallenegger 2009).  For him, the model case in point involves an illegal cigarette 
shipment tracked by global positioning system and demonstrates the “added-value of 
sophisticated analysis.” Going further, he points to EUROPOL standards and “analytical work 
files” as legal instruments organized to take advantage of various security databases.  At the end 
of his time praising the power and utility of these technologies he concedes that Moldovan 
officials only own a single laptop compatible with this system.   Moreover, the prize example of 
the lead analyst is not a container of rockets bound for Chechnya or Gaza, but the rather benign 
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load of cigarettes.   Elsewhere, internal and external political disagreements remain hidden and 
hinder cooperation. For example, a separately funded EU “flanking measure” to introduce a !30 
million communication system to link Moldovan border and customs agents is on hold.  Intra-
agency competition resulted in a single proposal from the border guard service and only a small 
part of the pilot effort will materialize while the two key border control organizations will 
continue to communicate separately or not at all.  As an ironic expression of this division, the 
closest the respective countries’ border guards and customs services ever appear is when they 
share a page in the annual report’s introduction (EUBAM 2006, 2008). 
 Examining its own visibility and presence, EUBAM offers an optimistic self-assessment.  
For the public relations representative, a “56% recognition rate is rather good indication that the 
EUBAM community communication program is delivering sufficient results. This program 
includes presentations in local schools by EUBAM Field Office staff; local media relations and 
[a] celebration of Europe Day in local communities.” For focus group participants, relations with 
border guards were not so positive.  Several participants noted that they would never consider 
calling the complaint departments of various authorities and laughed when others suggested they 
try.  One participant recounted the drama of triggering what appeared to be a successful 
investigation when a supervisor arrived at the border hours after the complaint only to dismiss 
the claim hastily.  The key limit facing EUBAM, by its own admission, is “…the institutional 
subordination of customs and border guard services as well as their law enforcement mandate. In 
Moldova and Ukraine all four services are not subordinated to the respective ministries; and 
except Moldovan customs, they do not have investigative powers.” EUBAM is bound in its 
successes and results by its hosts.   
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 Below the top, my interviews with agents from two-dozen member states reflect realistic 
concerns for ‘better border management’.  Surprisingly, not all agents express opinions 
consistent with the formal discourse of unidirectional knowledge transfer and others challenge 
assumptions about which groups indeed exercise the ‘best practices’.  Informally, individual 
perspectives and experiences vary and indicate a more complex reality where institutional and 
intergovernmental political disagreements remain hidden under a veil of uniformity.  These 
internal narratives governing EUBAM’s role in the world highlight how ‘the border’ is emerging 
as a “technological zone” to be controlled as a “field” with relevant areas of expertise (Mitchell 
2002). Because EUBAM only hires experts from ‘security’ backgrounds listed on individual EU 
member state rosters, border assistance necessarily acquires a certain state-sanctioned and 
restrictive orientation when the “field” is populated with similarly trained personnel. The parallel 
creation of statistics, trainings, partnerships, and study tours is making a new kind of borderland 
visible, if not more stable or secure.  Still, according to experts, “skills transfer” can go both 
ways. In one instance, a western European customs expert learned from a Moldovan agent how 
to inspect cars for contraband with two low technology tricks.  Instead of expensive X-ray 
scanning, he learned how simply knocking on hollow sections of side panels or smelling for 
fresh or stale air in a tire can indicate suspicious activity and prove as effective as so-called more 
advanced risk analysis.  Likewise, efforts to wipe mud off license plates or match trucking 
manifests with their contents are cheap analog techniques that can secure the border, per se, and 
improve management.  Such dynamics show how political will matters as much or more than 
skills or tools to probe EUBAM’s transformative power as an advisor and facilitator in its move 
to deploy hegemonic controls from afar.   
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 Other contradictory evidence indicates EUBAM efforts are incomplete and uneven.  For 
instance, when EUBAM administered what it acknowledges as a very basic and non-scientific 
visibility surveys during “Europe Day” celebrations recently, just over half the self-selected 
respondents were able to identify the mission and its goals (EUBAM 2009). Conversely, in my 
focus groups for my dissertation, during late 2009 only about 10% of my 100 participants 
(including 30 from Stefan Voda where EUBAM is actively observing) could identify the mission 
or its goal when shown a photo of a uniformed EUBAM agent observing an inspection at a 
checkpoint (See Appendix F for Focus Group Kit Image 11, courtesy EUBAM).  Still, in limited 
ways authorities views this level of recognition as a success as correspondence with them 
indicates (Personal Communication 2009).  Other findings situate this contradictory evidence in 
a world governed by competing inter- and intra- security organizations, institutional legacies, and 
political wills. In short, EUBAM’s vision assumes that modern European technology and 
training can fix an antiquated and anachronistic border regime.  The reality, however, is more 
complex than the risk management system and data collection and analysis practices designed to 
contain it, and most agents acknowledge this situation. 
 
Part IV) Beyond EUBAM 
A) From Externalization to Internalization 
  As noted above, EUBAM is just one part of the ENP and today other EU tools like the 
Eastern Partnership have come into effect.  While the EU seeks a one-size-fits-all model to 
harmonizing control in theory, in practice the extension of regulations and legal technologies is 
variable and asymmetric.  As evidence of proprietary attempts to reconcile this unevenness, and 
thus to expand the logic behind EUBAM, the latest generation of policy tools is continuing to 
 
 
145 
unfold in Moldova as testing ground.  In the EU’s “Concluding Statement” regarding “Eastern 
Partners” delivered in Chisinau in October 2010, it explicitly acknowledged its intensions to use 
migration and border policy as the core of its external relations.  In noting return agreements 
would be the future foundations of migration management, the group confirmed intentions to 
“promote mobility via readmission agreements” and, in hindsight, also suggested the future of its 
coordinated migration controls as part of its revised “global approach” (EC 2010, 2011a; 
Interview 2011a). The choice to deliver this news in Moldova was not coincidental. To 
complement the EUBAM, the Eastern Partnership’s goals echoed in its concluding statement 
suggest the need to consider domestic legislation on foreigners and migration detention schemes 
as markers of expanding geopolitical and biopolitical bordering regimes.  I thus aim to show that 
externalization is only one technique since other internalization moves also work to show how 
sovereign powers to regulate territory unfold domestically and via a proliferation of bureaucratic 
forms and institutional spaces. 
  In this section, my argument about the value of Moldova as future model for and ongoing 
expression EU sovereign power is deepened via focus on the production of the biopolitical 
subject, i.e. the tolerated person, and the re-territorialization of new frontier controls and places 
to put people who fail to circumvent them.  Perhaps indicative of the EU’s soft power, in its 
ability to transform frontier regimes in exchange for visa-liberalization for Moldovans, the top 
political and popular goal as the current government seems willing to accept considerable 
asymmetry and responsibility for regulating its territory.  Still, only after biometric borders, 
document security, border management, and database controls are implemented to its liking will 
the EU even discuss “benchmarks” for quantifying risks via EU-backed security expert “gaps 
analysis”.  Ironically, few (if any) Schengen states could meet these same rigorous external 
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targets they intend to force onto others. As of 2012, EU monitors remain unconvinced these 
measures are effective to the point that a visa liberalization regime can be negotiated (UNDP 
2011). Moreover, if EU moves are about re-territorializing its neighborhood, then my analysis 
tracing the filtering role of joint EU-Moldova bordering projects shows how the transformation 
of risk takes on geopolitical and biopolitical (i.e. not just national) forms beyond just EUBAM as 
monitor lacking executive authority. 
 
B) Frontiers as Filters 
  New frontier security rules are in place via new appeals to integrated border management, 
not just the risk management schemes incorporated within EUBAM practices. These strategies, 
with outside support, have led to broad structural reforms and have been accompanied by key 
political appointments as evidence of the weight given to such transformation as expressions of 
state sovereignty. Given the motivations of the AEI governing coalition associated with its name, 
it is not surprising they have introduced a “National Strategy for Integrated State Border 
Management” consistent with EU wishes and dependent on Brussels for equipment and training.  
The Ministry of Interior has shifted and a new model for the border guard units is now in effect.  
Here I offer a genealogy of this transformation as evidence of EU abilities to leverage their 
power to exclude via bolstering their neighbors’ power to survey and restrict, identify and then 
indefinitely tolerate, i.e. incarcerate.  This approach, in line with the latest Moldovan government 
Strategy to support “policies, principles and objectives needed for the uniform, coherent and 
efficient implementation” (2010: 5) of it was introduced during the recent political crisis. As 
attempt to negotiate controls and as expressions of hegemonic powers and sovereign control over 
national territory, these tools work in reference to the legal standards just entering into force, and 
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in fact are designed to complement them.  In this sense, such Europeanization strategies are 
promoted, via glossy publications (e.g “Government Monitor”) and pithy editorials (e.g. EU 
Observer), to both EU-oriented decision-makers and Moldovan citizens, including the diaspora.  
Logically, these moves are used as a prime example of the current government’s efforts to 
incorporate EU rules and accept any sovereign reorganization as precondition.  So, such efforts 
explicitly follow the goal stated in the preamble to the new “Law on the Regime of Foreigners” 
in that it seeks to promote visa-liberalization so Moldovans can circulate freely in the Schengen 
zone.  Ironically, before Moldovans can move freely they must first reinforce the conditions of 
their own incarceration and exclusion.   
  Other administrative moves have paved the way for these legislative shifts.  In 2011, the 
Border Guard Service continued its move away from its military background and use of 
conscription toward a professional body of risk managers who volunteer for service instead; they 
are now housed within the Ministry of Interior rather than serving as an autonomous executive 
body.  Not coincidentally, the new Interior Minister is the old Border Guards Service General, 
Alexei Roibu.  This move is part of efforts to convert conscripts and militarized border guards 
into professional migration managers.  Accordingly, the Department for Combating Illegal Stay 
will now transfer its authorities and capacities from the rights-oriented Bureau of Migration and 
Asylum in the Ministry of Justice to the criminally focused Ministry of Interior.  In terms of EU 
external assistance, the litany of training, “twinning”, and technical assistance is best illustrated 
in the titles of projects used to articulate ENP goals.  The names of such programs are self-
explanatory: Strengthening Capacities and Cooperation in the Identification of Forged and 
Falsified Travel Documents at the Moldova-Romania Border; Technical Cooperation and 
Capacity Building for the Governments of Ukraine and Moldova for the Implementation of 
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Readmission Agreements with the European Union (GUMIRA); and Supporting the 
Implementation of the Migration and Development Component of the EU-Moldova Mobility 
Partnership.  Collectively, 2010 saw such cooperation yield the first meeting of the inter-agency 
technical working group for coordinating the execution of the first “Extended Migration Profile” 
to complement EUBAM-led “risk analysis”. As cooperation and integration via securitization, 
such projects have successfully paved the way for the EU to produce management models in line 
with its own interests. 
  The success of such powers to exclude is evident not just in EUBAM or the tolerated 
persons regime.  They are also evident in the ongoing reorganization of institutional and 
procedural mechanisms; a “four-tier access model” of Moldovan borders has emerged to 
reorganize the country as space of confinement for citizens and TCNs.  This new structural and 
administrative effort involves the Border Guard Service, Customs Service, and Ministry of 
Interior and is simultaneously EU-approved. Conceptually, it embraces “four filters” in its 
overarching model, which is explicitly territorial and spatial in style and substance. It seeks to 
govern: 1) Activities in third countries, countries of origin and transit; 2) bilateral and 
multilateral international cooperation; 3) measures at external borders, control and surveillance; 
4) activities within the territory.  As a coordination mechanism, it aims literally to recast 
Moldova as a “filter”, nationally and territorially as well as regionally and geopolitically.  
Repeatedly, officials state the “main risk factors in the field of border management comprise 
internal and external factors. The internal factors are low capacity, lacks of 
telecommunications…the external risk factors are the following:  proliferation and development 
of terrorist networks and transnational organized crime, escalating migration…(Official 
Governmental Newsletter of the Republic of Moldova 2010b: 7).  From this perspective, the 
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government has internalized EU visions administratively and legislatively, adopting its 
managerial and technical discourses of regulation and reorganization using a language invoking 
terrorism alongside migration.  For Moldovan officials who do not control their entire sovereign 
territory, it is perhaps mildly amusing but certainly significant when they proclaim that “In this 
regard, special laboratories in the central office of Border Guard Service and National Guard 
College, Chisinau International Airport, and at Leuseni, Tudora, and Giurgiulesti state border 
crossing points have been set up.  In the future, it is planned to create similar laboratories in 
other state border crossing points, given the quantity and profile of the flow of passengers, based 
on threat assessment and risk analysis” (EC 2010b: 5-6, emphasis mine).  Consistent with my 
“liminal laboratory” argument above, this case shows how the EU’s hegemonic powers and 
Moldovan government sovereignty can be read via a territorial lens. 
 
C) Tolerated Persons and Detention Centers  
  The internalization of pro-EU reforms in Moldova is also evident in legislative arenas 
and is part of the shift to internalize governance via EU pressure. In terms of migration control a 
key shift is visible in the “Law on the Regime for Foreigners”.  This regime came into force in 
2010 and, consistent with wider EU shifts, reflects securitization practices masked as 
harmonization efforts and cooperation incentives within partnership agreements, as I have argued 
above. As a case, like EUBAM, the latest regime is perfectly contiguous with EU aims.  Its 
program involves a new set of rules that “ensures partial transposition” of fourteen separate EU 
regulations, starting with the Schengen Agreement (of which Moldova is not party to now and is 
unlikely to adopt soon).  Asymmetry in terms of sovereignty is further evident in the subsequent 
litany of rules that includes various other directives, modifications, and residency restrictions 
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consistent with EU standards.  As a self-consciously technical and juridical approach, it is 
designed for the goal of improving external border security for Moldova --and thus the EU-- as 
common cause. The preamble to this legislation is remarkable because of its candor.  
Significantly, it reflects the wholesale internalization --rather than the mere participation in 
externalization moves-- of EU aims at the expense of Moldovan sovereignty and mobility and 
thus can be seen as a deepening of earlier EUBAM and ENP designs or, indeed, in response to 
their failure to manage the perceived crisis of ungovernability and the fictions of sovereignty 
surrounding TMR.   
  Indeed, the new regime reads like an EU wish-list. The law mandates “…ensuring a 
complete, uniform and continuous mechanism for regulation of the regime of foreigners…in 
compliance with [EU] community legislation”. Specifically, the most relevant points here 
concern Articles 65-69 and reference, introduce, or reform spaces and subjects of incarceration 
using discourses of “toleration” and “accommodation” as neologisms for pending deportation 
and indefinite detention. Fundamentally, these moves are designed to produce and govern 
migration-related spaces and subjects of detention for the EU via its external partners. The 
regime emphasizes these five separate domains: (1) the Temporary Accommodation Center; (2) 
Rights and Obligations of Foreigners Accommodated at the Center; (3) Tolerance of Stay on the 
Territory of the Republic of Moldova; (4) Categories of Foreigners Who May be Granted 
Tolerance; and (5) the Tolerance Regime itself.  Additionally, this regime introduces new legal 
persons while codifying the precise time, space, and nutrition allotments available to them as 
detailed below.  Using this case to show EU maneuvers designed to regulate spatial access and 
thus rights like those to movement, I argue that this so-called “toleration” and “accommodation” 
regime is really about the geopolitical institutionalization and biopolitical categorization of risk. 
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   Such moves are indicative of how Europeanization is spatialized, not just re-
territorialized.  This shift to an integrated regime backed by comprehensive laws rather than 
administrative regulations is revealing in the Moldovan context.  Rather than evidence of a 
change in direction by any one election or politician, this change is more consistent with an 
increased rate of administrative reform.  Collectively, these moves are an expression of the 
seriousness with which the last three governments have approached Europeanization.  However, 
the “tolerance regime” is a departure from earlier legal structures and administrative divisions.  
Ostensibly, it is remarkable in both its completeness and in comparison to its anemic 
predecessor. The older regulation, Governmental Decision HGO71, was also inherently 
geographic in that it created the first “temporary placement center for foreigners”.  As a 
supplement to the initial 1994 foreigner’s regime adopted in 2004, it contained a mere four 
elements but paved the way for new migration-related spaces of detention as “temporary 
placement”.  This initial approach managed “aliens”, and treated “accommodation centers” even 
more like jails and migrants like patients, though it acknowledged the limitations of existing 
legislation. Its purpose then, as now, remains “efficiency” and increasing the scope of authority 
and policy to manage “illegal stay” of foreigners (Article No. 026: 212).  In this sense it is 
directly in accordance with EU geopolitical visions about helping neighbors make their borders 
and foreigners who cross them legible in multiple senses.  It remains important because it marks 
a shift in domestic policy away from the older laws governing foreigners that passed in the mid-
1990s.  Simply, the new law acknowledges the problem of “informal toleration” and attempts to 
codify and thus manage it as just one form of “regularization” (Kraler 2009).  Problematically 
however, from the EU’s perspective this old method worked to isolate subjects physically and 
legally and, ironically could not ‘tolerate’ them. Seen in contrast to older regimes, the latest 
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efforts appear positive and rights-based.  
  This fresh appeal to tolerance is significant.  It is important and effective because it 
accepts EU responsibilities as a ‘good neighbor’ in working to expand its capacity to serve as an 
external holding ground for migrants entering the EU Member State space illegally across 
Moldovan territory.  In her genealogy of tolerance as a form of governmentality, Brown (2006: 
14) stresses precisely these “protean” characteristics of “tolerance and/as depoliticization”. This 
neutral language appears technocratic at first glance, as Brown’s genealogy suggests. However, 
comprehensive attention to core issues like detention and other restrictions reveals the politics 
beneath the surface, especially in terms of processes of national identification and institutional 
categorization relative to residential options or work restrictions. Implicitly, however, this latest 
appeal to a “tolerance regime” embedded at the core of the law accepts the political need for a 
visa-free regime.  According to its Official Government Newsletter (2010a, 2010b) bulletins, the 
government’s logic is that by aggressively implementing EU protocol, especially in overtly 
political realms of border and migration control as non-binding expressions of good 
neighborliness, Moldovans can (be led to believe they will) receive fast-track access to the EU 
and maybe later even its labor markets given their special status as citizens of an enthusiastic 
non-accession neighbor and partner.   
  The transformation of these spaces and subjects involved in migration-related detention 
here show how restrictions are re-scaled as expressions of EU and Moldovan territorial and 
biopolitical sovereignty.  Given the recent birth of this “tolerated person” in Moldova, the 
influence of earlier devices is evident.  Though it seeks to harmonize and unify old legislation 
and regulations with EU standards, this new law introduces problematic categories whose status 
remains contentious. As form of legislation by imitation, “tolerated status” is actually a category 
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that tries to emulate the German Duldung, or “tolerated persons model”.   Technically, the label 
refers to formal removal orders and their application and/or suspension in the face of technical, 
financial, or administrative obstacles to return for TCNs.  In the Moldovan case, such moves 
present new obstacles to migrants as a country of origin and renders the country as a potential 
staging area for those seeking EU access, including those who need more robust protection like 
asylum seekers and trafficked persons.  Still, because the approach to “toleration” is seen as a 
status that does not exclude subsequent expulsion once technical or political conditions change, it 
offers second-class protections and accommodation across a new network of specially built 
detention centers that the Moldovan government could fail to maintain or manage properly 
(Interview 2011b). The “tolerance regime” maintains a decidedly technical and legal approach 
though it is designed to make controls over “aliens” more uniform, at least in legal proceedings if 
not in actual practice, especially given notorious corruption challenges. For Chisinau, aside from 
meeting its Mobility Partnership and other EU-linked goals, these moves help government agents 
recognize new command structures given revised legal authority.  
 
D) Spaces of Detention? 
 In addition to legislative changes and frontier controls, internal holding grounds have also 
proliferated alongside laws to manage these “tolerated persons”.  This section examines 
outcomes of the new foreigners regime and readmission agreements.  In assessing the rescaled 
political geographies of border control as migration management, it is clear that the 
internalization of Moldovan policies has meant new institutional architectures of confinement 
including those for refugees, undocumented migrants, and trafficked persons.  The resulting legal 
spaces and political subjects introduced to support the “tolerance regime” specifically, and the 
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Mobility Partnership and Action Plan generally, are detailed below in order of intended length of 
detention/accommodation. Each space is then considered in terms of its legal origins, 
administrative organization, and practical operation.  Collectively, these facilities are all 
operating well beyond the present need.  Though these spaces were constructed to house transit 
migrants and assist repatriated Moldovans, state borders have not (yet) emerged as a key staging 
ground for illegal crossings or migration flows, though the figures are increasing according to 
official data.  However, these same data show decreasing smuggling figures so a contradictory 
picture of illegal flows emerges.  And though only small populations of TCNs and “tolerated 
persons” appear in need of accommodation/detention, rapidly increasing rates of readmission 
requests suggest a more ambiguous and even contradictory picture (see tables in appendix).  To 
quote an official questioned about the EU’s enthusiasm for procurement and emphasis on 
trainings abroad and study tours, “the honeymoon is over” (Interview 2011b).    
 The point in analyzing these spaces and the laws enabling them is to show how 
governmental controls and biopolitical borders are organized.  In this way, it is notable that the 
geography of Moldovan detention conflates institutional, spatial, and temporal logics.    Despite 
its convoluted border regime and multiple migration categories for citizens, TCNs, and asylum 
seekers, only one dedicated space exists to house “detainees” identified via risk managers and 
border guards.  The approach now relies on a “temporary holding facility” (THF) that serves the 
entire country and is located in Chisinau’s new “migrant accommodation center” (see below).  
Requests for readmission, asylum, or extended stay come from persons housed in this location.  
Regardless of which kind of state border is crossed, or if the checkpoint is jointly operated with 
Ukrainian authorities, those migrants detained and identified within 24 hours by Border Guard 
Services are transferred to competent agents, including UNHCR when asylum seekers arrive.  
 
 
155 
Unlike Ukrainian models, where five such facilities are formally equipped and 27 modern 
Toyota minibuses are used to move undocumented migrants, access to Moldovan checkpoints is 
more limited (Aeneas 2009; Human Rights Watch 2010).  While “specially-equipped” premises 
are present at international crossings as in Ukraine, these are not the most popular kinds of 
crossing and longer-term detention is less developed and smaller in scale.  Primarily, THFs are 
used to hold migrants in isolation while a UNHCR protection officer can arrive to assess an 
asylum application.  Despite the diversity of modes of passage range from trains, ferries and 
roads across well-marked checkpoints to foot and barge traffic across poorly demarcated borders, 
a one-stop shop for processing unidentified or irregular/undocumented migrants is the only 
option in Moldova.  
 
E) Migrant Accommodation Center 
 The Migrant Accommodation Center (or “MAC” in common usage), as mentioned 
above, is a cornerstone of EU-Moldovan detention. Built to house 150 residents for maximum 
(but renewable) six-month stays, only 20 people lived there as of April 2011 according to their 
director (Interview 2011b). Women and children are currently housed separately from single 
men, and families also have their own wing of the building.  Additional construction and 
expansion is set to include a separate building for women and children and an independent 
administrative structure on the MAC grounds is expected to begin soon.  Between 2007-2009, 
the EU, IOM, and the Bureau of Migration and Asylum housed within the Ministry of Interior (a 
police rather than protection oriented body like the Ministry of Justice) worked to build and later 
upgrade the detention facilities. In a profoundly biopolitical moment, the grand opening was 
subject to delay:  Though inaugurated in April 2008 with EU assistance, the center remained 
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empty until nutrition guidelines could be codified in 2009 (Law on Nutrition).  Simply, the 
center is the outgrowth of EU expectations that, following Romanian entry into the Schengen 
zone of common borders, Moldova will become a staging area for persons illegally attempting to 
enter the EU after getting around border controls.  Given both the success of border guards in 
identifying illegal crossings and false documents, at least statistically, it appears these fears were 
overblown yet spaces of detention are still favored over more durable solutions consistent with 
rights rather than restrictions.  Such findings might be premature, however, as Romania has still 
not entered the Schengen zone because of its perceived failure to comply with EU standards.  
While it should have joined in 2010 and then again in Spring 2011, the latest decisions suggest 
the anniversary of Schengen’s signing will not coincide with Romania and Bulgaria fully 
acceding to the agreement and thus, transit migration via Moldova remains marginal to date.   
 The legal and administrative history of the MAC is itself revelatory in terms of 
sovereignty and territory. As the above genealogy suggests, the evolution of such spaces shows 
both how EU-Moldova relations have transformed externally and internally.  Beyond 
aforementioned ENP-scale geopolitical issues, internal contention between border guards and 
customs managers as well as international agents including IOM and UNHCR embody wider 
institutional and `geopolitical tensions.  For example, IOM’s failure to facilitate legal 
harmonization in preparation for opening the MAC demonstrates their limits in terms of 
expertise and managerial capacity.  These limits are also evident in the lack of attention to proper 
nutritional guidelines that ultimately delayed the center’s opening.  Likewise, competition 
between customs agents and border guards reflect competition around migration management as 
either increased individual protection or improved institutional authority. Because the new 
tolerance regime allows foreigners to renew their stay indefinitely, the accommodation, 
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experienced as detention within a wider space of legal and social confinement, could last forever 
or end the moment a technical or financial barrier to return falls.  Significantly, this space blends 
deportation and detention, labeling them “accommodation” and “toleration”.  The labels are 
especially important because they reference entirely new spaces and subjects.  These outcomes, 
which exist outside the realm of free movement and where people cannot seek alternative forms 
of protection or local integration, are the future model landscapes of migration control. Though 
the scale is small, the MAC represents the outcome of readmission agreements and functions as a 
spatial solution to various migration control dilemmas via “residency restrictions” rather than 
“indefinite yet revocable permission to remain”.  This space is especially important for those 
concerned with transit migrants.   
 Because the EU is seeking to use third countries to house unwanted migrants, it prefers to 
promote border security rather than housing and human rights, as evidenced by the proportions 
of ENP funding UNHCR and IOM or EUBAM receive (IOM 2009a, 2009b). Given the lack of 
statistical detail and individual access to the center for outside researchers, interviews with 
stakeholders have proven exceptionally vibrant and occasionally quite humorous. Ironically, 
another visiting IOM expert began a recent training on migration controls and border protection 
at the MAC with a genealogy of notions of “detention”.  To the pleasant surprise of the UNHCR 
staff according to how they looked at one another, the IOM representative from Geneva (rather 
than Chisinau) casually defined such spaces in her talk and used the Moldovan MAC as ‘exhibit 
A’ (Interview 2011b).  Emblematic of their understanding of the problem, IOM agents and other 
officials in attendance appeared either unmoved or failed to notice the admission. An additional 
anecdote concerning accommodation involves food and nutrition.  In the Ukrainian experience, 
which is admittedly larger in scale and less cooperative in nature, migrants complain loudly 
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about food, corruption, and treatment.  In the Moldovan case, by contrast, the MAC director is 
known for his consistent repetition of a claim he believes points to the success of the center in 
the eyes of residents.  Specifically and regularly, he boasts only one resident in the history of the 
MAC has lost weight, and even that resident, he insists, only reduced their mass by a kilogram.  
As a perfect indication of the contentious approaches to this subject and its micro-situational and 
embodied outcomes, the UNHCR staff immediately claimed such patterns were a consequence 
of limited mobility and lack of exercise space, i.e. symptomatic of confinement, rather than a 
function of the high-quality nutrition and bit plates of Moldovan cuisine. 
 
F) Refugee Reception Center 
 People fleeing persecution or in need of humanitarian assistance or refugee protection in 
Moldova also have a space dedicated to them as forced migrants.  The “refugee reception 
center”, like the MAC, is also formally though less frequently labeled a “temporary 
accommodation center” despite serving a separate purpose and existing in a separate location. 
Given EU donor priorities, the TAC is representative of how migration controls and refugee 
policies are prioritized especially when compared to attention and resources provided to 
migration management and border security projects over the same period. To be sure, regardless 
of financial or managerial support, the TAC protects more people than the MAC.  As of April 1, 
2011 the TAC is hosting 77 refugees and refused asylum-seekers, including those receiving 
complementary/humanitarian protections. Like the MAC, women and children are housed 
separately from single men and family units have their own separate space too.  To date, no 
unaccompanied kids and only a few single women have requested accommodation.  Like the 
MAC, the TAC has also expanded recently and faced some obstacles preventing it from 
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operating at full capacity.   Although the formal dedication of the “women and children’s wing” 
was held to commemorate with World Refugee Day in 2010 the wing has since been completed 
but remains unoccupied.  
 
G) Center for Protection and Assistance 
 Moldova is notorious worldwide as a source of human trafficking flows for sexual and 
labor exploitation, as well as for organ harvesting. As a form of migration, it is particularly 
complicated to prevent or manage for a myriad of political, personal, and philosophical reasons.  
Competing data are, understandably, similarly misleading and come from competing agencies 
with competing interests so misunderstanding and therefore claims of mismanagement are 
widespread.  As a result of competing understandings of this problem as a criminal or 
humanitarian matter for states, international organizations, and NGOs, confusion over how 
trafficked persons should be confined, tolerated, and/or assisted or protected remains pervasive.  
For the IOM, which has operated counter-trafficking projects separately and within the context 
of migration management for EU member states, the US State Department, and donors like the 
Soros Foundation, counter-trafficking is a windfall (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010). Their 
hegemonic view and privileged position among regional and national officials means IOM can 
claim to have assisted more than 5,100 individuals between 2000-2008.  These people include at 
least four separate categories, including 2,400+ “Assisted Voluntary Return” program 
participants, 1,000+ minors under age 18, and 1,600+ “at-risk” individuals prevented from 
experiencing further abuse given their irregular status and parallel lack of ability to access police 
or human rights protections (IOM 2010).   As a privileged category, attention to the spaces 
provided to secure this particular group, i.e. trafficked persons, is emblematic of a biopolitical 
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bordering approach internalized abroad. By definition, trafficked persons requesting return 
assistance are afforded access to the 24 places offered by Ministry of Labor and Social 
Protection managed Center for Protection and Assistance in Chisinau. According to Ministry of 
Interior data on human trafficking cases registered between 2006-2010, IOM numbers do not 
match the figures for the mere 200 or so traffickers caught offending per year.  To be clear, a 
decrease since 2008 is evident in the trend line, but analysts and experts are unclear whether data 
recording has improved or prevention efforts are working (Interview 2011a/b).  
Legally, as irregular migrants, these persons are subject to criminal controls rather than 
the humanitarian protections they most likely need.  Moreover, such persons are confined by 
their illegality. The key problem in the Moldovan case is that this logic where trafficked persons 
are subject to competing categorical logics can have both positive and negative implications.  
This problem is most acute in the eyes of counter-traffickers and human rights advocates, who 
see appeals to the “toleration regime” covering trafficking subjects as particularly egregious.  In 
short, the new foreigners regime and its “tolerated status” provisions of second-class protections 
could be applied to trafficked persons who transited the country against their will. 
 
H) Significance 
 This genealogy and case sheds important light on questions of EU re-bordering and 
remote control.  As with the Mediterranean and African contexts of off-shoring (see Vaughn-
Williams 2011), attention to the biopolitical and territorial aspects of European expansion offers 
key indicators of how and where the EU is engaged in producing novel forms of sovereignty and 
generating new spaces of (in)security.  The EUBAM embodies a complicated organizational 
strategy to harmonize political practices in an uncertain arena.  As such, it uses various strategies 
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to communicate its vision, from formal statements and institutional cooperation to security 
statistics and risk analyses.  These discourses and narratives, unlike those of my research 
participants, reveal a technical body that is well received but politically impotent.  The power of 
its purse appears as its most enduring legacy domestically and in terms of showing what 
incentives might work for the EU externally.  In rethinking EU borders and developing new 
management models to focus attention on geopolitical imperatives and biopolitical problems, my 
approach to the EUBAM as a remote control apparatus helps explain why such a project formed 
and how it does or does not work. In also offering a genealogy of wider EU plans to externalize 
via standardization, my argument about the parallel internalization, via securitization and 
spatialization, is evident in border and migration controls.  In analyzing the legislation and 
production of bordering projects and the people affected by them in this case, my analysis of EU 
hegemony and Moldovan sovereignty has shown the value of a geographic approach.   
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CHAPTER IV   
 
MOLDOVAN “IDENTITY” 
 
 And I wonder if my father is deprived of citizenship, who am I?  And where are the rights that I miss 
with citizenship and nationality?  It is unfair for someone else to decide for me and my parents’ what is 
our place-- to tell me what nationality I am.  I mean, what country is my nationality. Chisinau Teacher, 
Female, 52 years old 
 
It’s the rebirth of the national ideals…I remember in my family…we were proud that all our people 
would live, one day, national revival; then we were disappointed. Ungheni Teacher, Female, 39 years old 
 
 While the Russian thinks, the Moldovan builds. Stefan Voda Politician, Male, 53 years old 
 
In the past it was a shame for me to be Moldovan, but now I am not afraid to say so…Moldovans are 
smarter than Russians and Ukrainians. Chisinau Student, Female, 20 years old 
 
Part I: Who are We? 
A) Introduction 
 This chapter extends arguments about how perceived problems of ungovernability laid 
out above to show how convoluted self-identification among citizens reflects a broader crisis of 
national legitimacy and thus popular sovereignty, when seen informally.  In analyzing such 
domestic crisis discourses and the conceptual distance between formal visions and public 
opinions I seek to show how elites and other stakeholders define governance problems and how 
different groups incorporate and/or revise such frames of self-reference.  Thus, in evaluating data 
from my focus groups and surveys of their participants,11 results suggest Moldovan-ness remains 
a messy proposition that is contingent and shows a stubborn staying power for so many old 
frames but reflects their instrumental power nonetheless. In deconstructing and unpacking these 
claims via participants’ attitudes and their discussion of them I show how national stereotypes 
about membership and competing storylines about “what it means to be Moldovan” embody 
                                                
 11 In transcripts and word cloud coding “Participant” is marked by seat/survey number, i.e. 
“Participant 1” is shortened to “P1” to identify person in seat one and completed questionnaire tagged to 
that seat and group. 
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important ambiguities as expressions of how difficult it is to govern this area in a way that makes 
all categories equally legible or identifiable via a common frame as expression of sovereignty.  
Among my participants, debates and explanations varied widely and indicate the contingent 
directions and frames different groups of people use or ignore to make sense of their worldviews 
and daily lives given widespread domestic instability.   The construction and communication of 
these visions, as evidence that emerged when participants articulated their commonsense 
understandings and essentialized knowledge about moments of uncertainty, deprivation, 
disappointment, and no-good (or less good) neighbors, illuminates the more banal frames useful 
for charting how such socio-spatial frames like ‘the nation’ and ways of understanding them 
work to reconstruct particular self-identification schemes, i.e. the multiple embodiments of 
Moldovan-ness as understood in combinations of citizenship, nationality, and exclusion from 
these various groups and their association rights and privileges.   
 As the manifestations above suggest, given their stubborn persistence in the face of 
neoliberal transformation and various redefinitions of Moldovanism alongside wider 
Europeanization efforts, attempts to reconcile pre-given categories with post-Soviet lived 
experiences remain a work in progress.  These expressions are evidence of how my participants 
manifest their collective and individual uncertainty, ambiguity, pride, and self-identification 
surrounding ethno-national identity, citizenship, and the general state of being in the country, i.e. 
Moldovan-ness.  In my data, loyalty to community appears as neither a purely civic and rights-
based approach nor a decidedly blood-based proposition. For my participants, the effects of 
attempts to reconcile these shifting frames of allegiance and association are visible in examples 
like “My town is my country” and “my yard is where I feel at home” taken from group 
discussions.  These claims are made alongside geographic visions where “motherland” and 
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“homeland” are also evidence that discrete spaces can be claimed within the same vision 
(Chisinau Students P1).  In contrast to these distinctions, my return migrant participants from 
Chisinau referenced the “national nothing” (P1) while another member of his group noted “our 
country is a way to survive and endure” (P3). In these expressions, ethno-territorial and national-
cultural symbols are both dismissed and reified via discursive practices manifest at multiple 
socio-spatial scales of imagined community to challenge their claims to legitimate popular 
sovereignty.    
 Despite these manifestations, so-called crises of identity decried by educators, elites, and 
experts remain contentious in that even they disagree on what the sign “Moldovan” means (see 
section D below).  Such discord is evident in public spats about how to teach history in schools 
or differentiate between Romanian and Moldovan ethno-linguistic or cultural characteristics and 
is not exactly the problem as curators, teachers, and politicians in my study suggest.  Instead, my 
participants talked about such differences in contradictory and thus counter-productive ways 
suggesting a more complicated and contingent relationship. My data and others’ competing 
census and survey findings suggest ethno-centric and nationalist models, while still negotiated, 
are shifting and otherwise hard to measure.  This crisis of conceptual slippage is evident in new 
ways given economic and political challenges related to popular mobility, suggesting neither the 
traditional ethno-national dimension nor formal territorial unity are the most salient concerns in 
citizens’ daily life. Rather, economic, existential, and affective frames are used to regulate 
subjectivities and re-territorialize old territorial and national models given transnational 
movements and neoliberal effects on sovereignty, identity, and territory. 
  To evaluate such discursive evidence alongside other slices of participant opinion, this 
chapter considers 19 different focus groups, segmented by experience and geographic location as 
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detailed above.  Unlike other chapters, this one emphasizes data from the focus group with State 
Museum of Ethnography representatives rather heavily. I present the museum-based comments 
first (i.e. Part II, Section A below) to serve as baseline knowledge and marker of formal 
professional opinions by those expert agents responsible for codifying proper knowledge about 
the nation in their efforts.  Their powers over official discourse and contributions to my project 
are evident in curators’ answers to questions about iconic events, cultural artifacts, and popular 
representations from their collection.  Their views also matter because I used their collections as 
a source for several trigger images deployed during all 18 other focus group discussions. Only 
after comparing the curators’ ostensibly refined biases and beliefs as markers of institutionalized 
approaches to ethno-national identity against other presumably less professionally invested 
groups of interest can a useful analysis take shape.   
 
B) Argument 
 I argue from word clouds showing the data presented in this chapter to focus on each 
subsection of the relevant portion of the discussion, i.e. the first third of the script and protocol 
and group discussions surrounding ‘identity’ (Figure 4.1, Figures 4.10.1-4.10.6).   
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Figure 4.1: Word cloud of museum curator transcript, part I 
 
Figure 4.10.1: Word clouds of focus group transcript portions re: identity by Return Migrants 
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Figure 4.10.2: Word clouds of focus group transcript portions re: identity by Pensioners 
 
Figure 4.10.3: Word clouds of focus group transcript portions re: identity by Teachers 
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Figure 4.10.4: Word clouds of focus group transcript portions re: identity by Students 
 
Figure 4.10.5: Word clouds of focus group transcript portions re: identity by Civil Society 
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Figure 4.10.6: Word clouds of focus group transcript portions re: identity by Politicians 
 
In this chapter, to be clear, while my primary focus is on the particular themes and expressions 
discussed from the first portion of the focus group, I also consider such frames separately, as 
when a stereotype about national characteristics was mentioned during the geopolitically 
oriented triggers.  Still, my analytical focus is on consistencies and intensities of understanding 
and affect, measured as opinions and spoken expressions (e.g. keyword frequency counts) 
surrounding (in)formal discussions and debates about culture and language. For example, if a 
participant makes a relevant claim about identity or language during a different portion of the 
discussion, I include it but note when the expression surfaced and then discuss why this 
(dis)connection might matter. My argument is that tracing the variable contents of national 
characteristics shows how discourses of ungovernability are generated internally in the eyes of 
stakeholder groups. 
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 As my word clouds suggest, attention to conventional frames helps expose totalizing 
governmental narratives about citizenship and risk as limited and contingent rather than absolute 
expressions of self-identification and existential crises or inauthentic corrosion of national 
identity (Figure 4.1).  In tracing the plurality of uncertainty in formal and informal perceptions, I 
thus enable a more flexible way to study the re-territorialization of sovereignty as unstable effect 
and contested artifact rather than durable object of governance because of focus on the slippery 
use of hegemonic frames like the nation and its tools like passports or visas.  These processes 
and products suggest problems of isolation and individualization, or the conceptual moves 
people use to align internal and external categories of identification, seen in terms of Trouillot 
(2001).  Likewise, Brubaker (2006) sees variable self-perception as “everyday” or “embodied 
ethnicity”, i.e. both a contingent and a prosaic product. I synthesize their approach and, 
consequently, I trace what “being Moldovan” means in the eyes of my participants. As 
illustrations of how salience is linked to identification in a discursive, textual sense among those 
with privileged power over discourse and expert knowledge as authorities or those who 
challenge them, I present data on these terms using word clouds and keyword counts.  In this 
way, I am able to shed new light on the production of individual and group differences by 
indexing and comparing patterns of self-ascription and group characteristics to show how the 
banal production of identification and categorization varies or not by social position.  My 
approach thus shows how different social groups, geographic commonalities, and inter-
generational differences crystallize and change, using the word clouds as summary illustrations.  
I argue analyzing these data in their interactive, reflexive context meaning the word clouds and 
content word counts are not taken alone, but rather as summary markers of which people 
articulate concerns in which ways help audit and supplement conventional approaches like 
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surveys.  After establishing the range of inconsistencies dogging elite, formal views of the 
Moldovan nation, I show how common hopes and fears unite participants instead.   
 To continue this line of investigation, a comparison of how keywords including 
“citizenship”, “memory”, and “tradition” were articulated by groups and across sites appears in 
order of frequency of use (Figures 4.2-4.5).   
Figure 4.2: Frequency count of select keywords re: identity 
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Figure 4.3: Frequency counts of individual segmentation groups by percentages of use…. 
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Figure 4.4 Frequency counts of select keywords by focus groups by percentages of use… 
 
Figure 4.5 Frequency counts of select keywords overall Frequenc  C unts of Keywords
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In these charts, appeals to places and personhood, historically and today, i.e. “homeland” and 
“citizen(ship)” appear twice as often in group discussions as appeals to an imaged past and ideas 
of invented (but no less powerful) bonds.  This comparison highlights tensions between affective 
affinities to imagined communities at local scales and via personal or loosely defined cultural 
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connections.  It offers evidence of more instrumental-ideological and formal understandings of 
civic citizenship as survival rather than individual self-identification seen as affective 
expressions realized as rights.  These tensions between people and their connections to place 
anticipate the “homeland” discussion to follow and are consistent with the style used to 
contextualize the use of “ethnic(ity)” above. This approach helps to consider the qualitative data 
that follow and trends introduced above in terms of how frequently a term appears as proxy for 
its salience or ambiguity.  Though the numbers are so small and therefore potentially misleading, 
these counts help summarize group visions in illustrative ways. Consequently, trends 
surrounding other topics of interest, i.e. those beyond “ethnicity”, can be evaluated for their raw 
use and relative frequency. 
  Seen at the segmentation group scale rather than taken as a whole, other patterns suggest 
various understandings of what, if anything, it means to be Moldovan.  In short, among my 
participants, return migrants consistently privilege territorial and historical-emotional terms of 
endearment versus more formal and often explicitly civic notions like “citizenship”. Teachers, 
politicians, and migrants, as well as students --but oddly not civil society members-- use 
citizenship frames most or rather often in my study, but in different ways.  The appeal of 
memory and allure of an existential home, as birthplace or more deeply rooted connection based 
on labor and/or ancestry suggests territorial affinities that contradict earlier Ethnobarometer 
surveys of ethnicity trumping territory and citizenship insignificant in comparison with affect 
(2006).  Conversely, among my participants data suggest that citizenship is less ‘civic’ formally 
and better seen as an instrumental-survival aspect of Moldovan-ness since affective-ascriptive 
manifestations take more abstract, but no-less geographic yet essentialized forms of attachment 
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to place rather than polity given the rate and style of appeals to village-level communities and 
backyard spaces alongside discussions of “the Romanian space”.   
The table (Figure 4.6) lists groups in the order they appear in group-focused analyses and 
interactions.   
Figure 4.6:  Segmentation groups by keyword proportion of use Segmentation Groups by Keyword Proportion of Use
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In looking beyond ethnicity and towards citizenship, homeland, traditions, and memories the 
appeals and cognitive frames used in my groups emerge more clearly despite small numbers.  
Which words dominated which groups?  For return migrants, and, to lesser degree pensioners, 
homeland was the most common frame of reference, whereas teachers, students, politicians, and 
civil society discussed citizenship most often.  Traditions were mentioned variably across 
groups, while memories were unevenly and less frequently addressed. Memories, as students 
suggested, are less important than those who must imagine the past because they are 
disconnected from it spatially, i.e. migrants. As with the attention to interactions and contexts 
that follow, data work to summarize keywords discretely and by site as they appeared in focus 
group transcripts.   
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Questions of “citizenship” are evident in terms of relative weights afforded to this crude 
index, and reveal curious geographic patterns (Figure 4.7).   
Figure 4.7: Frequency and proportion of keyword “citizen(s/hip)” by group and location 
 Frequency and Proportion of Keyword "Citizen(s/hip)" by Segmentation Group 
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In short, the politicians were both the most frequent overall users of “citizenship” but 
arguably the most geographically divided, i.e. 85% of those discussing this notion were in 
Chisinau. However, civil society there did not even mention it though they did discuss patriotism 
and identity while arguing at length against ethno-centric notions of community.  By contrast, the 
least frequent appeals to citizenship were articulated by pensioners, with only one utterance from 
Stefan Voda, so their 100% monopoly is technically even more divided than the politicians.  
Students were the most average of the group, both in terms of weight and geographic 
distribution.  Spatially, more than 50% of the times this frame appeared the group was in 
Chisinau, with Stefan Voda only seeing a bit more than a quarter and Ungheni-based participants 
the least interested in talking about this idea. 
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In terms of appeals to “tradition(s/al)” and “memory(ies)” the groups are again listed in 
order of total frequency of use, from left to right, and then by geographic location (Figures 4.8-
4.9).   
 
Figure 4.8: Frequency and proportion of keyword “tradition(s/al)” by group and location 
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Figure 4.9:  Frequency and proportion of keyword “memory(ies)” by group and location 
Frequency and Proportion of Keyword "Memory(ies)" by Segmentation 
Group and Location
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The appeals to an imagined and collective past are another way of assessing the role of common 
origins relative to primordial, constructivist, and instrumental accounts of citizenship and 
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territorial governance.  These frames also suggest some ways that legacies are incorporated or 
ignored when Moldovan-ness is discussed. In the table detailing traditions below, a bit more 
prevalent frame than memory, appeals to conventional markers and common traditions were 
most frequent among politicians, though even students with shorter periods to generate memories 
voiced their appreciation for their genealogy and official histories.  Geographically, appeals were 
rather even though pensioners in Ungheni were the only retirees to discuss traditions, in a 
situation similar to their relative disinterest in memory, though spatially the relationship is 
reversed as Ungheni’s pensioners were like those in Stefan Voda, who were themselves the least 
interested in this frame. As indicated above, migrants were most mindful of the past, explicitly, 
suggesting personal experiences and vicarious attachments trump formal ideological values.  
Teachers, alternatively, were more interested in “history” than “memory” seen as “scientific 
fact” rather than experience like the curators.  Still, no migrants, teachers, or pensioners in 
Ungheni seemed compelled to speak about this past, especially compared to those in Chisinau or 
Stefan Voda.  Students, given their short period to collect memories also seemed disinterested in 
this term, regardless of location or gender.    
The framing of uncertainties occasionally involves “ethnicity”, for instance.  They are 
evident when this keyword (or its stem) was only uttered in 8/19 discussions by 4/6 groups, 
unprompted, and even then its use was debatable; return migrants and pensioners did not bother 
to mention it.  By contrast, all participants checked boxes on the survey categorizing themselves 
in this way but the actual salience of the frame emerged in interactively when participants 
debated its meaning.  In several instances but one rather contentious and thus revealing one, talk 
about ethnicity was debated at length. Thus, seen in terms of sheer frequency, i.e. raw counts of 
usage across my segmentation groups, a range of frames appeared as a function of my research 
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design and participant reaction. While the weight of a frame or keyword is not a measure of the 
contents of that symbol, it still suggests salience in a basic way.  After summarizing frequencies 
overall and their use in segmentation groups I will consider keywords by group and site for the 
before considering them interactively in their context to show how counts work as summaries. 
 
C) Problem Solving 
The word clouds, frequency counts, and transcript interactions offer snapshots of how 
various stakeholder groups in my project see problems facing Moldovans in daily life and as a 
country.  In summarizing expert and elite opinions with other survey data about ethnicity 
compared –internally and externally—I show the flexibility rather than stability of my 
participants’ claims about ethnic or cultural markers.  Using an analytical focus on ethno-
national origins, cultural connections, and bureaucratic wrangling, these meetings highlight the 
conceptual distance between formal and informal visions and mean that the crises facing 
Moldovan are multiple. Moving forward from this position, my data suggest a better approach is 
to focus on ethnicity and history in a different way. My participants’ claims indicate 
conventional analyses have missed the instrumental, survival style elements of Moldovan-ness 
alongside informal, affective ties to local community in favor of more formal ideological and 
institutional emphases.   
Experts and elites overemphasize interethnic tensions and institutional linkages at the 
expense of economic issues (Caraus 2006). Others, as my curators suggest, argue the problem is 
that economic limits are preventing more cultural expressions. As “self-searching” 
manifestations, from a psycho-social and historical-pedagogical stance these ideas emerge 
strategically in interactions among social groups across spatial scales and can fuel debate and 
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“ignite the spirits.”  Still, Handrabura concludes: “There is no interethnic conflict in the Republic 
of Moldova” (2006: 220).   This opinion about the lack of interethnic conflict, expressed in a 
flagship Ethnobarometer report based on representative polling, is important for three reasons 
and works to establish the range of formal concerns facing nation-builders. As ‘experts’  --
including both pro-Western journalists like Tanase and jurist-cum-president Timofti-- have 
suggested in chapter I, it is commonplace to link interethnic problems to state policies.  Their 
approach thus misses that according to IPP (2006) most Moldovans do not think this confusion 
about ethno-national criteria is a serious problem, especially compared to economic insecurity 
(Caraus 2006).  Moreover, Handrabura now has formal power over discourse as the Deputy 
Minister of Education.  Since authoring this conclusion, her role as critic has shifted to 
practitioner and she is a key player at home and abroad in promoting education-related mobility 
for Moldovan students.  She explicitly sees political obstacles and embodies, formally, 
government efforts to overcome sovereign border controls rather than reinforcing conventional 
ethno-national limits.  This trend is also evident in her efforts to promote Europeanization at the 
expense of closer ties with Romania, i.e. via EU-wide preferences instead of bi-lateral language 
exchanges (Handrabura 2011).  Her vision is reflected in the latest Ministry of Education 
decision to rename history classes in Moldovan schools as “History of Romanians and World 
History” (Imedia 2012). 
Public opinion sees economic rather than national political or ethno-cultural challenges.  
Rather consistently in fact (Ethnobarometer 2009; WVS 2006), separate polls have shown 
average Moldovans define poverty as their most pressing problem. When asked, over 80% listed 
income and unemployment  —not interethnic conflicts over ‘identity’-- as their primary 
predicament; worldwide the norm was about 60% (WVS 2006). In 2009, the Barometer of 
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Public Opinion found less than 5% of all Moldovans feared ethnic persecution, ranking it 
between concerns about disasters and dictators.  As a multi-ethnic republic, such sentiment is 
encouraging because it is conflict averse.  Most recently, despite on-going political crises and 
failures to form a government since April 2009, QSP (2010) also found its representative 
samples reinforce this view.  There, 74% of self-declared Moldovans reported economic 
problems are “quite serious” but only 15% perceive interethnic tensions as seriously.  They show 
representatives of Ukrainian and Russian national minorities are similarly inclined, as 66% and 
70% respectively, see the economic situation as “quite serious”.  By contrast, 20% of self-
identified Ukrainians and 25% of self-declared Russians seriously fear ‘interethnic tension’, a 
reasonable sentiment among minority groups worldwide. The most recent IMAS (2012) results 
from representative surveys in both Moldova proper and TMR show the populations live in 
“parallel worlds”, with Moldovans fearing poverty and those in TMR fearing war with Moldova, 
which the Romanian-backed survey’s analysts attributed to the effectiveness of pro-Russian, 
anti-Romanian propaganda (Adevarul 2012c) 
Paradoxically, contradictions and ambiguities surrounding ethno-national identity are 
evident in 2006 IPP/Ethnobarometer surveys designed to correct such confusions.  Then, in an 
effort to move beyond journalistic claims, IPP asked a number of relevant questions, including 
which “attributes” and, separately, other “things” a representative sample self-identified with 
most or that “give a person the right to be Moldovan”.  There, only 15% of the Moldo-Romanian 
titular majority considered themselves “citizens” first when asked to rank their mode of 
allegiance.  For IPP/Ethnobarometer data analysts, such a situation shows “…identity based on 
affective relations…” instead of legal qualities like “…citizenship, which is based on rational 
principles of respecting rights and liberties, and assuming citizen responsibilities” (IPP 2006).  
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Yet, inexplicably, these same analysts also used longitudinal data from their own survey from 
1998-2005 about “which two statements best describe your identity”, finding 81% saw 
themselves as representatives of their declared nationality, 57% as citizens, and 32% as members 
of their “locality”. For ‘Moldovans/Romanians’, responses show 70% chose “Moldovan” first 
and 81% selected it overall. In the 2006 version, the editors offer no explanation about the shift 
from 15% considering themselves citizens first (1998-2005) to 57% (2006) reporting citizenship 
is a defining element of their being Moldovan as in their earlier longitudinal surveys. Logically, 
it might seem plausible that attachments to the government and its version of citizenship have 
been growing over time simply due to its presence. But the almost four-fold increase in 
identification of citizenship among the titular group remains curious, as there do not appear to 
have been any events in 2005-2006 that would have precipitated such a dramatic shift.   Rather, 
my findings suggest citizens sometimes articulate their allegiances in such discretely ordered 
frames, even if their understandings also undermine those same positions.    
Existing survey data suggest that while some primordial and kinship ties or cultural 
continuities like language matter, as evident in the museum curator word cloud, they are neither 
always salient nor necessarily separate. The problem is rooted in the formal conflation of 
citizenship models that privilege both kinship and birthright citizenship, rather than allowing 
both forms but institutionalizing a clear preference for one or another as in France or Germany 
(Brubaker 1992). In 2006, Ethnobarometer a Moldovan sample above to describe their “opinion 
about the three most important things that give a person the right to be considered a Moldovan”. 
For ‘Moldovan’ self-identifying respondents, the three most popular responses revealed “having 
Moldovan parents” (51%), “speaking the language at home” (48%), and ‘respecting traditions’ 
(36%).  These characteristics outweighed, explicitly, components such as “citizenship”, “feeling 
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Moldovan”, and “speaking the language” but not at home and were consistent with earlier 
findings about birthright, language, and tradition versus civic, instrumental, or less affective ties.  
Locality was more important for minorities than Moldovans, as 32% said it was their first rather 
than third choice, as with the titular group (Ethnobarometer 2006). This situation where 
principles of jus domicili, jus soli, and jus sanguinis overlap complicates conventional ideas 
about more discrete guidelines for obtaining national group membership.   
In contrast to IPP findings privileging birthrights and language, later studies have 
suggested citizenship matters most to Moldovans.  In 2007, a Russian Centre for Geopolitical 
Studies survey led by the woman now acting as TMR’s ‘foreign minister’, Nina Shtanski, found 
45% of all respondents considered themselves citizens first, nationals second, and only 5% see 
themselves as Moldovan ethnics and Moldovan citizens simultaneously. Again in 2007, a New 
Age survey found an even greater proportion, i.e. 60%, of Moldovans, versus only 24% of 
Russians and 30% of Ukrainians, considered themselves citizens of Moldova first.  There, the 
notion that Slavs are not loyal to other states was dismissed with appeals to multilayered 
attachments.  Accordingly, they note 51% of Russians and 75% of Ukrainians identify 
secondarily and increasingly as citizens, but do not offer an explanation.  In line with these 2007 
studies, but against IPP, in 2010 QSP also confirmed the citizenship frame.  They found, over all 
groups, 93% “name themselves first” citizens of Moldova, with Moldovan-nationals the highest 
rate at 96%, Ukrainians 87%, and Russians 77%; less than 1% of ethnic Moldovans identified as 
“Soviet citizens” but 12% of ethnic Russians did. Among QSP’s sample of non-titular minorities, 
perhaps not surprisingly, similar attitudes are evident.  For them, 44% of self-identifying 
Ukrainians and 31% of Russians list ‘birth and residence’ as salient, while less than 20% of these 
minority members think ‘speaking the language’ should matter more  (QSP 2010).  These figures 
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are roughly consistent with older WVS data more generally and in Moldova locally, when 
worldwide in 2006 about 41% of people thought a ‘very important requirement’ for group 
membership is a birthright based on birthplace. These findings showing citizenship trumps 
birthright and language as membership criteria directly contradict IPP 2006 findings where only 
15% of the titular group saw citizenship as the primary mark of being Moldovan.  Attachments 
to place are similarly convoluted as evident in the word clouds where crises of identity are 
discussed alongside economic and social crises in similarly grave tones.  
 
Part II: Formal Visions 
A) Museum Curators as “Guardians of Tradition” 
As self-described “expert ethnographers” and “scientific authorities”, Chisinau’s State 
Museum of Ethnography authorities’ comments revolve around notions of authenticity, i.e. what 
‘being Moldovan’ means and they are hardly natural or neutral arbiters where “identity” and the 
verb “to know” dominate their attempts to construct a particular version of the past and present 
(see also Figure 1.1.7).   Though neither peasants nor politicians, curators are worth consulting in 
my research because they are privileged indicators of a different vein. Thus, I present data and 
offer analysis from the meeting with museum staff as baselines of expert, codified metrics of 
Moldovan-ness and its contents.  In my analysis, their views serve as a bridge between formal 
frames of institutional authority, political history, and common culture as authentic national 
knowledge and memories of a collective past on the one hand, and proxy for comparing other 
actors’ opinions in the capital and two frontier towns on the other. Their vision suggests to 
limited power of formal visions and their variations from informal opinions of a country in crisis.  
In tracing curator visions of Moldovan territory and identity, a variety of problems underlying 
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the longer term perception of ungovernability projected onto the region emerge to show fractured 
visions of the collective and its geographic coordinates.   
Looking at the word cloud of their transcript, they represent the conventional wisdom 
where frames of identity, language, and people dominate and iconic symbols are central. Because 
two images used in my kits are from their collection, curator opinions matter when considering 
an object’s context of production.  Accordingly, I consider their fabrication as technical 
instruments since events and icons organized around language, politics, and community are 
widely accepted as nation-building tools.  Capturing and analyzing their responses to these and 
other ‘triggers’ helps me reveal how important it is to question institutional understandings of 
how identity, authority, and territory are forged. Finally, this group discussion differs from the 18 
others because two extra images of historical maps were included as supplements in their trigger 
images kit. Their answers offer a basis for understanding cartographic origins rather than 
homeland, per se. A word cloud of the transcript from the first part of the group discussion on 
what it means to be Moldovan and ideas of homeland and nationhood is Figure 4.1.  It follows 
the protocol detailed earlier but removes “facilitator” and “Moldova(ns)” –the two most common 
words-- to provide a more legible tool. 
In the word cloud (Figure 4.1), several patterns emerge while others remain hidden.  
Visibly, “identity” as a noun and “know” as a verb suggested a prominent link between self-
identification and the role of institutional knowledge for experts.  And while contributions from 
P6, P5, and P3 were more numerous, all participants were active.  To quantify keyword usage 
and distinguish between their contents and references as discursive expressions of subjectivity, it 
is worth considering how curators compare to other groups, as indicated in the Figure 4.3 
detailing “Frequency counts of individual segmentation groups by percentages of use”. The chart 
 
 
186 
summarizes and enables comparisons between which keywords participants used in two ways.  
This method shows what that balance was on the whole, as a cumulative percentage chart, and 
the raw word counts in the table, indicating how many times that keyword appeared in each 
group.  In comparison with other groups individually given the inability to compare curators 
across sites or segmentation groups as a whole, for museum agents, “ethnic(ity)” and 
“nation(s/al/ity)” rank highly, like “territor(y/ial)” and “language”.  More surprising was their 
less frequent use of “memory(ies)” or its cousin, “tradition(s/al)”. As these visualizations 
indicate, “identity” and “knowledge” stand out for them but are absent from the keyword table.  
This dissonance suggests the variety of answers captured including what my protocol anticipated 
and what participants found relevant remain important when initially coding contents and help to 
compare how participants actually responded across individual groups.  
In light of their attention to authenticity, maps, museums, and images, the curators’ 
potential power to bridge spatio-temporal and social group boundaries is worth examining, as 
indicated in their references to “country” more frequently than “homeland”.  Regardless of the 
‘factual’ errors admittedly present in their collections, these participants plainly recognized, 
relished, and reflected their expert, scientific credentials as indicated in comments from a senior 
representative explaining: “While we appreciate that attention [to our historic artifacts], there are 
some things that need to be reviewed” (P3).  Such comments are justifications, strategically, and 
come from the chief curator who reported a much stronger attachment to her nationality over the 
past 15 years when surveyed at the start. The meeting with them illustrates well the value of 
understanding the contexts where symbolic and cultural discourses and representations are 
forged as appeals to institutional authority and factual accuracy in terms of problems to be 
solved. They are evident when an authority responded to the trigger image of a commonplace 
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billboard proclaiming “Moldova, my homeland” in precisely these terms and irreflexive of his 
role as the same kind of “manager” and “image-maker”, i.e. a person or group able or compelled 
to “dictate images of identity”:  
 
P5:  Whenever I saws it, I had an ironic reaction because I know what my country is, but the one 
who wrote this has no idea who is leading his country…I wondered, as a man who must worry 
about everything, like my colleagues because we are image-makers and manage pictures—or at 
least promote them—and understand them, I ask why we are not permitted to discuss identity?  
Why not [discuss] the concepts of identity…we dictate images of identity?” 
 
For context, the question of permission is about whether formal agents can discuss “identity” as a 
“scientific word”.  This complaint references new government mandates preventing officials 
from commenting on this topic.  Curators’ complaints can be taken to support claims that 
problems with accuracy and iconic images of national territory affect authorities differently than 
other subjects.  The issues are also seen to revolve around the right to represent the country and 
homeland, i.e. as questions of territorial authority and branding the national geo-body.  These 
“problems” and “crises” emerge formally in this sense as localized geopolitical projects to 
govern unstable populations.  As tools and objects of governance seeking to stabilize uncertain 
identification patterns, curators reveal the power of considering the creation and consumption of 
ethno-national iconography and historiography despite their inaccuracies and instrumental aims.  
These expressions highlight tensions between older generations of public sector authorities and 
the proliferation of public relations firms. These tensions appear in my data as manifestations of 
shifting internal power structures and the right to represent ‘the nation’.  
 
B) Homo Moldovanus 
Common national political origins and stereotypical portraits of average Moldovans 
remain contested.  As a ‘collective individual’, the idea of homo Moldovanus, is a modern 
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incarnation of the old Soviet man as ideal type.  My argument is that its emergence indicates how 
influential visions see the subject of national identity.  As motivated by labor but unmoved by 
material rewards, this mythological character is a modern version of Pushkin’s ‘Russian soul’ or 
even Smith’s (1976) “emotional, impulsive” worker-bee participating in the geometric 
reorganization of its society. As an enduring anthropological, ethnographic, literary, 
psychological, and sociological creature populating the real and imagined national community its 
specter outlines how attributes and attitudes have changed over time as indicators of territorial 
attachment and views of ethno-national identification (Zinovyev 1986).  Even if its core 
characteristics remain ambiguous, the stability of this figure is useful analytically when it 
appears normatively and strategically in discussions. 
I argue that for museum staff, its characteristics are worth studying to see how a common 
citizen is seen in formal elite visions.  My findings indicate that they are predominantly framed 
in terms of historical stages, linguistic origins, and progressive changes alongside language and 
ideology to explain the titular group’s conscious re-formation (P5).  When looking at images of 
their historical and promotional materials, the following expressions summarize well the thinking 
around how independence is viewed formally. Collectively, the trope of sameness, i.e. “we”, 
offers evidence of how difference is articulated, managed, and situated.  In this context, ‘we-
here’ means both the internal focus group and the wider national community of Moldovan 
citizens and their supposed dispositions as externalized ‘they/there’ (post-Soviet) people.  From 
the start, these frames resonated in a essentialized way noted a self-described image-maker (P5): 
 
With these two images we see signs of another stage…[I]f before we needed to remind the 
leadership who we are and what values we can opt for, to detach ourselves from the image of 
Soviet man, and from the Soviet ideology, and to show that we have a different language, we 
have a separate consciousness, we have a separate identity, already at this time, management 
began to use trade marks or images that would like to remind us of things that we know …   
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This explanation reflects an ordered, systematic vision seeking to link time and social groups in a 
consistent way.  It seeks to distinguish ages and orders.  They are the words of a state-backed 
ethnographer promoting a uniform move to national history in a fractured territory. Here, sight 
and memory are the tools supporting constructive and transformative strategies that frame, as 
memory, notions of unification and governance.  Notably, blame is shifted to an external, pre-
existing other to reveal faulty but no less powerful strategies of ideological consolidation and 
national distinction. As a strategy to reconfigure the perpetuation of certain Soviet era mentalities 
like that of a model, modern citizen, clean breaks with the past are portrayed in eventful terms 
tinged with hope.  Below, emotional attachments are seen as embodiments of authentic and 
discrete collective consciousness as with peasants’ momentary fearlessness: 
  
P5: …There was a general social revolt with all walks of life attending.  Images of this kind we 
have in our archive and museum and we remember those times when they came to Chisinau to 
show their protest, or rather to assert their identity, including people from the villages…I 
remember the time when, for me we were discovering social meaning…I was moved the most 
when peasants came from the villages to seek justice and language…They came in columns, 
standing on the sidewalks…The tops of their caps were raised up –it [i.e. pointy hat-wearing] 
happened only when peasants set out for a fight…I was thinking that I should just stay on the 
plaza and make demands for [the Romanian] language and [Latin] alphabet--that I should be 
more involved as an intellectual than the peasant.   
 
Facilitator:  Moldovans were identified with peasants? 
 
P5:  100%. And a citizen who wanted to respect you because you are classified otherwise said 
‘Oh, you peasant’. They were not afraid of anything.   
 
Here, the homogenous and heterogeneous contours of Moldovan characteristics are captured 
well.  They are reflected in a moment of collective rebirth and social connection as the 
construction of ‘identity’ and negotiations over its ‘meaning’.  In appealing to authenticity, the 
usual frames of hospitality, dance, and work are ignored in favor of costumes, columns, and 
country living.  Questions of fear, as well as courage, are shown to govern how people situate 
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themselves spatially and subjectively within “a general social revolt” especially with “all walks 
of life attending”.  
 
C) Common Cultural Displays 
In my efforts to interrogate expert views, I seek to understand how iconic and banal 
national identification frames shift. Beyond stereotypical heroes, collective displays beyond 
protest also suggest how stakeholders conceptualize the Moldovan nation and its jumbled 
contents.  Nelly Ciobanu’s iconic folk dancing video included amateur content solicited from 
Moldovan citizens hoping to help represent their ‘national culture’ in Eurovision offers a lens 
similar to Homo Moldovanus.  As a group exercise in embodied subjectivity and collective 
mobility, the dance is symbolic because it requires participants to join hands in circles and move 
without leaders via joint efforts and thus can be seen to reflect common bonds. The communal 
yet competitive connotations of this exercise not withstanding, additional comments and 
reactions about this topic suggest curators also found it revealing as a vehicle for teasing out 
common elements.  The exchanges revolved around staples of ethnography, were perfectly self-
aware in a modern scientific sense, and included appeals to authenticity at the expense of 
ethnicity to suggest the contention surrounding authorized accounts of national culture: 
 
P3:  There are no musicologists, but there really is Balkanism.  When I hear it start, I’m not 
[feeling] like a Moldovan national; the music is not ours. 
  
P2: I think they upgraded. 
 
P3:   It is not upgraded…Personally I do not accept it, as I do not feel it is Moldovan dance.  
There are pictures of the market, after the wine festival, where there is total drunkenness…I’m 
very sorry that this event has been transformed in this way… 
 
P5:  The text [i.e. subtitles appearing during introduction] itself is meaningless…The images are 
not representative.  If one were to examine them from my point of view of an ethnographer, I can 
show a lot of mistakes…I saw several mistakes…the clothing was very different, but many of the 
images were not our authentic costumes.  In all the costumes were eclectic mixes, or pseudo-
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costumes.  Pseudo-brand values have been ethnicized…but the costume is our brand identity…If 
we look at everything we saw in this video and what I heard, indeed, it is far from being 
Moldovan. 
 
P4: Experts are offended by some moments in here [i.e. Ciobanu’s video].  Unfortunately, it was 
made to promote the pseudo-culture that we hear about and is commercialized.  Where is our 
country?  A nation would not be bad to consult with specialists in the field and to promote some 
values that should be promoted when representing a nation, but they found these simply by 
chance.   
 
This normative reflection shows just how ‘Moldovan identity’ is subject to dispute by self-styled 
scientific authorities. These complaints invoked appeals to “the restoration of historical truth” 
and emotional events that “divide[d] the soup of the truth” (P5).  In fact, these struggles to 
reproduce oppositional differences and manage their institutionalization are clearly articulated 
and are not “simply by chance” (P4) as P5 shows below when suggesting, as above, that the text 
is “meaningless” because of the sponsor’s myopic “vision as to the understanding of our identity 
as a country”.  This exchange ends with amendments about the need to promote ‘the people’ in a 
‘proper’ way.  But the exact principles to be advanced remain contentious in terms of the video:  
 
P6:  It is political advertising—they wanted to show that we are on the rise, but that does not 
reflect any reality and it is not traditional. 
 
P5: It is interesting that it is written that the public has participated in creating this video, as the 
company received these proposals, but it did not have enough vision… 
 
Plainly, curators appreciate their roles in powerful ways, including their professional 
responsibilities and visual acumen but fail to offer a common understanding of “common 
culture.”  
 
D)  “Slavs Can’t Swim?” 
Questions about the birth of the nation and its homeland are indicative of a crisis of 
national identity in elite visions.  Domestically and internally, the formal territorial limits of the 
nation and its original archaeological extent were discussed in the context of old maps housed in 
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the museum.  Two supplemental images showing photos of the maps as exhibits were added to 
this group’s trigger image kit including “The lower Carpathian and Danube basins during the I-
III centuries”, with Latin scripts and both ancient Greek and medieval Romanian place names 
(Maps 4-5).   
Map 4: “Lands of the lower Carpathian and Danube Basins, 1st-3rdc” suggesting ‘Slavs cannot swim’ 
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Map 5:  Maximum Archeological Extent of Pre-modern Moldova, State Museum of Ethnography 
 
 
Despite its post-script status, this discussion was perhaps the most revealing of the entire 
meeting.  When shown these images in their collection for over 20 years and asked about them, 
including if the message was that “Slavs cannot swim?” given the map’s shading indicating that 
unlike Dacians Goths and Sarmatians, the Tyras River12 was insurmountable for Slavs, awkward 
laughter followed.   
Undoubtedly, the sharpest answer to the final question about the map was “They could 
not swim because they were not here” (P3).  The accuracy of the maps was immediately called 
                                                
12 The ancient Greek label for the Nistru and basis of Tiraspol is evident in this etymology. 
 
 
194 
into question and no agreement was reached besides assigning blame to an absent curator.  
Despite this sense of humor and historical revisionism, when told the maps were from their 
collection, the director’s face turned red and he put his shaking head into his hands in disbelief 
and embarrassment for failing to recognize his artifacts or explain their continued presence.  The 
discussion on the images’ origins and the context of their production recognized the contingency 
of the images, including explicit discussion of the Romanian-language script and the context of 
Soviet decline.  For them, the artifact was justified as a product of its times, suggesting the 
various territorial visions of Moldovanism: 
 
P5:  Do not forget that the exhibition began to be made in the years 1980, 1986…At that time of 
Slavism, and this policy was dominant and bloated.  As like everything in science, the aim was to 
demonstrate that the Slavs had been here when the world formed and then we landed and we 
came after them.  So we should explain this map.  It contains historical errors and I do not know 
if this finding beyond these mistakes requires further discussion. 
 
P6:  And the second map has the same problem…the border is placed exactly on the border of the 
Soviet Union. The same error is made here…It should be removed. 
 
P5:  Let’s make it clear why it was necessary to discuss these maps.  There are some maps that 
should help us identify ourselves or go down in history to help us realize that our national 
members are the components of our identity.  Or are we seeing how wrong we were in that time?   
 
Facilitator:  As people see maps in their imaginations, they design them on paper? 
 
P4:  Right, but it is an imagination of our nation, which was about 20 years ago. 
 
P6:  [interrupting] No imagination, no restrictions! 
 
P4:  We used some documents, which, unfortunately --we have had to correct them. 
 
P5:  There are some maps that do not represent us --that show identity is fragmented.   
 
This exchange reveals the constructed, contextual, instrumental nature of formal cartographic 
projects and maps-as-logos presented in museums.  This exchange also validates census and 
survey data demonstrating the “fragmented” nature of national identity in a complementary but 
contextually separate fashion.  
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To summarize this section’s attention to official ethnographers, my discussion of curator 
views and interactive explanations is attentive to formal and unofficial narratives about 
stereotypes and common characteristics, ethno-national origins, cultural displays, and geographic 
limits associated with a language of authenticity and authority.  The results suggest how 
malleable identification practices are deployed as flexible instruments of governance in the post-
socialist, pre-EU context.  In the nest section, the interactions in my other 18 focus groups are 
presented similarly to understand how those groups understand their own experiences with these 
same changes.   
 
Part III: Group Comparisons 
A) Segmentation Groups and Similarities 
In my groups, similar claims about the unconsolidated and disappointing nature of post-
Soviet transformation of socio-spatial attachments and subjectivities can be considered by first 
asking which groups use which terms, and if any (dis)similarities emerge.  These expressions can 
take conventional counting forms but are also evident in group interactions codified in focus 
group transcripts.  They are evident in the following visualizations and discursive data showing 
keyword counts by segmentation group (Figure 4.3).  In showing both the table of counts and the 
graphs of relative usage, patterns around relevant frames like ethnicity, nationality, and territory 
emerged as useful illustrations.  Despite conflicting data and analysis of it, earlier surveys have 
been used to suggest Moldovan-ness is more ethno-cultural than ethno-territorial (Petruti 2006). 
Below I demonstrate this comparison is potentially misleading because “culture”, as it exists, is 
inherently territorial as a place-based affinity and mode of belonging rather than discrete 
attribute as in my data. For instance, among return migrants, informal allegiance to community is 
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framed more as a question of “homeland” and they did not reference territoriality yet images of 
place and space permeated their discussions.  
The breakdown by segmentation group total (Figure 4.4), suggests a complicated story.  
In looking at segmentation groups rather than raw counts, the particular preferences and 
collective appeals to socio-spatial frames of meaning across scales are aggregated. Indeed, I 
argue returned migrants are almost twice as likely to appeal to notions of “homeland” as other 
groups. Yet, in terms of spatiality and geographic visions, they did not talk in terms of “territory” 
per se, as a legacy of formal control.  Likewise, teachers and politicians were about four times as 
likely to reference “nation(al/ality)” frames, as government agents, in comparison to pensioners 
or students, which is unsurprising and suggests the potential power of my approach.  These 
tables reflecting discursive data from my participants offer new evidence about the ways groups, 
generations, and government agents appeal to citizenship, space, and community as tools rather 
than just empty containers of social life.   
Despite my use of this approach, the absence of ethnicity should not be overstated.  For 
example, in the aforementioned meeting (Chisinau Civil Society) participants debated the 
historical and political limitations of “ethnicity” for explaining Moldovan social and political 
trends, unprovoked by the moderator except for the same triggers other groups were using. 
During a self-described critical reflection on ethno-national origins that emerged in the 
discussion of security and geopolitical influence, one speaker (P4) expressed the problem using 
mixed terms, muddy logic, and an authoritative demeanor suggesting certainty yet actually 
representing the opposite:   
I think we have failed to take a clear direction. We are the only ones who have ethnic origins in a 
nation in Europe, but still look with great confidence to Russia. Much of the population believes 
that it speaks Moldovan --We have not managed to keep our history in line vertically…But 
besides, these values are not maintained in the country, but by the diaspora. 
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In this expression, multi-scalar geographic and political affinities and explanations are offered 
that invoke but go beyond ethnic framing.  In his vision,  “we” refers to “Moldovan citizens” 
generally and the national metonym conflates natural continental scales with collective political 
predispositions, while connecting these frames across a discontinuous territorial space and 
debatable historical timeline.  The appeal to exceptional origins “in Europe” is equally 
contentious of course, but no less effective despite its inaccuracy or imprecision as argued in 
Siam Mapped.  Still, the muddied logic highlights appeals to conceptual ambiguity surrounding 
how even educated parties use this term, without irony, to clarify an explanation about this 
precise concept and its contours.  The speaker acknowledges that “the population” is confused, 
disoriented geopolitically and linguistically and “the diaspora” (separately and from afar) is the 
wellspring of traditional rather than formal national or civic values as conventionally understood.  
Such views accept that patriots need not be present on the territory of the nation to support it, 
thus without contradiction their attachments are simultaneously existential, essential, and 
instrumental.     
Again returning to ethnicity for examples, a similar discussion resurfaced minutes later 
during this group’s interactions in response to images of national territorial borders and a series 
of side-comments by others about commonplace traditions and prosaic characteristics. The 
discussion digressed, unprompted by the facilitator or PI, to “ethnicity” in another revealing 
exchange:   
P4: Ethnicity is the largest element of solidarity that may occur. 
P5: In our times, ethnicity only matters to very few people. Different nations have been made on 
different criteria. In ours, the basic criterion is linguistic. 
P4:  Yes, but language is a component of ethnicity. 
P5: I see ethnicity as logical… 
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P4:  (Interrupting) We have managed to keep our identity because we were able to take refuge in 
small enclaves. 
P5: …Romanian national identity: The first element is language. Religion is the second element 
and the third is ethnicity. 
 
In this exchange, both participants accept “ethnicity” is problematic, but for different reasons. 
Both men are right but via different logics, as domestically the Moldovan constitution does use 
language criteria for governing protected status, among others, while academically social 
scientists indeed see ethnic identification and embodied forms of categorization “as cognition” 
(Brubaker 2004).  Such deviations were rare during meetings.  Again, scales of allegiance and 
historical order were all put in discrete yet conceptually muddled rank-order (i.e. which 
Metropolitan’s Orthodoxy?) with a vaguely defined geography (e.g. “small enclaves”) in a way 
suggesting how inconsistently even well educated citizens conceptualize categories and justify 
them (e.g. “Yes, but…”).  Such exchanges emerge in my data as indicators of subject formation 
and, in interactions like these, illustrate the value of provoking explanation in groups.  This 
interaction also highlights potential problems with relying on rank-ordering of preferences or 
ideas in this context because here the nuance and justification is more important than discrete 
measures, which though orderly remain illustrative in this instance where the value claim was 
then undermined by its advocate, i.e. “ethnicity only matters to very few people” then 
articulating the notion that “third is ethnicity.”  
 
B) Word Clouds by Segmentation Group 
In addition to curators’ comments and keyword counts, formats like the visuals 
themselves are useful (Figures 4.10.1-4.10.6).  To compare and contextualize keyword 
frequencies, word clouds for each segmentation group are worth viewing.  As keyword and 
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content word summaries, they reflect only the first part of group discussions, i.e. those asking 
“what it means to be Moldovan”.  These illustrations serve as the conceptual bridge to link 
summary counts of participants’ relevant frames with critical discourse analysis of focus group 
transcripts to follow.  The usefulness of this synthetic and summary approach is evident when 
looking at group iterations and the types of description they offer.  Whereas counts consider pre-
determined frames, these visual devices allow for other patterns to emerge to help fill in the 
contents of symbolically-laden containers like country or nation. 
Word clouds offer a different but comparable view to frequency counts.  Looking at these 
tools helps illuminate concourses of similar priorities and frames of reference like “home” 
instead of “homeland”, “people” rather than “nation(al/ity)”; “think” and “feel” constructions 
about logical or emotional drivers, and the frequency of “not_” constructions each offer some 
different descriptions than frequency counts alone.  Ideas about attachments to place can be 
national-territorial, i.e. about “homeland”, or also more informal-existential, i.e. “home”. As the 
next chapter details, return migrants speak most about homeland and, as these clouds also show; 
they also show this group talks even more about “home”, internally and compared to other 
groups.  Only the politicians appealed to homeland as national territory more than home as 
personal space, but students seemed split evenly on this frame of reference.  It is also noteworthy 
also that for teachers, Romania stood out far more than in other frames as referent, consistent 
with their particularly nationalist visions.  Similarly, “people” as generic rather than discrete 
frame for instance, appears far more visibly than parochial frames like nation or citizen, and 
household scale frames including “parents” and “children” are rather more visible as well.  In 
terms of thinking and feeling, the verb “think” is far more prominent than “feel”, suggesting 
reason rather than intuition governs logical constructions and affective attachments, despite the 
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“home” versus “homeland” data suggesting existential rather than national emphasis.    Finally, 
in terms of “not_” constructions, other useful patterns are revealed.  For instance, the “not know” 
and “not understand” responses prevailing among return migrants, pensioners, and teachers 
suggest uncertainty.  Alternatively, for civil society, the frame negates “giving”, i.e. “not give”, 
and suggests a different group orientation though data are limited in this respect; for students the 
question of negation is voiced in terms of “not to”, in the sense of lack of ability ‘to do’ 
something, perhaps a universal tendency of young adults worldwide.   
 
(C) National-Historical Origins and Popular Imaginations 
In this section participants’ attitudes and explanations and experiences underlying them 
are detailed.  While these topics and themes are analyzed separately, my analysis accepts the 
limits and problems associated with unbundling ideas about identification and territorialization 
practices involving homeland and identity, for instance.   Still, the mixing of views and logic 
behind them, taken in the same order as the word clouds and curator discussions as above, 
suggests how origins around the birth of commonality are debated, i.e. good sovereign 
Moldovans and bucolic life in their homelands or, by contrast, money and its absence demanding 
migration.  In the context of group interaction rather than isolated counts, these data are manifest 
in the form of reflections about national origins and language policy.  In a national-territorial 
sense they are about the birth of the nation and its manifestations.  As truth-seeking claims, they 
reflect institutional and more banal and individualized forms of power because they are explicitly 
about the authority to name, own, and therefore, to dispossess and re-territorialize.   
In forging distinctive connections to a collectively imagined past in pursuit of common 
bonds, either beginning 650 years ago as the government claims, and re-born in 1919 into 
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“Greater Romania” or re-re-born in 1991 as a sovereign, post-Soviet polity, my analysis shows 
debates among my participants suggest how citizens are aligning their personal experiences in 
collectively irrational yet no less powerful ways that take the form of competing political 
narratives and legitimate sovereignty.  In exposing its underlying fictions and practical 
manifestations as expressed by influential citizens, my argument is that these tensions are 
evidence of the modern Moldovan citizenship regime.  These fictions, as I document below, have 
riddled efforts to institutionalize a common view formally.  As language shot through with such 
categories and knowledge about their origins shows below, my argument is that such practices 
hint at how codification is internalized and instrumentalized to reconfigure and re-characterize 
Moldovan-ness.  
My argument is that, in the eyes of participants, “being Moldovan” has taken new forms 
in terms of citizenship, and thus helps illuminate how situated subjectivities are constructed 
among my populations of interest, including economic migrants.  Data also address problems 
with rank-ordering of problems or attachments.  In my view, these problems are a consequence 
of people trying to rationalize ill-fitting if discrete hierarchies of allegiance to community and 
territory in anachronistic and particularly country-scale terms, despite widespread disagreement 
and inconsistencies, both formally and informally, about what these terms and signifiers mean 
and how they have transformed over time.  In what follows, return migrants, pensioners, 
teachers, students, civil society, and politicians are considered in terms of their interactions 
around origins, characteristics, and territorial affinities. 
In group exchanges, citizenship, language, and diaspora were all invoked in talk about 
social membership and territorial displacement using discourses of uniqueness and normalcy, 
patriotism and pragmatism, collective suffering and individual experience, as shown below.  
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These stories document displacement and are typically narrated in matter-of-fact and, less often, 
even poetic tones as when teachers or activists recited nationalist poetry of their own or of 
Eminescu, romantic and historic icon of western-oriented Moldovans.  In the Soviet tradition of 
laboring heroes, participants’ emphasis on labor and struggle, like pragmatism in the face of 
disingenuous ideology or “the other side of the coin” in the language of participants, is a 
common thread across group storylines.  Its use suggests a collective appreciation for the 
dissonance between formal images of national membership or more embodied and informal 
understandings of “reality”.  For every disenchanted survivalist in my groups ranting about the 
“national nothing”  (P1 Chisinau Return Migrant) there was also a patriot voicing contrary 
ideological values about feeling duty-bound “to defend” (P5 Stefan Voda Return Migrant) the 
country. Similarly, but in more grounded territorial terms, attachments are seen also as “my 
land” worth fighting for (P5 Chisinau Politician). Overall, discussions of ethno-national origins 
and language or citizenship practices have proven to be useful for capturing how my participants 
situate themselves socially and politically as shown in the following summary analysis of 
segmentation groups and geographic differences among them.  
 
(1) Return Migrants 
Among return migrants, discussions about group origins commonly invoked home as an 
abstract notion, money as an object, and country as a scale of attachment. As the word clouds 
suggest, (4.10.1) and frequency counts confirm, this group argued that problems of history were 
justified in terms of territory, identity, nationality, and language in ways that mirrored how other 
groups spoke about national-political origins. Paradoxically, across sites all groups discussed 
both ‘getting the history right’ aspects of national origins and, simultaneously, accepted the need 
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to promote national myths, as variously understood, in visible ways consistent with the other 
groups despite their otherwise outward orientation compared to pensioners or teachers.   A few 
examples below highlight group dynamics and discursive strategies to suggest that despite their 
pragmatic approach to national membership they were proud of their affiliation nonetheless. 
Across sites, a variety of bonds were articulated.  For those in Chisinau, language and 
normalcy and identity were bound up in discussions of pride and prescriptive bonds.   As P2 
noted,  “…I think we were the only ones [in the former USSR] to get lucky with such language”, 
which is consistent with his belief that the problem also lies in this being a “language without an 
identity”, yet he also believes Moldova, while unique, also held “rulers in common” but is only 
20 years old. In Stefan Voda a participant knew about the event and understood it vicariously 
from his father and wider family, articulating commonly held notions by all groups, of 
disappointment and defense while also splitting hairs over the precise nature of states and 
sovereignty in this context. In the eyes of a woman abroad in Italy for several years, kinship is 
not a prerequisite for membership as much as birthright, yet she also explains her vision of 
historical accuracy using “we” when discussing defense of the homeland, which is characterized 
as the ‘place she sleeps best’ earlier in the discussion.  Her view is that this debate is also about 
the power to name and thus exist, but it is also the power to know, domestically and abroad, as 
bound up in convoluted claims about the nature of connections as shown here.  In Ungheni, the 
reality/uniqueness distinction was evident in terms of map and patriotism, recalling Anderson’s 
view of “logoicization”, or the power of the territorial outline of a country in an age of 
commercial reproduction.  For P3 being “on the map” is important and in this view, “Moldova is 
not unique”.  
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(2) Pensioners 
Among participating retirees, the most consistently evident themes invoked ideas about 
language rather than location in talk about the nation (Figure 4.10.2).  For them, interactions with 
authorities and distinguishing between romantic notions of nationalism and political expressions 
of authority and nationality prevailed. Origins were considered in terms of ancestry, war, and 
Russification consistent with their life experience.  National meanings like those linked to 
citizenship and/or patriotism were also included and appeared in instances where war and 
linguistic accommodation were clear tropes.  For them the language of Moldovan, as distinct 
from Romanian and the product of change beginning in the interwar era rather than the post-
Soviet one, was consistently evident if not so important.  For most pensioners, origins were 
forged in longstanding experiences of invasion and they saw common social struggles to survive 
as consistent features spanning current generations.  To them, a key Moldovan characteristic is 
‘to endure’, but they also distinguished across axes of differentiation in terms of language and 
tolerance.  This language of difference was later used to distinguish between both Romanians 
and Russians in defense of national distinctiveness regarding whether or not Moldovan and 
Romanian are the same language, as all agreed they spoke Moldovan a “similar” (P2) but 
discrete tongue.  
Among this group, more than the return migrants, some geographic differences were 
evident.  In Stefan Voda, by contrast, some participants (P1, P2) took the opposite view claiming 
“We are Romanian, without discussion” (P2) despite word clouds showing Romania is less 
salient in this eastern Moldovan town (Figure 1.3).  For those who maintained a difference exists, 
the answer was rooted in the history of Moldovan sovereignty and its brevity. They invoke both 
Stephen (P5) and Alexander (P3) who were from Romania and were anti-Turk, but the former 
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suggests statist principles trump cultural ones for this group, as each in turn explains the other. 
Like with the migrants, ‘getting history right’ was deemed important even among those who 
disagreed, as shown in the exchange where a ‘Great soul’ is less attractive than a ‘Good 
technocrat’ suggesting an instrumental notion largely avoided by pensioners and used by 
migrants. 
This group also spoke about origins in an informed yet contradictory way that assigned 
identity via appeals to historical and political geography, i.e. whether or “not to blame the east” 
(Ungheni P4).  They accepted the origins of the Moldovan state in terms of 16th century medieval 
sovereignty as historical rather than political, with the actual origins rooted much further back, 
again, juxtaposed against Turkish and Russian threats.  Members generally agreed that such 
rehabilitation of historical figures was for “political purposes” (P3) as suggested above.  The 
embodied expression Moldovan “to the sole of my foot” (P4) also surfaced as source of “pride”.  
Like with curators and teachers, anti-Turkish and anti-Russian sentiments were voiced in terms 
of charting landmarks of national historiography. For these women (e.g P3), despite the fact that 
“our mothers are sisters, I mean that in our families, our parents worked in Bessarabia until 
1940…we learned Romanian in the school system with the Latin script”.  As a hyphenated 
Moldovan-Romanian, P4’s response was to claim to be more deeply Moldovan, linking this 
feeling as a source of pride, suggesting a variegated sovereignty; others lamented that they knew 
“more Russian history than my people’s” (P3) and when asked its legacy answered “I live in 
Moldova and call myself Moldovan, but, after my Dacian origin, I am Romanian” as a 
representative appeal to ambiguity in the face of uncertainty about identification and national 
origin. Pensioners, like return migrants, used various historical understandings and contradictory 
logics to bring their self-perception into line with their political position, drawing on discourses 
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of language and historical figures like more nationalistic teachers and indeed six retirees 
admitted working as teachers.   
 
 (3) Teachers 
Among civic-minded teachers, national origins remained disputed. As their word cloud 
(see Figure 4.10.3) suggests, notions of “state”, “national”, “people”, and Romanian as language 
were debated at length.  Historically and in terms of sovereignty debates, the question was not 
always whether ‘the state’ was independent at the time as in official narrative debated by 
migrants and pensioners, but when mattered too.  Was it sovereign in 1539 rather than Stephen 
the Great’s 1565 and should it instead honor Prince Bogdan, the Hungarian “infiltrator” (P2)?  
Despite their appeals to accuracy like the other groups, ultimately the debates came down to an 
odd mix of citizenship disconnected from nationality in a way that suggests identity and 
citizenship, seen exclusively as legal membership, are unfairly conflated for political purposes 
when they should be personal decisions instead (P5).  This group knew history well as expected, 
similar to curators and pensioners and used it in appeals to their own authority. 
As evidence of fractured sovereignty and alleged ungovernability, connections to an 
imagined and sometimes personally experienced past remain contested.  In revealing discussions 
among teachers involved national rebirth, “the Romanian space”, and explanations about formal 
citizenship and nationality labels alongside personal stories about the linguistic education of their 
own children suggesting a more nationalist than average position.  Outspoken participants had 
attended some of the events depicted in the focus group trigger, others reiterated the core 
question of “who are we”, and the informal power of navigating parental and institutional 
authorities was also invoked.  Despite their enthusiasm for Moldovan sovereignty in its modern 
sense, for them the country was “still suspect” (P3). While they appreciated the intentions were 
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bad to change the language and divide the country, unlike pensioners before them they 
acknowledged speaking the same language and understanding each other, i.e. Romanians and 
Moldovans. 
As authorities and citizens themselves, their emotional discussions also involved 
administrative process and passport rules.  Some (e.g. P4) only wanted to be “Romanian on 
paper”.  Indeed, these sentiments themselves were contentious and revealed informal citizenship 
and nationality effects rooted in pragmatism bordering on nihilism, since “the document must be 
written, the state is obliged to fill in some papers” although according to him, fatherly advice to 
‘behave in school but listen to your parents at home’ was more important logic (P5).  Critically, 
two other moments suggested that despite patriotism, the national frame remains ill defined and 
ill examined as when P6 noted “I have nationality without really talking about what it is…a 
hateful act of a great empire”.  As a bald geopolitical statement, the link between social 
ascription and territorial occupation and related displacements is the key connective trope 
illustrative of sovereign power among this group.  In terms of efforts to reconcile such assumed 
ungovernability, others suggested less historical but equally political sources of confusion 
evident in comments like “When was the census was exactly? I said that I am Romanian, but 
there I meant Moldovan” (P3).  Such ambiguity is indicative that the sovereign fiction of the 
nation remains poorly mythologized even among its core agents.  
National rebirth was also interpreted in personal terms of fear.  The fears concerned 
differences between Russian and Romanian and were about memories of speaking their language 
on the bus before the 1992 conflict in TMR, with those in Ungheni using the “bridge of flowers” 
as references.  For example, while those in the eastern part of the country felt fear most acutely 
according to discussions, those in the western parts spoke in terms of a luckless lady and 
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territorial dismemberment, where in Moldova “the biggest part is cut”, to yet another who wrote 
poetry about her “country, my holy icon…from river to river and your land ancestor, I punch like 
a cry baby”, begging the poem’s audience to “rise” and “fight” for the “union bells” (P2).  A 
self-proclaimed “very romantic” person, she felt motivated but disappointment and a lack of 
freedom in a “symbolic state” represented from the Middle Ages to present.   She recited her 
own verse during the meeting to applause.  Other ‘revivalists’ also noted origins and “outbreak” 
were experienced as dormant bodies waking to newfound clarity but shrouded in fear, including 
those from Stefan Voda who had previously lived in TMR before they “felt on my skin what it 
means to be Romanian or Moldova” (P2) where either nationality is acceptable and Romanian 
speakers are labeled interchangeably with the Moldovan language, both of which were “spoken 
with awe” because “we were afraid”.  Still, despite her strong opinions, she also noted that “the 
trouble” in TMR began with demands for Russian as a second language, blaming the 1992 
opposition leader Snegur for proclaiming a union with Romania and providing “a big impetus for 
that conflict to have been bloody”.  
  
(4) Students 
The word cloud (Figure 4.10.4) for students reflects a less national, less emotional series 
of keywords at first glance; national frames and generational concerns seem to matter less than in 
comparison to the teachers.  However, like teachers, with students language and country still 
matter in emotional though less historical ways. Students in my groups were focused on the 
national future rather than interest in past memories, though traditions were worth discussing for 
them in some ways.  Those who took pride in imagining their past, often vicariously through 
their parents, offer evidence of generational shifts.  Some feel ashamed; others see origins in 
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common culture rather than iconic figures.  With this again, uncertainty remains pervasive and, 
as I argue, indicative of a crisis of governability.  Those in Ungheni were most proud of their 
linguistic ties, despite also conceding they spoke Russian at home.  Others reported or evidenced 
both pride and shame in their language practice. A Romanian-speaking Transnistrian citizen who 
studies in Chisinau was “disgusted”, “disgraced”, “afraid”, and “felt foreign” and gave “many 
causes”, the first of which echoes Adevarul’s (2012a) coverage of IMAS (2012) Moldova/TMR 
survey where propaganda and anti-Moldovan sentiment is widespread because “even if some 
knows the Moldovan language, no one speaks it…If you speak Romanian, it means you feel at a 
lower level”.  In this exchange, hierarchies, insecurities, daily uncertainties, and internal schisms 
emerge vividly.  Others who are not in TMR and regularly studying during the year in Chisinau, 
like those in Ungheni, “being Moldovan” meant to show pride and seek to respect what was 
before, “new” is the tie that binds their collective vision, drawing on kinship, i.e. “to know your 
traditions, know where your ancestors went…but you must add something new…into the 
country to grow it, not stay abroad” (P1). Indeed, generational schisms and “new visions” were 
explicitly discussed and linked to the Romanian language, i.e. “The fact that we are taught 
Romanian in school makes us accept what we are” (P3) rather than elided as in the example of 
the woman from TMR.   In this way, language serves as a proxy for belonging and pride but it is 
hardly the only one.   
 
(5) Civil Society 
According to its word cloud (Figure 4.10.5), civil society discussions were the most 
country-oriented, with migration also featuring prominently in discussions of the social body.  
Among civil society the consistent theme was inconsistency.  The dominant characteristics in 
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this regard appeared as pride and parallel disinterest or, both separately but also within groups. 
Topics including outmigration and money, as well as political appeals to the country scale rather 
than national elements like language or nationality distinguished this group.  In word clouds, 
disappointment with the outcomes of debates about national origins and the legacy of language 
policy and weak sovereignty is evident.  According to this group, origins were best debated in 
terms of both independence from Soviet rule and the end of World War II. As their word cloud 
suggests, national meanings like those associated with citizenship and/or patriotism are worth 
mentioning, but are far less related to language than politicians, pensioners, or teachers.  In this 
sense, they were more like the migrants in terms of how they framed their patriotism. In such 
views, patriotism was still explicitly linked to an affective and embodied sense of homeland and 
more recent iconic figures are incorporated to this end.  These views offered more geographic 
attention to territorial analogies and sovereignty problems as separate from linguistic ones in an 
attempt to organize a consistent worldview. Collectively, as active citizens and community 
organizers, they tended to invoke common themes of more and less invented national histories as 
part of their isolation and individualization practices. In discussing notions of state, homeland, 
and language participants tended to conflate categories in explanations about historical memories 
and language policy and why they were less important for those who were too young (Ungheni 
participants) versus those who participated in the independence-era events like the “bridge of 
flowers” (Stefan Voda).  This instance suggesting debates about language and history was about 
the right to exist, in whatever convoluted form, and seemed to unify participants across 
segmentation groups regardless of logical inconsistencies.   
In Chisinau participants were not particularly interested in this topic of history and 
language, especially compared to politicians or teachers from the capital.  They were far more 
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irreverent too collectively, especially as when this group focused on territorial problems framed 
in country-scale terms and alluding to external foreign precedents like Cyprus and, separately, 
internal consciousness as historical artifacts.  Still, participants were not as interested in this 
subject in comparison to other groups and resorted to jokes related to wordplay i.e. in the face of 
what they saw as insignificant public relations ploys designed to mirror efforts in other post-
Soviet states including Kazakhstan.  In these discussions, propagandistic billboards were 
discussed as banal and failed appeals to community, which, reflexively, offered a clever 
language lesson and heard the claim that “patriotism is attachment to a geographic area” (P4) 
whereas others were reminded of a joke and dismissed such notions in expressions like ""#$%&' 
()*%+,, -.&/ 0.1," i.e. a case where Soviet-style Romanian language billboards (See 
Appendix, Image 12) imploring citizens to "Love your language, Love your country” that are 
taken profanely to mean "Love the motherland, motherfucker.13” (P3).  This same sarcastic tone 
moderated moments later when the same participant began comparing Moldova to Cyprus 
reasoning that “territorially, [Moldova] has the same problem as Northern Cyprus, but they 
realize they are Greeks” (P3).  Others explicitly invoked how characteristics or “national 
sentiments”, i.e. habitus, is learned, before then noting “but you cannot impose them” and 
                                                
13 According Andrew FX Gustafson, the pervasive meme appears all over Russian language 
websites, yet no one has written a clear explanation of its meaning. His interpretation is that the phrase 
derives from a variety of Soviet-era slogans and posters depicting the "()*%+.--.&/", which we can 
redundantly translate into English as "Motherland Mother." These included, "2)*%+.--.&/ 3)0'&" (The 
Motherland is calling) and "4. ()*%+,--.&/" (For the Motherland) from World War II; there was also a 
common anti-littering sign throughout the Soviet Union, "5'('6%&' 7(%()*, - -.&/ 0.1," (Protect 
nature - it's your mother).  While he has not found evidence this exact phrase was ever printed on a poster, 
it follows the same structure to make a pun. The important thing is that this phrase is often written with 
ellipses at the end, because there's a word missing - that word is "fuck." Like we will often exclaim in 
English, "Mother ... !" leaving out the "fucker" part, the same is often done in Russian. The exclamation is 
usually "80)# -.&/!" an abbreviation of the full "9$ &0)# -.&/!" or "Fuck your 
mother!"/"Motherfucker!" In this case, "your" - &0)# - is replaced with the formal/plural 
0.1,.  Translating it as "Love the motherland, fuck your mother," preserves the parallelism of the 
original, but "Love the motherland, motherfucker," might be a better translation. 
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appealing to historical rather than emotional arguments in concluding that besides, Moldova “has 
never existed as a separate state.”  
In Stefan Voda, the question of history was less about territory and profanity and more 
about personal experience. For some, e.g. P1, independence is a 650 year-old legacy rather than 
an 18 year old one, so “of course it was deserved” as his pride evident in thinking about the age 
of the sovereign state surfaced and he was forced to explain his self-identified ethnic Romanian-
Moldovan status. By contrast, in Ungheni, civil society representatives were both more polarized 
and equally uncertain.  Talk about origins and divisions remained rather more fresh in their 
minds as a series of denials, hatreds and moments in a stage “where we had to identify as the 
state” and that, “it was good to see that ethnic division in society”(P6).  This variability, with 
ethnicity and territory both invoked to describe ethno-linguistic and national-developmental 
pride and problems was emblematic of the wider participants in general. The inconsistency 
suggests the value of unpacking claims and logic which are ultimately about a rather vague if no 
less dear attachment to geographic notion of home(land) and socio-political attachment to a 
group, i.e. “to be part of an entity.  To have a state, a homeland in which they fall, to speak one 
language and to contribute to the full, to do something for the country to prosper.” (P2).  This 
optimism contrasts sharply with the carefully and coldly framed analysis and is more consistent 
with those in Ungheni and Chisinau in terms of active engagement with the polity though less 
attentive to language.  Ironically, civil society seemed disenchanted despite the word “good” 
standing out in their word cloud (Figure 4.10.5) and “values” receiving consideration attention.  
Finally, in anticipation of the discussion with politicians below it is worth noting that “state” was 
a frame that did not register with this group much at all, suggesting again their informal affective 
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motivations and value orientations, not instrumental attachments to agencies, prevail in their 
view.   
 
(6) Politicians 
Among politicians the consistent theme was the birthing process as well. As evident in 
the word clouds (Figure 4.10.6), the dominant characteristics in this regard appeared as 
authoritative claims about history, iconography, patriotism, and native national consciousness as 
with the teachers.  According to this group, origins were considered in terms of legal, historical, 
and to a lesser degree in comparison with civil society even more romantic expressions of 
collective attachment.  At the same time, as reflections of their sovereign powers as government 
agents the group’s views were accompanied by a firm acceptance of distinctions running 
between Moldovan and Romanian nationalisms.  Not surprisingly, for these agents national 
meanings like those associated with language and citizenship attracted more attention than other 
group but patriotism was less visible as evident in word clouds and interactions (See Appendix 
Figure 4.10.6).  Thus, values were less important than for civil society but appeared in terms 
where kinship matters but sovereignty matters more, even if the justification for such necessities 
has waned, or it is important because “if we are brothers with the Romanians, they had until 
today to help us…Why not know about the rest of Moldova in Romanian history because the 
existence of our state was not discussed” (Stefan Voda P4) as evidence of rupture and revision.  
Like teachers, the attitudinal-legal view of citizenship and accuracy is not fully reconciled.  In 
other words, the question of language, sovereignty, and subjectivity remains disputed.  
As a walk in the capital or even Olanesti suggests, national origins remains contested 
(Photographs 1-10) suggest.   
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Photograph1: “Moldova was not my ancestors’, was not mine, and is not yours, [but] it is for the  
future descendants’ and their successors forever…” outside Olanesti, Stefan Voda (author) 
 
 
Photograph 2:  Unsuccessful trigger image, “Life is too short for a bad job” in Chisinau (author) 
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Photograph 3:  Chisinau political billboard iconography example I, Chisinau, founded 1436  
(author) 
 
 
Photograph 4: Chisinau political billboard iconography example II “Chisinau, my city” (author) 
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Photograph 5: Pan-Romanian graffiti, “December 1918 the Romanian Nation United” downtown 
Chisinau (author) 
 
 
Photograph 6: Pan-Romanian graffiti, “United”, residential Chisinau (author) 
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Photograph 7: Nationalist iconography promoting independence and language day celebrations, 
 downtown Chisinau (author) 
 
 
 
Photograph 8: “Independence day!” billboard with map, downtown Chisinau (author) 
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Photograph 9: “Our Language—Romanian” on Pro-Romanian, anti-Moldovan language graffiti, 
downtown Chisinau (author) 
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Photograph 10:  Patriotic billboard, “Love your language, Love your Country!” downtown  
 Chisinau (author) 
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In Chisinau, representatives from parties currently holding seats in the parliament were 
invited to participate. In their eyes, even representatives of a sovereign state see themselves at 
least partly as Romanian rather than purely Moldovan, as the question is one of “revival” and 
“rebirth” instead of “conception” or conflation of holidays for both the common language and 
the celebration of state sovereignty.    Still, historically this leads indeed to some “very 
interesting combinations” when self-described Romanians stress that “even those who wrote this 
paper were not sure what they were doing, but still moved forward” despite the sovereign 
fictions (P4).  It was seen as “a new beginning, a new construction --about attitude-- and it's the 
first step taken, the language.” Additionally, the debates, taken collectively, were seen 
simultaneously as about “independence” and thus sovereignty (P1) for some and “not about 
independence” but rather just the “day that led to the adoption of the law on language” (P5).  
Even for self-described Romanians it was seen biologically and existentially “like birth pangs” 
accompanying a “desire to be reborn” (P4).  This “rebirth” theme was echoed not only by other 
members, but is consistent with other more nationally-oriented groups like teachers who voiced 
similar notions about “the revival of national consciousness” and being “about the natives, the 
Moldovans.  At that time, there was no case for Romanian” (P3).  In short, politicians remained 
divided on the question of nation versus nationalism.  In Stefan Voda the debate took the form of 
logical appeals like among teachers and migrants, as opposed to pensioners.  In challenging 
Romanian origins and claims, it was clear that disputes were mostly about why Moldova should 
be annexed “if we first appeared before it” (P3) because “with these traditions and language we 
are simply a nation.  We were divided, but were not divided; it was not to be a state (P6).  This 
uncertainty was framed against older necessities but “now such things have become normal” 
(P3) according to participants in Ungheni.  
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D) Conclusion 
In looking at my participants’ contradictory visions of national origins, historically from 
focus group interactions and surveys and comments from participants, it is clear that generational 
and attitudinal vectors have emerged. For example, certain ideas about uncertainty are evident 
where older citizens looked backwards, versus students and civil society who saw a more 
interesting future than a provocative past.  And while some students respected tradition, others 
could not be less interested and mocked them. Still, notions of common cultural traits and 
territorial notions of homeland, as the next sections develop further, were inextricably bound up 
in how these atomization effects were manifest when people connect themselves to the past and 
seek to exercise agency over their future.  In combination with theirs and others’ views, my 
findings suggest Moldovans have continued to identify themselves as such, but the meanings of 
this designation have continued to change from cultural linguistic justifications for existence to 
less certain motivations to legitimate national sovereignty.  So, while the country-frame still 
seems to resonate, precisely what those identifications and subjective self-assessments mean 
remains open rather than exclusively survival or self-expression oriented as some WVS-based 
models have suggested (Inglehart and Welzel 2010).  In tracing these shifts, my approach helps 
contextualize logical and affective drivers motivating changes in factor analysis scores charting 
Moldova’s and other countries’ relative position on a “Cultural Map of the World”.   
  Whether linguistically, psychologically, or historically oriented, the pursuit of the true 
origins and authentic characteristics of the Moldovan nation and its territorial limits remain 
disputed.  In pursuit of maximum archaeological extents and original moments, founding fathers, 
and “pillars of the nation”, the segmentation groups all saw national rebirth, disappointment, and 
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conflicting views over what Moldovan-ness means historically in terms of sovereignty and 
linguistically among my participants.  As expressions and manifestations of national identity 
crises and problems maintaining a façade of sovereign territoriality via appeals to homeland, this 
variability is evidence of a contingent and contradictory series of categorizations and 
experiences. 
To summarize discussions of Moldovan national culture and political ideology across my 
segmentation groups related to homo Moldovanus and stereotypical understandings of it as 
evidence of hegemonic commonsense categorizations, it is safe to say no single ideal type exists.  
Efforts to forge the new mold agree that the project is natural yet instrumental, though they 
disagree about its value as formal and informal awareness-raising tool both domestically and 
abroad.  In considering these exchanges, their logics, and patterns of agreement and 
disagreement it is clear that my method works to complement, i.e. challenge and confirm, studies 
about the “survival/self-expression” tendencies among this population, as well as to color 
findings of these same studies (e.g. QSP, WVS) where “secular-rational values” are indexed 
against more “traditional” ones.  In the next chapter, these ideas of place and attachment to it, in 
the form of participants’ attitudes about “homeland” and displacement in the face of emigration 
will be addressed in terms of internal views and domestic visions of national territory and state 
territoriality.  In this way, the next chapter builds on the previous one’s treatment of the EUBAM 
as a case of formal boundary-making and migration management regimes to help contextualize 
how affective socio-political links are connected to national-territorial frames for regulating 
various groups in Moldova.    
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CHAPTER V   
 
TERRITORY:  HOMELANDS AND BORDERLANDS 
 
Part I: Placing Insecurity 
A) Introduction 
This chapter is about the territorial attachments and associated perceptions, practices, and 
visions that have rendered Moldovan borderlands in their current form.  As expressions of 
classical territorial, national-cultural, and biopolitical-governmental bordering practices they 
suggest how EU bordering practices and territorial sovereignty are understood on the ground in 
neighboring countries.  As keyword and conceptual proxies bound up in territorial attachment 
and individual mobility, the chapter examines the production of both “homeland” as keyword 
and ‘life at the frontier’ as experience.  These considerations are relevant because they show the 
reach of varying bordering practices and how, as externalizing powers, they reflect various forms 
of sovereignty in the ability to regulate exclusion in the EU’s periphery and in a weak state with 
poor enforcement over its sovereign territorial borders.  In unpacking informal visions in terms 
of spatial scales and their instrumental uses, emotional attachments, and informal effects, the 
point is not whether competing formal and stakeholder visions are accurate per se, but rather if 
and how they crystallize in convenient if conventional frames like “country” when seen in clouds 
or counts.   
Empirically, my approach extends the previous chapter’s discussion of the processes and 
frames people use to link themselves and others to place, i.e. homelands and diasporas. It is also 
about power and governance and their territorialization via border and migration management 
schemes where these homelands and their diasporas are seen as unstable spaces and hard to 
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govern subjects, as shown in the discussion of EUBAM as external visionary.  Thus, in distilling 
various territorial visions and variegated sovereignties and affinities, I show how revised 
territorial orders are seen in the eyes of stakeholders, i.e. Moldovans and their managers.  Such 
problems, as I show, can be understood in terms of passport ownership and visa application rates, 
for instance. Thus, I examine the uneven articulation of efforts to incorporate new regimes for 
passports, visas, and checkpoints as experienced by stakeholders informally. In focusing on these 
tools and conceptual frames as used by my participants I aim to unpack overlapping geopolitical, 
national, and biopolitical bordering elements of these visions.  In this way, my analysis works to 
capture various experiences with such regimes as they change over time and across scales.  Thus, 
I seek to show precisely how discourses of ungovernability are translated individually and 
collectively, i.e. how fears, crises, hopes, and opportunities are personally and popularly framed 
in competing narratives of socio-economic (in)security and (in)stability among variously 
privileged borderlanders in my study. In this way, I seek to trace the popular geopolitics 
surrounding border permeability as well as national and biopolitical bordering strategies are 
incorporated on the ground, informally, among stakeholder groups in a borderland.  The results 
also show how re-territorialization works across spatial scales, from the supra-regional and extra-
territorial EU to more localized or individual transnational understandings of crossings and 
crises. In the big picture, it also suggests how the EU is emerging as a geopolitical actor via 
attention to its bordering practices as “external relations”, “neighborhood policy”, and “eastern 
partnerships”.   
As their word clouds suggest (Figures 5.1.1-5.1.6), the politicians talked about the border 
using words like “state”, customs, control, and corruption.  
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Figure 5.1.1: Politicians 
 
Figure 5.1.2: Return Migrants 
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Figure 5.1.3: Teachers 
 
Figure 5.1.4: Students 
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Figure 5.1.5: Pensioners 
 
Figure 5.1.6: Civil Society 
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For the teachers, the language of enclosure and family ties trumped states and countries using a 
language of country, where both formal and informal confining and controlling mechanisms are 
used to affect senses of closure and community, as when teachers found parents and other 
relative s negligent or at least complicity in corrupting their children and spoiling them with the 
ever-distorting power of remittances.  The students were more attuned to visa and passport 
debates, were more even-handed in their use of geographic referents, and for both students and 
teachers, the subtle language of social crisis economic stagnations are also evident in these 
images and subsequent transcript highlights.  For the pensioners, personal as well as political 
attachments appeared visibly but inconclusively, and in this instance, the word cloud does not 
reveal the complications and complaints evident in the transcripts.  Finally, for civil society, 
territorial changes can be seen as much as bridges as they can as borders, suggesting linkages to 
European states are as attractive or worth discussing as Russian and TMR, with problems, in the 
plural sense, debated at length in economic and educational terms.   In their drawn out criticisms 
of corrupt officials and illegitimate border regimes, all these groups acknowledged the economic 
drivers and political complications of territorial fracture and the suffocating effects of exclusion 
as banal but unified feature of life at the frontier.   
 
B) Argument 
In arguing from the word clouds and keyword counts, I seek to show how ideas about a 
sovereign “homeland” are territorialized internally and excluded institutionally.  I argue attention 
to group similarities and differences to how affinities and exclusions are articulated and 
governed suggest the ways EU sovereignty and Moldovan nationality are experienced as 
exclusion and disruption.  Thus, I aim to unpack discussions about place-based forms of 
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attachment and ideas about displacement or emigration as expressions of a core territorial-
emotional kernel.  I argue that, as rough proxies, keyword usage and their referent visions across 
stakeholder groups and among individuals can indicate the construction of national or territorial 
identities via self-categorization.  Because this chapter shows how disconnection from the 
homeland and exclusion is seen primarily in terms of the EU, it starts with the most affected, i.e. 
return migrants.  The word clouds in the previous chapter include this term too as it appeared in 
relevant discussions of identity, but frequency counts and discussions are detailed in this chapter 
instead, as shown below, to outline segmentation group visions on this frame separately.  
To scale up from keywords (Figures 5.1.1-5.1.6) and consider word counts projected via 
word clouds, it is important to consider how “homeland” appears in these kinds of summary 
snapshots.  In looking at the images (Figures 5.2-5.3), a few useful aspects of this method are 
evident.  First, in shifting from my pre-given coding frames like homeland to user-generated 
ones like “home”, the national-territorial implications of this frame of reference can be roughly 
disaggregated from less formal ones.  Indeed, migrants mentioned both “home” and “homeland” 
more than the other groups.  Both home and homeland are visible in each group’s cloud (except 
among civil society as homelands eight appearances were too low to project), and the trend 
where home appeared more often than its counterpart, except among politicians, offers evidence 
of its affective core and thus political utility.  Across other groups, students appeared split in the 
appeal to such affective frames when articulating their formal versus informal understandings.  
As evidence that such variation matters, for the more nationalistic teachers, home still trumped 
homeland as frame of reference in discussions countrywide.  Pensioners, the least interested in 
this frame, found ideas of home rather more worthy of discussion.  Other patterns, such as 
frames like “family” and “children” also suggest the utility of the word clouds for summarizing 
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these discussions about scales and spaces of attachment as personal and informal rather than 
patriotic and overly nationalistic despite higher than average amounts of pride as discussed 
above.         
To show how regulations like passports and visas matter, I ask about such devices 
systematically to show how formal controls are understood and experienced informally.  In 
Figures 5.1.1-5.1.6, segmentation groups display the territorial and geopolitical components of 
focus group discussions including physical barriers, institutional authorities, and competing 
spatial scales from other countries to the village level. In describing patterns evident in these 
images as a bridge between pre-determined keywords I assumed might resonate with others 
driven by participants, I seek to briefly summarize the visual trends before using them to situate 
transcript discussions.  In comparison with the ‘identity’ iterations, these territorial debates 
where much less about “country” and much more about the “border” as political artifact rather 
than a “frontier” as national-cultural barrier. More surprising, perhaps, was the lack of discussion 
about passports and visas, especially given formal uproar and uncertainty around passport 
issuing schemes.  Indeed, only returned migrants and students spoke about passports to any 
degree, but both these groups were more interested in access to a visa rather than a passport per 
se suggesting the crises of security are perhaps formal fears more than popular ones.   
To document the governance challenges such fictions and bordering problems are 
thought to produce, my data in this chapter rely on two sets of word clouds detailing these kinds 
of discussions about home.  The first (Figures 4.10.1-4.10.6), on homeland, are the same as those 
used in the previous chapter because the discussions overlapped conceptually, via triggers and 
script markers, and are related to identification logically in this way too.  The second set, 
(Figures 5.1.1-5.1.6) is new to this chapter and considers transcripts of related discussions and 
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associated triggers and themes about borders and their effects.  In both instances, the word 
clouds appear after the keyword summary illustrations but before the transcript analysis.  In this 
way, multiple perspectives and various illustrations are bridged to paint a more comprehensive 
picture of how my participants understood and articulated experiences about boundaries and 
frontiers.  It is important to note that the two sets do not present segmentation groups in the same 
order because while homeland was most frequently invoked by migrants; politicians 
understandably invoked notions of “borders”, “states”, and “government” most often spoken in 
terms analyzed in part II below14.   
 
C) Homeland 
The Moldovan landscape is marked by competing illustrations of homeland.  Given 
unresolved conflict with TMR too, questions about territory in this context are roundly 
problematic for maintaining the sovereign fiction of the nation-state, but in different ways. Seen 
informally, in keyword counts of how participant talk about spatial attachment they (Figures 5.2-
5.3) show rates of appeal to the emotional-territorial frame “homeland”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 See Figure 5.2 
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Figure 5.2:  Frequency count of select keywords re: ‘frontier life’ 
Keyword Frequency Count Total re: 'Life at the Frontier'
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Figure 5.3:  Segmentation groups by keyword proportion of use Keyword Counts by Segmentation Group As Proportion and Sum Totals re: 'Life at the Frontier'
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As general trends, they indicate a disproportional use by those in Chisinau, especially 
among its migrants, politicians, and teachers are notable.  However, this discrete ordering belies 
the convoluted appeals to homeland as difficult to contain so neatly.  As I show in detail below, 
my argument is that given attention to the exchanges surrounding these counts, both migrants 
and students argued motherland/homeland distinctions were more useful for distinguishing 
national-territorial versus local-informal sentiments of attachment. In contrast, my politicians and 
civil society participants saw the geography in more instrumental-control terms but used spatial 
frames more discretely.  
 
(1) Return Migrants  
Overall, this group felt particularly strongly about home and their homeland and spoke 
about it twice as frequently as other groups as suggested in its word cloud profile. The notion 
appears most usefully for this group when discussing patriotism in terms of individual versus 
collective benefits at the local rather than exclusively or even primarily at the countrywide level 
(P4).  Debates were about affections surrounding the “homeland” (P1, P2, P4) as “the second 
level” or the “country where you live”. In the same breath, though, some conceded awkwardly if 
loyally that it “must be defended” because “family interests must be defended first” before again 
distinguishing between homeland and “motherland” (P2). By his own admission, this man’s 
loyalties were not primarily ethno-national but in his own assessment have remained divided.  
Here, rank-ordering of attachments in terms of kinship primarily (P2), even for a person now 
working in Moldova  --coincidentally, in the government as a bureaucrat-- suggests both 
personal and professional axes of allegiance that are simultaneously affective and local-
traditional as well as survival-oriented.  In this way, his position can be seen a challenge to the 
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two-dimensional and aspatial idea that these tendencies are antagonistic as some WVS-based 
findings assume (Inglehart and Welzel 2010).  
In Chisinau taken separately, all participants accepted Moldova as their “homeland”, but 
noted efforts to unpack what it means pose “a very good question” (P1).  Answers from these 
young men ranged from “country of origin” (P1, P2) to “the bosom of God…[with] natural 
qualities unlike the other countries” (P4), suggesting both detached and naturalized/essentialized 
attempts to categorize difference. Additionally, scale of attachment was reportedly to family first 
even for the migrant who became a government official.  Rather than a purely civic view as a 
technocrat, he claimed to reflect daily and consciously on his Moldovan origins and admitted 
questioning his motives. As he (P2) said, “every day through various methods of expressing 
myself, I remember”.  This “unconscious” (P1) approach is also, according to his challenge to 
P2’s notion of self-expression, about memory, i.e. “remembering” rather than “shooting”, i.e. 
acting impulsively, as it was debated by them.  Indeed, for P2 the motivation to return was 
related to kin, not country, even though his status as an official might have anticipated a more 
civic minded view.  For him, family and old age were instrumental and affective territorial 
drivers to return to a “native place” where “memory is closely related to that place.  Not for 
nothing is it said that the experiences of adolescence are the most powerful, as they sink deeply 
into the conscience”(P2).  Still, psychological connections to these places went beyond 
adolescence and were articulated in categorical terms and the decidedly German language of 
“gasterbeiter” (P1), or “guest worker”, literally implying the same temporary connotation as the 
host government:  
 
P1: Ask any gasterbeiter. His goal is to return to Moldova, no matter how old, he'll work in Italy, 
in Russia, and he made plans for more than 10 or 20 years to return to Moldova. I have not found 
anyone willing to remain in Russia, France – it is a source of income. 
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Facilitator: Temporarily? 
 
P1: Exactly. 
 
Reflecting on the variety of ways participants linked memory and reality on the question of 
return, P2 registered his agreement in qualified terms, noting “It is correct, but on a case-by-case 
basis, we cannot generalize as I said, and I cannot generalize any way.” But in challenging this 
view and seeking to refine it, P3 appealed to generational schisms rather than ethno-national 
ones.  As he said, “The answer is from the point of view of a man who has gone away now for 10 
years --he is 50 years old and all his family is here-- but in our case, some youngsters go… 
In Stefan Voda, ideas of homeland as “more than patriotism” were also debated.  Here, 
they were separated between sacred approaches (P5) and recent changes. These manifestations 
were ambiguously framed in terms of “citizenship” and “land” (P5) alongside more abstract 
ideas of “home” (P1). Nevertheless, explicit views of this space as a site of ‘restful sleep’ (P5) 
that changes over time, across generations, and in spite of her emigration to Italy for 7 years also 
emerged in the face of a different time-scale, i.e. an “accelerated” life.  Others also tried the 
rank-ordering approach, like those in Chisinau, and privileged local-level attachments primarily 
(P3) over the country, “which is the second level” of affinity.  Finally, even among those abroad 
only briefly, agreement on this topic was strong, with (P2) noting: “I was not abroad for a long 
time, only a year in Russia. There were many different people, but I have not met our 
Moldovans…I agree with others that there is nowhere better than home. Your name is always a 
longing for home.”  Here, affect and ambiguity work alongside competing spatial and temporal 
units.  In Ungheni, homeland and patriotism were also intertwined in emotional (“My mother 
country is where I feel good”, P3) and historical-geographic analogies.  Instead of Russia, Italy 
and Romania appeared (P1) via terms invoking their historical existential and irredentist crises 
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(P2, P3), talk about Moldova’s small size (P1), constitutional sovereignty (P2), and the absence 
of stability and security (P4).  Uncertainty in definitions of homeland and patriotism were also 
debated, as in the other groups, and suggest a monolithic or homogenous notion of territorial 
attachment remains convoluted and contradictory in ways recalling debates about homo 
Moldovanus.  Given their experience, it is worth noting their uncertainty about “whether or not 
Moldova has the right to exist as a state”, which sees the problem as a pragmatic one of border 
delimitation legacies and present dilemmas where “we are now a small country…we are lower 
than the level we used to be but that does not mean we should not exist as an independent state” 
(P3).  Alternatively, discourses of crises were articulated as “we cannot exist” (P2) via reasoning 
that regardless of talk about politics, demography cannot be ignored, i.e. “Guys, remember half 
the population is abroad”.  
 
(2) Pensioners 
Overall, this group has pride in their attachment to their homeland despite articulating it 
as a keyword less frequently --but not necessarily less forcefully-- than any other group. For 
them, the concept is articulated in terms of birthright and anti-Romanian sentiments historically, 
and widespread emigration and family separation geographically.  Moreover, only two 
participants in this group admitted in surveys that they had been sporadically or seasonally 
looking for work since 1998, perhaps indicating an attachment to the domestic territory 
unmatched by migrants.  There was minimal geographic variation in attitudes across or within 
this group on this topic.  In Chisinau, not quite the least affected, interwar memories of hunger 
involving outsiders, i.e. Romanians, seeking to trade priests for maize were the source of bitter 
memories and selective amnesia evident in xenophobic epithets articulated passionately using 
Russian slang: 
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P5:  I would not want to go to Romania because they are oppressed --of low quality. My mother 
suffered greatly because of them. She was also beaten, and…I do not want to remember. 
 
P4: I do not appreciate Romanians because we consider them to be a lower level. 
 
P1: :)(& 3. (Third quality, i.e. low quality) 
 
In general, group discussions confirmed Moldova is the preferred homeland, especially if 
Romania is the alternative option suggesting an exclusive territorial notion. All participants in 
this group expressed pride as an extension of birthright, history, sacrifice, suffering, and 
superiority in the face of hardship and family experiences with war and earlier rounds of 
displacement.  Paradoxically, connections to an imagined past still invoked joint Romanian-
Moldovan hero Stephen the Great and his obedience to his motherland and his mother: 
 
P3: Stefan cel Mare fought for this little country. When he returned home his mother asked, 
"Have you overcome the Turks?" He said no, and his mother told him to return and to overcome 
them, to fight to the end. We love it. 
 
Likewise, the meeting in Stefan Voda also concentrated on family ties, but more in the sense of 
all the participants had family abroad, generational splits between where grandparents want to 
die and where the grandchildren are raised, and the usual suspects of “the house, the spring, the 
woods, the forest –this native home” (P4). For them, the discussion was about displacement 
experienced as  “homesickness” (P3), echoing the true sense of nostalgia and capturing the 
“patriotic spirit” (P2). In similar way, members in Stefan Voda were emphatic in their patriotic 
self-expressions where, despite receiving remittances and acknowledging their value, “To go 
abroad is not a way out…I get something from this—but it is not a way out” (P1).  
 
(3) Teachers 
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Teachers did not mention “homeland” so often, though notions of “home” were discussed 
in the context of migration, as will be shown in Part II below.  While the Stefan Voda teachers 
spoke about this notion, those in Ungheni did not, preferring home in a more domestic than 
political sense.  In general, teachers were more interested in notions of homeland than pensioners 
but less interested than return migrants.  However, Chisinau’s teachers were the second most 
affected group in this regard across all groups, while the professional class as a whole ranked 
fourth out of six groups in this regard, given that Ungheni’s teachers did not mention this notion 
at all.  
In Chisinau, teachers independently drew on national history and Christianity, though 
they debated the contents at length suggesting that the ‘bandwagon effect’ is not simply a 
function of ‘follow the talkative participant’. Their self-evident style (e.g. “Everyone knows it is 
the homeland” (P2)) was linked explicitly and historically to “language and territory” (P3).  In 
this way, participants showed how the historical construction of the homeland remains contested 
territorially and morally via appeals to formal authority.  For P4, “I had high thoughts of joining 
our mother country. I mean, I was in the midst of these [protest] actions [to promote the 
Romanian language in the Latin script]...And my country is not only Moldova, but also 
Wallachia.”  This vision is in accord with P2 who notes “Everyone knows that [i.e. Wallachia in 
Romania] is the homeland…For most, Moldova is not their homeland… I think no child should 
accept what is written in the street (i.e. graffiti) with reference to his homeland. The homeland’s 
meaning is from other sources, not from inscriptions on the street.” (See Appendix, Images 6-9, 
11)  For background, it is worth noting that the hallway in the school where this focus group was 
held contained a long corridor of historical maps and their change over time as evidence of how 
their proper appeals to authority were envisioned.  
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In Stefan Voda, professional experiences as historians and personal experiences as 
parents drove conceptions of homeland and country-scale allegiance. For the historian in Stefan 
Voda, the situation was less clear and his statements suggested a more nuanced approach:   
    
P1: I have some mixed feelings. As a historian by profession, I do not accept that Moldova and 
beyond, and Moldova is here, and that 650 years, I still do not agree. What keeps the state 
language is Romanian, true. I just do not want to leave my homeland again…to avoid ethnic 
conflicts, we should not put emphasis on placing the Romanians back in history. From the 
historical point of view, we should do this, but politically, I feel that now is not the time. 15 
 
These feelings were not monolithic, but like those in Chisinau they appealed to less uncertain 
authority and memory.  For one woman, seeing her daughter return from Romania was a source 
of pride and joy (P4) though life in the country might be “bad” and “difficult”.  Later in the 
discussion, she spoke in explicitly patriotic and gendered terms of birthright-based allegiance 
and the need to have both daughters, “but more sons.  They are those who continue the race” 
suggesting primordialist views remain somewhat popular.  
 
(4) Students 
Students ranked third in overall frequency of use of the term “homeland”.  Like teachers 
and pensioners, their usage was rather uneven geographically, where those in Ungheni found it 
more salient than any other group from that town while, conversely, those in Chisinau bucked 
the trend spatially.  In the capital the frame was almost completely ignored in their discussions of 
domestic life and territorial attachments.  Unlike teachers in my study, language did not equal 
nation or territory coincident with homeland, per se.  For those in Chisinau, “motherland” was a 
better moniker than “homeland” for reasons explained below.  In Stefan Voda, students agreed 
Moldova was the homeland but were divided as to whether it is also part of Romania.  For those 
                                                
15 In 2012 “The Romanians and World History” was formally reinstated at the prodding of 
experts like Handrabura, former IPP analyst and active today as Deputy Minister of Education 
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in Ungheni, the question was about birthrights, experiences, and the privilege of ownership, in 
short. For those in Chisinau, including a woman who lives in TMR but studies in Chisinau and 
speaks Romanian, Moldova is not her homeland and she disputed the entire notion.  Recounting 
a family trip to Chisinau and a discussion with her mom about patriotic billboards, she responded 
clearly: 
 
P1:  For us there is the motherland. There is no homeland, so...My town is my country. I feel at 
home there although I learned Romanian… 
 
In response, P5 also drew on maternal symbols and emotive phrasing when agreeing that the 
motherland metaphor is powerful, but in different ways.  For her:  
 
P5:  It's just writing…Homeland is in my heart. Do you remember that you are Moldovan? 
Moldova is like a mother that raises her children and sends them abroad…Yes, those children 
grew up, went to foreign countries and brought mother money. 
 
Those students in Stefan Voda, by contrast, were in general agreement in comparison to their 
comrades in the capital.  They articulated attachments in terms of memory and dual membership 
when noting “all memories start here” (P4). Others, when asked to explain “homeland” further, 
talked in terms of the location “where my roots are” (P5), yet the village was not explicitly 
attached to homeland as others like return migrants have suggested.  Instead, “Moldova is a 
corner of paradise” (P3) or even “…Like a stage from which we proceed towards a decent 
future” (P4) in a phrase echoing a widely distributed billboard visible throughout the capital.  
Ungheni students also agreed with their comrades living along the Ukrainian border that 
Moldova is also their homeland (P1, P2, P3). Still, questions of scale and divided allegiances 
were expressly evident in placing affinities in territory.  For P2, like the TMR resident above, 
“My homeland is my country and my native city.  Moldova is very important to me.  No matter 
how beautiful another town might be, I would come back here anyway.  It’s my life”, suggesting 
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a less-than-discrete scalar hierarchy in terms of logic but also an inevitable or inherent 
attachment to this space in terms of concomitant allegiance.  
 
(5) Civil Society 
Civil Society in general ranked next to last in frequency of use of “homeland”.  Those in 
Stefan Voda ostensibly found it most compelling while, counter to the geographic trends in 
Chisinau, those non-state actors were the least interested in this segmentation group.  In Stefan 
Voda, the older generation was invested in both pragmatic and patriotic visions.  These 
competing frames seem organized around both birthright attachments and “beating hearts” (P3) 
and affections built over 50 years of labor in their home village and alongside the less affective 
“region where you live”.  They were balanced against a less explicitly contiguous territorial 
vision where patriots and those who must make money abroad, i.e. “escape” (P4), were seen as 
agents to blame for defining a new notion of homeland.  In Ungheni, overall, birthrights and 
“beating hearts” were also invoked alongside explicit attention to spiritual and material binaries 
used to explain what home ‘feels like’.  Despite its capital status, in Chisinau patriotism was seen 
as explicitly geographic and billboards echoing this sentiment were dismissed as propaganda and 
did not spark a discussion of “homeland” per se. Participants found neither the term nor the 
territorial notion worth discussing, e.g.: “I once asked young people, is this their homeland? 
They responded that it is generally the place where they were born, but at the moment it is where 
they can make money”(P2).  This flexibility is notable, especially in comparison with other 
groups, as even pensioners and teachers who did not mention the term discussed the idea in some 
form of connection to place.   
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In Stefan Voda, the generational differences and spectrum of survivalist-expressionist 
sentiments were on display, as were accidental curatorial ones like the woman (P1) who 
organized a village historical society and photo collection.  This situation suggests that, on the 
one hand, participants had clearly found this subject worth investigating themselves, which itself 
suggests the frame is salient. For those along the Moldo-Romanian frontier, attachment meant: 
“…to be part of an entity.  To have a state, a homeland in which they fall, to speak one language 
and to contribute…to prosper”(P2). Others were more guarded and did not articulate this feeling 
in the same way and suggested a different spatial mismatch, i.e. “”to me it is a very personal 
thing”, hesitating to express that she saw “my nation and religion as more intimate 
stuff...everyone in the world has an identity…nations that are small will feel ignored.  And I 
think that from these moments there are many conflicts and misunderstandings between people” 
(P1).   
 
(6) Politicians 
Politicians were the second-most frequent users of the “homeland” keyword in my study. 
In terms of contents and justifications, like other groups they discussed cases of patriotism, 
spiritual/material binaries, and negotiations about what ‘home feels like’, in addition to appeals 
to kinship and village level attachments that were also evident.  Given their explicitly political 
orientation, it was not surprising these particular segmentation group members, i.e. politicians, 
were equally outspoken and sophisticated in their approach to the territorial symbol of the 
divided government. As with the other groups, homeland provided a rich source of insights into 
how even formal agents forge affective connections via distorted communicative strategies.  In 
the border regions, politicians were less expressive in regards to this topic, where they both 
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invoked notions of family and village-level priorities in the same kind of attempt to rank-order 
membership. 
In Chisinau, the terms were seen as implicating both positive and negative aspirations and 
effects.  For example, “For me my country means more than the homeland. I hate the word as it 
sounds” (P6).  Thus, both the word and the spirit of it were directly challenged as a source of 
comfort and, simultaneously, as an “incurable disease”, “…regardless of the fact that many 
would try to distort it, change it anyway to make the correct selection”(P2).  As a term 
“confiscated by the Communist Party” it is seen also as source of pride and shame, individually 
and externally among institutional actors but it is also “where you feel good” (P5). In similarly 
concrete yet equally ambiguous way, another politician appealed to definitions and common 
cultural elements including food, wine, and drinking alongside behavioral-emotional affects such 
as “gesture, aspiration”, ultimately concluding “the Moldovans are not patriots, in my view”.  In 
this sense, the contradictions among others seeking to show pride or attachment to another 
country took on a sharper, more personal edge when P2 paraphrased former Prime Minister 
Tarlev’s claim that “foreign citizenship is for you if you’re not patriotic” and P1 responded that 
he agreed, snidely reminding fellow participants that Tarlev holds Bulgarian citizenship. 
Along both the eastern and western frontiers, i.e. in Stefan Voda and Ungheni, the idea of 
homeland was less contentious within the segmentation group.  There, kinship and village-level 
attachments were expressed more visibly than in the capital. Politicians in both sites spoke in 
terms of “nation” and, “house” and “home” in more direct ways than those in Chisinau 
suggesting national rather than emotional attachments predominate, as reasonably expected.  In 
Stefan Voda, an inclusive devotion to people, young and old (P2, P6), and digging trees and 
family life (P2, P3, P6) was seen as a mere extension of traditional values.   
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Part II:  ‘Life at the Frontier’ 
A) Survey Responses by Individual Participants and Segmentation Group 
To complement keyword counts and word cloud diagrams, in this section I review individual and 
household-level border crossing practices and perceptions using survey and discussion data as 
evidence of the power to exclude via bordering.  The segmentation groups are presented in rough 
order of appeal to the key frame in this analysis, i.e. the “border” as an object of rule.  In this 
way, I show how perceptions of bordering practices and risk management are seen by 
Moldovans variously affected by them as evidence of the central government and EU 
sovereignty measured in the ability to regulate territory.  As evidence of changing management 
schemes (Figures 5.3-5.10), my findings suggest that while many see the situation as unchanged, 
just as many others see some kind of shift, for better or worse depending on their social or 
political position.   
Figure 5.4:  Participant attitudes to ‘frontier life’, 1989 vs. 2007 
Participant Attitudes toward 'Life at the Frontier', 1989 vs. 2007
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Figure 5.5:  Frequency of participant interaction with border agent in last year 
How frequently participants have interacted with border agent during last year:  Total Responses
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Figure 5.6: Frequency of participant work-related border crossings How often do you cross a border for work-related purposes: Participant totals
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Figure 5.7: Frequency and proportion of keyword “border” by group and location Frequency and Proportion of Keyword "Border(s)" by Segmentation Group and Location
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Figure 5.8: Rate of self-reported border crossings by group Self-Reported Border Crossing Rates by Segmentation Group
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Figure 5.9: Frequency of self-reported border crossings by participant residence… 
Frequency of Self-Reported Border Crossing Frequency by Participant Location
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Figure 5.10: Frequency of border crossing used by type, participant total Most frequent border crossing type used by participants:  Sum Total
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Restrictions, as evidence of sovereignty, remain pervasive and show the continuing relevance of 
state borders to affect how citizens understand themselves.  Still, taken individually, the most 
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frequent response of my participants to border crossing frequency questions was “never”.  The 
tables in Figure 5.4-5.5 suggest interactions with border agents are rare among my participants.  
In analyzing figures showing participants’ self-reported crossing rate by overall 
frequency (Figure 5.5), evidence of work-related crossings is provided.  Here, it is immediately 
clear how infrequently, if ever, my participants leave their territory for work.  Again, this table is 
consistent with the above data showing how infrequently my participants reportedly interacted 
with agents directly at the border, rather than a more general and/or informal experience with a 
border agent in a more social, community-oriented setting instead of during a check or crossing  
Seen at the segmentation scale rather than as reports of individual practices (Figure 5.6-
5.7), other patterns emerge.  Those in closest proximity to the border indeed tended to discuss it, 
explicitly, most frequently even if they crossed it less frequently.  Thus, seen in group-scale 
crossing rates by geography, a clearer picture emerges where proximity is shown to be 
disconnected from mobility as a sign of effective bordering practices by state and EU actors.  
Still, pensioners and teachers, like students, stand out for their infrequent crossings but for 
obvious reasons.  Separately, but more revealingly, for migrants infrequent crossings can be read 
as a function of controls and other costs related to frequent returns to their particularly beloved 
homeland, as seen in their visions of an abstract place of refuge.  Politicians, despite their 
domestic mandates, appeared perhaps surprisingly more well traveled compared to my other 
potentially most-mobile groups.  In Figure 5.7, three patterns are suggested.  First, this relative 
immobility of those ‘left behind’ seems to remain a function of their status as pensioners.  
Second, teachers are inherently limited in their ability to take students abroad as part of their 
work so their situation is also a logical artifact evident in the data.  Third, participants from 
border towns Ungheni and Stefan Voda reported the highest proportions of those who responded 
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that they never cross borders and that they can see but not necessarily easily communicate across 
given TMR radio-jamming efforts that target news broadcasts on the public airwaves from 
Chisinau.  As a whole, the role of boundaries and incentives for those who cross them suggest 
the relationship between proximity to a checkpoint does not determine mobility.   
As the residue of EU-sponsored training regimes that include study tours and 
harmonization, domestic authorities appeared more mobile than civil society, for instance, which 
were also often externally oriented in practice despite domestic programmatic demands. When 
considered in terms of crossing rates by geographic location, i.e. to see if and how those who live 
near a border are more or less active as a result of proximity, those in the borderlands registered 
the most “never” responses, and those in Chisinau were more evenly distributed in terms of their 
external travel schedules.  Still, the fact that any return migrant could respond in this way, i.e. 
“never”, let alone two of them, suggests this measure might not be a reasonable representation in 
this case given this blatant contradiction in terms and many non-answers.  When looking at the 
geography of checkpoint types (Figure 5.8), it is important to recall the variety of crossing types 
detailed in chapter two and how participants see them varying across space (Figure 5.9) to show 
how those at the edges appear more isolated than those in the capital. Given the logic of EU 
extraterritoriality in chapter three, or what others and I have labeled “remote control”, 
international airports must also be considered as crossing points and thus their value emerges.   
Likewise, as data on border types (Figures 5.8, 5.10) suggest, various kinds of crossings 
and controls exist to govern mobility (See Maps 3-5).  Moreover, while travelers informing my 
research also used airports, participants typically crossed at border where only local Moldovans 
and their immediate neighbors may pass, rather than points where all nationals or international 
traffic are permitted to cross. Like the regimes and authorities administering them, borderland 
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residents also reported using networked knowledge and multi-scalar tactics.  For them, 
perceptions and practices are about legal and territorial controls to govern resource circulation 
and codification using techniques like visas.  In these ways, various citizens and authorities 
produce and reorganize risks to manage mobility across spatial scales and social groups to 
reconfigure controls.  As collective action in pursuit of stability, individuals within wider 
households offer perhaps a better window into how borderlanders and migrants understand daily 
life and navigate its challenges than isolated visions in this context.   
As suggested in Figures 5.11-5.12, when my participants are mobile they encounter a 
variety of checkpoint and crossing types.   
Figure 5.11 Self-reported passport ownership by segmentation group Self-Reported Passport Ownership by Segmentation Group
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Figure 5.12 Self-reported passport ownership by type and participant residence Self-Reported Passport Ownership by Type and Participant Location
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Figure 5.13 Self-reported remittance access via household member, participant total Self-Reported Remittance Access via Household Member
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Moreover, despite formal alarm about the crises of nationality surrounding passport issuing and 
the backdoor to Europe problem outlined above, few participants acknowledged holding multiple 
passports (Figure 5.12), perhaps indicative of their immobility.  However, during preliminary 
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observations along the neighborhood roads near the checkpoints I encountered citizen who held 
Romanian passports but had never used them.  Such anecdotal evidence is consistent with my 
figures showing passport ownership by location seemed insignificant in terms of territorial 
affect. Aggregated at the household scale as in Figure 5.13, few participants individually 
admitted receiving money from abroad, though many did. These patterns show this metric 
reveals a less disconnected, if more mobile view of those in the country and available to 
participate in my groups. Indeed, more people responded ‘rarely’ instead of ‘never’, with Stefan 
Voda remaining the most isolated in this regard for potential remittance earnings or other 
benefits.  
 
B) Keyword Counts 
At first glance (Figure 5.1-5.3), borders and states understandably dominated group 
discussions.  The words “border” and “money” jump out at once in the word cloud (Figure 5.1.1-
5.1.6).  At second glance, attitudes about life at the frontier remain ambiguous seen in the 
medium and short term, i.e. since 1989 and 2007, respectively (Figure 5.4).  Put another way, 
since most participants in my study see life as unchanged in spite of massive securitization and 
outmigration drives, the informal effects of EU shifts on local residents seem to have left them 
excluded but rather unmoved.  In light of the above description of homeland as identity-territory 
nexus, in this section I consider other frames in terms of boundary-making practices to 
understand how such exclusion can have economic and social, rather exclusively instrumental 
effects.  Upon further review, the internal narratives and participants’ attitudes about change 
reflect a complicated picture.  To understand it better, I consider bordering processes using my 
participants’ survey responses about their frequency and type of crossing, individual attitudes, 
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household practices, and visa regime/passport experience. Using keyword and context analysis 
alongside visualization tools and close readings of interactions, an overall picture of competing 
understandings and practices evident among those who live along and seek to control the frontier 
emerges.  Seen in terms of academic border studies, the picture captures a particularly 
ambiguous biopolitical, national, and geopolitical border regime, inside and out. Participants’ 
attitudes of life at the frontier today suggests interesting findings when comparing their views of 
early independence controls with more Europeanized ones.   
The data for Figure 5.4 correspond to key moments in Moldovan state formation and EU 
external regulation.  The dates 1989 and 2007 are proxies for the collapse of Soviet-era controls 
in the first date, and the introduction of EU-mandated ones along the Prut prior to Romania’s EU 
accession in the second.  Seen another way, these dates reference popular memories of when 
towns like Ungheni were labeled zona frontiera, or “[restricted] frontier area”. Though given the 
double meaning of “zona” as “area” in Romanian and “prison” in Russian, bi-lingual Moldovans 
can appreciate a variety of labels in this sense.  Likewise, 2007 marks a new rule set, i.e. the 
introduction of expensive visas and enhanced passport controls for Moldovans seeking to enter 
Romanian, and thus EU territory, via a different geographic vision, i.e. one where “checkpoints” 
as “crossing points” versus the zonal, i.e. less discrete frontier model. Understandably, bigger 
changes appear over a longer timeframe and so people reported seeing fewer changes following 
from more recent changes, but a slightly larger portion reported thinking that the new regime is 
making life worse to some degree.  The fact that older, defensive territorial regimes from before 
independence are still seen favorably by some today, i.e. that any participants felt Soviet-era 
controls made life better than EU-led ones today suggests nostalgia for a different kind of order.   
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From the perspective of my participants, the outcomes of Europeanization, i.e. EU border 
policies, are thus seen rather unfavorably despite limited first-hand experience.  As expressions 
of how informal notions of exclusion are learned then, this case suggests the power of remote 
controls to restrict outsiders and discourage cross-border exchanges.  Though based on limited 
experiences, the bases of such views should not be ignored given various indicators collected in 
my research.  On the other hand, the data should not be overemphasized given the small changes 
over time or by site and limited sample sizes (Figures 5.3-5.13).  Indeed, the majority of 
participants’ knowledge was based on rare or nonexistent first-hand experiences with those 
tasked with governing the frontier (Figures 5.5-5.9).  This situation where opinions based on 
conjecture matter but are not always based in individual practice and thus exist as networked, 
transnational knowledge production and collective perceptions suggested another way the 
discursive production of new regimes have unfolded, i.e. indirectly rather than immediately via 
direct interactions among local residents (Figure 5.4).  
 
C) Group Discussions of Life at the Frontier I:  Remittances  
In this section I show how discourses of uneven national economic development and 
exclusion from EU markets are received among my participants.  As proxies of the need to make 
a living elsewhere, i.e. as expressions of neoliberal subjectivity as well as transnational mobility 
and national decay, the following segmentation group breakdowns show how displacement is 
understood in the eyes of my stakeholders.  As notions of economic disorder or evidence of the 
triumph of market rationality, the different national and individual oriented visions of 
participants are shown to offer evidence of the actual risks they see themselves facing as citizens.   
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(1) Politicians 
As the word cloud snapshot of their group suggests (Figure 5.1.1), “customs” is smaller 
than “go” and “went”, suggesting the nature of discussions involved discussions of a fluid 
situation characterized by the “border” itself as main object of reference.  Politicians see 
problems explicitly in terms of “depopulation” of the nation and weak policy responses around 
remittances by previous governments. In diplomatic fashion, most did not blame commerce or 
the Communists, and some expressed nostalgia for coupons rather than cash (Chisinau P1) while 
emotional concerns were expressed as joy, pride, and sadness associated with imperial rule, i.e. 
Soviet legacies (Chisinau P3).  For example, in Chisinau P3 reported his: 
 
…[S]adness based on the fact that one million of the population is abroad and growing a 
consumer economy. We do not produce anything…We are a Third World country. On the other 
hand, I read some reports of the UN, IMF, saying that in 2050, Moldova will be de-populated by 
a million citizens…I wonder to myself where is Moldova. I want to be part of the empire or 
Europe…where there is a feeling of strength. 
 
More ambiguously, politicians were both grateful for and yet threatened by both the notorious 
(Chisinau P6) aspects of remittances in the country.  For those in the capital, remittances 
suggested the triumph of a market economy, whereas in Ungheni and Stefan Voda uneven 
experiences with capitalism and multi-scalar conflicts between town and village were debated 
more clearly.  Generally, this group debated about policy, both developmental and demographic, 
in ways that acknowledged its loss of control over its population.  The perceived costs and 
benefits were evident when migrants observed how many citizens left so “their families and 
Moldova were saved from disaster...” (P5), though this contribution was also then targeted as the 
source of market-related failures. As an expression of neoliberal subjectivity rather than post-
colonial nostalgia, others appealed to individual motivations rather than demographic destiny or 
imperial stability.  As pragmatic rather than political exercises, some of their explanations that 
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the migrant perspective sees that their behavior is normal, and appeared as questions like “what 
country does not count itself a recipient of money from abroad?” (P6).  
Disputing that view in embodied and emotional tones, others argued the money “hurts 
us” (Stefan Voda P4).  At the same time, neighboring supporters (P2) suggested the inflows raise 
the standard of living in the village based on her experience.  In such debates, households with 
access were perceived to have better resources for children but oddly claimed that this money 
“does not affect the economy of our village.  Family, yes [it affect them], but those [of us] who 
work in the government know the welfare budget, and it is not increasing like the transfer of 
money”(P5).   Continuing the critique of the uneven economic outcomes associated with access 
to remittances and the village and household scale, P5 argued with support from P1 that “money 
does not really do good for the republic at the village level…because the families, children are 
left without a father, mother or without both parents. And when money is finally sent, it is only 
for food and clothing. In our village there is not a sociological study of how much money did 
come from abroad...If we live near the border all that money goes to Ukraine, as the Ukrainian 
economy is the new stimulus…“.  And though P1 agreed about consumption and the problem of 
controlling capital flows, he still reasoned that “money coming into the country has never 
confused a country”.  Staying on the subject of circulation and its regulation, in reply, P2 
responded that “there is another side, freedom of movement”, and since “we are a democratic 
state” we cannot “forbid her to go somewhere to find a better place to live or work” suggesting 
that citizenship and territory are fundamentally linked in politicians’ views of remittances.   
As with neoliberal rhetoric more broadly, the role of remittances was also seen in terms 
of its existence and the differences between myth and reality, especially in Ungheni.  It was also 
seen in geographic terms of uneven development and “discrimination” in life “between town and 
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village” (P3).  Thus, politicians from outside the capital tended to take a favorable if skeptical 
(P1) view, where Chisinau appeared as a world away causing people to return from the capital 
“with a broken heart, with pain. You are at the heart of Chisinau and you think you are in Berlin. 
German cars and…How do they make money, how can they afford to buy 40 cars, [each worth] 
50,000 euros?”  While this spatial differentiation is seen as helping individuals, the transfers 
were seen to escape government coffers.  The new flows were seen as a challenge to budgets 
where 70% of revenues were held to come via customs fees, such that “We exist, but we do not 
live. It is a very miserable situation” (P2).  
 
(2) Return Migrants 
In Figure 5.1.2, the return migrant word cloud suggests “money” and the “border” are the 
main objects of concerns, with children a close second.  For obvious reasons, migrants offered 
particularly revealing insights into the role of cash transfers.  These insights involved narratives 
of adultery, competition, fairness, gratitude, assistance, misery, and poverty that emerged in self-
aware ways. In terms of agency and argumentation, reasoning was articulated in ways that 
invoked personal experiences rather than abstract political problems as with politicians.  Also in 
contrast to politicians, remittances were seen as source of state income rather than untapped 
inflows, which is why they still flow at all in the mind of a cynical returnee (P2 Stefan Voda). 
Spatially, there was little variation across sites, as opposed to politicians, for instance.  Others 
disputed fairness doctrines via personal experience and historical analogy.  For one man, who 
proclaimed to “have a very personal view about remittances”, it was important to “believe that 
money transfers from abroad create unfair competition, here in Moldova, to us, who are in the 
Republic of Moldova, as we have a salary and there are certain individuals who receive transfers 
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from abroad. Accordingly, their access to certain goods, like apartments, is more accessible…My 
personal observation is that it creates unfair competition via the transfers of money...”(Chisinau 
P1).  In a perceptive move challenging this logic, another participant effectively accused his 
fellow participant of relying on Soviet logic and socialist doctrine given his concern for placing 
“social equity at a higher level” rather than embracing a winner-take-all mentality (P2).  But, he 
goes on, capitalism is equitable too because in his understanding of meritocracy, [switching to 
Russian] “The one who works, is the one who eats and it is true --it is so.”  This sort of 
antagonism about how participants seek to negotiate the transition to self-discipline and bring 
their sense of self-identification in line with transnational capital suggests that these antagonisms 
are calcifying on top of socialist-era structures rather than in a vacuum or on a blank slate.   
At other times, a more considerate, less confrontational approach emerged instead of a 
‘pull yourself up by the bootstraps’ model.  Such rationales were evident during the following 
exchanges in Stefan Voda where gratitude and respect set the tone, e.g. “Thanks to these 
people…to help those who are left.  Those who send money, they know where to go…Bravo and 
thanks to them for taking care of the country”(P3) emerged via “I think” and “I know” appeals to 
authority.  Such logic and its evidence were reinforced when others chimed in supporting the 
claims of a woman who had been abroad 2000-2004 and recounted two notable observations, 
including “That’s the figure that I sent myself, along with others…” showing how people 
oriented themselves to visual abstractions like maps or charts, rather than passively receiving 
information in my study.  The comment also suggests family ties work to extend transnational 
networks established over time.  Such knowledge and willingness to sacrifice are seen as a 
treasure rather than the apex of crisis.  In addition, her memories of returning home, again 
framed in terms of family and landscape, suggest discourses of nostalgia, despite its wasteland 
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qualities. Such visions also explicitly acknowledged the variability of the situation as an 
extension of their role in shaping it, i.e. producing the spaces and subjects of interest to my 
project.  As P5 recalled her first trip home after arriving in Chisinau, she noted:  
 
I forget all about the dirtiness, there were potholes in the streets, and there were not even 
sidewalks here in Stefan Voda --weeds grew in the center. It seemed you had arrived in the 
desert. Everything was let go [i.e. untidy]. And I said to myself during all this: ‘Quick, go back to 
Italy because I'm tired of this mess.’ But my son said [in Russian]: ‘Mom, here is your home, 
your motherland.’…but I'm tired of misery…For four years I got used to luxury, not a lot of 
luxury, but compared with Moldova it was great… Then for half a year I came home. I noticed 
some changes...I believe that this curve is talking about those changes. Because the money has 
changed the appearance of Moldova and our life has changed. If you invest money in Moldova, 
then they are going to return. The curve also shows that not all have left. 
 
Such visions of agency and change suggest both survival and expressive orientations to 
homeland were viewed through traditional family-oriented values.  They also expressed 
calculated forms of neoliberal rationalities, from inflation to investment. Such discourses of 
poverty and survival were noted by other women with experience working in Italy and again 
invoked via a mix of Romanian and Russian, suggesting not all Russian-language preferring 
migrants go to the federation, but that they use their Romanian language skills to gain Italian 
ones. As another mother who left discussed the costs and common experiences of her 
compatriots, she (P2) noted:  
 
(In Russian) …There is such poverty here.  I do not know how to survive.  I have two children; I 
went to work in Italy...Another woman found my husband and now we are divorced.  It was hard.  
But I earned my money and maintained my family. All that I’ve earned, the money, I’ve sent 
home.  My husband left us…I do not understand what to do…except to go abroad to live again in 
order to earn money.  But I do not have a person to leave my children with.  This is what stays in 
Moldova. 
 
In these above interludes, expressions, and manifestations of how remittances were 
viewed by those who have generated these transfers and remain affected by their flow are shown 
to move through both emotional-expressive and survivalist-rationalist frames simultaneously, 
perhaps suggesting a more complicated understanding of subjectivity than the binary scheme of 
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WVS (Inglehart and Welzel 2010) that holds survival in tension against self-expression and 
secular rationality versus traditional values shows that instead, such values might not be 
polarizing so unpacking how they can converge instead is worthwhile too.   
 
(3) Teachers 
As evident in their word cloud summary (Figure 5.1.3), children and parents, brothers 
and daughters, as social frames, but not visas or the “state”.  The disjuncture appears in the 
frequency of appeals to political controls like those involving the border and customs agents and 
suggests where they see the most acute crises, i.e. as one of domestic problems.  Teachers, 
despite being state agents formally and rather nationalistic as a group according to my surveys of 
them individually, expressed ideas about life at the frontier in terms more like the return migrants 
rather than more than the politicians, who spoke in terms of personal experiences with the social 
outcomes of economic out-migration using ideas of survival, misery, and complexity. These 
views were layered on top of attempts to reconcile past and present, in this case by blaming 
population density in Moldova as the source of unemployment.  Best summarizing the group 
overall, a reflection by a teacher in Chisinau, stated “I know many families were shattered…I 
really think that our nation is affected” (P4).  The more nuanced opinions about the ‘good and 
bad’ effects of out-migration were tragic and crisis-ridden, reflected poor governance and bad 
policy, and were a threat to traditional family values despite the nobility of parents’ labor.  
Paradoxically, however, the consequence of the phenomenon was debated in terms of physical 
and psychological pains (Chisinau, Stefan Voda) and as a healthy trend (Ungheni).   
Overall for this group pride and psychological problems were the key elements in the 
remittance debate.  For instance, during the Chisinau group these views were encapsulated in 
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statements where participants showed respect for the money “earned by the sweat of their brow, 
difficultly. It is not so easy. Some work in construction, but there is another side...” and where 
recognition of complexity and individual legacy also lead to “psychological” problems (P6). 
Interpreting the data in another way, P2 saw proof that “the government has no clout in thinking 
about this whole thing. As a whole, their visions showed how understanding about displacement 
and patriotism fit into narratives of experience, policy, and perception.  In Stefan Voda, teachers 
had much to say about remittances as problem and survival strategy related to “limping to 
democracy” where they were used to describe participant interpretations and debates about the 
role of remittances in their lives and communities as individual stories of children crying 
surfaced (P4): 
I look at this money and see the tears of children. In November each year at the beginning of the 
school year I make a survey by noting the gathering of parents. Two years ago, two thirds of parents were 
working abroad. This is extremely painful…these children become adults too early. 
 
While many (P1) supported this view of individual development barriers rather than national 
ones, others were threatened when other teachers were quick to point out the formal versus 
informal nature of the data in the chart offered as trigger.  In Ungheni, where participants 
mentioned the role of minibus drivers as couriers given their daily trips to Romania, unregistered 
transfers were discussed, as were family ties and changes in the built environment.  Put 
differently, teachers noted the value of packages transmitted informally by bus drivers and the 
proliferation of new fences in the countryside observed in poor villages, and while noting the 
negative effects on family too noting “…it is a healthy trend” (P1).  Such variability and 
ambiguity viewed links to the diaspora as resolving some tensions but also creating new ones.  
 
(4) Students 
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In their word cloud (Figure 5.1.4), both formal controls and barriers like “customs” are 
evident, but so are informal ones like parents and people, alongside “visa” and “work”.  Like 
migrants and teachers, especially those in Stefan Voda, students offered a complicated but 
personalized view of remittances and life in an economy based on them.  The combination of the 
need for money and challenges to young people whose parents have left in search of it was 
debated in styles of consistently linking four interconnected ideas to yield a common set of 
visions.  The first kind appeared nuanced, e.g. ‘there are two sides’ (Stefan Voda P2, Ungheni 
P2). The second was similarly cautious, e.g. Chisinau P5 “even with money you cannot buy 
many things” versus an optimistic Stefan Voda P5 “with money you can lead your life” or 
contradictory model, e.g. Chisinau P2 “Remittances do not affect me much.  I have relatives 
abroad”.  The third kind is best described as contingent (e.g. Stefan Voda P2, P3 “we do not 
know, it depends”.  Fourth, the outward oriented opportunists, i.e. “we’re leaving”, “it is good to 
escape”, “it is the only option” generated discourses that offer evidence of neoliberal, survival 
mentalities.  These can be seen to work differently than the more nuanced and skeptical, rather 
than futile or nihilistic approach of the escapists (Stefan Voda P4, P5).   
Countrywide, parents were a key source of knowledge and experience.  As the word 
cloud suggests, the “notbuy” code here is also worth noting given its consistent usage, rather 
than “notknow” or “notunderstand” as evident with pensioners and teachers.  Students spoke 
uncritically about consumption and prices, whereas their elders distinguished between price and 
value.  Nonetheless, via their parents they learned of Soviet purchasing power, which was used 
to justify complaints about the futility of its notoriety, even if “now we are the second country 
among those with the most remittances.  Our economy is based solely on money” (P5), whereas 
P3 seconded the notion that compared to when her father went away in 1998 since now she 
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cannot buy the same things.  In terms of assigning blame, those in Stefan Voda placed 
responsibility where “Moldovans are not to blame, but those in power are because they allow 
it...they do not offer jobs.  Therefore the youth are forced to go abroad” (P5).  But, for 
survivalists a more positive view surfaced arguing, “We have no economy. Our economy 
consists of all the money that is transferred from abroad. If all those from abroad come home, 
Moldova will not exist (P2). Their nuanced view suggested that supporting families by going 
abroad could be counter-productive.  
 
(5) Pensioners 
According to their word cloud (Figure 5.1.5), “children” and social frames like “parents” 
“mother” and “husband” emerged alongside “money” and the usual suspects “border” and 
“customs” were relatively less prominent in their discussions.   Like teachers, pensioners were 
quick to notice only the sick remain. Like the students, they thought in terms of generation and 
landscape.  Like politicians they noted that depopulation seen as “degeneration”, in contrast to 
students’ “degradation”, was a problem.  Still, like the politicians, they saw “threats to the 
nation.” In Chisinau, the effects of outmigration and restrictions on growth remained elusive but 
no less evident, i.e. “they come but we do not see them –the roads are damaged, the pensions are 
small (P1). Similarly, this group was also nostalgic. For those in Stefan Voda, tragedy was 
evident, but nostalgia for the Soviet era was absent save for P1 who said the country today is so 
uncivilized “it is enough to make a cat laugh”. Changing the subject, others (P1, P5) saw a 
tragedy for “200 unsupervised children in our village” as more urgent, begging questions of how 
money is spent if one visits a classroom to find cell phones and “potential drug addicts”, but now 
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parents are simply taking their children abroad with them so that soon the country will be one of 
“the old and sick” as teachers also acknowledged.   
In Ungheni (P1, P2, P3) pride in Moldovan labors and living standards was manifest in 
stories about Brezhnev, rather than Stefan Voda anti-Soviet sentiments. Their memories recalled 
his iconic encounter with m!m!lig!, the national polenta dish, after which he notoriously gushed 
“Give me Moldovan maize!” as evidence of hubris and connections to common experience. One 
detractor (P4) in the group felt it worth reporting satisfaction with the fact that at least collective 
farms were gone, so unadulterated nostalgia was not uniform.  Seen from the inside, moral 
corrosion surfaced as an outcome of survival-oriented logics, suggesting a more traditional rather 
than rational view and conservative gender politics, i.e. “in general it has many negative aspects.  
Prostitution—there are many young girls doing it.  The older ones lose their health” (P3).  Not 
disagreeing but refining the problem, P4 added, “Others get married and stay there.” Either via 
neglect or other negative aspects, pensioners gave many reasons linking migration to national 
decay and the health of citizens suggesting a variable experience with re-regulation and re-
territorialization that cycles through crises of displacement for economic, social, and political 
reasons as indicative of geopolitical, national and biopolitical bordering practices of the day.   
 
(6) Civil Society 
As their word cloud (Figure 5.1.6) suggests, this group’s visions involved frames like 
“customs” and “money”.  For this group overall, the questions were about how money has been 
mismanaged institutionally. More generally, the key themes articulated among participants in 
this group were about the natural, normal character of emigration and its perverse yet patriotic 
effects that appeared in assessments of migration as a survival strategy. Notably, for those in 
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Chisinau it also taught other values, like not being a litterbug (P5), commercial skills (P4), and 
was thus seen as “extremely favorable” and “not purely financial”.  This group also saw perhaps 
the most succinct discussion of the core question in political geography, i.e. those of mobility 
and rescaling, when in Chisinau P1 stated: “It's good. You must be free to move. It is removing a 
wall and putting up another. There has always been the migration of peoples. Now they have 
made barriers, so one goes and only the wife and children remain at home, or vice versa” (P1). 
Those in Ungheni and Stefan Voda seconded these notions about territorial changes as “not 
limited to the transfer of money” (Stefan Voda P2), arguing they were associated with other 
patterns, including vacant housing, consumption versus production, and mismanagement of 
funds given governmental complicity.  In this way, questions of government powers and 
legitimate claims to manage the flow of capital into the population and movement outside of it 
remain survival rather than nationally-oriented even among the politically active members of 
civil society. 
In Chisinau, this group offered variable responses on this topic of migration regulation.  
The discussion included assessments ranging from ‘good’ to ‘natural and normal’ to ‘not-quite-
Georgian’.  They compared the situation to post-Soviet Georgia and its diaspora to Moldovans 
given their similarly networked character and geopolitical orientation. Despite favorable views, 
P3 distinguished between temporary and permanent movements rather than mode of 
displacement.  The Georgians, by comparison, were seen are less mobile (P1), not because “it is 
more difficult to leave”(P5) as suggested, but “simply because they have connections 
everywhere.  The Georgian diaspora is stronger. They are more patriotic in comparison with us.”  
Others were skeptical of these networks and attributed differences not to remittances as 
indicators, but to behavior and savings rates, since as opposed to conspicuous Moldovans, 
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Georgians “leave and do not eat.  Much of the money they earn, they send to the country” (P4).    
Clearly, regulation rather than de-population was the primary frame of reference for this group, 
suggesting a view of crises as more political than existential.  In Chisinau,  students saw border 
as both “delimitations of space” (P2) and the “demarcation of space” (P3), though she accepted it 
is “more complicated”.   
 
D) Group Discussions of Life at the Frontier II:  Borderland experiences 
 This section is about how participants narrated their experiences with controls and 
corruption along local and national borders.  It involved discussions of border crossing 
experiences and ideas about migration and border controls.  As evidence of how national 
boundary-making practices are experienced and EU exclusion is seen by outsiders, the section 
shows the variety of views still proliferating among Moldovans in regards to how best to 
articulate their exclusion from the EU as proxy of national sovereignty and geopolitical 
hegemony for the EU.  Among politicians generally and for those in Chisinau particularly, 
debates about the borderland were articulated in terms of problems of national sovereignty and 
EU territoriality too.  In Chisinau return migrants saw the border experienced as a barrier to 
things, and they “cannot remove it”.  For teachers, it represented cynical views and detailed 
memories they invoked via a language of enclosure but blamed on different, i.e. historic jailers. 
Pensioners were in some ways the least interested in talk about the borderland and change within 
it. They were more interested in talk about how corruption and the failure to tax remittances 
denied them proper pensions.  For civil society participants, the border was a barrier whose 
status has not changed appreciably since 1940. It was thus a barrier to those “not able to 
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assimilate. Asking citizens about bordering produced revealing data about how this area is 
changing under EU and national domestic pressures, and what those pressures really are. 
 
(1) Politicians 
Among politicians generally and for those in Chisinau particularly, debates about the 
borderland were articulated in terms of problems of sovereignty and territory.  These terms 
included the border debated as a place representing separately, the “attributes of national 
security” (P2), “attributes of the state” (P3), a territorial limit (P6), a jail (P3), or regionally as a 
“ghetto” and simultaneously for him “a complex thing…economic, linguistic…” (P4), where 
corruption was (half) jokingly seen as a right rather than as a problem (P2). When thinking about 
how outsiders see their local authority and national sovereignty, their indignation was clear, 
especially when talking about EUBAM. Revealingly, its mere presence was seen as something 
“which is presented as a triumph of collaboration [but] is a shame for us because we cannot 
manage a strategic component of the country” (P2).  Seen as managerial incompetence in 
addition to marker of instability, P3 voiced agreement in similar terms noting EUBAM “is an 
indicator of a failed state, and that controls us.”  Despite EUBAM’s observer status and lack of 
investigatory power, it was seen as a sovereign source of shame and presented as cautionary tale 
rather than heroic myth.  
Others, concentrated in Ungheni (P1) claimed to be “born one hundred meters from the 
border and when I first opened my eyes I saw it”, so that while now it was associated with the 
Berlin wall, he hoped the wires would come down, noting “I have a dream” in direct homage to 
Dr. King. His enthusiasm was also evident in comments that he planned to have a museum in his 
village, which would contain a checkpoint, and install an exhibit consisting of 5m of border for 
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people “to worship.”  His colleague replied that his dream was to simply control an actual meter 
of existing border, referencing power and corruption in a revealing way (P3).  For P1, the “great 
paradox” was that the border along the Romanian border remains, but there was nothing on the 
Ukrainian side.  Consistently, fear was invoked but rather as a lack of knowledge about the 
customs code rather than as a lack of sovereignty, i.e. complaints about TMR were absent.  
These officials conceded they had personal conflicts with customs officers (P2), especially 
regarding the introduction of the regime on small-scale border crossings set to be introduced 
during my research.  They noted that those with visas go freely, while others already have 
problems, concluding memorably that “Somebody thinks we are so wild that if a wire disappears 
we will start to swim?” (P1).  Nevertheless, their provincial orientation was evident in a lack of 
knowledge about other borders, i.e. this group could not identify EUBAM.  Memorably, when 
asked if they had heard of its acronym after failing to describe the photo, a telling but incorrect 
answer, in Russian, referenced the Baikal-Amur Mainline, a railroad.   
 
(2) Return Migrants 
In Chisinau return migrants saw the border as a barrier to livelihoods, and they “cannot 
remove it” (P2).  It was articulated in a language of “enclosure” (P1), via “fences”, where “we 
were locked in a cage” (P2), which P1 insisted was impossible to understand until you have these 
experiences and subsequent feelings. The border was seen formally and properly in some senses 
as “the delimitation of states” and their “demarcation” with “very high restriction” (P3), though 
P2 thought it is worth trying to join the EU’s free migration and trade zones.  Despite this 
favorable view, he seemed uncertain as to why such rules are needed anyway. As P4 explained 
the situation, the barriers could still be circumvented, as according to him, “each person knows, 
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or knows how to find out, how to go to Italy through the woods.”  As informal knowledge to 
circumvent controls, this power suggests ways bordering practices are challenged successfully 
from those who know.  Additionally, P2 knew about EUBAM and described them and their 
reception internally in revealing ways such as his apt observation that Moldova is a 
“Wonderland” in EU eyes.  Given his experience in the government, he claimed that local agents 
always received advance notice of EUBAM observers en route, despite their claims to the 
contrary.  He claimed control checks would then briefly employ their full range of scanners and 
resources once EUBAM arrived.  He noted this was easy to spot because the warning lights 
indicating checks in progress (i.e. all the time when monitored, otherwise switched off) were 
visible to anyone knowing where to look.  For him EU integration remains an impossible task 
given corruption, noting plainly that “the new rules…many of them cannot be implemented”.   
In Stefan Voda, migrants saw changes from a less privileged view and one (P1) had even 
participated in the “bridge of flowers” event despite the distance from the eastern frontier.  They 
noted good and bad views of life between east and west too, including lamenting that the 
situation was dynamic and not necessarily intractable, claiming it was  “economic and 
political…and Russified, but Romania has remained rooted in the past” (P1). Practically 
problems were seen to stem from inconveniences of having borders between family and friends 
(P5). The problem for locals here was the closure of the Ukrainian frontier rather than the 
Romanian one, even though it was obviously closer.   More recently, they noted how now even 
locals must pass customs controls to see friends and relatives, rather than work in a way that 
would make the situation “normal” (P1).  Auspiciously for EUBAM, two members of this group 
recognized their presence and one had seen them in action as observers (P1). In response to 
visible changes, P3 summarized them as “nothing good”. For others (P5), controls seemed 
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ambiguous, as they were thought to work more “regularly and more rapidly…but nothing has 
changed” as P5 stressed, “like I said, I do not want to be at the border”.  
In Ungheni, migrants recounted their (P2) stories of being smuggled via false Romanian 
documents and outwitting actual Romanian document readers en route to Greece via Bulgaria 
(P3).  When they talked about border and customs controls, it was thus from an embodied 
perspective, especially when a woman detailed her trip in a plastic grocery bag in the backseat of 
a car across Austria and into Italy. These two agreed “the border is the passage to reality” (P3) 
but it was increasingly a barrier for those (P2, P4) without Romanian documents.  In debating the 
nature of this barrier, the phenomenon of trafficked women received rare attention, with P2 
claiming that traffickers would disappear if the border was open, while P3 maintained that it was 
still forced, but then P2 responded she paid 4,000 euros to travel via luggage rack so trafficked 
persons too could have other opporunities and avoid force.  Still, they all agreed the EU maitains 
borders that are expensive to cross irregularly, so in this way migrants see the border landscape 
in terms of permeability and access to opportunity rather than simple proximity, i.e. pragmatic 
rather than idealistic terms.   
 
(3) Teachers 
Teachers represented cynical views and detailed memories invoked the language of 
territorial enclosure and national division.  Overall, their comments offered sophisticated if 
uneasy and cynical views of the frontier from the capital.  Their comments noted how such 
changes appeared as a “pain” (P1), “painful” (P5), a “mess” (P2), “a disease of the entire nation” 
(P2), “an area of contact between the EU, NATO and the CIS bloc” (P3), and “barbed wire 
between brothers” (P1). In Stefan Voda, teachers have taken the long–term view and a 
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particularly cynical perspective.  For them economic pressures and corrupt practices were seen to 
produce a border where there were problems despite “the European Union created something at 
the border of Palanca, some obersvers, but the mentality is not like the European Moldovan” 
(P1).  Here, he was referring to EUBAM prior to its appearance in the trigger kit or interrogation 
by the facilitator, thus being one of the few particiapnts to recognize this group, and the second 
to say it is counter- or not yet- productive.   The border was thus seen as a “hindrance” (P2), an 
“isolation”,(P3), a “closure” (P4), and “a wicked among the people” (P3), with all except P2 also 
agreeing the state boundary was a barrier, though P2 added her husband  “has issues” when 
crossing into TMR when joining her to visit her family.  For others (P5), this situation was not 
because of unavoidable legacies of Soviet corruption, i.e. “[c]onditions were such that we had to 
get out of the situation at any cost”. For this reason, they found the country was “closed” and 
“many slip illegally, mostly” some even “daily” (P1, P4).  
 
(4) Students 
Seen as both convoluted expressions of territory and sovereignty, this group had the most 
to say about TMR.  In Chisinau,  students saw borders as both “delimitations of space” (P2) and 
the “demarcation of space” (P3). Corruption was widely reported, personally and via parents’ 
stories.  For P1 and others with family in TMR, additional papers and payments are required., 
which costs time, not just money (P2).  Moreover, recent changes also mean people cannot return 
easily or frequently to Moldova, as getting a visa to leave again has become too restrictive (P1) 
so only the elderly remain in vllages. Moreover, when these young women plan their 
honeymoons, they were indignant in noting they cannot get visas to Greece, for instance, because 
despite just wanting to go on vacation they were perceived as risky subjects and denied the legal 
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authorization to cross ‘into Europe’.  In Stefan Voda, the border was seen more statically as the 
“limits of a state” (P2) that “should not be exceeded” (P3), or “a barrier to which we can aspire” 
(P5).  Spatially, the site “prevents us from moving as freely, to get acquainted with other people” 
(P3), though it is also seen as an “obstacle” or “hindrance” more than a source of shame or or 
other emotional distress like Chisinau’s student participants.   As a result, this group agrees their 
livelihood situation as bleak (P4).    Participants living along the state frontiers invoked notions 
of barbed wire and territorial mobility linked to passports (Stefan Voda P2).  It caused one 
woman (P1) to “feel bad.  When you see that in Europe there is no barbed wire, but here there is. 
Alternatively, participants (P2, P4) drew on personal experience and family ties to assert that 
movement was “rarely” undocumented these days, as “my sister is already a citizen of France. 
And she went with someone who has German citizenship.  There are rules for everything” (P4), 
showing how knowledge and networks matter as much as passports and personhood when 
seeking to chart the changing logics of life at the frontier.   
 
(5) Pensioners 
Pensioners were in some ways the least interested in talk about the borderland and change 
within it. They were more interested in talk about how corruption and the failure to tax 
remittances denied them proper pensions.  When they stopped to compare themselves to friends 
in TMR, they felt luckier by at least $20 per month (P5). For them, despite relative distance from 
its borders, they generally saw frontiers and efforts to govern them in the country as both 
“painful” and a “prison” (Chisinau P2).  Despite such evocative language, some still felt it was 
“absurd” to call it a reservation (Chisinau P4), though other members felt the picture was 
accurate, concluding, “We cannot go anywhere” (P1) though as noted earlier seem rather 
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uninterested in travel as a group, but P2 explains why as a problem of economic exclusion rather 
than political restriction.  For others P4, the problem was the “work is not valued…children are 
forced to go abroad to make money for housing” (P4).  Still another two (P2, P5) were nostalgic 
for “the life I lived” (P5) during the Soviet period because “now you cannot go anywhere 
because it is expensive” (P2).   
Others saw different problems like barriers in TMR (P5). Looking closer to home and 
away from the Prut to the Nistru they saw “Russian policy” as a “weapon” (P2), with “both 
arms” around the globe (P1).  Their awareness among those in Stefan Voda about dis-armament 
agreements and their failure (P1) as well as blaming Russian interests in the Balkans as their 
justification (P2), and reaching the conclusion that the Nistru, as a border, saw the problem as 
“especially political” (P5).  Drawing on life “under occupation” when “Moldovans were put in a 
harness” (P4) with “Russians everywhere” (P1), their attitude about historical grievances from 
the Second World War, when “Bessarabian Moldovans were taken to the front to be destroyed” 
(P4) remains understandable. Lamenting stagnating improvements, the loss of easy trips to 
Odessa was offered as an example of how corruption limits movement for those who do not want 
to be extorted (P2). Summing up his view of border guards and their practices, one man said it 
best:  “charlatans” (P1).  Though technically this notion involves having long hair rather than a 
short neck, others agreed they are “suspicious” (P3). For less polarized members if this group in 
Ungheni (P1), by contrast, the situations following the closure were associated with visa 
restrictions, and comments that the country became “a cage” to escape since “Romanians have 
the same language, the same traditions, the same culture. I often went to museums, monasteries, 
as I’m interested in culture, and travel. I'd go now, but for a while we have been closed off.” 
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(6) Civil Society 
For civil society participants, the border was a barrier whose status has not changed 
appreciably since 1940.  They saw it as “very well maintained” (P4), a “pain” because of the 
failure to acquire a Romanian passport (P1). It was thus a barrier to those “not able to assimilate 
European values” or objects that, along with mass media “stop the penetration” of these same 
vales (P5).  Others saw it as a jar of pickles, where the people are the pickles who could see 
everything but could not escape (P1).  But more than a protective layer, P5’s admittedly 
conspiratorial version included the robust observation that “in fact, Moldova is a land of 
experiment for other areas”, reinforcing my ‘paradigmatic periphery’ argument without any sort 
of provocation.   
Their critical views and educated opinions were as critical of Russians as they were of 
“Europeans”, suggesting the country is ‘caught in the middle’. While Chisinau and Ungheni had 
similar complaints, the situation in  Stefan Voda was different.  There, civil society debated 
territory and sovereignty in terms of problems of circulation and security (P2, P3).  All agreed 
state frontiers were barriers, with P3 specifying their bureaucratic character. In this view, the 
problem was that “no map and no court recognizes that [border beyond the river] is not Moldova. 
There is Moldova, Transnistria does not exist. It is not recognized as a state, but we've 
recognized it de facto.”  As a precise embodiment of academic disputes about sovereignty and 
the significance of de facto sovereignty regimes (Agnew 2005) and the lack of de jure 
recognition for quasi- or pseudo-states (Kolsto 2006; O’Loughlin and Kolossov 1999), change at 
the frontier appeared in both sophisticated and more barnyard forms of sovereignty.  For others, 
the problems were less academic or political and more about personal circulation.  For those who 
travel frequently in TMR (P5), they did not report seeing changes, and two claimed to recognize 
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EUBAM but did not see improvement after four years (P4), while others said they saw “All the 
same lines, all the same problems” (P2).  Their conclusion was that there was “too much control 
at customs” (P3).   
 
E) Conclusions 
This chapter has illustrated a few of the surely innumerable attachments to home and 
homeland expressed by Moldovans from different but internally comparable backgrounds in my 
study.  These manifestations take multiple forms as well, as affective self-expression and 
national territorial attribute.  They are evidenced mostly by those migrants and patriots who seem 
differently connected to territory in terms of aims and understandings, but they both have 
powerful reasons to pay attention to the regulation of mobility, either for the sake of sovereignty 
and power or as a way to circumvent it by avoiding the same controls, though more remotely 
organizing and legislatively intensifying efforts to administratively organize divisions and build 
new kinds of borders and barriers or clear bridges between peoples.  In sum, Moldovan territory 
in both its formal external and national security sense, and its informal domestic salience remain 
provocative cases for those interested in how borders between peoples rise and fall, i.e. political 
geography because they show how sovereignty and territory are experienced in terms of popular 
mobility and access to economic opportunity.   
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CHAPTER VI   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A) Final Analysis 
This dissertation about Moldovan and EU sovereignty has detailed the present and future 
trajectory of migration and border management in Eastern Europe.  As a case study in external 
relations and national territorial consolidation, I have detailed how the power to exclude and for 
political communities to determine their fates is seen in terms of attempts to govern territory and 
citizens via formal and informal perspectives.  As a study in how formal attempts to regulate the 
perceived endemic crises of Moldovan ungovernability are constructed discursively, my findings 
offer insights drawn from the banal production Moldovan national space and regulation of its 
territory as expression of sovereignty or its absence. Seen from the outside, I have shown how 
EU agents and policies are debated as evidence of practical and formal geopolitical reasoning via 
attention the construction of their world-views.  Seen in the language of critical geopolitics and 
political anthropology, my approach has asked how such threats are represented, boundaries 
conceptualized and institutionalized, communities essentialized, and powers to exclude are both 
practiced and perceived. As bordering exercises and passport or customs controls, my attention 
to debates surrounding the production of exclusion using visas or tolerated persons legislation 
shows the manifestation of such policy in practice is banal but worth investigating because it is 
revealing of who can go where, and how people are linked to place, key geographic questions.   
In my attempt to explain the transformation of Moldova(ns) as object of rule from inside 
and out, formally and informally, I  have investigated EU policies in terms of internal legislation 
and bureaucratic incorporation via EUBAM.  In tracing the role of policy implementation and 
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efforts to bring border and migration management schemes in line with EU standards and 
consolidate national sovereignty, my mix of survey and discursive focus group data have asked a 
variety of citizens what and how they think about their homeland, politically or otherwise 
emotionally, as evidence of attachments to community and thus geographic markers about claims 
to territory in the face of mobility.  My findings based on analysis of EU publications and 
interviews with its agents alongside observation of its efforts and investigations of its claims 
suggest these types of formal views and informal understandings overlap in terms of problems 
around migration as threat but diverge over solutions and their sources.  Put differently, out-
migration is seen in focus group participant statements as a social catastrophe for teachers and 
pensioners, a necessity by students and return migrants.  Formally, the present discussion in 
terms of a crisis of ungovernability appears as a black-mark-turned-golden-opportunity for both 
EU and Moldovan government officials in their public statements and interviews with me.   
As such, my discourse analysis of formal border and citizenship controls around 
Europeanization outlined in chapter two and then later discussed in chapters four and five on 
border management and geopolitical attitudes shows how bureaucrats, nationalists, and other 
kinds of citizens understand the situation.  Their understanding reveals how such (supra)state 
actors imagine the frontier as a field of action, i.e. the Moldovan borderland, in their 
explanations that it is an object of rule and instrument of (extra)territorial control.  In their view, 
bordering and other legibility problems must be battled in the name of security or managed as 
unavoidable risk as shown in the EUBAM case study above.  These visions of ‘who secures what 
for whom’ were articulated practically and formally in geostrategic discourses and contested in 
more informal group settings, among return migrants and others. 
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B) Sovereignty? 
As expressions of sovereignty, my case suggests how the EU will manage territorial and 
biopolitical risks via appeals to technological and legal bordering controls in the future.  Thus, in 
my pursuit of the banal and focusing of critical attention to the iconographic, my answers to 
these questions about the various bordering practices involved in exercising sovereign control 
over national (i.e. Moldovan) and regional (i.e. EU) spaces as evidence of their power to exclude 
is best summarized in terms of contingency, generation, and uncertainty.  I have learned to think 
differently about what citizenship is and how it works in relation to mobility as well as to 
community and the regulation of exclusion as shown in the discussion of passports and national 
self-identification above.  While at various times I have seen evidence that leads me to think 
“Moldovan” is a stable category and durable form of reference, I have come to realize that its 
allure to me is a function of its informality and malleability as exhibited by the wild contortions 
my participants will make to fit themselves into molds or defy them in attempts to shirk authority 
and assert their own power in subversive ways.  The nature of this contingency is evident in my 
participants’ inability to define a homo Moldovanus ideal type beyond and excluded figure who 
must move to survive that remains intriguing and unstable itself.   
Alternatively, when outsiders attempt to corral these lands, the flexibility is limited and 
requires a rethinking of how controls can be territorialized, as evident with EUBAM efforts to 
insert itself into a conflict on behalf of particular risk analysis and threat perceptions, regardless 
of their actual menace.  As far as imagined communities, invented traditions, and geopolitical 
imaginations are concerned, I have learned to focus on the contests to name, govern, and control 
people and place rather than to objectify any particular referent and to instead look at how ideas 
are learned, challenged, codified, and experienced of found lacking through appeals to common 
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but clearly constructed figures like Stephen the Great as manifestations of national legitimacy.  Is 
‘being Moldovan’ simply an instrument of cold, calculated people whose census and survey 
responses suggest either collective schizophrenia in shifting from 65% claiming one self-
understanding, i.e. seeing themselves as Romanian in 1989 versus the 2% who identified 
similarly 15 years later?  In trying to understand the various logics citizens use to construct a 
national territory, from previously ethnic or national to today’s utterly messy series of 
multiethnic and multinational and residential rules reviewed in chapter II, I have come to 
appreciate how convoluted and contingent the problem is.  My contribution is thus to show how 
variable rather than how parochial or miserable this label can be, despite stereotypes, which are 
themselves contradictory.  Actually, given that at least six different formal meanings can be 
attributed to this symbol --from ethnonym to post-Soviet citizen-- in searching for accuracy and 
precision I have come to realize that attention to flexibility and mobility offers better frameworks 
for understanding how a people and a place are objectified rather than simply come into being as 
neutral, empty ‘things’.   
 
C) Moldovan?  
In asking over 100 Moldovans about this label, I have come to the conclusion that the 
answer is “it depends”.  When I asked my group members this question in systematic ways 
across 19 different groups, I was amazed at how contentious and contradictory the answers could 
be, ranging from references to the soles of feet to less expressive and more pragmatic Romanian 
passport holders who were seeking an instrument to circumvent somebody else’s exclusionary 
practices and policies rather than attempting to realize their own vision of themselves, i.e. 
citizenship in a formal sense is a tool, whereas Moldovan-ness is a way of life.  This attitude was 
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most evident in how people talked about their disenchantment with independence and its 
aftermath via discourses of disappointment surrounding independence, when sovereignty made 
many lives more difficult.  As a result, my plan shows how mixed-methods social science 
approaches can yield data about uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding the social 
construction of citizenship and political allegiance. These uncertainties surrounding questions 
about “ethnicity”, for instance, are evident when this precise word (or its stem) was only uttered 
in 8 of 19 discussions, unprompted, and even then its use was debatable, but in interesting ways.  
This particular ‘ethnicity problem’ suggests but does not confirm this frame is less relevant than 
conventionally held Kulturnation views of Eastern European nationalism.  By contrast, all 
participants checked boxes on the survey indicating they categorize themselves in this way but 
the actual salience of the frame emerged in group interaction when participants debated its 
meaning as shown above.   However, I do not want to suggest that citizenship and passports 
are the best proxies for understanding a particular frame of experiences and learned behaviors, 
because the jokes made by participants about how they are perceived in the world also suggested 
a refined ability to avoid being pinned down by EU border managers or American graduate 
students and to navigate other people’s expectations in clever and counter-intuitive ways.  
Although the jokes were beyond the scope of the dissertation, like other discursive constructions 
they too are about power and thus the possibility to challenge authority and its various ways of 
making truth-claims.    
 
D) Emigration  
In terms of outmigration, my dissertation has shown how shifting forms of citizenship 
and territoriality --i.e. dual citizenship, Romanian passport ownership, visa regimes, migration 
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management— remain targets of governments since they are seen to influence mobility and 
restrict opportunities.  They reveal a crisis of perceived ungovernability where multiple 
overlapping geopolitical, national, and biopolitical logics are internalized unevenly by 
Moldovans.  Results show how the EU and Moldova, as formal sovereigns, are transforming 
spatial and identity in their own self-interest and in the face of informal opposition. But for 
pensioners or students, such controls have different meanings, regardless of their sentiments 
surrounding Moldovan-ness, as passport restrictions are prohibitive for some and irrelevant for 
others.  The bordering and sovereignty regimes operating in this space thus continue to affect 
residents but in different ways, as when young people plan to leave, the demographic profile 
looks misshapen, and the EU becomes a territorial authority.  So, emigration in Moldova means 
both economic crises have happened and that social ones are seen as likely to follow, even 
among those who think emigrants are patriots.   
 
E) Homeland?   
As manifestations of state sovereignty and geopolitical hegemony, I have shown how 
territorial strategies, understood here as processes of re-bordering --i.e. local frontier zone traffic 
measures, EU visa regimes, bi-lateral labor agreements—are linked to the transformation of 
economic activities like smuggling or corruption to organize life along the border and in the 
wider borderland.  My data suggest a clear sense of Moldovan-ness remains elusive for outsiders 
despite attempts to label them using all sorts of techniques, from land borders and biometric 
passports to Eastern “partnerships” and Neighborhood Policies.  These labels have long attracted 
outsiders, including me, but for different reasons.  Upon further reflection, the difficulty of 
rendering people in this place legible to outsiders is, after all my effort, a reflexive and poetic 
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conclusion.  It seems to me that avoiding rigorous and creative attempts to match a preconceived 
label is precisely the unifying practice binding people in this place in common cause.  In other 
words, this group has perfected in some ways the art of not being governed according to 
traditional mores, though, perplexingly, plenty of people do hold conventional self-assessments 
of themselves as ‘good Moldovans’ suggesting that groupism or common connections are 
themselves the goal as debates over cultural contents suggested.  To be clear, however, historical 
accuracy is not my concern, but rather how entitlements are assumed based on such truth-claims, 
such that Moldovans claim to be legitimate citizens but to what end? 
My participants thus offer evidence of competing forms of conduct used to redefine, 
reconstruct, and re-territorialize how governments and citizens affect who has a right to be what, 
why, and where.  These manifestations, as localized and internalized geopolitical notions about 
populations, incongruously invoke ideas about political fairness, demographic discontent, civil 
rights, national ideology, categorical essentialisms, and periods of both pride and shame 
implicated in what it means to be Moldovan. These schizophrenic and contradictory views taken 
from different generations and groups of citizens could be considered as the failure among titular 
group members, ethnic entrepreneurs, and elected officials to meaningfully articulate the 
usefulness of such otherwise indiscriminate distinctions (e.g. ethnic or national markers or 
common characteristics seen to serve as explicit criteria or qualification of membership) as also 
suggested by the new president, Mr. Timofti.  In my view, this situation is provocative because it 
suggests how discursive strategies of legitimation or contestation work, consistently or 
conveniently, in a geographic and geopolitical sense when seen as scales of attachment.  In 
contrast to traditional approaches to this subject, I argue Moldova and Moldovans have emerged 
as failed state- and/or nation-building artifacts and localized geopolitical objects of governance 
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par excellence.  The failure yet continued ferocity with which outsiders still seek to regulate this 
zone and exclude its citizens simply makes the case even more alluring to me.   
 
F) Methodological Contributions I: Genealogical approaches 
My genealogical focus on borderland residents and returned migrants has shown how 
territory, borders, and citizenship are formalized and perceived beyond the formal “nation-state” 
scale.  I have also questioned how nations of emigrants challenge competing government and 
EU-led efforts to manage citizenship and homelands in post-socialist borderlands. This approach 
is appropriate for exploring fresh theoretical explanations and collecting revealing data about 
identification and territorialization schemes and practices in situ from multiple perspectives.  As 
a result, my approach has revealed how these underlying tensions between ethno-national 
identity and nation-state territoriality work, often ambiguously, via attention to individual 
perceptions compared with that same person’s social interactions. Specifically, this contextual 
exchange of ideas served to illuminate competing, nascent views of national development, rather 
than reinforcing pre-existing, primordial visions.  
If done correctly, turning focus group interactions into text generates rich data.  
Previously, scholars have used similar methods of “ethnomethodology” across Central and 
Eastern Europe (Galasinska and Krzyzanowski 2009).  Their experience suggests and findings 
confirm that (a) attention to context-specific intra-national changes are not uniform and, (b) that 
the localized variability of experience associated with socialist transformation and the legacy of 
conflict should consider such diversity versus uniformity of outcomes, especially in the context 
where Europeanization is understood as a spatial process (Bialasiewicz et al 2008). Following 
Krzyzankowki and Wodak (2009), I also see productive roles for critical discourse analysis of 
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interviews and focus groups in studies of social change because this approach links 
representations and interactions to show how reality is framed and (re)constructed regardless of 
the banality of the constructions themselves.   
My analytical approach to cross-tabulating and contextualizing focus group transcripts 
thus shows how a novel method for blending ostensibly disparate tools and theoretical 
frameworks can work.  My recipe therefore enables answers to questions about reasons behind 
why people think like they do when they explain themselves in ways they see fit, despite my 
open-ended if consistent starting points, i.e. triggers and questions. As a result, the data I 
collected show how attitudes and perception factor into the production of situated identification 
schemes in meaningful ways.  In conducting these conversations in standardized forms, focus 
groups produce a different kind of common and internally comparable but unavoidably 
institutional though not necessarily representative space. The results suggest how participants 
slip between --and therefore challenge and reconfigure-- pre-existing, prevailing, or competing 
commonsense understandings of collective stereotypes and conventional meanings as seen in 
metonyms and their usage.  Likewise, my data suggest how discursive strategies work as 
markers.  This focus on the creation of entirely new categories of atomized subjects and 
processes surrounding how boundaries are delineated, institutionalized, and legitimized show 
how territorial and biopolitical borders work.  Such efforts are evident in my study in hegemonic 
visions and informal knowledge about visa regimes or the role of the latest ‘tolerance’ regime for 
managing migration domestically mentioned above.  Seen as empirical demonstrations of  “state 
effects”, these insights map almost precisely onto Brubaker’s (2004) and Trouillot’s (2001) 
model for studying the “isolation, individualization, categorization, and spatialization” processes 
of 21st century state-making and nation-building, as suggested above.   
 
 
285 
 
G) Methodological contributions II:  Visual appeals 
Reassuringly, visual techniques worked as expected and planned.  Indeed, looking 
together at photographs created an atmosphere of shared experience between researchers and 
informants and facilitated open but structured questioning and conversations. This technique has 
suggested that a mix of methods is most appropriate in light of census and survey accuracy 
concerns in a place where people in my focus groups repeatedly said they lied to investigators 
and BBC/Council of Europe agents confirmed this suspicion.  In addition, in working to refine 
my methods I have tried to avoid one of the most difficult problems for all researchers with a 
discourse-analytical focus, namely that the words and labels for the different socio-political 
entities and events or their pronunciation could first be introduced by the informants and not by 
the interviewer. My open-ended questions enabled participants to drive the conversation from a 
standard starting point, as the debates and disconnected views that came from them have shown. 
This advantage was evident during talk about “the Bridge of Flowers”, which youth outside 
Ungheni could not identify as a sign of its erosion as a point of reference about education and 
experience.  Ungheni youth, not surprisingly, immediately knew the bridge and recognized the 
context of the banner, demonstrating knowledge of particular historical events based on their 
relative geographic position.  Several other instances are also worth noting as indications of the 
richness of my approach, as when the formerly underground cartoonist and current pensioner 
brought his portfolio of cartoons to supplement my efforts to chart cartographic change and 
social affect in this region (Map 6).   
Used as an adjunct method alongside census and opinion data, my recipe of 
methodological tools and constructivist frameworks of identification and territorialization serves 
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to confirm and contradict assumptions about ethnicity or (national) identity in revealing ways. 
Additionally, in terms of epistemological orientation this approach works for social 
constructivists and those interested in the production of spatiality involving passports and 
borderlands generally or checkpoints and detention centers specifically because it emphasizes 
how members including politicians and technocrats collaborate, achieve consensus, and construct 
shared meaning about concerns, symbols, and processes like national citizenship or state 
security.  This approach is also useful because of its emphasis on subjective perceptions of 
individuals, so it reveals political and personal sentiments particularly well.   My research 
suggests the subsequent data on attitudes and opinion-formation offer clear windows observing 
how people access and deploy group frames, i.e. formal migration rules and citizenship/passport 
access as about economic opportunity in relationship to social mobility and affective nostalgia, 
i.e. longing for home. Though moderators and observers are necessarily involved in eliciting 
topics for discussion and injecting biases, focus groups provided unrivaled access to participant 
meaning for widely used social science frames like ethnicity or nationality. In my view, such talk 
suggests conflicts and concerns about reconstructing and re-contextualizing competing social 
categories that are about political legitimacy expressed in socio-spatial ways like attachment to 
home.  Such self-awareness is also manifest in the atomization and isolation of wider social 
frames like nation and is associated with prosaic state-making efforts and its anticipated or 
surprising effects. 
In line with other social scientists, but particularly human geographers and political 
anthropologists, (Secor 2003, 2004; Skop 2006; Trouillot 2001) I have used focus groups to 
investigate and theorize poorly understood processes of knowledge production and spatial 
inclusion.  My twist on their claims, together with visual models and descriptive visual-analytical 
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techniques, offers new ways to document social context because it shows how people share 
attitudes (i.e. opinion data) and manage identity. My attention to the tensions governing their 
interaction and each group’s dynamics is innovative and as tables above show, enable quick 
comparisons across scales.  So, while not necessarily generalizable, this approach does highlight 
inter- and intra-group differences and relies upon survey data to explore these variations.  This 
approach to individual and group segmentation allows for the quick identification of patterns 
using different logics including counting of containers, territorially or conceptually, alongside 
the relative appeal of particular thematic patterns.  Clearly, group composition works as a ready-
made resource for explaining differences but it also allows for confirmation of known patterns of 
social identification, like referring to oneself as a certain kind of ‘national’ or patriot.  Attention 
to interactions also shows how participants themselves can work as co-analysts, dismissing 
certain themes or moments as inconsequential (e.g. patriotic billboards), erupting over others 
(e.g. independence events), and remaining silent or resigned (e.g. political cartoons). This 
approach works because it effectively marks the conceptual distance separating formal and 
informal understandings of border regulation. 
 
H) The Take-Home Message 
In this case, my data suggest how such socio-spatial and institutional political frames like 
nation-states or former Soviet republics are being recast in contradictory ways.  They are 
evidence of competing forms of conduct used to redefine, reconstruct, and re-territorialize how 
governments and citizens affect who has a right to be what, why, and where.  These 
manifestations, as geopolitical notions about populations, lineage, and risk, incongruously invoke 
notions about political fairness, demographic discontent, civil rights, national ideology, 
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categorical essentialisms, and periods of both pride and shame implicated in what it means to be 
Moldovan.  Here, as evident in the informal spoken manifestations of such attempts to reconsider 
categories of socio-spatial difference, clear contradictions and conceptual slippages emerge 
where Moldovans are represented as both clever and industrious.  Such schizophrenic views, 
even among titular groups like the self-described Romanians and Moldovans above, nevertheless 
emerge and could be considered as the failure among titular group members, ethnic 
entrepreneurs, and elected officials to meaningfully articulate the usefulness of such otherwise 
indiscriminate distinctions (e.g. ethnic or national markers or common characteristics seen to 
serve as explicit criteria or qualification of membership) as also suggested by the new president.  
In my view, this situation is provocative because it suggests how discursive strategies of 
legitimation or contestation work, consistently or conveniently, in a geographic and geopolitical 
sense when seen as scales of attachment. 
My findings point to the discursive and constructed nature of a broad range of social 
changes like citizenship laws and toleration regimes for foreigners.  These critiques and 
genealogies highlight the array of discursive practices in both ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres.  
Evidence of these practices is most visible in my project when people who were adults during the 
post-Soviet independence speak about their disappointment and, separately, when migration and 
the related role of remittances emerge.  Keeping in mind my explicit desire to focus on the 
tension between formally articulated visions brought to life in legislation or public statements as 
sovereign, juridical, and biopolitical expressions, these findings suggest the presence of more 
complex and subtle understandings about crisis management and the (lack of) power to regulate 
socio-spatial exclusion.  Seen this way, discursive strategies embodying memory and perception 
affect identifications so my approach can help explain how people manage their connections, 
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affinities, and access to places and communities.  Similarly, formal speeches and legislative 
codes also offer a related view of discourse of citizenship and its limits. I show this approach is 
appropriate since it interrogates those holding power over discourse.   
Talking about what it means for them to be Moldovan, my participants across 
segmentation groups used discourses of both uniqueness and normalcy, patriotism and 
pragmatism, collective suffering and individual experiences of pride.  These stories also 
document economic displacement and are typically articulated in matter-of-fact and, less often, 
even poetic tones when teachers recited nationalist poetry of their own.  As a whole, these 
discussions show the variety of Moldovan-ness rather than a uniform archetype of a singular, 
modern homo Moldovanus or its society evident in expressions like “all-”, “the-”, or “we 
Moldovans”. As individual and collective symbols these frames suggest conventional tropes are 
being reworked where external dynamics like neoliberal displacement are wrought on a second 
generation of semi-sovereign citizen subjects and their illiberal governors.  Here, the emphasis is 
on labor and struggle, like pragmatism in the face of disingenuous ideologies of those of 
romantic nationalists and political opportunists. This common thread across participants’ 
narratives, which was framed in a mix of both iconic and banal terms and common references, 
like Stephen the Great, the Romanian Christian who beat the Turks, appeared as abstract notions 
of home and common culture.  Thus, it reveals the extent of existential challenges internally.   
Whether linguistically, psychologically, or historically oriented, the pursuit of the true 
origins and authentic characteristics of the Moldovan nation and its territorial limits remain 
disputed.  In pursuit of maximum archaeological extents and original moments, founding fathers, 
and “pillars of the nation”, the segmentation groups all saw national rebirth, disappointment, and 
conflicting views over what Moldovan-ness means historically in terms of sovereignty and 
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linguistically among my participants.  In my final analysis, this variability is evidence of a 
contingent and contradictory series of categorizations and experiences that, while constructed, 
are no less powerful in their ability to reconfigure exclusion and thus alter lives.  In combination 
with theirs and others’ views, my findings suggest Moldovans still identify themselves as such.  
In conclusion, five key conclusions emerge from this dissertation:  (1) Moldova does not 
have an ethnicity problem, per se.  (2) Formal visions of national territory and risks linked to 
regional insecurity are inconsistent with popular understandings of crisis and economic 
displacement and social problems.  (3) The tensions between geopolitical, national, and 
biopolitical bordering projects, formally and informally, suggest the Moldovan laboratory will 
remain a zone of competing governance schemes in the face of enduring perceptions of 
ungovernability. (4) Passports, as instruments, suggest the variability and utility of national and 
state-level attachments to sovereign territory vary by effect across generation, i.e. visa controls 
affect students and migrants differently than pensioners.  (5) The EUBAM and  domestic regime 
on foreigner toleration are formal models of future technical controls envisioned by hegemons 
like the EU, however their remote controls and self-perceptions are not matched by informal 
experiences and popular understanding, i.e. the most high profile EU program is unknown to the 
vast majority of my participants. 
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Part I:  Introduction 
A) Aims 
This appendix has five aims:  (1) Show how a mixed-method approach to territory and 
identity in a borderland and among various groups can be applied; (2) Chart and summarize 
individual participant and group scale responses in my study of formal constructions and 
informal articulations of territory, identity, and mobility where citizenship is subject, object and 
instrument of governance; (3) Discuss visual methods and focus groups as a tool for political 
geographers and like-minded social scientists seeking to plot tensions governing the production 
of socio-economic mobility and practices of national security as expressions of sovereignty; (4) 
Detail ways to triangulate data via critical discourse analysis and novel computer visualizations; 
(5) Make sense of individual participants, segmentation groups, and field sites using data about 
their attributes and distinctions.  To achieve these goals, I use a mixed-method approach.  In 
particular, I emphasize the analytical utility of focus groups (and visual methods within them) for 
answering questions about the contexts and constructions governing social change.  Because my 
method targets both individual and collective level understandings, as well as comparing formal 
versus informal articulations, my approach is useful because it allows access to the meaning 
behind contested group norms like “nation” or “Moldovan”.  
 
B) Theorizing Tensions 
The formal viewpoints and official visions used in my study of hegemonic narratives 
were collected throughout all phases of this research, 2009-2011, because the situation 
surrounding border demarcation and territorial control in Moldova is an unresolved one.  
Appropriately, this background has relied on available legislation, concept notes, council  
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recommendations, press statements, and project reports to show how official views vary (See 
bibliography). In this dissertation, these materials appear most visibly in the discussions of 
EUBAM and migration-related spaces of detention as part of the EU’s wider yet asymmetric 
“integrated border management” policies within its wider ENP.  
 
C) Why Focus Groups?  A justification 
A burgeoning literature on focus groups as a social science tool offers several convincing 
arguments about why this method fits for this dissertation. Defined as “…a research technique 
that collects data through group interaction on a topic predetermined by the researcher…” 
(Morgan 1996 in Skop 2006: 113), this approach to bringing people together is a non-essentialist 
way of thinking about ostensibly natural identification patterns because it does not recruit 
participants exclusively via ethno-national criteria or linguistic preference or demand their 
response take the form of any particular or otherwise pre-existing category.  As such, this 
technique can document how political labels are made to endure, divide, or even multiply when 
they are reconfigured and re-contextualized. This potential for unique and spontaneous group 
interactions, in the face of consistent script and moderator protocol, is a key advantage of this 
approach because it shows how widely held conceptions of change or conflicting attitudes 
converge or fragment in concentrated ways, across age, gender, or location (Pratt 2002; Secor 
2007; Wilkinson 1998).  Therefore, this method offers a key advantage for my project on subject 
and territorial formation because focus groups are known to show how difference is constructed 
and identification and atomization strategies operate. 
This method has been used increasingly in human geography, anthropology, and 
sociology because it can offer rich insights into social change.  Topically, it works well for 
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investigating processes like migration and citizenship, and is evident in ethno-national identity 
studies where slogans like “One Scotland, Many Cultures” have generated findings suggesting 
the flexibility of such tools (Barbour 2007).  Undoubtedly, this flexibility helps resolve problems 
with data based on mutually exclusive categories handed down to us in official documents and 
opinion surveys, where “methodological nationalism” is a well-documented problem and the 
“nation-state homology” dominates (Marston 2000; Trouillot 2001; Wimmer and Schiller 2003). 
This possibility exists because self-identification and interactive strategies take on new meaning 
and significance when discussed in a group setting and appear, in effect, as “sameness” and 
“difference” though they can also appear interactively as “dominance” or “silence” from a given 
participant.  To acknowledge this potential for over-reliance on any single participant, I seek to 
show how techniques like word- or tag cloud visualizations can and do make such potential 
biases readily transparent (see Part IV).  Focus groups are best used alongside other methods, 
usually to deepen existing understanding or double-check findings alongside surveys of 
individual attitudes or interviews with influential or representative people.  I appreciate this trend 
and follow it in this analysis.  Collecting multiple kinds of data is a strategy endorsed by 
supporters who argue focus groups work as adjunct method or, separately, as extensions of 
survey and other techniques (McNaught and Lam 2010).  As audits, which is how I see them 
used most effectively, they can also serve as a main study or be used to interpret survey result or 
assess the meanings underlying particular attitudes or behavior, as is my plan here.  
A useful illustration of the forensic power of focus groups in comparison to interview 
techniques and survey data comes from public health research.  The evidence from research 
comparing three African projects involves a mix of surveys and focus groups in three separate 
studies of HIV knowledge and related healthcare practices.  Upon later review, follow-up 
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assessments of these findings report 28% of results from different methods were similar, 42% 
were similar but focus groups were more informative in terms of generating data about relevant 
processes and practices, and in 17% conclusions were similar but surveys were a better option.  
Finally, in the remaining 12% of instances researchers found dissimilar results in conclusions 
about knowledge and attitudes surrounding public health programs and their privileges (Fern 
2001; Irwin et al 1991; Ward, Bertrand and Brown 1991).  Likewise, studies of managers and 
workers involving attitudes about HIV in Congo (Harai and Beaty 1990) are worth noting here 
because they suggest rank-ordering of places and preferences can be misleading in such 
scenarios, despite different goals of the methods, as suggested in the “ethnicity” interactions 
detailed in chapter IV. These kinds of controversy about focus groups as a method and their 
findings are reflexive. In other words, focus groups are effective when they serve as adversarial 
point of entry into contests or qualifications related to other surveys.  
Like methods surrounding their study, fights about the relative fixity of history, identity, 
and territory never end.  Not coincidentally then, for most recent advocates, the adversarial 
elements of focus groups are the best (i.e. most useful) part. In brief, the whole point of focus 
groups is to capture interaction, especially when targeting influential actors like teachers or 
politicians in my study, so the more in-depth revelations and outspoken expressions from the 
participants, the better (Kitzinger 1994). For some political geographers (Secor 2003, 2004) the 
role of group interaction in producing both group consensus and multiple points of view is 
particularly worthwhile to consider in terms of citizenship.  In this light, the method uncovers 
ways in which citizenship is encountered and contested through “spatial practices of everyday 
life”.  Such views see these practices as evident in how some participants joined together to 
express pride in variable understandings of their less-than-discrete cultural identity. Thus, my 
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approach shows how ideas are learned or ignored in practice.  Together, this research also shows 
how, after subtle maneuvering, questions about social unity and meaning function subversively 
to reveal why ambiguity around frames of identification matters. Similarly, Bloor et al (2001) 
argue trends surrounding focus group use show the technique is valuable because it enables 
access to variable group meanings, processes and norms, including meanings behind these 
assessments. Others (Barbour 2007) also argue focus groups best excel at uncovering why and 
how people think as they do because they detail the processes of attitude formation and make it 
possible to decipher them. All these scholars agree this method works well to distill information 
about areas of group life not always available to the ethnographer, demographer, or survey 
enumerator precisely because they expose the process of inspection, elaboration, and 
questioning.  
In studying such banal processes, feminist geographers (Boyle 2002; Silvey 2004) use 
focus groups because of their strengths in this regard. They argue this method excels when 
focusing on social construction of categories in population geography and suggest it enables 
insightful consideration into the constructed nature of categories and material interests they 
inevitably serve and thus enables subjective interpretation of identity.  In addition, such research 
argues convincingly that this method is particularly applicable to migration studies, since it 
focuses on domestic, labor, and related localized effects at the scale of the individual, household, 
and nation-state (Skop 2006).  In print, these scholars have repeatedly demonstrated attention to 
interaction can reveal mechanisms governing how identification strategies link places and shape 
people. Interactions have also been shown to suggest how displacement and resettlement patterns 
affect views about various boundaries in daily life rather than via formal or iconographic frames 
and my data confirm this view.  
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  For some writers on identification and identity formation (Fairclough 1992), the cultural 
political economy of social construction necessarily involves discourse.  In this view, the 
structural and strategic dimensions of crisis, instability, hopelessness, and displacement --
expressed in spoken terms when participants use words like “happy”, “sad” and in questionnaires 
inquiring about quality of life—illustrate how certain discourses are used to account for social 
change and political crises. These topographies are rendered observable in the antinomies, 
commonalities, and tensions reported and observed in focus group data. Specifically, the most 
distinctive contribution of this kind of a discourse-historical approach is that it provides a 
consistent framework to accessing historical and political topics expressed by participants across 
groups and sites in distinctive or common ways. In systematically using scripts and protocols 
(Appendix E-F) when asking how participants compare and justify, contradict, or elaborate their 
perspectives during animated discussions –provoked by visual triggers of potentially relevant 
images—the resulting data can offer evidence showing how tensions crystallize.  This evidence 
is, in part, crystallized by the relative presence or absence of the moderator in each meeting as 
shown in word clouds detailed below and is also confirmed in discussions of frequencies 
presented below as well. When examining tactics of differentiation within collectivities this 
‘text-as-data plus survey indicators’ framework also proves useful for seeking clarification about 
axes of (dis)agreement, unanimity and consensus.  These coordinates show empirically just how 
group norms operate in comparisons across generation, life experience, and location.   
To show how interactions and discourses are constructed in these settings, I focus on how 
common keywords are used and developed two complementary ways.  My approach to 
describing and analyzing the data extends the text-as-data approach outlined above. In short, 
using tag clouds and word clouds of frequently voiced notions alongside cross-tabulations of 
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characteristic strategies across groups, generations, and geographies, competing narrative 
strategies are revealed in clusters of common understanding (e.g. students saying “not have” or 
“not go” versus pensioners “not know” or “not understand”).  Both of these techniques are 
detailed below in the next part of this chapter. However, since discourse is produced and 
understood only in context, I also go beyond simple attention to frequencies and counts to ask 
how labeling strategies are used in practice and collectively across space and socio-economic 
situation.  
 
Part II: Research Design 
A) Population Description and Participant Selection I:  Facilitator  
 Standard focus group protocol rightly demands use of a moderator for several reasons.   
The most obvious logic is that using a facilitator enables the PI to observe additional cues like 
body language in anonymous settings where video recording is unacceptable. Maia Metaxa, a 
seasoned Moldovan journalist who has lived in Chisinau and the countryside, served as 
facilitator. Her contributions have proven invaluable, though she only received a nominal fee of 
100$/survey plus 100$/transcript.  She was chosen because of her resume and exceptional 
communication skills developed over many years conducting interviews as the BBC Moldova 
correspondent, executive editor at privately held Publika TV, and instructor at the local Center 
for Independent Journalism (itself an OSCE-backed project in stabilization and conflict 
resolution). We first met while working at a women’s legal assistance NGO in 2002 and have 
collaborated successfully on counter-trafficking and independent media projects since then. Her 
skill set, refined during her work as a migration information hotline coordinator, radio talk-show 
host, and executive news producer, were invariably on display during data collection as she 
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executed protocols consistently and read scripts faithfully time after time, but also offered 
follow-up questions if an answer appeared vague, as evident in the study.  Perhaps as 
importantly, Maia was able to implement the research design in a way where each participant 
seemed to feel comfortable enough to stay the entire meeting despite sensitive subject matter and 
an enthusiastic foreign observer taking notes at her side.   
In short, Maia conducted all focus groups as the facilitator and I always sat next to her. 
To collect data during focus groups and ensure meetings followed a standard plan, we developed 
a protocol and script and tested it in the pilot meeting in Chisinau with students (Appendix E-F).  
The scripted menu of topics included socio-economic indicators, perceptions of nations/states, 
and allegiances to ethno-linguistic communities, migration histories, and ideas about iconic 
landscapes and banal symbols as measures of identity and/or attachment to place.  These tools 
and the ability to test them enabled comparison across groups and helped promote effective data 
collection. Significantly, Maia always followed pre-determined protocols and closely adhered to 
structured scripts in precisely the same order, except during the pilot exercise when several 
triggers failed to resonate with the participants which, in follow-up interviews (P2, P4) were seen 
as immature rather than shocking in a more thoughtful way and thus simply not worth discussing 
further. Aside from her improbably consistent and curious role as provocateur and peacemaker, 
Maia proved effective as a moderator in the true sense.  She encouraged chatty participants to 
share the space, prodded reluctant participants to voice their inner monologue, and made rather 
diverse groups feel both welcome and willing to share their sometimes-traumatic experiences in 
addition to their time. Findings show that using such approaches to the nation and the homeland 
can elicit useful data.  
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Two examples of Maia’s contributions are evident in her ability to get participants to 
expand about sensitive topics and experiences.  Repeatedly, she challenged participants to 
explain unprovoked claims about contentious points such as what “patriot(ism)” means versus 
ideas of nationalism whenever is was mentioned independently by participants.  The second 
example shows Maia was able to facilitate discussions about undocumented migration --and 
personal trauma associated with it-- among return migrants and others who are directly affected 
by labor emigration. One instance involved a woman smuggled to Italy, via Austria, in a grocery 
bag after a trip to Romania.  Maia’s mix of local knowledge, topical expertise, and skills 
encouraged people to speak freely in a country with an authoritarian past.  This point cannot go 
unacknowledged.  Transcripts and visualizations based on them show her consistency evident as 
interventions in the word clouds (see appendix) summarizing her role at a glance and in 
comparison. Aside from her journalistic credentials, she is fluent in English, 
Romanian/Moldovan, and Russian languages so she was able to assist with clarifying potential 
misunderstandings during meetings, transcribe audio recordings of meetings, translate a handful 
of Russian-language idioms, and verify translations or interpretations during subsequent analysis. 
Also, it is worth noting that working with a female facilitator appears to have served to create a 
more gender-balanced environment for participants.  This contribution was presumably 
beneficial in promoting more fluid exchanges because 68% of my participants were women too, 
a figure related to reliance on teachers who are disproportionately teachers and pensioners who 
are more likely to be female because Moldovan women outlive the men16.  Politicians, as in the 
wider population, were predominantly male as were return migrants.   
 
                                                
16 In 2010 demographic data from the census bureau, the total population was 52% female.  Those 
aged 18-35 were 49% female, 36-60 were 53% female, 65+ were 61% female. 
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B) Survey Instrument  
At the start of each focus group, participants arrived to the meeting to find two copies of 
the survey instrument (one in Moldovan/Romanian language, the other in Russian), the focus 
group trigger-image kit, a copy of the research questions guiding the discussion also in both 
languages, and sheets of paper for note-taking with the pencils provided.  Each survey was pre-
stamped with a given identifier based on group and location, respondents were asked to offer a 
pseudonym, though not all did, and then the four-page questionnaire was administered over 15-
20 minutes (Appendix C-D).  In seven cases participants asked for longer periods to complete the 
survey, a request that ultimately led to seven lost surveys (four Chisinau pensioners; three 
curators) and many more wild goose chases. Only 3 of 92 surveys returned were in Russian, with 
all others, i.e. 97%, self-selecting Moldovan/Romanian when given the chance17.  All three of 
these cases were in Ungheni, surprisingly, though two were pensioners meaning the Russian 
language was their primary language of work and instruction, suggesting a key legacy of Soviet-
era rules, i.e. their generational legacies.  The other case involved a returned migrant who 
worked irregularly after migrating to Italy without proper documents.  
The questionnaire on “Borderland Attitudes and Experiences” contains five sections that 
mirror subsequent themes in the focus group discussions.  The organization followed in parallel 
order after the initial section, which is about “generation, occupation, and location” and asks 
individual participants about their age, employment, and labor migration/commuter patterns in 
open-ended, nominal, and straightforward ways.  The next section asks about their general socio-
                                                
17 Nationally, representative language figures show 60% self-report “Moldovan” as their mother 
tongue and language usually spoken, 5% claim Ukrainian, 11% Russian, and 17% declare “Romanian” as 
distinct from “Moldovan” in 2004 census figures; more recently, QSP (2010) found 94% of self-identified 
Moldovans claim to speak Moldovan (80%)/Romanian (14%) at home. At the rural/urban scale, the 
balance of the population speaks Moldovan and only 2% of rural residents claim Russian as primary 
language.   
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economic status and its change over time as well as their attitudes, indexed using a Likert scale, 
as well as self-reported patterns of ethno-national and linguistic identification and 
communication at the individual and household scales.  Questions of national pride, social trust, 
and security threats are also interrogated in this section using the language of earlier census and 
public opinion polls to enable rough comparability between my targeted population of influential 
participants and the representative samples of others.  The third section of the questionnaire asks 
participants about their bureaucratic experiences, encounters with formal agents, and mobility 
opportunities using both attitudinal and nominal indicators about how people engage government 
agents when crossing borders and how life at the frontier has changed in light of shifting regimes 
and endemic corruption.  The final section is about migration experiences, place preferences, and 
passport ownership.  The questions are about an individual’s likelihood of migration, 
opportunity, frequency, and motivation to move and include considerations about household 
members and their remittance patterns too.     
 
C) Population Description and Participant Selection II:  Participants, stratification, selection 
This section is about how participants were stratified into groups and selected as 
participants.  I sought to recruit participants from different social groups, occupations, and 
generations via telephone or in person via use of professional association lists for contacts and 
postings of public flyers to join two-three hour weekend, evening, and after-school discussions in 
municipal centers. Specific groups from across society were intentionally targeted to stratify 
participation including separate discussions for six groups because random, representative pools 
of return-migrants for instance, are elusive though Groups targeted include: non-university 
teachers; students over age 18; civil society activists; civil servants and political party members; 
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recently returned migrants; pensioners. In this way, over 125 borderlanders were properly 
contacted during visits to schools, farms, roadside stalls, central markets, non-governmental 
organizations, community centers, and bus stations serving the sites listed above. After following 
uniform protocol and informing potential participants of associated risks and benefits (including 
the modest cash incentive of 10$) and receiving their consent, anonymous, conventional social 
surveys were completed to provide data about participants’ socio-economic status, (family) 
mobility, and (ethno-national) identity. An index of dates and locations is also available in the 
Appendix.  
The meeting with the state ethnographic museum staff (i.e. archivists, administrators, and 
curators) was held in the director’s office to assess expert opinion.  Their answers work to 
establish a baseline for educated opinions and consider the relative sophistication of participants’ 
responses to standard focus group ‘triggers’.  Given their privileged status and curatorial 
decisions, as reviewed in chapter II, this group was shown two additional images, both historical 
maps in their collection (See Maps 6-7). In all, six focus groups were completed in each region 
and one additional meeting with museum curators (not recruited randomly but as architects of 
formal ethno-national and cultural iconography and guardians of tradition), meaning 19 groups 
were organized and included the minimum of at least four participants. I have used their words to 
generate data on discursive frames like community and normative ones like mobility. Group 
level markers exhibited by types are detailed in the next section, following a discussion of 
recruitment and a review of participant responses but they are not included in other sections 
because I do not have similar groups to compare with them. 
Obviously, the logic governing how groups are selected, sampled, and stratified matters.  
My targeted sampling uses separate starting points to avoid conventional problems with selection 
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bias. This approach to recruitment follows Baxter and Eyles (1997) ideas about purposeful 
sampling and “information-rich cases”.  The logic of their approach sees sample size determined 
largely by the need to consider as many experiences as possible when developing conceptual 
frameworks and theories and recruit until redundancy. Still, myriad purposeful sampling options 
exist and I adopted “stratified purposeful sampling” to locate focus group participants because it 
is most useful to ensure sub-groups and settings are given equal voice.  As a result, internal and 
cross-group comparisons of self-reported survey data can be combined with text-as-data analysis 
to map commonalities and differences across influential groups.  Because I aim to study abstract 
understandings and empirical measures to document real processes associated with particular 
moments and mechanisms of social change, my approach is not necessarily random or 
representative. In targeting groups based on relevant experiences, positions of authority, and 
professional orientations instead of relative degree of representativeness, I can investigate how 
influential (if not representative) people and groups see the world in comparison to those in less 
hegemonic social positions, like students.  As a result, this focused recruitment method shows 
how it is possible to maintain a consistent research focus and systematically place attention on 
how different generations and geographic visions intersect and/or diverge. Given financial and 
other constraints of this dissertation, the variety of experiences available was necessarily limited 
but still able to populate a comparative study, as this dissertation shows.   
I relied on different techniques to diversify my participant sample, including use of 
different starting points in terms of both governmental and non-governmental institutions from 
political, economic, and cultural domains, as well as private citizens.  I also used assorted social 
networks to recruit these participants instead of relying on a single node, the single biggest 
potential source of sampling bias in such research.  More specifically, directories and directors of 
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professional associations, social service providers, community activists, work-study programs, 
and social networks accessible to me after introductions from different friends and colleagues as 
well as interview participants and people met on public transportation or in the park were also 
used successfully to generate contacts and access willing participants. Institutional sources like 
political parties, museum administrations, and schools provided especially thoughtful 
participants, as did senior citizen centers where pensioners were happy to respond to requests for 
participants. Still, my search to maintain consistency across segmentation groups organized by 
age and occupation or social position (rather than ethnicity, mother tongue, or class) was 
necessary so the focus groups would contain similarly positioned people.  This method is 
essential to reveal informal understandings via concentrated attention to interactions, 
explanations, and debates among potentially like-minded respondents who share socio-
demographic, occupational, geographic, or ethno-linguistic connections as discussed above.  In 
short, putting ‘like with like’, i.e. populating groups with social peers helped ensure useful 
interactions rather than long silences, especially in unconsolidated democratic contexts like this 
one.  
Systematically dividing samples has practical advantages on top of the aforementioned 
theoretical ones.  This approach is especially convenient but no less rigorous because it promotes 
a ready-made analytical structure for comparing geographic differences across groups or 
generations as well as enabling geographic comparisons of how attitudes do or do not vary 
locally.  Still, this convenience does not come at the expense of analytical rigor because it does 
not assume group or geographic differences exist in meaningful ways. Seen as a problem of 
“segmentation”, scholars (Knodel 1993; Skop 2006) have argued homogenous “break 
characteristics” must be seen from multiple perspectives and levels.  To maintain comparability, 
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segmentation must be consistent. Therefore, in terms of structure between four and six group 
types are commonly seen as ideal, with fewer participants seen to enable more charged and in-
depth assessments of narrative and self-identifying strategies. My attention to seven distinct 
groups is consistent with this view of comparability and they are the right size and breakdown 
according to the literature above. This approach to breadth limits the potential of one participant 
or even an entire group to spoil the sample or dominate debate, and given my coding and word 
cloud scheme, it is evident when such episodes unfold.  As intended, this approach to 
categorizing how the construction of identity works was divided by age or generation, 
profession, and experience and offers a ready-made yet flexible analytical structure. 
 
D) Population Description and Participant Selection III: Summary indicators 
This subsection briefly summarizes how focus group participants self-identified in 
preliminary questionnaires.  In providing an overview of respondents’ first by individual socio-
economic metrics and then by experiences with cross-border movement and geopolitical 
orientation the aim is provide a snapshot of subjects informing my research (Figures A.1-A.13).  
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Figure A.1: Participants, individually, by year of birth 
 
 
Figure A.2: Participants by self-reported material well-being 
 
 
How often can you buy whatever food you need in the store or market?   a) never  b)  
rarely  c)  sometimes  d)  most times  e)  always  f)  seasonally.   
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Figure A.3: Participants by self-reported ethnicity 
 
 
Which category best describes your individual ethnic identity?  a) Moldovan b) 
Romanian c) Russian  d)  Ukrainian e)  other______. 
 
Figure A.4: Participants by self-reported nationality 
 
 
Which category best describes your individual national identity? a) Moldovan b) 
Romanian c) Russian d) Ukrainian e) other______. 
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Figure A.5: Participants by self-reported national pride 
 
 
To what extent do you feel proud to be a member of your national group?  Would you say 
you are:   a) very proud b)  somewhat proud c)  little proud d)  have no pride at all e) you are 
neutral about this question f)  Don't know/Difficult to say  g)  Refuse. 
 
Figure A.6: Participants by self-reported experience: political participation 
 
 
How often have you participated in such activities as joining an election campaign, 
collecting signatures, demonstrating, striking or signing a protest letter? Have you participated:  
a) very often b) sometimes c) rarely d) never e) other (list) f) don't know g) refuse. 
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Figure A.7: Participants by self-reported geopolitical threat 
 
 
Which political unit presents the biggest threat to Moldova’s security? a) Transnistrian 
leadership b) Romania c) Russian Federation d) EU e) Turkey f) Ukraine g) other______.   
 
Figure A.8: Groups by material well-being 
 
 
How often can you buy whatever food you need in the store or market?    a) never  b)  
rarely  c)  sometimes  d)  most times  e)  always  f)  seasonally 
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Figure A.9: Group responses by self-identity-ethnic 
 
 
Figure A.10: Group responses by self-identity-nationality 
 
 
Which category best describes your individual ethnic identity?  a) Moldovan b) 
Romanian c) Russian  d)  Ukrainian e)  other______. 
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Figure A.11: Group responses by attitude:  national pride 
 
 
To what extent do you feel proud to be a member of your national group?  Would you say 
you are:   a) very proud b)  somewhat proud c)  little proud d)  have no pride at all e) you are 
neutral about this question f)  Don't know/Difficult to say  g)  Refuse. 
 
Figure A.12: Group responses by experience: political participation 
 
 
How often have you participated in such activities as joining an election campaign, 
collecting signatures, demonstrating, striking or signing a protest letter? Have you participated:  
a) very often b) sometimes c) rarely d) never e) other (list) f) don't know g) refuse. 
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Figure A.13: Group responses by geopolitical threat 
 
Which political unit presents the biggest threat to Moldova’s security? a) Transnistrian 
leadership b) Romania c) Russian Federation d) EU e) Turkey f) Ukraine g) other______.   
 
In Figure A.1, Participants individually, by year of birth, my data suggest despite the 
absence of five of Chisinau’s pensioners and several museum staff, the graph below marks the 
number of participants by year of birth. My sample clearly reflects a broad age range for 
participants, including those from 18-81 with clusters of those born during the first 15 years 
following the start of the Cold War, with others much nearer to its end.  This situation is 
noteworthy given Moldova’s awkward population pyramid, where productive workers are 
clearly absent (Bureau of Statistics).  In my study, plenty of participants have lived long enough 
to remember well life under Soviet rule, its predecessors, and the post-socialist transition too.  In 
short, my participants are roughly in line with the younger and older generations on the 
population pyramid, but the loss of working-age citizens to emigration is not evident there as it is 
in my data. In Figure A.2:  Participants by self-reported material well-being proxy, show 
participants individually by material well-being as reported in the following question and answer 
pair as proxy for direct interrogation of incomes or earnings: How often can you buy whatever 
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food you need in the store or market?   a) never  b)  rarely  c)  sometimes  d)  most times  e)  
always  f)  seasonally.  In these responses, it is clear none of my respondents appear totally 
impoverished.  Specifically, about 60% of my participants reported they mostly or always can 
meet their food needs while the remainder is affected by poverty or food insecurity in some way 
(30% rarely or sometimes, 10% seasonally). Data from QSP (2010) suggest my participants are 
about average Moldovan citizens in material well-being terms given their data showing 61% of 
self-identified Moldovan nationals can buy all the food they need or more while 37% (vs. 30-
40% of my participants) do not always have enough for food.   
 Geographically, poverty remained rather more deeply entrenched in rural areas. Since 
2009, rural poverty has increased as a direct result of the external economic shocks experienced 
by the country (World Bank 2008). The poorest groups have been hardest hit, losing income 
from agriculture, employment and remittances, and via cuts in wages, pensions, and benefits. 
The World Bank estimates 42% of the rural population are now affected by poverty, as compared 
with 14% in cities and 28% in smaller towns.  Among my participants, this trend is roughly 
consistent with the cities where 20% of my Chisinau-based participants are rarely or sometimes 
food insecure and in line with Stefan Voda, where 48% of my rural participants cannot always 
buy the food they need; Ungheni-based participants are also on par with the ‘small town’ 
average, where about 30% of my respondents are food insecure.  Data from QSP (2010) show 
my participants are in line with their findings that 22% of self-identified Moldovans in Chisinau 
are food insecure, but my Ungheni respondents are a bit better off than the 21% of representative 
Ungheni residents who cannot buy all the food they need always.   
In Figure A.3:  Participants by Self-reported Ethnicity, participants are considered using 
ethnic markers.  The following question and answer was interrogated:  Which category best 
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describes your individual ethnic identity?  a) Moldovan b) Romanian c) Russian  d)  Ukrainian e)  
other______.  In the answers, it is clear my respondents indicate an overwhelming preference for 
a Moldo-Romanian cultural core, but the precise contents of this frame remain unknown as 
discussed above and elaborated in the next chapter. This confusion is absent from census data, 
which consider nationality rather than ethnicity. 
In Figure A.4:  Participants by Self-reported Nationality, I follow earlier census and 
opinion surveys. I too ask about nationality in non-hyphenated terms: Which category best 
describes your individual national identity? a) Moldovan b) Romanian c) Russian d) Ukrainian 
e) other______.  In response to the nationality question, it is clear Russian and Ukrainian 
nationals, as well as Bulgarians, Gagauz, and Roma are absent from my sample, though they 
make up 8.4% and 5.9% of the citizenry according to the latest census, while officially 
Moldovans are 75.8% and Romanians only 2.2%; QSP reports 79% of residents identified 
themselves as Moldovan in 2010, Ukrainians comprised 7%, Russians slightly lower at 6%, and 
a mix of “other” making up 8% --including the Gagauz 3%.  In short, within my data the titular 
group is over-represented.   
In Figure A.5:  Participants by Self-reported National Pride, another common question is 
probed.  The questionnaire asked: To what extent do you feel proud to be a member of your 
national group?  Would you say you are:   a) very proud b)  somewhat proud c)  little proud d)  
have no pride at all e) you are neutral about this question f)  Don't know/Difficult to say  g)  
Refuse.   In considering how much pride participants had in their national group membership, 
about 72% of focus group attendees responded positively --34% of participants expressed very 
favorable sentiment, with another 27% positively inclined too and 11% reported even a little —
while another 15% remained neutral and 5% lacked pride to a degree (the remainder are refuse or 
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n/a responses).  Globally, according to WVS, 90% of people are prouder than not of their national 
identity. But WVS in Moldova found a slightly smaller but representative proportion of 67% of 
Moldovans reported they were either very (19%) or quite (48%) proud of their nationality, 
suggesting my prouder than not participants are more intensely proud but on balance only a bit 
more proud overall.  This intensity is a function of recruiting politicians, teachers, officials, and 
activists who are typically more nationally minded than other citizens, and these effects were 
evident during meetings when teachers recited nationalist slogans or politicians voiced similar 
rhetoric. Still, the representative European Values Survey (EVS) (2006) results suggest a 
substantial number of Moldova’s minority communities have developed strong attachments to 
the country, as 56% of ethnic Russian respondents and almost 60% of ethnic Ukrainian’s surveys 
said they were very proud or proud of their Moldovan citizenship. These numbers are 
noteworthy in comparison to responses from ethnic Russians in Ukraine. There, only 32 % of the 
latter group claimed to feel very proud or proud of being a citizen of Ukraine. 
Comparing Moldova’s score on national pride to the scores of other post-communist 
countries in response to the question, “How proud are you to be a citizen of Moldova?” in 2006 
(Ethnobarometer) elicited the following responses: 12% said they were ‘very proud’, 56% 
‘proud’, 25% ‘not so proud’, 5% ‘not proud at all’, and 2% provided no answer. Comparing 
these results is possible given parallel questions and data about responses to a nearly identical 
question on national pride in the 1999-2000 EVS conducted in many European countries. In 
related analysis of EVS data, Moldova’s score puts the country at the lower end of the list of 
post-communist countries according to the strength of national pride metric. These data suggest 
the Moldovans feel more pride about their country compared to Ukrainians or citizens in two of 
three Baltic states. These findings are consistent with Kolsto and Melberg (2003) who indexed 
 
 
335 
attitudes of titulars and minorities as a crude measure of attitudes to minorities and their 
willingness to assimilate. This study, which was framed as a comparative study of attitudes in 
Moldova and Estonia, found self-styled Moldovans were more willing to include minority 
nationals than were self-reported Estonians. These data are challenged in 2006 WVS findings 
where 34% are not proud at all to be Moldovan, and where Ukrainians ranked 6th compared to 
Moldova’s 4th place position behind Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong; the global average for 
‘limited or no pride’ is 9%. However, minorities in Moldova were less willing to be integrated in 
the national community than non-titulars in Estonia although QSP (2010) suggests this situation 
has changed.  Their recent data from Moldova show 74% of minorities were very (42%) or rather 
(32%) proud overall, and titular Moldovan nationals are more chauvinistic (78%) than minority 
Ukrainians (69%) and Russians (53%). 
In Figure A.6:  Participants by Self-reported Experience: Political Participation, I 
consider why my participants are rather proud of their national group membership.   In my study, 
many participants are politicians and civil society activists, i.e. they have a high rate of political 
participation by default.  This positionality is indicated in responses to the following: How often 
have you participated in such activities as joining an election campaign, collecting signatures, 
demonstrating, striking or signing a protest letter? Have you participated:  a) very often b) 
sometimes c) rarely d) never e) other (list) f) don't know g) refuse.   This situation where 70% 
have participated in some action beyond voting is quite high and a function of the fact that 
activists and students were over-represented in my groups which were held in the Fall of 2009 
after contentious elections proved inconclusive in April that same year and, shortly thereafter, 
riots broke out in Chisinau and parliament set on fire in one of the first so-called “twitter 
revolutions”.  The old-style use of agent provocateurs and Molotov cocktails was also a 
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widespread tactic against old and young protestors alike.  More usually, Moldovans are perfectly 
average in WVS surveys (2006) showing 16% of residents are ‘active politically’.  In the post-
socialist sphere where low levels of activism are well known, the same study found Ukrainians 
participated only a bit more actively (19%) just after the Orange Revolution of 2004-05, whereas 
the axiom “polenta18 does not explode” is well reflected in neighboring Romania’s 6% rate of 
citizen activism.    
In Figure A.7:  Participants by Self-reported Geopolitical Threat, wider frames of 
reference are polled.  As a proxy for conventional questions about national defense and anti-
Russian sentiments, I asked: Which political unit presents the biggest threat to Moldova’s 
security? a) Transnistrian leadership b) Romania c) Russian Federation d) EU e) Turkey f) 
Ukraine g) other______.  Not surprisingly, more than a third of my participants answered to 
suggest Russia, either directly or via what is perceived as its puppet in Tiraspol, is the biggest 
conventional threat to the Moldovan government in power at this time.  In comparison, QSP also 
asked about this subject, with data showing results to questions about how participants think 
about politics and international relations framed in terms of cooperation.  In a ‘Goldilocks and 
the Three Bears’ style of ‘too much, not enough, and just right’ range of relationships with 
outsiders like Russia, 43% of Moldovan nationals think “everything is all right”, whereas 47% 
feel the same way about Romania as opposed to ‘the West’ more generally, where 41% are 
satisfied.  Minorities in Moldova feel differently, with 64% of self-identified Ukrainians but only 
57% of Russians seeking greater ties with Russia; 34% of Ukrainians and report seeing too close 
a relationship with Romania though 49% of the Russians think relations with Romania are fine; 
and only 30% of minority Ukrainians and 37% of minority Russians urging more cooperation 
                                                
18 A reference to “m!m!lig!”, the maize dish considered the national dish of Romania and 
Moldova 
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with “Western states” though fully 40% of Russians are happy with the status quo.  These data 
suggest a clear consensus has yet to emerge in Moldova generally but that my titular participants 
are most afraid of Russia and its proxies in TMR.  CBS-AXA (2011) data from this period show 
an even more divided public, with 48% of respondents favoring closer EU ties, 48% want closer 
ties with Russia or within the CIS; the rest are split with 2% pro-union with Romania and 2% are 
not sure; this situation is a precise quantification of the cartoon from the focus group kit (i.e. 
Appendix F for Focus Group Kit Image 12).   
 
E) Population description and Participant Selection IV:  Summary responses by segmentation 
group 
In this sub-section, I briefly describe participants’ answers to questionnaires to help 
contextualize their similarities and differences across segmentation cohorts.   In Figure A.8:  
Groups by Material Well-Being, it appears my groups are divided among those who are 
struggling and rather well off, though none of the members are destitute unlike many Moldovans.  
Clearly, the group is economically privileged in a relative sense.  In regards to How often can 
you buy whatever food you need in the store or market?    a) never  b)  rarely  c)  sometimes  d)  
most times  e)  always  f)  seasonally  some surprising answers were registered. Looking at 
responses across groups, it appears none have impoverished members, while pensioners, 
politicians, return migrants, and teachers seem worst off.  In comparison, students seem rather 
well off, as do civil society members.   
In Figure A.9:  Group Responses by Self-Identity-Ethnic, the groupings indicate that 
participants seem to identify with Romanian ethnicity over Moldovan, but politicians and 
migrants buck this trend. .  In contrast, Figure A.10, Group Responses by Self-Identity-
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Nationality, suggests that among my participants the national scale provokes less variations than 
the ethnic issue.  Evidently the Moldovan frame tops the Romanian one across all groups except 
civil society, which sees the Romanian nation as their own at three times the rate of those who 
claim a Moldovan nationality.  These data are perhaps better seen in terms of reported affect, as 
suggested in Figure A.11:  Group Responses by Attitude:  National Pride.  Seen in terms of pride 
as a whole, all groups fall on the positive side of the scale for personal assessments of pride.  Not 
surprisingly, those most oriented to public service in an institutional setting are most proud of 
their membership in state and shadow service provision, i.e. civil society and teachers, alongside 
politicians and hopeful students.  So, despite narratives about corruption and government 
legitimation many people have pride in their social group according to these data.   
Two other group clusters are worth cursory attention to political affect and social 
organization.  As proxies for political opportunity, connective structures, and resource 
mobilization, how various groups engage formal political systems remain important.  In terms of 
participation rather than identification, similar trends are evident.  In Figure A.12:  Group 
Responses by Experience: Political Participation, data resemble those on national pride.  In other 
words, civil society, politicians, and teachers were the most active, with students as the youngest 
group reasonably denied the time to gain experience compared to those alive during 
independence and able to vote or migrate since. In terms of threat perceptions rather than pride 
and looking outwards rather than domestically, the Russian Federation and TMR still appear, 
separately though as clear proxies for one another, in data on how groups perceived national 
security threats.  In Figure A.13:  Group Responses by Geopolitical Threat, data show all of 
these groups feared the Russians most of all, with the exception of nationalistic teachers who 
viewed the Transnistrians as the biggest threat to the country’s existence.   
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To summarize these characteristics, individual participants and segmentation groups are 
not perfectly representative of the entire population as indicated in comparisons with other 
random samples. However, data are rather illustrative of how hegemonic actors and relevant, 
influential groups positioned at key intersections of nation-making, state-building, boundary-
demarcation, and citizenship regimes.  Thus, data on these groups, as ‘institutionalizers’ of the 
nation-state, indicate that my well-positioned subjects remain worthy of interest because of their 
disproportionate power over discourses or the trajectories of national inclusion.  Still, in 
comparison with random survey data, my participants appear to be a bit better off in material 
terms, a little more proud given their active social interests and government roles, and a bit over-
representative of titular groups.  Given the political crisis at the time of fieldwork, my 
participants were understandably a bit more political than usual and undecided on geopolitical 
questions about looking east or to “the West”.  
 
F) Field Site Selection I: Justification  
This project proposed to and ultimately succeeded in maintaining a focus on two border 
zones –Ungheni and Stefan Voda-- and is centered in the capital Chisinau. My research targets 
these three raions, or local sub-units, because of their territorial significance in terms of identity, 
mobility, and security. The capital city is officially populated by 67% Moldovan nationals, 14% 
Russians, 8% Ukrainians, and 5% Romanians.   Residents of Ungheni and Stefan Voda, by 
contrast, identified as Moldovan at rates between 88-93%, respectively. This study focuses on 
the Ungheni raion along the Prut River because it has both informal symbolic and formal 
institutional and territorial importance.  
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Pragmatically and geostrategically, Ungheni is a strategic site and has been since the 
1870s. Then, it was chosen to host a key railroad junction by Russians in preparation for the 
Russo-Turkish war.  No less an authority than Gustave Eiffel, the French tower’s namesake, 
designed the bridge itself.  This French connection is not an isolated involvement, as the border 
also reflects the transition in geostrategic thinking and doing, from lavish territorial defenses of 
frontiers like those discussed by Foucher (1998) to those “new security threats” like cigarette 
smugglers and human traffickers that Bigo (2000) argues are perceived to govern risk-
management around the EU today (Walters 2004). Because Ungheni also hosts the newly 
renovated Moldovan Border Guards training center as a legacy of its status as a “restricted area” 
of limited mobility during Soviet times, it remains a solid institutional marker of central state 
control and boundary-making preferences. As such, its inhabitants are positioned at a key 
intersection in the geopolitical and national imagination given close proximity to Romania and 
easy access to Romanian airwaves (those in Stefan Voda are jealously incommunicado because 
of Transnistrian radio-jamming practices in Grigoropol) and simultaneously reliance on central 
government support.  
Emotionally, Ungheni was the site of the biggest and most iconic podul de flori (bridge of 
flowers) cross-cultural exchanges with Romania during independence in May 1990 and again in 
1991.  At that time, thousands of citizens marched across the Prut at multiple sites to promote 
linguistic and ethnic ties and connect with their families after long separations. Then, Soviet 
Moldovans and socialist Romanians celebrated newfound independence when thousands 
marched over the six other bridges to (re)unite under patriotic placards and kiss their kin.  In this 
iconic event Romanian priests led a Te Deum, or group procession of hymn-singers, and marched 
to support the Moldovan independence movement led by the opposition social movement calling 
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itself the “Patriotic Front”.  My participants recalled that speeches were absent but euphoric 
expressions of music and merrymaking were not. Archival photos show protesters waving 
banners with lyrics of patriotic poetry on parade, including the country’s original romantic 
nationalist, the Moldavian Eminescu.  In the photo (Appendix F Images 6-7) of this event used in 
focus groups, the words “From the Nistru to the Tiza tides, all Romanians filled with cries; all 
Romanians hear my cries” appear in an explicitly geographic call celebrating a return to the 
historical limits of “Romania Mare”, i.e. “Greater Romania”, marked via collective invocation of 
the sacred landscapes encircling the Carpathians and the Nistru in Moldova to the Tisa River in 
Ukraine. In both the physical and political geographic sense, Ungheni is a rich site for border 
study. 
Two sites in Stefan Voda raion, both situated along the Ukrainian border and the 
disputed Transnistrian “line of control”, were also included.  The village of Olanesti, within sight 
of the internal and unrecognized TMR boundary, and the Stefan Voda municipal center on the 
main road to Odessa’s major markets and Tiraspol’s smuggling corridors were selected to see 
how problems and perceptions might differ. In short, whereas the EU has authority to control 
Romanian frontiers, it does not have such power over the TMR or Ukraine border.  Indeed, the 
Nistru boundary remains incomplete as noted above and this site is a different kind of work in 
progress.  To compare these data with views held away from the actual border zone, citizens 
living in Chisinau participated in the same process.  Palanca, further south on the main 
commercial road to Odessa, was originally proposed at the outset of the project as site for 
comparison against the commercial and cultural backdrop of the Romanian situation and the 
capital city. However, after visits to recruit participants from this town and interview pensioners 
selling roadside produce it became clear an insufficient number of resources were available to 
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populate focus groups in a robust way. Chisinau, as capital city and centrally located command 
and control node, is important both because 1 in 5 Moldovans live there and because it is the hub 
of formal political and economic activity.  Moreover, because most international, EU, and NGO 
offices are located there, as are formal archives, this site works as control to compare actual 
borderland areas to those more than 15km removed, but still in a state-scale sort of limbo.   
 
G) Field Site Selection II: Site Summaries 
A summary of descriptive characteristics and dominant attitudes of research participants 
reveals generational and geographic divides along several axes. Census data suggest and other 
surveys (QSP 2010) confirm these sites are not abnormal in terms of demographic indicators, i.e. 
they are not disproportionally populated by Bulgarian or Gagauz residents.  Below, I briefly 
describe self-reported data of my respondents broken down by group type, geography, and 
measures of them. In terms of geography, Stefan Voda seems worst off, though teachers and 
politicians in the city, alongside rural pensioners, seem similarly disadvantaged, especially in 
comparison with return migrants and, strangely, students and civil society—two groups typically 
considered less affluent than others. Answers to other survey questions suggest the national 
identification answers parallel the ethnicity data in general.  However, in Chisinau less parity is 
evident where the Moldovan nation appears preferable to the Romanian one but still Russians 
and Ukrainians among other minorities are again absent.   
Following this analytical structure, data suggest my participants from the capital have the 
most pride.  Outsiders like those in Stefan Voda and Ungheni are less one-sided and more evenly 
divided, though still clearly rather proud of their national membership.  Given this pride, data 
from questions about political participation are worth considering.  The findings there show little 
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variation in experience with political participation as evidenced by participants when considered 
across geographic contexts.  The respondents thus appear to be an active group interested in 
society and therefore they can be considered to serve as thoughtful sources of data.  Finally, 
paralleling the above analysis, it is also worth noting if external perspectives are divided along 
spatial lines by research participants’ site of residency. Regardless of location, participants found 
Transnistria to be the primary threat.  This situation did not vary noticeably across space, from 
areas immediately neighboring this zone to areas far removed from it and more connected to the 
Romanian-European space across the Prut.  In this instance, mental maps of fear seem less 
rooted in immediate Euclidian distance and more concerned with a wider notion of homeland 
and ‘national security’.   
 
Part III:  Methods 
A) Visual Methods and Photo-Elicitation 
A description of visual methods generally, in geography, and in my project is needed. I 
combine discourse analysis of visual trigger images in ways sensitive to the construction of 
mental maps and am thus following other research about how ideas are produced via 
iconography.  As Goodwin (2001: 157) observed, “for the past thirty years conversation analysis 
and ethnomethodology have provided extensive analysis of how human vision is socially 
constructed”.  In other words, my approach is not entirely new as the history of visual methods 
and field research suggests. The ethnomethodologies and images used to provoke discussions or 
provide data for analysis typically fall into two camps according to how and why they were 
made.  Said differently, there are ‘already-existing tools’ and those that are ‘participant created’ 
and generate images for the researcher to analyze; I use the former. In the literature, some argue 
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the latter are more empirical, as they are more widespread in anthropology and geography, 
whereas the former are perceived as more communicative and media oriented, asking what 
viewers think images mean (Banks 2007).  These approaches to the original contexts of 
production and reception alongside subsequent contexts of reception are important because they 
document situated ways of seeing and the things that are seen (Berger 1972; Rose 2004).  In my 
view, which focuses on capturing how participants perceive socio-spatial transformation as 
communicative strategy and thus necessarily involving mass media, I combine rather than 
separate these traditionally competing views via content analysis.  As detailed above, this 
approach is equally useful for understanding photos or speeches and suggests the role of ‘visual 
culture’ when participants comment on the content and meaning of various images.  
Among social scientists that use visual methods, using found images presented as photos 
or videos are a well-known technique.  With the exception of an outspoken amateur cartoonist in 
Olanesti who volunteered his rich portfolio --replete with a bona fide cartographic land octopus-- 
once the meeting ended (see Map 8) I did not ask participants to make photos or draw maps, but 
rather to interpret them.   
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Map 6:  Cartographic land octopus shackles Moldova, drawn by Stefan Voda pensioner (2009) 
 
 
 
My approach is rooted in logic that stems from the fact that in the field, images can work 
as objects and as such they have biographies (Appadurai 1988).  By extension, I used photos 
(Photographs 1-10) as objects exhibiting ideas about socio-spatial change, from those celebrating 
the 650th birthday of founding father Stephen the Great to others of awkwardly composed 
billboards advertising the spatio-temporal vision of “To Europe, for a decent future”. Clearly, the 
context in which social research deploys such objects in interview or group settings varies.  
Moreover, the value of video and moving images is also well documented.  In studies of 
Egyptian modernity, Abu-Lughod (2004) interviewed participants about a popular TV drama.  
Significantly, her conclusion that the social and political importance of the serial reveals more 
about the construction of the producers than the perception of viewers is provocative and 
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instructive.  Her finding matters to me because it shows how unexpected results can come from 
such tools and that participants are not ‘needing enlightenment’ as much as the images’ 
producers.  To me, the lesson from such findings shows the need to use multiple images and 
consider various perspectives since participants are not passive and their challenges can highlight 
the production and transformation of knowledge and identity as evidence of social change.   
Another strength of photo-elicitation is related to memory.  This method has been shown 
to help participants invoke comments and spark memories in interview and focus group settings 
(Banks 2007).  These studies have shown how specific examples of social relations, cultural 
form, or territorial control depicted in the photographs can become the basis for a discussion of 
broader abstractions and generalities. Conversely, vague memories can also be given renewed 
sharpness. Such studies of photo-elicitation and memory (Chiozzi 1989) have been used in 
similar contexts including studies of a Tuscan migrant village and its older inhabitants’ ‘cultural 
disintegration’.  In studies of photo-elicitation and ethnicity among Chinese and Vietnamese 
(Gold 1991), photos were used to prompt participants to discuss the stereotypes each holds of the 
other.  As in my research, these tools worked to help generate discursive data, as respondents 
were able to elaborate upon their views and the basis for them. Taken collectively, this approach 
works to increase intimacy between researchers and subjects when collaborating to explain 
various instances.  The use of moving pictures was particularly useful in this regard.  In 
considering both the original contexts of an image’s production and subsequent contexts of 
reception, it is a mistake to limit use of these techniques to eliciting data about content.  In 
existing research as well as my own, these prompts are equally useful for studying the internal 
narrative of an image, i.e. the story it tells.  In this way, there are also two external narratives, i.e. 
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the immediate here and now context of interview, but also the there and then original production 
of the images, whose selection is detailed in the next sub-section.   
 
B) Trigger Image Use I: Selection 
Research topics were examined using trigger images collected from museum collections, 
including maps and documents, as well as iconic and banal representations, including billboards, 
banners, cartoons, and music videos captured from a park, sidewalk, or website. I took digital 
photos of images during preliminary site visits and captured graffiti during my daily multi-hour 
walks around Chisinau or other (potential) field locations (Photographs 1-10).  These visual tools 
were used to elicit individual and group level understandings of socio-economic change and 
political transformation in a borderland. This approach was pioneered by Meinhof and 
Galasinski (2000) during research on the German-Polish and former German-German borders. 
Replicating Meinhoff (2003) I used carefully chosen images showing iconic moments involving 
geo-physical features like the Prut River bridge, political ones of national symbols or leaders like 
Stephen the Great, economic trends of official Bank of Moldova remittance data by year since 
the ruble collapsed in 1997-98, political cartoons of corruption and border control, banal 
commercial billboards, and historic snapshots of the frontier during key moments of transition.  
These were used to investigate attachments and affinities to place and community.  Moving 
images in the form of a brief music video of a contemporary Eurovision song contest submission 
celebrating common culture and comprised of home video footage contributed by citizens 
countrywide and documenting banal scenes alongside iconic landscapes were also used 
successfully.   
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My selection procedures involved visits to formal and informal spaces. The guiding 
principle in the decision process was to find materials that would help respondents remember 
their attitudes and expectations and to articulate them reflexively and deliberately.  Thus, I 
sought images that would provoke discussion or stimulate memories.  In this way, the images are 
biased towards those that ‘trigger’ interactions among participants, as the interactions rather than 
the images are the object of research.  Accordingly, I sought out spaces including the state 
ethnographic and national history museums’ exhibits and archives.  I attended cultural events 
like ceramics festivals, ethno-folkloric societies’ joint birthday party celebrations for medieval 
hero Stephen the Great and national holiday ceremonies including “Our Language Day” (favored 
by pro-Romanian sympathizers and represented in the first trigger image on display in the state 
ethnography museum) and “Independence Day” parades (favored by the old guard Communists) 
(Photographs 7-8, 10).  After building a diverse collection of images and discussions in later 
meetings with the facilitator, those images that appeared most closely matched with the research 
aims were selected for testing. Then, pilot focus group participants were observed and consulted 
about which images resonated or fell flat with which themes.  Perhaps counter-intuitively, the 
students failed to respond to the most graphic images of hopeless workers stuck in mindless jobs 
(Photograph 2).  Ironically, these visual signs did not provoke despite their original role as eye-
catching bus stop advertisements designed to induce precisely these same participants (as 
potential consumers of their services) into seeking help with getting a better job outside the 
Moldovan labor market.  Because they failed to support the prime directive of the dissertation 
and despite provocative design, they failed to trigger useful interactions so they were eliminated 
from future media kits.  
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In terms of the migration effects and remittance data, given this topic’s commonplace 
discussion in mass media and economic development venues, the goal was to produce an easy to 
read graph alongside iconography of currency that would enable respondents to reflect on the 
costs and benefits of labor migration and diaspora-driven development.  This method was easy to 
read, marked a clear point in time, and allowed informal explanation of how those caught up in 
these trends might be interpreted, rather than solely relying on social scientists and development 
experts as the source of knowledge and understanding.  The cartoons are the work of A. 
Dimitrov, an elder statesman of political art in Moldova and one-time samizdat provocateur 
(Appendix F Images 8-10; 12-13).  The images I chose are from his Transparency International-
Moldova sponsored exhibition “Artists Against Corruption” (2003) and his syndicated cartoon 
posted on the country’s leading online news portal both domestically and among the diaspora, 
Unimedia.md.  The final images are courtesy of EUBAM and show an inspection by agents in 
progress (Appendix F Image 11) and snapshots (Appendix F Image 14) of a representative series 
of billboards from around Chisinau and Ungheni –“To Europe for the Future”, “Moldova, my 
homeland”—that are my own.  These represent the ubiquitous appearance of ostensibly 
ambiguous slogans about space and time and unique connections to universal characteristics like 
sun and sky and transport.  Since I was unable to secure a meeting with the advertising firms 
responsible for their display to discuss their design, I can only report on speculation from a local 
Chamber of Commerce representative who claimed they were simply inoffensive emblems 
designed to fill unsold space (Interview H).  Others speculated during the interviews that they 
were simply a Communist plot to mimic other post-Soviet urban landscapes like Moscow and 
Kazakhstan (P4, Chisinau Civil Society). 
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C) Trigger Image Use II: Mixing methods and media kits 
This section describes how group meetings worked. Unlike earlier projects (i.e. 
Meinhoff) where textiles, artifacts, and enlarged photos were presented to participants, my 
approach relied on traditional paper images collected in ‘media kits’ (Appendix F) and also a 
battery powered laptop computer.  Photocopies of ‘triggers’ were collated in reverse order on 8.5 
x 11 sheets of paper, stapled, and placed face down on the table to be used as kits for participants 
to open one page at a time so as not to anticipate future questions once meetings began.  In five 
of 19 groups, respondents anticipated future topics with references to historic events like the 
“bridge of flowers” (Appendix F  Images 6-7) or “national language day” (Appendix F Image 1) 
protests during independence and, in two other instances people referenced the nationalist poetry 
of Eminescu (whose stanzas appear on the banner referencing the nationalist fantasy of 
maximum archaeological extent coincident with the full scope of interwar “Greater Romania”.  
In this way, the material and historical references triggered by images were in line with talk 
about images and ethno-national and territorial change, and were also evidently in line with 
participants, which is reassuring. Still, problems were encountered and two group discussions 
differ from all the others in minor but revealing ways.  
In short, presenting images around a conference table and using a laptop computer 
monitor to provoke discussions of borderland and national development, common culture, and 
ethno-folkloric authenticity worked better than expected despite being necessarily hierarchical. 
First, the moderator explained the ground rules including concerns of anonymity and 
administrative points like payment and leaving early, it was immediately underlined that “there 
are no right answers”.  Participants were welcomed, offered cookies and soft drinks, and invited 
to complete a brief survey in the language of their choice, as both copies of the questionnaire and 
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a focus group kit were placed at each seat.  After completing the survey in 15-20 minutes, 
participants were asked to recall any jokes or anecdotes that reflect Moldova(ns) in the world.  
Jokes and humor under communism and during the post-socialist transition have served as vital 
sources of data about daily life and political elites. Modern Moldovans are continuing this 
tradition.  With the exception of one group of young adults in Stefan Voda, the subsequent 
exchange of stereotypes and characteristics served as an outstanding starting point to help 
participants feel relaxed and begin to communicate collectively.  Generally, the jokes took two 
forms and respondents often differentiated between those that praise Moldovan qualities and 
those that mock them.  When Moldovans are presented as clever, industrious, or possessing 
special qualities, participants seemed to approve of their use.  On the other hand, negative 
portraits are also seen as containing elements of truth related to victimization and socio-
economic exclusion as in the joke about the Russian kicking the Moldovan and Ukrainian out of 
the airplane because, like the wine and vodka bottles thrown out first, “we have plenty of them at 
home.”  Such statements can be read as a commentary on economic exclusion and Soviet 
legacies.   
After this introductory period, the standard group discussion began by asking participants 
to consider a particular theme, the facilitator introduced an image (pair) and discussions began 
around the topic though they typically diverged in revealing ways.  Subsequent measures of 
attachment include attention to discourses of in/out group construction and notions of community 
and/or material deprivation such as nostalgia for particular political orders or material goods. In 
an attempt to further extend photo-elicitation techniques, my triggers also incorporated a three 
minute video clip displayed on a laptop computer monitor – pop star Nelly Ciobanu’s recent 
Eurovision song contest entry the “Moldovan Hora”-- to provoke discussions about borderland 
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life and national character.   This modern adaptation of an iconic folk dance was well known 
even to the pensioners.  As “common culture”, it paints a conventional collective portrait of 
Moldovan food, drink, and dance.  Not surprisingly, elite or educated ethnographic museum 
personnel found it simultaneously un-Moldovan (e.g. “It is totally Balkanized”) and inauthentic 
despite the video’s origin as a montage of Moldovan life captured by residents and assembled by 
the producers.  Some youth found it to be a stereotypical effort and were either offended by its 
content or unmoved by its accuracy.   
Similarly, political cartoons proved to elicit particularly lively discussions and keep 
participants involved and interested in the material.  While they typically agreed with the point of 
the artist A. Dimitrov, some pieces promoted serious reflection on geopolitical themes and 
parliamentary politics, especially concerning a future where EU visas, Romanian passports, and 
Russian actions matter.  The cartoons also helped ease into discussions of corruption and 
exclusion.  Finally, basic statistics were gathered into a table to consider questions of economic 
life and labor migration using official Bank of Moldova data on transfer volumes since 1999, the 
first full year following massive out-migration surrounding the ruble’s collapse in 1997-98.  
While experts commonly interpret such numbers in quantitative terms, participants typically 
argued about how such money affected families with access to it.  Their discourses on crises 
show social effects (e.g. generations of youth raised with grandparent or no supervision) as much 
as political (e.g. electoral and geopolitical stalemate) and economic (e.g. corrupt practices, 
remittance-dependent consumption) ones.    Several noteworthy outcomes are evident in this 
approach. For instance, no students outside Ungheni could identify the “bridge of flowers” event 
by site.  By contrast, many older research participants said they had attended those social events, 
including those in Chisinau and further afield in Stefan Voda. At the beginning of this project, I 
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asked precisely this question, i.e. “Will images of the ‘bridge of flowers’ events and their ethno-
linguistic nostalgia affect or resonate with ethnic Ukrainians living near Transnistria in the same 
way such memories might matter along the European frontier?” and found the answer to be “it 
depends” on factors like generation as the failure of youth outside the region to identify the 
image suggests.   
 
D) Focus Groups II: Transcription, translation, and triangulation  
 This section describes the transcription, translation, and triangulation regime used to 
prepare my data for analysis.  Using a consistent format, the responses were converted into text-
as-data.  They have been transcribed, translated, and triangulated across groups, broken down by 
topic and segmentation group, and coded for keywords and the presence or absence of topics like 
ethnicity.  This process allows for all the data and information collected throughout the fieldwork 
to be compared, visualized, and analyzed in multiple but ultimately complementary ways.  This 
procedure also enables a variety of coding schemes and accommodates competing ideas about 
units of analysis, comparability, and transferability as described in the next sections.  Simply, 
data have been coded and analyzed for consistencies or irregularities and used to develop 
understanding about which focus groups find which topics interesting and/or important (Gould 
and White 1974; Meinhoff 2003).   
While no perfect schema exists, the goal in converting text to data was to learn how 
participants think and talk about issues without obscuring more subtle ways they also express 
themselves, like narrative construction and the variable use of ‘form’ and ‘content’ words 
(Steward et al 2007).  And while no perfect transcription exists, these are useful for indexing and 
interpretation, storage and retrieval (Bloor et al 2001).  They document speakers and are cross-
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referenced to each participant’s survey questionnaires.  Each speaker is anonymized and, when 
the data are cleaned, they can be rapidly visualized in word or tag clouds and pivot tables or 
cross-tabulations as shown in the Appendix and discussed below.  Using this method also 
enables counts of keywords, which can themselves support logical analysis when they reveal 
complementary definitions, beliefs, and reflections related to how individuals and social groups 
perceive ideas (Williams 1976, 1982).  The relative weight of each speaker/participant is 
balanced within each group but not comparable across groups because I cannot assume each 
speaker across groups spoke the same amount since different groups emphasized different topics.  
This kind of transcription, though it obviously depends on the nature of the questions asked and 
direction of the conversation, is useful because it notes agreement or disapproval by participants 
and interjections too, and helps reveal the participants’ logic instead of imposing further the PI’s 
potentially less meaningful pre-constructed frames. 
  The focus group discussions were digitally recorded and then transcribed, cleaned, and 
coded to enable the production of mental maps, a critical discourse analysis of participant 
imaginations, a survey of individual identities, and rendered data regarding shifting perceptions 
of geopolitical orientation by generation and geography. All transcripts were completed in 
Spring 2010 and I translated them as they became available.  Small parts of several groups and 
one extended section of an Ungheni Return Migrant group evolved into extended discussion in 
Russian, which Maia both transcribed and then translated to English. Since then, coding and 
analysis have paid particular attention to historical and collective recollections of hurt or trauma, 
like when participants spoke of the country being “torn apart”, i.e. dismembered in a particularly 
territorial sense, and how such memories affect identities and imaginations, as well as how they 
might structure mobility opportunities. Following from the notion that categories beyond the 
 
 
355 
national matter, the focus on the common use of particular categories and social scales 
themselves illuminates the ways ethnicity, race, and nationhood can exist and work (Brubaker et 
al 2006).  
 
Part IV:  Primary Data Analysis 
A) Primary Data and Content Analysis I:  Interpretation and interaction 
Some argue the challenge in studies like mine is to capture data suitable for comparative 
analysis.  For them, the claim is that “[i]n survey research data making occurs prior to 
administration of the survey. Such data involves the identification of reasonable alternatives 
from which respondents select and answer…in content analysis, data making occurs after 
observation” (Fern 2001: 124-125).  In other words, researchers necessarily distort the data and 
presume certain frames matter either during collection or analysis. I seek to confront such 
problems with bias in the structure of my investigation, not just the organization of participants.  
When respondents wrote-in complex or contradictory answers (e.g. “Bessarabian Romanian”) 
despite requesting discrete answers via ‘circling the best answer’ schemes, their behavior 
suggests more complex formulations and geographic connotations not initially proposed; my 
survey instrument was able to accommodate the data rather than let it go.  This ability to generate 
links and interconnections can also be seen as a limitation.  Addressing this point, Fern (2001) 
cites Wells (1979) in noting subsequent concerns about the independence and interdependence of 
statistical assumptions are invalid if the aim is to study the effect of groups on individual 
responses, i.e. effects of reference groups on individual attitudes. These academic studies of 
focus group methods have found most research projects use the group, not individual, as the unit 
analysis whereas I use both.   
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My aim is to emphasize discussion and thus to depend on the facilitator, protocol, 
individuals, and intra-group dynamics.  In my synthetic approach, neither the individual nor the 
group constitutes separate ‘unit of analysis’ because I assess both to investigate participant 
identification and self-categorization patterns and techniques in practice and informally rather 
than exclusively via census or survey metrics. Accordingly, my project seeks to balance the 
biases that permeate both surveys (individual attitudes confirming pre-given categorical frames) 
and focus groups (group discussions dependent upon participants and facilitators using 
protocols). In collecting multiple points of intersection around attitudes like threats or national 
identification and contexts of interaction like the use of legitimation and identification strategies 
evident in the narration of experience. Consequently, the most useful codes included in my 
analysis consider the following: a) who does or does not mention a code; b) does each individual 
mention a code; and c) does each discussion contain a code.  However, counts alone are 
insufficient sources and, if taken alone, could violate assumptions about the statistical 
independence of words as significant markers of identification and contextual ones about 
referents (Morgan 1997).   
Debates about generalizability, interdependence, and proper units of analysis are rooted 
in logical concerns about avoiding the potential for basing claims upon an ecological fallacy.  
Indeed, there is no group mind (Davis 1969).  However, frames people use to situate themselves 
via identification and categorization schemes are neither constructed in isolation nor are 
individuals free from social constraints.  So, while a group is made of individual persons it is 
also comprised of interdependent persons and therefore potentially useful for studying social 
interactions and the strategies they use as exercises in group practice and perception. In 
considering the independence of responses across focus groups, interviews, and surveys it is 
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obvious no method is free of threats to bias.  Yet, developing an open-ended but structured 
design engineered to focus on interaction and the institutional setting of the research design 
itself, i.e. questionnaires and group discussions, promoted consistency and thus allowed me to 
focus on comparability, even at the expense of generalizations.  
In discourse analysis of focus group data, definition and classification schemes matter 
most.  In order to incorporate these textual/discursive moves into the research design, I followed 
a systematic approach to unitizing data at multiple scales. Sampling units were generated using 
segmented groups organized according to occupational criteria and personal experience.  
Recording units, or the subsets of sampling units, contain sets of emotional statements and 
political opinions surrounding different events.  These frames can be compared to attitudinal 
indicators provided by that same participant during the prior survey. In my study, the data are 
both individual words and their stems like “ethnic” and phrases “not ethnic”.  In selecting 
context units, or the basis for interpreting recording units, I consider both syntax (i.e. content and 
function words) and structure (i.e. group segmentation by group type, meeting location). In this 
way, I combine both approaches to defining content units because I systematically compare 
different scales of “whos” saying various “whats”.  Consequently, sampling units are taken as 
parts of a whole and regarded as independent of physically identified boundaries and group 
attributes (i.e. size, place, time).  My approach thus combines natural grammar, i.e. words or 
images with categorical units, i.e. terms of reference or their expression like “nation” (regardless 
of length or frequency) referring to a person, object, or event. My coding and analysis framework 
follows Stewart et al (2007) in focusing attention on both the content of interactions and the 
context of recording units.  This focus enables both access to otherwise hidden data sources and 
simultaneously helps analyze this information systematically via attention to signs and symbols 
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as tools for managing subjectivity. Seen this way, key notions used to construct understanding 
about the world serve to classify ideological contents via counts of the raw number of times 
words or types of words are used. In addition, such data emerge here to indicate the weight of 
favorable or other attitudes as markers of bias and/or ignorance.  
 
B) Text-as-Data I:  Counts   
It is important to evaluate the frequency in which ideas and symbols are deployed as 
Williams notes.  Though partial, such measures serve as an important but necessarily limited 
proxy of the relative importance of subjects in the eyes of participants. Looking at how many 
times a word is used helps prevent over-reliance on pre-constructed moderator protocols or 
frames provided for data verification appearing on surveys.  But which words count? Despite 
attention to “keywords” about ‘big ideas’ or “content” words signifying key categories or aspects 
of identification, these devices are hardly the only kinds of ways people manage self-perception 
and self-identification territory as evidenced by the “Secret Life of Pronouns” (Pennebaker 
2011).  As this well-established research in social psychology has demonstrated, individual and 
collective human experiences are contingent upon the relations between language and behavior, 
especially in terms of “function words” like pronouns, i.e. “we” or “us”, and prepositions, i.e. 
“here” and “there”.   As inherently political instruments for governing people and territory, these 
kinds of labeling and debating practices are not limited to binary forms and reveal how people 
think about place.  In short, while keywords are indispensable they cannot be counted without 
also considering their role in context and as performance.  In this research, therefore, I use them 
both simultaneously.  Considering the functions and tactics wrapped up in discursive 
constructions, simple frequency counts are necessary but insufficient when analyzed alone.  
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Precisely because different kinds of qualifications like “really” or “never” have been shown to 
matter as measures of affinity, intensity, conviction, and contention, they cannot be excluded 
from the study.  These qualifiers are as important as keywords, counterintuitively, because they 
often comprise 30% of all words written and spoken worldwide.  Pennebaker’s succinct 
explanation is worth quoting at length:  
 
Every one of the top 20 is a function word; together they account for almost 30 per cent of all 
words that we use, read and hear. English has about 450 common function words in total, which 
account for 55 per cent of all the words we use. To put this into perspective, the average English 
speaker has a vocabulary of perhaps 100,000 words. More than 99.9 per cent of this is made up of 
content words but these account for less than half of the words we use. This split is comparable in 
other languages. 
 
 
This view shows it is irresponsible to discount ‘minor’ words and such evidence demands 
attention to how such frames operate.  While the most frequent function words are not included 
in the word clouds used in this project, as they are devoid of context and content words matter 
more in this particular limited sense, I counted them separately to enable cross-tabulation of 
communication styles --themselves performative reflections and central elements of self-
identification. The following function and content words were included in the frequency counts 
and include the following relevant terms and their stems.  Though all are unlikely to matter 
equally, I consider them as illustrations of complicated, contentious, or commonly held 
understandings about the content of politically meaningful words: because; border(s); 
bribe(d/s/ery); but; citizen(ship); control(led);  corrupt(tion); country; happy(iness); homeland; 
joy; language; memory(ies); sad(ness); them; they; tradition(s/al); us; we; you; ethnic(ity); 
govern(ment); nation(s/al/ality); passport; security; state(s); tax(es/ation); territor(y/ial).   
 
C) Text-as-Data II:  Contents  
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 A shown above, counts involving words used as data are meaningless without attention to 
the contents of narrative strategies.  Studies of political parties, speeches, and the ways members 
use words to define the content of partisan conflict suggest studying both the weight of words 
and their context.  There are two slightly different goals to be considered when analyzing 
contents: a) feature selection and; b) feature evaluation. With feature selection, the goal is a 
binary decision --in or out-- for the inclusion of features in some later analysis. Political 
scientists might, for example, want to know which words two parties use differently or more or 
less frequently. With feature evaluation, the goal is to quantify data about different features. For 
the authors of “Fightin’ Words”, the extent to which two political parties use each word 
differently is the object of inquiry (Monroe et al 2008). This view might be used to weight 
features in a subsequent model or allow evaluation of qualitative data where the relative 
importance of each word in framing contents of partisan debates emerges.  For these scholars of 
the “text-as-data” movement, the problem is how to deal with massive deposits of disembodied 
words.  With my method of projecting word clouds and summarizing keyword counts, I can also 
trace the reflexivity of the speaker and thus avoid assuming the speaker is reflexive given their 
use of pronouns or keywords.  The results offer a crude index of participants’ relative positions 
or ideas they find worth uttering in multiple ways, adding richness to my data. 
 Another problem in this ‘‘text-as-data’’ discussion is how to visualize and analyze data. 
Like others, I see considerable utility in the word cloud.  Contemporary journalism, internet 
websites, and academic papers have all used lists of words that vary to classify differences across 
groups of documents (Diermeier et al. 2007; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Quinn et al. 2006;  
Sacerdote and Zidar 2008; Yu et al. 2008), pictures of words scaled in some political space 
(Schonhardt-Bailey 2008), or both (Monroe and Maeda 2004; Slapin and Proksch 2008). These 
 
 
361 
word or feature lists and graphics are one of the cheapest, fastest, and most intuitive ways to 
convey the key insight from such analyses—the precise contents of politically interesting 
difference. As a consequence, it is worth noting when analyses 1) produce key word lists with 
odd conceptual matches; 2) remove words from lists before presenting them to the reader 
(Diermeier et al. 2007); or 3) produce no word lists or visualizations at all (Hillard et al. 2007; 
Hopkins and King 2007). I have heeded all three warnings in my approach.  The resulting 
visualizations should still be handled with care. Used in this way, visualizations are held to 
re>ect either a selection of words or a word-speci<c measure that is intended to characterize 
some relevant idea in a study, for example, a topic (Quinn et al. 2006), an ideology (Diermeier et 
al. 2007), or competitive frame (Schonhardt-Bailey 2008). Second, the visualizations, while 
useful, show preconceived assumptions that might not materialize.  Third and more broadly, the 
political content of the words themselves allows word lists and visualizations of words to 
summarize political contents justifying a project (Monroe et al 2008). How should words of 
individuals be weighted and linked to different groups before being compared? 
 
D) Text-as-Data III: Coding 
 The problem when coding content is to create new ways of producing socially relevant 
research.  After transcribing and translating reams of data, the problem of how to count, code, 
and display the information meaningfully emerges as the pre-eminent one for me and other 
discourse analysts.  My coding plans are designed to investigate existing theoretical claims about 
territory and journalistic hyperbole about Moldova(ns) as expressions of sovereignty understood 
as territorial and biopolitical bordering.  In short, following borderland and territory theorists like 
Paasi (2012), the texts were coded for ‘discursive languages of social power’ like “memory” and 
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collective notions like “we”, as well as ‘technical languages of social control’ like “state”, 
“citizenship”, and “corruption”.  Also, “non” words were produced to tease out contentious and 
legitimating discourses. Specifically, the three most frequently appearing “not” constructions 
were counted too with the aim to identify “notknow” or “nothappy” contexts rather than counting 
people who say they are “not happy”, incorrectly, as “happy”.  Still, for visualization and coding 
I rely mostly on conventional content words to avoid potential misinterpretation surrounding 
emotionally laden concepts. 
For visualization, not analysis, the keywords from each segmentation group have also 
been selected and then listed alphabetically.  In these tools, the 100 most popular (usually 
function) words are excluded and all words capitalized in the most legible font. First, they offer 
an immediate way to compare relative participation rates for facilitator and participants across 
group types and geographic locations.  Second, they allow outsiders to assess the likelihood of 
cherry-picked data coming from 19 focus group transcripts without having to read each 
transcript.  Third, they show which terms dominated the discussion versus those evidently 
marginalized in particular places or by particular groups or generations.  Fourth, they summarize 
interactions within and across geographic locations, so they offer insight into place-based 
discursive interactions. Because these tag clouds are descriptive rather than analytical, it is 
appropriate to marginalize pronouns and prepositions in favor of topical and thematic contents.  
However, because I still code the functional words like “we” and “us” in the database but not the 
word cloud, my analysis remains sensitive to the original context of interaction and discussion. 
In simplifying the visual field but remaining attentive to contexts and phrasing, I seek to 
reconcile competing approaches to “stop lists” of words researchers usually remove.  The trend 
has moved from eliminating common words (from 200-300 words or smaller 7-12 term limits) 
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where entire phrases can be omitted, the natural meaning can be changed, and pronoun use is 
improperly evaluated to avoiding this technique completely.  By using a 100-word stop list for 
the visualizations but none at all for the content coding, I seek to resolve this problem. 
In terms of content analysis, responses were coded according to areas of responsibility 
and location of experience. Following this logic, I examined the discourses and perceptions of 
my participants with attention to scale of attachment (i.e. village, nation, religious community) 
and degree of intensity (i.e. subjective measure of loyalty or commitment to view) using an 
approach where the consistency of responses to and perceptions of threats, affections, and 
memories became clearer after triangulating questionnaire answers with spoken responses. 
Additionally, geographic imaginations have been examined to determine “uniqueness and 
generality” across competing and relative visions, just as with data reflecting the “ranking of 
space and place preferences” in terms of potential access and individual or collective desirability.  
Also, locations of “psychic stress” like social revolution or political violence, patterns of 
historical or geographic ignorance as in the “bridge of flowers” events, and limits to spatial 
knowledge as well as notions of allocating peoples to places relative to “perceptions of Europe” 
are all factors included in the surveys, interviews, and focus groups analyzed here using 
questions about place-preferences and security threats.  The results draw on older notions of 
mental maps that used lists of rank-ordering spaces as evidence though in a separate context (e.g. 
Gould and White 1974), but instead use a different visualization method, i.e. tag clouds as 
mentioned above and detailed below.  My web-based version more conceptually models studies 
by Milgram and Jodelet (1976) who used a similar approach to mental mapping in Paris.  For 
them, the frequency in which places were mentioned in interviews determined their relative size 
on the map.   However, since Harari and Beaty (1990) have shown that in hierarchical contexts, 
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like those of managers and workers, rank ordering can be misleading so instead my approach 
opts to follow the latter, more contextual model. Still, from the geographic perspective, how 
political attitudes and practices differ, distort socio-political distance, and influence attachment is 
what matters most and places mentioned in discussions are indeed evident in my word clouds.   
 
E) Text-as-Data IV:  Clouds 
In short, using “word clouds”, or a computer visualization method that basically works to 
create a textual cartogram, or map of words, I have rendered snapshots of group interactions 
where the frequency of word usage is proportional to the size of the word itself.  As such, my 
technique renders a form of mental map that is useful for preliminary and exploratory qualitative 
visualization, analysis, and comparisons useful for generating new or confirming existing 
findings.  While it should never be used alone, this method has several advantages when used 
alongside other techniques. This method, has been used in Political Science (Monroe et al 2008) 
analysis, in computer science (Jose, Silba, and Ribeiro 2011) to generate place-based public 
information request data, and focus group evaluations of education programs (McNaught and 
Lam 2010). In that study the dynamics in focus-group meetings and the need to identify human 
factors (especially the interactions between the facilitators and the participants) that might affect 
the comments made by participants drove the researchers to generate visualizations. For 
computer scientists, this approach allows access to data on place-making and contextuality, as 
early user-interface designs suggest, and therefore empirically useful for understanding situated 
interactions and place-making.   
The ‘cloud’ approach has been used to study environmental issues in geography too.  In 
this case, the method ultimately serves as a form of exploratory, “qualitative GIS” (Cidell 2010). 
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Content clouds thus offer an effective technique for summarizing and comparing information 
from different places on a single issue. However, recent work has shown clouds are better for 
descriptive information than for relational concepts and my findings appreciate this warning 
given my focus on identification practices (Kuo et al 2007).  Additionally, warnings that big 
words stand out offer prudent reminders that tool can be counter-productive given an initial lack 
of context. These findings suggest word clouds are valuable because this approach allows rapid 
generation of views detailing which segmentation groups or localized groups used which words.  
Moreover, because participant and facilitator comments are also visible and yet easily removed, 
the relative dominance or silence of a group member (or overall) is evident at once and in 
comparison.  
In critical geopolitics, such attention to the relationship between discursive and opinion 
data matters because it is the foundation supporting the practice and production of geo-
knowledge (O’Tuathail 1996).  This theoretical approach regularly privileges foreign policy and 
national security discourses like speeches as targets for study because they are hegemonic, 
formal political exercises.  In this literature, such narratives have been shown to affect national 
identity (Dittmer 2007) and have been studied as exercises in statecraft like State of the Union 
speeches in the US (O’Loughlin and Grant 1990).  In this spirit, word clouds can be quite useful 
for representing the contents and characteristics of speech acts.  This practice and its potential are 
evident in Dann (2008) where TagCrowd was used to analyze a key Australian budget speech. 
The study concluded this approach worked well for preliminary analysis. Given the known 
limitations of Wordle, which are elaborated in the final section of the chapter, my use follows 
scholars who argue speeches matter so the intention is simply to offer a quick overview of the 
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data. To recapitulate, cloud-style visualizations are a useful supplement rather than a primary 
analytic tool (Cidell 2010; McNaught and Lam 2010).   
A wide variety of these kinds of visualization tools exist to analyze political speech acts.  
Packages range from proprietary code written in statistical analysis software “R” to less bespoke 
web-based platforms like Wordle and TagCrowd. Both TagCrowd and Wordle are free and easy 
to use. One advantage for TagCrowd is that it has built-in stem analysis software so it takes all 
forms of “nation”, “nationality”, and “nationalism” as the same root. However, Wordle outputs 
are regarded as “more personal and visual than the others” when compared to similar tools 
(Ramsden and Bate, 2008: 6).  Wordle may be the most versatile software to use. Despite its 
playful design and even its founder’s description of the application as a “toy” (Feinberg 2009), 
this tool has serious potential. It works because it enables users to employ an intuitive web-based 
interface to project the text-as-data uploaded to the site.  The toolbar menu then allows the user 
to manipulate the typeface, eliminate common words, and specify the horizontal or vertical 
orientation of words, alphabetically or otherwise, with output appearing as the Wordle word 
cloud. Options for removing individual words using ad hoc or aesthetic criteria are also available 
but I did not use them.  Instead, my scheme was to index word stems separately, preparing them 
for analysis using Microsoft Word and Excel to generate stems, concordances, and key phrases.  
Given my aim to promote comparability, when projecting the word clouds I used an alphabetical 
ordering scheme to allow keywords and actors (i.e. Participants by number, or “P1”, “P2” etc…, 
or “facilitator”) to appear in roughly the same spatial pattern and geometric coordinates. 
 
F) Visualizing Discursive Data: Clouds 
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A preliminary review of the actual word clouds themselves reveals how group patterns 
and geographic variations are rendered using this method.  In the following two chapters I 
compare these images to the actual courses and contents of discussions themselves, but in this 
methods section it is important to identify elements like the role of the facilitator or the socio-
spatial distance.   
 
G) Primary Data and Content Analysis II: Narrative strategies 
In addition to descriptive approaches to visualizing keywords, I am interested in analysis 
of narrative constructions and their strategic use within group interactions as reflections of social 
group dynamics.  Drawing on Wodak et al (2009), my methods pay attention to presuppositions 
or emphasis of sameness and/or difference (the two most important characteristics of identity 
formation) as well as uniqueness, autonomy/independence, inclusion, unity and continuity on the 
one hand, and heteronomy, exclusion, fragmentation, and discontinuity on the other.  In the 
transcripts, I unpack what different subjects mean when they reference themselves or situate their 
viewpoints.  These notions are thus evident as strategic devices and visible in the language and 
argumentative structure participants used to articulate similarities and differences across spatial 
scales during discussions of common themes.   
Other scholars of identification and territorialization have also focused on memory and 
territory.  For a useful typology of such approaches to the “national spirit as metaphysical entity” 
(Kolakowski 1995), and the “national body as metaphor for dismemberment”, cultural 
geographers (Paasi 2012) have shown how historical memory is an indispensable pre-requisite 
but the content need not be true.  Similarly, notions of progress and the future, especially re: 
national reproduction, are important because while the nation is immortal, people are not. 
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Indeed, discussions surrounding the nameable beginning of national consciousness are rich 
sources of data for understanding the process as spatial, temporal, and local as the Chisinau civil 
society group’s debate over ethnicity suggests. Moreover, approaching national identification as 
habitus following Bourdieu (1994) in “rethinking the state”, my attention to how participants do 
or do not invoke state effects through classification systems like those inscribed in law, through 
bureaucratic procedure, education structure and social ritual also offers an empirical approach to 
how effects are made.  In this way, discursive strategies show how state effects like 
“atomization” and “isolation” work empirically to mold mental structures and impose common 
principles of vision and difference can emerge.  Consistent with critical discourse analysis 
approaches to constructions of group difference, I take such moves as performances indicative of 
shifting identification strategies because they show how people understand and use ambiguities 
or maintain distinctions when using collective reference points to use certain social events or 
moments as informal but commonly understand landmarks and waypoints. As scholars have 
noted, these discursive strategies are tools for differentiating oneself from others, and are 
dynamic if prosaic examples of how political differences are manifest in daily life and 
understandings about how the world function (Benhabib 1996). In this way, I am able to chart 
informal and banal but no less important frames Moldovans use to identify with or align 
themselves against one another and their government or in the face of the EU or other external 
interventions.   
In my analysis, I use data about referents for “we” via stereotypical notions of ‘homo 
Moldovanus’. In this way, my view appreciates that the presupposition or emphasis of 
differences between nations often serves the negative.  Here it works separating out those from 
an out-group considered to be a different collective, i.e. ‘how are Moldovans different from 
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Romanians/Russians?’ and evident in “not_” constructions embedded in transcripts showing 
limited knowledge.  As a result, ambiguity and uncertainty are evident in proliferation of 
concordances of “not know” and “not understand” among those who remain in disbelief.  By 
contrast, students and pensioners expressed “not have” and “not buy” more frequently than 
others.  In short, my approach to accounting for the narrative strategies used to build, expand, 
transform, or destroy notions of group identity is to recast them in more contextual yet 
empirically sound study, which I have done as detailed here.  
The accounts of interactions show a variety of narrative and discursive strategies are at 
work generally when people negotiate particular forms of identification and categorization.  
Specifically in this case, ethnic frameworks were rather absent from explanations used to 
construct and justify ‘national self-perception’.  While its absence should not be overstated, such 
trends suggest that among groups that defied generational or geographic explanations including 
pensioners and return migrants (and students to a lesser degree), some did not express 
themselves using ethnic frames as shown in Figure 4.14.1 “Focus Groups by segmentation 
group’s frequency of keyword ‘ethnic(ity)’”.  In addition to group and geographic level 
differences (Figure 4.15.1), other discursive distinctions are evident in the data collected for this 
study.  These data suggest a larger variety of transformative storylines about negotiating socio-
political crises and territorial exclusion were evident in how people spoke about their 
experiences and attitudes about change over time. In some ways, these strategies were 
assimilative and worked to produce corresponding views about problems and events like the 
outcome of widespread labor emigration.  In other situations, participants exhibited these 
strategies when discussing temporal, interpersonal, and spatial/territorial similarities around a 
theme like independence, voicing agreement or disagreement evident in transcripts.  
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H) Primary Data and Content Analysis V:  Triangulation and contextualization 
After considering the kinds of data collection involved in this project, it is important to 
address how they were triangulated, contextualized, and compared.  For those concerned about 
methodological rigor, this precise issue of cross-comparability is rarely documented 
convincingly (Baxter and Eyles 1997).  In light of such criticisms, scholars have addressed the 
types of triangulation and methods for promoting transferability.  Drawing on Denzin (1978), 
Baxter and Eyles argue for checking data against multiple sources, via multiple methods, via 
multiple investigators, relying on a multitude of theories.  I am convinced these concerns are 
valid and have responded accordingly.  In this project, I have targeted samples using different 
starting points, consulted formal and informal sources, employed surveys, and followed-up 
immediately with intentionally similar questions in pursuit of more open-ended and 
interactively-derived answers to the same questions.  It is worth noting, however, that while a 
facilitator was used and external survey data and census figures are included, alongside public 
statements and legal documents, I did not “use multiple investigators” given the dissertation 
format and related limitations.  Still, in terms of maintaining rigor, I worked to crosscheck the 
exchange of ideas in discussions with participants.   
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   APPENDIX C 
FOCUS GROUP SCHEDULE/PARTICIPANT INDEX 
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FOCUS GROUP SCHEDULE/PARTICIPANT INDEX 
 
 Summary by Date, Location, Sub-group, and Gender 
 
 
1) 24 September, Pilot.  Chisinau Students.  5 participants.  5 females. 
 
2) 3 October.  Ungheni Teachers.  6 participants.  6 females. 
 
3) 3 October.  Ungheni Pensioners.  5 participants.  4 females. 
 
4) 3 October.  Ungheni Students.  4 participants.  3 females. 
 
5) 5 October.  Chisinau Politicians.  6 participants.  2 females. 
 
6) 7 October.  Ethnography Museum Staff.  6 participants.  4 females. 
 
7) 7 October.  Chisinau Teachers.  7 participants.  6 females.   
 
8) 9 October.  Ungheni Politicians.  5 participants.  0 females. 
 
9) 9 October.  Ungheni Civil Society.  6 participants.  6 females. 
 
10) 9 October.  Ungheni Return Migrants.  4 participants.  2 females. 
 
11) 11 October.  Olanesti Pensioners.  5 participants.  3 females. 
 
12) 11 October.  Olanesti Teachers.  5 participants.  5 females. 
 
13) 11 October.  Olanesti Students.  5 participants.  2 females. 
 
14) 12 October.  Stefan Voda Civil Society.  5 participants.  2 females. 
 
15) 12 October.  Stefan Voda Return Migrants.  5 participants.  2 females. 
 
16) 12 October.  Olanesti Politicians.  6 participants.  1 female. 
 
17) 14 October.  Chisinau Return Migrants.  4 participants.  0 females. 
 
18) 16 October.  Chisinau Pensioners.  5 participants.  5 females. 
 
19) 16 October.  Chisinau Civil Society.  5 participants.  1 female. 
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   APPENDIX D 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT:  QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Survey ID Number:______   
Respondent Pseudonyn:______ 
Start Time:______ 
 
BORDERLAND ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES PRE-FOCUS GROUP SURVEY 
 
Please  comple t e  th i s  survey  AFTER read ing  and s i gn ing  the  a t ta ched  Consent  Form 
You may REFUSE to  answer  any  ques t ion  wi thout  pena l ty .  
 
I)  Generation, occupation, location 
1)  What year were you born?____________ 
  
2)   Which category best describes your formal education to date? 
a) none  b) lyceum  c)  technical school d)  some university e) university degree f) advanced degree 
 
3) What is your current employment status? Are you: 
a)  Working/Employed b)  Not working/Unemployed  c)  Student   d)  Do not wish to answer  
 
4)  What is your primary occupation sector? 
 a)  agriculture  b)  business c)  transport  d)  government  e)  teacher f) student g) other____ 
 
5) Within your profession, what rank do you occupy? If student or unemployed, see question #6. 
a)  Head position, director,  or owner b) Division head or specialist c)  Employee or technical staff  d) 
Worker e)  laborer-construction  f)  laborer-agriculture  g) Other (list)  h)  Refuse  
 
6)  If you are not working, what is your status?  
a) Student b) Not working – pensioner or invalid c) Housewife or woman on maternity leave d) Currently 
unemployed and looking for work e)  Currently unemployed and not looking for work f) Seasonal laborer 
waiting for new cycle g) Other? (List)  h)  Refuse 
 
7)  How far, in approximate kilometers, is your primary residence from the closest checkpoint, including KIV? ______ 
  
8) Where do you work most often? 
a) Moldova b) Romania  c) Russian Federation d) European Union e) Turkey f) Ukraine g) other_ 
 
9)  How long, in years,  have you lived in your present raion?  List: 
 
10)  Where did you live before? List:   
 
 
II) Socio-economic deprivation + ethno-linguistic identity and national community 
1) How is your personal economic situation compared to 1998? 
 a)  much worse b) slightly worse c) about the same d) slightly better e) much better  
 
2) How is your personal economic situation compared to 2007? 
 a)  much worse b) slightly worse c) about the same d) slightly better e) much better 
 
3)  How is your household’s economic situation compared to 1998? 
 a)  much worse b) slightly worse c) about the same d) slightly better e) much better  
 
4)  How is your household’s economic situation compared to 2007? 
 a)  much worse b) slightly worse c) about the same d) slightly better e) much better 
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5)  How often can you buy whatever food you need in the store or market?    
 a)  never  b)  rarely  c)  sometimes  d)  most times  e)  always  f)  seasonally 
 
6) To what extent do you think it is possible for you to increase your standard of living in the next 2 years?  
a) is definitely possible b)  mostly possible c) mostly not possible d) definitely not possible?  E)  Don't 
know/Diffiult to say  f)  Refuse 
 
7)  Which category best describes your individual ethnic identity? 
 a)  Moldovan b) Romanian  c) Russian  d)  Ukrainian e)  other______ 
 
8) Which category best describes your individual national identity? 
 a)  Moldovan b) Romanian  c) Russian  d)  Ukrainian e)  other______ 
 
9) How do you feel as a member of your national group over past 15 years? Would you say you have:  
a) much stronger attachment b) stronger attachment c) stay the same d) not more attached nor less attached 
e)  weaker attachment f)  much weaker attachment? 
 
10) What is (was) the nationality of your mother?   
a)  Moldovan b)  Romanian c)  Russian d) Ukrainian e) Soviet  f) Mixed g) Other (list)____  h) refuse  
 
11)  What is (was) the nationality of your father?  
a)  Moldovan b)  Romanian c)  Russian d) Ukrainian e) Soviet  f) Mixed g) Other (list)____  h) refuse  
   
12)  Which category best describes your first language? 
a)  Moldovan b) Romanian  c) Russian  d)  Ukrainian e)  other______   
 
13) Which other languages can you use and understand well? (check all that apply) 
 a) Moldovan b) Romanian c) Russian d) Ukrainian e) English f)  other______ 
 
14) I want (I'd like) my children to be educated in...? (check all that apply) 
a) Moldovan b) Romanian c) Russian d) Ukrainian e) English f) other (list)______ 
 
15) To what extent do you feel proud to be a member of your national group?  Would you say you are:   
a) very proud b)  somewhat proud c)  little proud d)  have no pride at all e) you are neutral about this question 
f)  Don't know/Difficult to say  g)  Refuse 
 
16) How often do you discuss the situation of your locality with your neighbors? 
a)  Obligatory, every time I meet a neighbor  b)  Sometimes when I meet neighbor c) Somewhat seldom d) 
No, I never talk to my neighbours about our situation e)  Other (list)  f)  Don't know  g)  Refuse 
 
17) Who are your closest friends? Are they: 
a)  all from your nationality b) mostly from your nationality c) mixed nationalities d)  mostly from other 
nationalities e)  or they are all from other nationalities? F) Don't know/Difficult to say  g)  Refuse 
 
18) How often have you participated in such activities as joining an election campaign, collecting signatures, demonstrating, 
striking or signing a protest letter? Have you participated: 
a) very often b)  sometimes c)  rarely  d)  never  e)  other (list)  f) Don't know  g)  Refuse 
 
19) Which political unit presents the biggest threat to Moldova’s security? 
a)  Transnistrian leadership b)  Romania  c)  Russian Federation d) EU e) Turkey f) Ukraine g) other______ 
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20) Which political unit represents the biggest guarantor of Moldova's security? 
a)  Transnistrian leadership b)  Romania  c)  Russian Federation d) EU e) Turkey f) Ukraine g) other______ 
 
21) To whom does power really belong to in the region?  
a)  To our national group b)  Shared fairly between the different nationalities c)  To people that the 
International Community likes d) To those who have money e)  To those whom we elect f) To other 
nationalities than mine g)  To corrupt officials  h)  Don't know/Difficult to say  i)  Refuse 
 
22) To whom does the power should belong to in this region?  
a)  To our national group b)  Shared fairly between the different nationalities c)  To people that the 
International Community likes d) To those who have money e)  To those whom we elect f) To other 
nationalities than mine g)  To appointed officials  h)  Don't know/Difficult to say  i)  Refuse 
 
 
III) Borderland encounters + mobility opportunities 
 
1)  How frequently do you cross a Moldovan border for work-related purposes? 
a)  never  b) rarely  c) annually d) seasonally e) monthly f) weekly g) daily 
 
2)  What kind of Moldovan border checkpoint do you transit most frequently? 
a)  local b)  internal TMR  c) bi-national d) international land/river e) international airport   
 
3)  How frequently did you request foreign work or transit visas after 1998? 
a)  never  b) rarely  c)  annually d) seasonally e) monthly f)  weekly g) sporadically 
 
4)  How frequently have you requested a foreign visa or additional passport since 2007? 
a)  never  b) rarely  c)  annually d) seasonally e) monthly f)  weekly g) sporadically   
 
5)  How frequently have you interacted with an official border agent of any kind in the last year? 
a)  never  b) rarely  c)  annually d) seasonally e) monthly f)  weekly g) daily  
  
6) In your view, life in the borderland is _________ than in 1989? 
a)  much worse b) slightly worse c) about the same d) slightly better e) much better 
 
7)  In your view, life in the borderland is _________ than in 2007? 
a)  much worse b) slightly worse c) about the same d) slightly better e) much better 
 
8) In the next 5 years, how will the situation of this borderland change?  Do you think the situation will:  
a) definitely improve b) probably improve c) not change significantly d) will probably deteriorate e) definitely 
deteriorate f)  Don't know/Difficult to say g)  Refuse 
 
IV) Migration experiences + Destination preferences 
1) To what extent is it probable for you that you will move in next 2 years? Is it: 
a) definitely b) somewhat probable c) maybe d) will definitely not move e)  Difficult to say  f) Refuse 
 
2)  Where would you like to move?  
a) Elsewhere in Moldova b) Abroad, in the European Union c) Abroad, in the Russian Federation d) Abroad 
in Turkey e) Abroad in United States f) Abroad other (list)_____ g)  Don't know h) Refuse 
 
3)  If you had the opportunity to move, what would be the reason for your move?  
 a)  I want to live in my homeland b)  I want to improve my material situation, to find a more interesting and 
better paid job c)  I fear for my and my family's personal safety d)  I am experiencing discrimination because 
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of my nationality e)  I want to join my family f)  For educational or training purposes g) Other (List) h)  
Difficult to say i) refuse   
 
4)  How frequently have you sought work outside Moldova since 1998? 
 a)  never  b) rarely  c)  annually d) seasonally e) monthly f)  weekly g) daily  h) sporadically 
 
5) How frequently does any member of your household cross a border for work?                                            
 a)  never  b) rarely  c)  annually d) seasonally e) monthly f)  weekly g) daily  h) sporadically 
 
6)  How frequently does that same member of your household remit goods or cash from abroad?  
 a)  never  b) rarely  c)  annually d) seasonally e) monthly f)  weekly g) daily  h) sporadically 
 
7)  In your opinion, which migration destination is most attractive for Moldovans in general 
 a)  Moldova b)  Romania  c)  Russian Federation d) EU  e) Turkey f) Ukraine g) other______ 
 
8)  In your opinion, which migration destination is least attractive for Moldovans in general? 
  a)  Moldova b)  Romania  c)  Russian Federation d) EU  e) Turkey f) Ukraine g) other______ 
 
9)  What passports do you hold (check all that apply)? 
  a)  Moldovan  b)  Romanian  c)  Russian Federation  d)  Transnistrian  e)  Ukrainian  f) other_(list)  g) refuse 
 
10)  What was/is your motivation to acquire additional passports? 
  a)  Freedom to work/travel in Romania  b)  Freedom to work/travel in Schengen zone  c)  Freedom to 
work/travel in Ukraine  d)  Cultural attachment to that state  e) Health/education in that state f)  other   
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                   APPENDIX E 
FOCUS GROUP INSTRUMENT I:  PROTOCOL AND SCRIPT 
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FOCUS GROUP MODERATOR PROTOCOL 
 
I.  Introduction 
*Aim:  To understand your views on Moldovan identity and Moldova’s place in the world 
*Rules:  Answers to questions and responses to ‘triggers’ and fellow participants; No wrong answers  
*Disclaimers:  You can leave at any time; all responses completely anonymous, secure 
*Compensation:  You can leave at any time and still collect the proportion of lei 
*Survey:  The first 15 minutes are general overview to help situate your views 
*Contact:  If you have additional questions, comments, or concerns, please contact us 
 
II. Main Research Questions: 
 
 1.  National border narratives and institutions 
How have historical events and public perceptions of structural, social, political, regional,  
national, and local changes met personal (i.e. informal) understandings of their outcomes? 
  
 2.  Local border storylines and prescriptions   
 How are processes of re-bordering understood and linked (formally and informally) to changing  
 identities and communities inside and outside the border zones? 
 
III. Topics…One page at a time! 
 
**presuppositions or emphasis of sameness and/or difference (the two most important characteristics of 
identity formation) as well as uniqueness, autonomy/independence, inclusion, unity and continuity on the one 
hand, and heteronomy, exclusion, fragmentation, and discontinuity 
 
**presupposition or emphasis of differences between nations often serves the negative, separating from an 
out-group considered to be a different  collective [how are Moldovans different from Romanians/Russians] 
 
1.  Moldovan identity (Think about what does it mean to you to be “Moldovan”?)  
         Trigger: Limba Noastra, EuroVision, Moldova Patria Mea 
 Metrics:  Sameness, uniqueness, (dis)continuity, exclusion 
  
 (i)  the idea of a ‘homo Moldovanus’  
  (a) Emotion: attachment to Moldova [why/what do you feel connected to? Family? Village] 
  (b) Mentality: Moldovan attitudes & their supposed behaviors/dispositions/habits [stereotypes] 
 (c) Origins: Aspects of the biographical genesis of Moldovan identity/community (destiny,  
  chance, origin, place of birth, place of upbringing, and place of residence, socialization)  
 
 (ii) collective political history  
  (a) History: myths of genesis and origin, mythical figures, political  
      triumphs; victim–victimizer relationships [Stefan cel Mare; Roman legions; 650 years old] 
  (b) Present and future:  collective political present and future according to the topics of  
   ‘citizenship’, ‘political achievements’, ‘present and future political problems’, ‘crises and  
   threats’, ‘prospective political aims’ and ‘political virtues/values’. In particular, accession  
   to the EU and constitutional role of ‘neutrality’ [‘Europe today; ‘EUrope’ tomorrow] 
  
 (iii) common culture  
  (a)  Formal:  ‘language’, ‘religion’, ‘arts’, ‘science and technology’  
  (b)  Informal:  ‘everyday culture’ like ‘sports’, ‘food and cooking’, ‘drinking’, clothing’, etc. 
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2. Economic opportunity/mobility (Think about how economic changes have affected your life?) 
        Trigger: Work/travel adverts; remittance chart; Lei ;joke re: Moldovan wishing for a skyscraper 
            Metrics: the ‘activation’ of national identity in a certain situation (e.g. while abroad); times of  
   flourishing and prosperity, decline, defeat and crisis; notions of nostalgia as ‘longing for a  
   home (not a house) in the past; survival strategies; improvement strategies [migration +/-] 
 
3. Frontier geography (Think about which changes in the borderland are most/least significant?) 
Trigger: ‘podul de flori’; ‘Rezervatia Moldova’ ; Customs Santa Claus 
Metrics: Borders as barriers or bridges?;  the discursive construction of a ‘national body’. local,  
geographic and physical dimensions of borderlands [barbed wire], metaphorically speaking,  
on the ‘national body’, i.e. on the national territory with its boundaries, its natural resources  
and its landscapes, but also with the materialized results of ‘development planning’; artificial  
structuration and arrangement as well as the architectural artifacts of national importance  
[bars and markets near border queue] 
 
4. Borderland bureaucracy (Think about (+/-) changes in how the border is managed?  
Trigger: Back door to Europe; Europeanization Treadmill; State vs Reformers 
Metrics: Where does knowledge about rule come from?Are border guards and customs  
agents separated from residents? Are they resented, respected, included as part of the village?  
Do people pity or fear or accept or ignore them?  What is the root of this feeling? Does  
‘passportization’ differ from ‘nationalization”?  Who is the villain: Voronin, Basescu,  
Chirtoaca, Putin, Lucinsci, Solana, Stalin, Hitler, etc? Is Europe getting ‘closer’ yet further  
away as Moldovans leave?  Are old ruins reconstituted for new  purposes, such as the  
borders and stations?  Are local border points helpful or harmful?  
 
5. Geopolitical views (Is Moldova ‘European’?  Where is will it be in the future?) 
 Trigger:  Images: Caught in the Middle; Chained to Communists; ‘To Europe for a decent future’ 
        Metrics: presupposition or emphasis of differences between nations often serves the negative,  
   debasing delimitation from an outgroup considered to be a different national collective. 
 
IV.  Types of Strategies to look for 
 
1.    Constructive  
 encompass those linguistic acts which serve to ‘build’ and establish a particular national identity. These 
are primarily linguistic procedures/pronouns constituting a national ‘we-group’ via particular acts of reference 
 
2.  Perpetuation /Justification 
 attempt to maintain, support and reproduce national identities. Perpetuation strategies are used to 
emphasize the need ‘to hold the course of the ship of state’ (the assimilatory metaphor of being in the same 
boat is very common in this context), i.e. to support continuity, to discursively construct immigrants as a 
threat to national identity.  Justification and legitimation strategies are specific types of perpetuation strategies. 
They are primarily employed to defend and preserve a problematic narrative of ‘national history’ which refers 
to controversial acts or events of the past. They help justify a social status quo ante…  
 
3. Transformation  
 one can discursively attempt to transform the meaning of a relatively well-established aspect of national 
identity into another. For example, some Moldovan politicians have been pretending that it would be possible 
to re-define their neutrality in a way which would integrate the modified geo-political conditions, without 
abandoning neutrality altogether, i.e. NATO/EU cooperation vs. membership 
 
4.  Dismantling/Destructive  
 Serve to de-mythologize or demolish existing national identities or elements of them. 
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FOCUS GROUP MODERATOR SCRIPT 
 
I.  Introduction 
*Aim:  To understand your views on Moldovan identity and Moldova’s place in the world 
*Rules:  Answers to questions and responses to ‘triggers’ and fellow participants; No wrong answers  
*Disclaimers:  You can leave at any time; all responses completely anonymous, secure 
*Compensation:  You can leave at any time and still collect the proportion of lei 
*Survey:  The first 20 minutes are general overview to help situate your views 
*Contact:  If you have additional questions, comments, or concerns, please contact us 
II. Main Research Questions:   
 *See  the  f i r s t  page  o f  the  “Part i c ipant  Ki t”  to  unders tand the  a im o f  the  mee t ing  
III. Topics…Only turn one page at a time, as instructed! 
** stereotypes + mentalities  
** emphasis of sameness and/or difference;  
** uniqueness, autonomy/independence,  
**inclusion, unity and continuity on the one hand,  
**exclusion, fragmentation, and discontinuity 
** how are Moldovans different from Romanians/Russians/Ukrainians/Europeans 
**where in the world is Republica Moldova 
 
IV.  START:  “Do you know any good jokes  about  Moldova or  how Moldovans  compare  to  o ther s?”  
 
1)  Moldovan identity 
 “Think about  what  i t  means  to  you to  be  ‘Moldovan’”  
Turn to: ‘Limba de Stat’,  
 A)  What does the “Literature si Arta” image mean to you? 
 B)  Where was this picture taken and why is it important?   
 C)  How does its display in the national ethnographic museum matter to you? 
 
   Turn to: EuroVision, prepare to watch 3 minute video…show video 
 A)  What does this video mean to you? 
 B)  Is is a good choice to represent Moldova and Moldovan culture in the Eurovision contest? 
 C)  Is the video a correct representation of life in Moldova and the Moldovan people? 
 
    Turn to: Moldova Patria Mea 
  A) What does the picture of this billboard mean to you? 
  B)  How do such billboards, and others like “iubesti-ti tara; iubesti-ti limba” make you feel? 
 
    Turn to: 650 ani + Stefan cel Mare 
  A)  What does this image mean to you? 
  B)  What do these images say about the origins of Moldova and Moldovans? 
  C)  Do these images reflect an accurate picture of Moldovan history and it triumphs? 
  
2. Economic opportunity/mobility  
“Think about  how e conomic  changes  have  a f f e c t ed  your  l i f e”  
Turn to: Picture of lei 
        A) What economic changes have affected Moldova and Moldovans most? 
        B) What are the biggest indicators of economic prosperity?  Of economic decline? 
        C) Do you have nostalgia for any Soviet-era goods?  Which ones do you miss least? 
 
Turn to: Remittance Chart 
      A)  What do you think about the increase in money arriving from Moldovans working abroad? 
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      B)   Is migration a good or bad survival strategy for individuals?  How does it affect them? 
      C)  Is migration good or bad for families or communities?  How does it affect them? 
      D)  How does it help or hurt the country?   
      E)  Should the government be more involved in managing the money sent home by Moldovans working abroad? 
  
3. Frontier geography  
“Think about  whi ch  changes  a t  the  f ron t i e r  are  mos t/ leas t  s i gn i f i cant”  
Turn to: ‘podul de flori’ 
      A)  What is pictured in these two images? 
      B)  What was your feeling about how the frontier would change at that time? 
      C)  What do you think about the message on the banner in the photo? 
      D)  How do you feel about that changes that have/have not occurred at the frontier since 1990? 
      E)  How would you characterize changes along the Prut frontier versus those along the Nistru? 
      F)  In Moldova in your opinion, are borders best characterized as ‘bridges’ or ‘barriers’ or ‘barbed wire’ or__? 
 
Turn to: ‘Rezervatia Moldova’ ; Customs Santa Claus 
      A)  What do you think about these images? 
      B)  Are they correct representations of experiences and understandings of Moldova’s borders? 
      C)  What is your opinion about corruption at the border?  Has it changed historically? 
      D)  Is corruption at the border a serious problem or just a nuisance?  Is it getting better or worse? 
      D)  Will new laws, like those on ‘local border traffic’ promote real change? 
  
4. Borderland bureaucracy  
“Think about  pos i t i v e  and nega t iv e  changes  in  how the  border  i s  managed” 
Turn to: Back door to Europe;  
      A) What do you think about this image? 
      B)  Does it correctly represent the situation of Moldovans (trying) to work in the EU? 
      C) How are such survival strategies and coping mechanisms learned and practiced? 
      D)  Is this knowledge and behavior constant or does it change over time?  How? 
      E)  How would you like to see the situation change?   
       
Look at:  EUBAM photo 
     A) Who are the people in the blue jackets present at the Mold-Ukr border? What do they represent? 
     B)  Do your experiences crossing the Nistru differ from those crossing the Prut?  How? 
     C)  How do you feel about the border guards and customs agents you know or meet? 
     D)  How do you feel about the EU’s presence on Moldova’s borders?  
                  E)  Are local border points helpful or harmful?  
 
5. Geopolitical views  
“Think about  Moldova ’s  p la c e  in  the  wor ld .   I s  i t  ‘European ’?   Where  i s  w i l l  i t  b e  in  the  fu ture?”  
 Turn to Images: Chained to Communists; Caught in the Middle 
     A)  What do these images mean to you? 
                 B)  Do they correctly represent the geopolitical situation and political legacies facing the country? 
                 C)  Is the ‘chain of communism’ (still) preventing Moldovans from entering the EU? 
                 D)  In which direction would you ‘like the wind to blow the balloon’? 
                 E) Is the ‘grass really greener’ in Europe as it appears in the cartoon? 
 
             Turn to Image: ‘To Europe for a decent future’ 
                A)  What do you think about this billboard image? 
                B)   Is Moldova not already in ‘Europe’?   
                C)  What is the best orientation for the next generation of Moldovans? 
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      APPENDIX F 
     FOCUS GROUP INSTRUMENT II: VISUAL IMAGE KIT 
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Focus Group Kit Image 1 
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Focus Group Kit Image 2 
 
 
Focus Group Kit Image 3 
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Focus Group Kit Image 4 
 
 
Focus Group Kit Image 5 
Transferurile de bani din str!in!tate efectuate de persoanele 
fizice prin intermediul b!ncilor comerciale, 1999-2007
(Banca Na"ional! a Moldovei)
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Focus Group Kit Image 6:  
 
 
Focus Group Kit Image 7:   
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Focus Group Kit Image 8 
 
Focus Group Kit Image 9 
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Focus Group Kit Image 10- 
 
 
Focus Group Kit Image 11 
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Focus Group Kit Image 12 
 
 
Focus Group Kit Image 13 
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Focus Group Kit Image 14 
 
